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Abstract
This thesis is an empirical investigation of information technology (IT) adoption 
behaviour within the banking industry in a developing country, which is Bahrain. It aims 
to provide an understanding of IT strategy formation processes, the drivers of the 
adoption behaviour, the influence o f vendors and others on the adoption process, the 
characteristics of these banks’ cultures and their effects on the banks’ adoption approach, 
and the banks’ approach to collective IT projects.
The nature of the research questions mentioned above suggests the necessity of 
qualitative research. There are eleven case studies presented in the thesis based on semi­
structured and unstructured interviews with representatives of top management and IT 
units within the banks. Other informants from other non-banking organisations were 
inteiwiewed as well, to further clarify some of the topics raised by these banks.
The IT strategy formation process within the banks went into different phases. During the 
early phases they were more ad hoc in nature. In later phases new patterns emerged 
amongst the banks. The incursion of the strategic discourse within these banks and 
subsequently their adoption behaviour were influenced by the changes that occurred 
within the banks’ external and internal environments. Three forms of strategy formation 
patterns were identified. The first was amongst two of the small local banks. The 
strategies were informal, ad hoc in nature, and driven by a ‘one man show’. The political 
influence of the sole product champions was essential for the adoption of the strategy and 
IT within these banks. The second form of strategy formation pattern was identified with 
three local banks; two big banks, followed thereafter by one small bank. The strategy 
formation was formal, influenced by the consultants who set the path to formalise the 
process, and the process took place within systems steering committees which included 
the top management and representatives from the support units. By virtue of their power 
and authority, the views of the top management dominated within the systems steering 
committees; however, input from the IT units was essential as the top management lacked 
the knowledge to take informed decisions without them. The board of directors was 
involved in the process o f approving the IT strategies. We have termed this process 
“formal-rational”, although in some cases it was not remote from the micro-political 
struggle. The third form of strategy formation process was identified with branches of 
foreign banks. These banks’ strategies were ‘imposed strategies’ from their groups 
outside Bahrain, were global in nature, had a ‘trickle-down’ effect, and were less 
responsive to local changes and needs in Bahrain. The foreign bank branches in Bahrain 
were in a political struggle with their development centres to shape the ‘imposed 
strategies’ if possible to meet their local needs.
The banks’ strategic vision was influenced by how these banks acquired expertise within 
this field. An important source of expertise came from the vendors. With the exception 
of one case study, all other case studies had had a strong and long relationship with either 
their hardware or software vendors. This form of expertise was the source of a tacit 
knowledge which influenced these banks’ IT strategic vision. Those banks that were
influenced by this source of tacit knowledge depended heavily on acquiring ‘off-the-shelf 
application packages to cater for their systems’ needs. There were other sources of the 
tacit knowledge which was acquired through the banks’ networks and relations with other 
organisations. In addition to the vendors, the consultants and the role model banks were 
mentioned as sources of expertise. New recruits and training programmes formed the 
other sources of expertise within the local banks.
There was high isomorphism amongst the banks, Such isomorphism was described as 
‘lemming behaviour’, as these banks tended to behave similarly in terms of their approach 
to business and the adopted IT. There was a tendency to match the institutionalised 
norms within the industry. As to the local ‘formal-rational’ banks, their approach was 
driven by legitimacy and psychological drivers to appear as rational and progressive, in 
addition to the economic and efficiency drivers opened by the changes in the 
environment. The foreign banks were isomorphic in their approach to the IT arena. They 
were more influenced and driven by the plans of their groups.
Metaphors were used to classify the banks’ cultures. The ‘daring banks’ and the ‘catholic 
marriage banks’ experienced ‘re-thinking’ and ‘re-doing’ and were more able to absorb 
new knowledge. Though the ‘play-it-safe’ culture experienced changes in its approach to 
its IT, its past legacy influenced the bank’s approach to adopting its current system. The 
‘demanding mistress’ culture experienced higher rate of inertia than the ‘daring banks’ 
and ‘catholic marriage’ cultures. The ‘others do the thinking and the doing’ culture was 
more influenced by changes within the head quarters and regional offices outside Bahrain 
than inside Bahrain.
Cultural factors interacted with economic-efficiency factors in shaping the strategic 
behaviour of the banks.
Inertia characterised the banking industry at certain stages, and affected these banks’ 
adoption behaviour. The sources of the inertia may be attributed to internal factors 
pertaining to the banks and external factors pertaining to the cultural gap between some of 
these banks and the regulatory body visions.
Tight regulation was an institutionalised feature of the banking industry and therefore 
collective IT projects such as the ATM shared network could not be initiated without the 
participation of the regulatory body. Nonetheless, the process of shaping the features of 
the collective project was influenced by the negotiation power of the key participants in 
such projects.
The thesis argues that there is a need for a comprehensive view for understanding the take 
up of information systems and technology (IS/IT) as they expand beyond the mere 
technical and functional domains to span other socio-political, cultural and institutional 
domains. Based on this argument, 1 argue that there is a need for more sophisticated and 
comprehensive frameworks that capture both the social and technical dimensions of 
IS/IT.
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Chapter One
This thesis is an empirical investigation of information technology (IT) adoption 
behaviour within the banking industry in a developing country, which is Bahrain, It 
aims to provide an understanding of IT strategy formation processes, the drivers of the 
adoption behaviour, the influence of vendors and others on the adoption process, the 
characteristics of these banks’ cultures and their effects on the banks’ adoption 
approach, and the banks’ approach to collective IT projects.
My stance is aligned to the second school of thought. I argue in this thesis that the 
rational perspective analysing adoption behaviour provides only a partial explanation of 
the phenomenon under investigation and needs to be complemented with understanding 
the social, institutional, and political contexts that affect and shape this adoption 
behaviour.
The IT adoption practices are covered in the literature within two main schools of 
thought. The first advocates that IT adoption is done rationally and through rational 
means. Based on this conception, scholars in this school like Earl (1988. 1989) and 
Scott Morton (1991) provided frameworks prescribing the means through which IT 
strategies could be deployed to gain competitive advantage.
The other body of literature goes beyond the narrow focus of the rational explanation of 
the adoption process. This school of thought considers the adoption process as an 
outcome of social, political, and institutional processes.
Significance of the study:
e drawing of specific implications; and
• contribution of rich insight".
Organisation of the thesis:
The thesis is organised into eleven chapters as follows: 
Chapter one starts with an introduction to the thesis.
The empirical work focuses on the financial sector in Bahrain. It presents eleven case 
studies which were developed based on a qualitative methodology. Generalisations 
from information systems case studies, according to Walsham (1995), could take the 
following forms:
• “development of concepts;
generation of theory;
;
My thesis contributes to providing a rich insight into the adoption process of IT within 
the financial services sector in a developing country, which is Bahrain. The majority of 
the literature in this field has been made with reference to the industrial world. My 
thesis fills a gap in the literature as it provides an understanding of this phenomenon in a 
part of the developing world which was not studied in this respect before. Moreover, it 
adds to the behavioural literature which explores how institutional, cultural and political 
accounts compete with rational accounts in explaining adoption behaviour.
Chapter two discusses the research methodology of the thesis. It lays out the main 
research questions and the methodological approach I followed. Moreover, it discusses 
how Nud.Ist, a qualitative data analysis computer package, was used in the analysis 
process. The chapter concludes by discussing the main limitations of the thesis.
Chapter three reviews the literature related to the above topic.
Chapter four introduces the financial services sector in Bahrain. This chapter gives the 
reader a background about the field in which the case studies were operating. It 
discusses the main economic changes that took place within the last twenty years which 
have influenced the players within that field. It also discusses the main features 
characterising the commercial banking industry.
;
Chapters five, six and seven present a 'thick* description of the case studies of the 
eleven banks. Chapter five includes six case studies of six foreign banks' branches in 
Bahrain. These banks were isomorphic in their approach to IT adoption. Chapter six 
includes a description of two small local banks that were similar in their approach to 
adopting IT, These banks' strategies were ad hoc, informal, and influenced by the 
vision of a main leader. Chapter seven presents three case studies of three local banks 
which followed a formal-rational approach to strategy formulation. These three banks 
behaved similarly in their adoption behaviour.
Chapter eight provides a case study of the shared ATM network project. This chapter 
discusses institutional factors within the banking environment and their influence on the 
collective IT projects.
Chapter nine explores the nature of the IT strategies within all these banks and the 
drivers behind these initiatives.
—..................
Chapter ten discusses the nature of the banks’ relationship with the key stakeholders in 
the industry and the effect of these relationships on shaping the banks’ strategic vision. 
This chapter elaborates on how the banks’ strategic vision was influenced by the tacit 
knowledge passed from the vendors to the banks.
Chapter eleven focuses on exploring the effects of culture, history, and organisational 
change, among others, on the banks’ adoption behaviour.
Chapter twelve concludes the thesis by summarising the main findings within the abov e 
chapters.
-S
Chapter two
Literature Review
Introduction:
Strategic issues in IT are approached from within different paradigms. The first of these 
paradigms is the rational-economic paradigm, which ascribes a strategic role to IT, and 
assumes that organisations seek to maximise their efficiency through exploiting this 
strategic role. Another paradigm goes beyond the narrow views of the rational paradigm 
to consider the social and political perspectives of IT strategic issues. More about these 
two paradigms will be discussed within this literature review.
This chapter starts with reviewing some of the literature written from within a rational 
paradigm. It covers the implications of IT for organisations in the 1990s as reported by 
an MIT research project, then it covers some of the main frameworks introduced in the 
eighties which prescribed how to derive a strategic advantage for an organisation from 
IT. A criticism of these frameworks is provided.
The literature review also covers IT strategy formation from a rational perspective, 
complemented thereafter by a socio-political and behavioural perspective.
In addition to the above, a theoretical background about the role of networks, 
institutions, organisational change and inertia is provided, as these topics were used in 
my analysis chapters to provide a base for better understanding of the adoption 
behaviour phenomenon amongst the banks.
1
The literature review concludes by reviewing some quantitative Ph.D. theses which
adopted a positivist approach and a quantitative methodology. This type of research is 
criticised for being narrow in scope and focus.
Impact of IT on organisations In the 1990s:
“IT is enabling fundamental changes in the way work is done” (Scott Morton. 
1991)
and the management of work processes.
Î
In this part of my literature review, I provide a summary of the impact of IT on 
organisations as reported by a research project carried out by MIT (Scott Morton, 1991).
The research project argued that IT has a profound effect on organisations. These 
effects are enabled by the continuously decreasing cost of IT on one hand, and on the 
other, by the continuous increase in the efficiency of these technologies. The main 
impact of IT on organisations in the 1990s are as follows:
IT has a profound effect on the way work is done in terms of production , co-ordination.
The production work consists of physical production, information production and 
knowledge production. Organisations seemed to be more able to exploit IT to enhance 
the physical production and information production than knowledge production.
The second effect of IT is on co-ordination. Exploiting electronic networks within and 
amongst organisations enables them to eliminate the effects of geographical distance 
and time difference as far as the information flow is concerned. Moreover, sharing the 
organisation’s memory, in the form of electronic databases, enables more effective co­
ordination.
I
Î
I
A
“IT is enabling the integration of business functions at all levels within and 
between organisations” (ibid., 1991)
The third effect of IT is on the work done by the managers. This is achieved through 
enabling the managers to efficiently set the direction and control the performance of 
their organisations.
Investment in electronic networks enhances the integration between organisations and 
may take the following forms:
• linking previously unconnected business functions;
• linking the value chain of different organisations;
• enabling subcontracting of the value chain; and
• establishing electronic markets in which shopping around is done via this 
network.
•  “ IT is causing shifts in the competitive climate in many industries” (ibid.. 1991 )
IT has a profound impact on the competitiveness of the industry. The competitive 
climate may be reconfigured based on using IT collectively - old rivals may become new 
allies based on sharing the benefits of IT rather than retaining it.
• “ IT presents new strategic opportunities for organisations that reassess their 
missions and operations” (ibid., 1991)
The profound effect of IT on work conditions, the opportunities opened to the 
organisations from the IT networks, and the change in competitive climate as a result of 
exploiting these networks may dictate that organisations need to rethink their missions, 
the way they conduct their business, and their design structure. There are three stages
:7.
that organisations may go through as a result of their response to their environment 
which are automate, informate, and transformation.
During the automate phase, cost reduction of the production process represents the main 
achievement.
“Successful application of IT will require changes in management and 
organisational structure” (ibid., 1991)
1
3
In the informate stage, new analytical skills need to be developed to exploit the 
opportunities associated with the by-product information produced by the IT.
The transformation stage requires leadership, vision, and sustained organisational 
empowerment to exploit the opportunities open in the environment and enabled by IT.
IT is a critical enabler of the redefinition of the organisation. This is because IT enables 
the redistribution of power, function, and control. With continuous improvement in IT, 
the cost of co-ordination is declining. This means that more efficient co-ordination is 
allowed at a lower cost. Moreover, IT is causing change in the economies of scale; for 
example, flexible manufacturing is enabling smaller organisations to be low-cost 
producers. Management has the challenging task of changing its structure and method 
of operation to keep it responsive to the dynamic and competitive world.
.3!;
lead (the) organisations through the transformation necessary to prosper in 
the globally competitive environment” (ibid., 1991)
Structure
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technological
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One of the major challenges 
facing organisations is to 
transform successfully to cope 
with their turbulent socio­
economic and technological 
environments. These
organisations need to make the
necessary changes in five sets of '  ''ole o f  m anagem ent in the change process.
internal forces (see Figure 1)
which need to be in equilibrium to cope with changes in the organisations’ external 
environments. There are several aspects that organisations need to consider for 
successful transformation; these are concerned with the:
• clarity of business mission and objectives;
• alignment between IT strategy and other organisational aspects; and
• implementation of a robust information technology infrastructure.
Five levels of IT-lnduced reconfiguration:
Venkatraman's (1991. 1994) 'five levels of 
IT-enabled business transformation’ (see 
Figure 2) contends that the potential benefits 
of IT increase as an organisation transforms 
successfully through the different levels 
which exploit IT within the organisation 
itself and between the organisations. The 
underlying thesis of the framework is that
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the potential benefits of IT are marginal if IT is only superimposed on the organisation. 
The framework argues that the benefits of IT increase considerably as the organisation's 
IT investments are accompanied by the necessary organisational changes in strategies, 
structure, processes and culture.
Before 1985, banks acted individually to introduce commercially and technically distinct 
networks. However, the banking community perceived the need to collaborate to 
introduce a common infrastructure for a sophisticated EFTPoS network and share its 
cost. The network aimed to benefit the banking community members in reducing the 
cost of cheques and other forms of paper money transmission. The collaboration 
between the banks turned to competition within the EFTPoS UK Ltd, the organisation
10
S
1.
The first two levels of the framework, localised exploitation and internal integration, are 
of an evolutionary nature due to their limited influence on the business processes, and 
hence the potential benefits derived from IT are limited as compared to the next three 
levels. The business process redesign, business network redesign, and business scope 
redefinition are revolutionary levels. Organisations that transform through these levels 
experience revolutionary changes in the business processes that maximise their benefits 
from utilising IT. The revolutionary changes take place within the boundaries of the 
organisations as well as across these boundaries through restructuring the networks and 
creating interdependencies amongst organisations to enhance their competitiveness.
Influence of collective IT projects on the 
competitive structure- a case study of EFTPoS 
network in the UK.
Howells and Hine (1993) reported a case study about the establishment of Electronic 
Fund Transfer at Point of Sale (EFTPoS) networks in the UK. The case study 
demonstrates, among other things, the changes in competitive structure that may result 
from collective exploitation of IT.
I
;|3
IT and Strategic Advantage:
Earl (1988) amongst others, e.g. McFarlan, 1984, Porter and Millar 1985, Wiseman 
(1985), to mention three of the influential scholars in the eighties, ascribed a strategic 
role to IT. Earl contended that IT could be employed strategically in at least four ways:
4. to develop new businesses.” (p. 33)
The framework for the frameworks:
1
established by the banks to introduce the national network. As the biggest merchant 
acquirer, Barclays bank feared that its dominance on the clearing business would be 
eroded by the proposed EFTPoS network. Barclays accordingly introduced its Visa 
Connect scheme. Lloyds soon followed and introduced its Visa debit card. To counter I
'. '3
attack the two initiatives, an alliance between Midland, Natwest and The Royal Bank of t
Scotland formed the Switch card scheme. These initiatives resulted in the demise of the 
EFTPoS UK Ltd. The above case study highlights changes in the competitive climate A
that may accompany collective IT projects.
• ' I
'f
■' 1. to gain competitive advantage: ■3i:
■çr
2. to improve productivity and performance;
3. to facilitate new ways o f  managing and organising; and 13.
Earl (1988, 1989) argued that the available frameworks are valuable in guiding the ,|
organisations in their attempt to exploit IT strategically. However, these frameworks if
fall short of providing a complete answer. He proposed the ‘framework of the 
frameworks’ as a tool for guiding the organisations in their strategic exploitation of IT.
This framework sees the other frameworks as complementary rather than substitutes, I.
3
and therefore presents them as three types of framework categories which aie awareness, 
opportunities, and positioning (see Table I). Each of these frameworks has its own 
purpose, scope and use as will be discussed later. Earl argued that these frameworks are 
essential for understanding the strategic era of IT and to contributing to its evolution.
Table I: A fra m ew o rk  o f  fram ew orks. E arl (1989, p . 40)
F ram ew ork / A w areness O pp ortu n ity P ositioning
attr ib u te
Purpose Vision Ends Means
Scope Possibility Probability Capability
U se Education Analysis Implementation
Awareness frameworks:
Awareness frameworks, or ‘alert' models as Andreu et al. (1992) called them, aim to 
create understanding and appreciation of the strategic potential and impact of IT.
An early example of an awareness framework is Benjamin et al.'s (1984)' strategic 
opportunities matrix. The matrix is a pedagogic tool and aims to raise awareness. It is 
based on answering two questions:
•  "Can I use IT to make a significant change in the way we are now doing business so my company can 
gain a competitive advantage?
C ited  in Earl ( 1 9 8 9 )  p. 41
12
Should we, as a company, concentrate on using IT to improve our approach to the market place? Or 
should we centre our efforts on internal improvements in the way we currently carry out the activities 
o f  the firm?" (p. 41).
1 C om petitive  
* market 
position
Internal
Operations
Significant structural i v ierrili 
Lynch
DEC
........................  ! .American
Traditional products and j H ospital 
processes Supply
United
Airlines
The answers to these questions place 
the organisations into a grid. One of 
its dimensions describes whether, 
based on IT, significant structural 
changes can be brought about, or 
traditional products and processes 
can be improved instead. The other
F igure 3: S tra teg ic  opportu n ity  g rid , B enjam in e t a l  dimension determines whether IT (1984). c ite d  in Earl. tlQSS. 1989) a n d  A ndreu et al.
(1992)
has a profound effect on improving
the organisation's competitive market position or is just limited to improving internal 
operations. The matrix used several examples which are located in its four quadrants to 
demonstrate the effect of IT. For example, Merrill Lynch in strategic alliance with Banc 
One of Ohio exploited computing and telecommunications in an innovative manner to 
establish a new product market and erect barriers to entry. Through its Cash 
Management Account (CMA), Merrill Lynch bundled a number of financial services all 
in one. These services were previously available separately. No other competitor was 
able to provide a similar account for some time, making substitutes difficult to find and 
creating a switching cost for its customers. American Hospital Supply exploited 
terminal-based order entry facilities to enhance the market position of the products that 
it traditionally manufactured. DEC developed an expert systems (XCON) which 
enabled it to restructure its internal operations to create computer configurations for 
customers. The dramatic change in its internal operations enhanced DEC efficiency, 
and improved its cash flow and level of customer satisfaction. United Airlines exploited 
teleconferencing to improve its internal operations and increase the efficiency of the 
traditional processes it performed, such as co-ordination across airports in emergenc) 
situations and daily briefings.
I
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Parsons’ (1983)^ framework is one of the early awareness models. It is based on an 
analysis of the competitive environment and strategies of business, and focuses on the 
possible opportunities to exploit IT strategically. Parsons’ framework draws on Porter’s 
five force model (powers of suppliers, customers, new entrants, substitutes, and rivals) 
and the three generic competitive strategies which are differentiation, cost leadership or 
focus. Table 2 indicates that the impact of IT can be at different levels. At the industiy 
level, IT may affect the industry products and services, markets, and/or economies of 
production. At the firm level, IT may impact the firm’s ability to manipulate or 
influence Porter’s five competitive forces. At the strategic level, IT may impact Porter’s 
generic competitive strategies of cost, leadership, differentiation, and focus.
■1
s
Table 2: Strategic impact o f  IT (after Parsons) cited in Earl (1989) p. 43
Level o f  impact Effect o f  IT
Industry level Changes fundamental nature o f  the industry
Firm level Influences com petitive forces facing the firm
Strategy level Supports the generic strategy o f  the firm
■I
I
I
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I
cited in Earl ( 1 9 8 9 .  p. 4 3 )
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A third example of the ‘alert' or
Information content of a product
awareness frameworks is Porter and ________ High
Miller’s (1985) information intensity outcfimng
Infomtation Airlinesgrid (see Figure 4 ). The grid exploits the 
possibility of exploiting IT for Low
competitive advantage based on
evaluating the intensity of information P orter an d  M dlar's in form ation
in tensity matrix. C ited  in E arl (1989, pp . 44-
within the firm’s value chain 
(represented by the vertical dimension
of the matrix), and the information content of the firm’s products (represented by the 
horizontal dimension of the matrix). Industries such as the financial services and the 
airline industry have a high intensity of information in their value chains and products, 
as indicated in the above figure. The oil refining industry has a high intensity of 
information in the value chain but little information content in the product. The cement 
industry has the least intensity of information amongst the mentioned industries in its 
value chain and product. The framework suggests that where the intensity of 
information is low in both the products and the processes, IT would not have a dramatic 
impact on that industry. However, as the information intensity increases in the processes 
and the products, IT would play a more strategic role in that industry.
Earl (1988. 1989) argued that although these models may be used as teaching 
instruments, they are too descriptive and too general to guide the practitioners to exploit 
IT-based strategic opportunities. For this reason, Earl proposed what he called "the 
opportunity frameworks".
Opportunity frameworks:
The opportunity frameworks are more analytical than the former type of frameworks, 
but also have an educational role. This type of framework aims to help organisations to 
define the areas where IT can be deployed strategically and suggests application ideas. 
The following are examples of these frameworks.
i
Porter and Millar’s (1985)^ value chain model enables the search for potential IT 
opportunities through a systematic analysis of the series of interdependent activities that 
deliver a product or a service to the customer. This process may define where IT can 
profoundly affect one or more of these activities, improve their effectiveness, and/or 
fundamentally change the nature of these activities (Applegate et al, 1996, p. 93).
Ives and Learmonth’s (1984)"  ^ customer resource life-cycle model focuses on the 
linkages between the customers and the suppliers, and analyses how and where IT could 
be harnessed to improve the customer-supplier linkages and possibly introduce 
competitive advantage. The customer resource life-cycle has four major phases:
•  “ Requirements: determining the requirements o f  the resource
•  Acquisition: obtaining or developing the resource
•  Stewardship: managing the resource while in inventory
•  Retirement: disposing o f  the resource" (Earl, 1988, p. 42 )
The Runge and Earl’s (1988) framework (see Table 3) is based on the Ives and 
Learmonth's (1984) customer resource life cycle model which is presented above. The 
Runge and Earl framework identifies twelve processes associated with the customer 
resource life cycle phases mentioned above. These processes are referred to as linkages 
(as shown in Table 3 ) because they identify opportunities for the suppliers. These 
linkages provide the suppliers the opportunities to link their processes to 
Telecommunication-Based Infomiation Systems (TBIS), and to do so in ways that 
differentiate the firm's product and create switching costs for customers. Runge et al. 
(1988) add another dimension to the framework, which represents the strength of the 
TBIS as a competitive weapon. The strength of TBIS is defined as the degree to which 
the supplier can control his customers through TBIS. These levels of strength are 
defined below:
 ^ c ited  in Earl (1 9 8 9 . p. 4 7 ) .  
c ited  in Earl (1 9 8 9 . p. 4 8 ).
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Internal support: The TBIS replace the internal mechanisms supporting the customer 
interaction life cycle. At this level of strength the effect of TBIS has indirect 
consequences on the customers.
Link up: The supplier value chain is linked up to customers but the switching costs 
for the customers are low.
Lock in: TBIS establish an operational dependence where the customer depends on 
the supplier. There is a high switching cost in this case.
Table 3; Runge et al. framework.
Stage Linkage
R equirem ents Establish requirem ents  
.Acquired in form ation
A cq uisition S pecify  
S elect a source  
Order
A uthorise and pay for 
.Acquire
Stew ardship M onitor
Manage
Support
Retirem ent Term inate use
.Account for
Internal Link-up Lock-in
Source: Earl (1989)  p. 52
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.4Each of Porter’s five forces - threats of new entrants, buyers’ bargaining power.
suppliers’ bargaining power, threat of substitute products or services, and industiy 
rivals- forms a base for identifying opportunities for gaining competitive advantage 
through exploiting IT (see Table 4).
li
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T able 4: Im pact o f  com petitive  fo rces
Force Implication Potential uses o f  IT to combat force
Threat o f  new entrants N ew  capacity
Substantial resources
Reduced prices or inflation 
o f  incumbents' costs
Provide entiy barriers:
Economies o f  scale 
Switching costs
Product differentiation, A ccess to 
distribution channels
B uyers’ bargaining 
power
Prices forced down 
High quality 
More services 
Competition encouraged
Buyer selection  
Switching costs 
Differentiation 
Entry barriers
Suppliers' bargaining 
power
Prices raised
Reduced quality and 
services (labour)
Selection
Threat o f  backward integration
Threat o f  substitute 
products or services
Potential returns limited 
Ceiling on prices
Improve price/performance 
Redefine products and services
Traditional intraindustiy 
rivals
Competition:
Price
Product
Distribution and service
C ost-effectiveness 
Market access 
Differentiation:
Product, Services, Firm
Source: Applegate et al (1996) p. 87
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In line with the above, Porter prescribed three main generic strategies which may 
capitalise on IT to gain competitive advantage. These strategies are cost leadership, cost 
focus, and differentiation.
What IS the strategic target'’
Supplier Customer j Competitor
What IS the strategic thrust'’
1 DifTerentiation | Cost 1 Innovation | Growth | .Mliance
What is tlte mode?
Offensive D efensive
What IS ilie direction?
U se Provide
Wiseman’s (1985)^ 'strategic option 
generator' ( see Figure 5) defines five 
strategic tlmists, which are 
differentiation, cost, innovation, 
growth and alliances. Each o f the 
strategic thrusts could be used to target 
strategic goals- customers, suppliers, 
and / or competitors. IT can be
capitalised upon to pursue these S: Wis.man^s.ra.egic op,ion genem,or
Strategic thrusts either offensively or 
defensively, through using or providing information.
Earl (1989) argued that the opportunity frameworks needed additional techniques 
besides the cost-value ones, and also needed more search tools to use in application 
areas and to assess specific technologies. To supplement the 'awareness frameworks' 
and the 'opportunity frameworks', Earl proposed another set of frameworks, which are 
the ‘positioning frameworks’.
Positioning frameworks:
The positioning frameworks are tools that are used to help assess the strategic 
importance, the character, and IT position within a given enterprise. These frameworks 
help to understand how IT functions and how IT can be assessed, developed and 
improved in a particular organisation. Positioning frameworks focus on implementation 
and they are poor in defining opportunities (ibid. p. 59). Examples of these frameworks 
are as follows:
C ited  in .Andreu {1 9 9 2 , p. 2 7 9 )
I
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Low
Stratégie im pact of portfolio of 
applications to be developed
High
Strategic im pact of 
applications in 
operation
High
Support
j i 
1
! Change
1
Factory Strategic
McFarian and McKenney’s (1983)
strategic grid (see Figure 6) helps in 
evaluating the strategic impact of the 
portfolio of applications to be developed 
in the future (high and low), and the 
strategic impact of the applications in
operations (high and low). If both F igure 6. M cFarian et al. s tra teg ic  g r id
impacts are low, information
systems/technology (IS/T) serve only as a support but they are not essential for the 
organisation’s operations nor its competitive success; if the present impact is high and 
the future impact is low, IS/T serves as a factory where the information systems are 
essential for managing the day-to-day operations. However, the development of 
applications portfolios does not provide a competitive advantage. If the present impact
of the IS/T portfolio is low, whereas, the future impact of IS/T is high, then the
organisation needs to consider a change or turnaround strategy as the developed 
applications are essential for their future strategic goals. Finally, if the present and 
future impacts of IS/T are high, then the organisation or the business is in a strategic 
position where the portfolio of applications is essential for the organisation’s operations 
and the developed applications are essential for their competitive success.
aJ
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Andreu et al's (1992, p. 283) positioning grid 
is based on two dimensions (see Figure 7). 
One dimension represents the impact of the 
value chain link in business (high or low), and 
the other represents the potential of IS/T 
support for this link (high or low). WTien the 
impact of the value chain link in business is
S upport potential based on inform ation
technologies and system s „  .Low nign
Low
Im pact o f value 
chain link in 
business
High
Forget
Beware of  
brilliant 
solutions to 
irrelevant 
problems
' Has it been Clear
' sufTiciently opportunities
1 analyzed? New i
; technologies'’
high and the potential support of IS/T to this itttpact g r id  in bu sin ess-su pport
p o ten tia l with IT/IS.
& .%
C ited  in Earl ( 1 9 8 8 .  19 8 9 )  and Andreu ( 1 9 9 2 )
2 1
link is high there are ‘clear opportunities’ for IS/T use. However, where both 
dimensions are low then ‘forget’ using IS/T. When the impact of the value chain in 
business function is high while the IS/T support potential is low, then the situation 
requires further analysis to determine whether IS/T could contribute something more. 
Finally, when the impact of value chain in the business function is low while the 
potential support of IS/T is high, then 'beware of providing expensive solutions to 
irrelevant problems’.
Earl's (1989) industry model determines the impact of IT based on the industry's 
attributes. Each of the industries has different attributes and thus the importance of IT 
may vary from sector to sector. Sectors such as airlines, financial serv ices, and retailing 
depend heavily on IT for delivering their goods and services, and thus this sector is 
called a ‘delivery’ sector. The infrastructure of the sector is highly dependent on IT, and 
each firm’s IT infrastructure represents a big proportion of its asset base. A poor 
infrastructure is a source of threat to the firm’s daily operations and future strategies. A 
second classification of the sectors is the dependent sector. Industries such as 
automobiles and textiles depend more and more on IT to implement their business and 
functional strategies. These strategies require major automation, information, or 
communication which are made possible by these technologies. A third classification of 
sectors, the drive sectors, are those in which IT has a potential for a competitive 
advantage (or the lack of IT could be a source of a competitive disadvantage). The 
requirements and imperatives, however, are not clear. The management needs to have 
faith in IT, and needs to drive for continuous benefits from IT. The food industry is an 
example of the drive sector. A fourth classification of sectors is one in which the effects 
of IT- opportunities or threats - are either not yet apparent or perceived. Based on the 
above analysis of sectors, IS/T practices vary depending on the nature of sector. For 
example for the delayed sectors, IS/T has no strategic impact and thus IS/T strategy may­
be disregarded. For the delivery sectors, IT strategy is more infrastructure-led. It is 
concerned with ‘‘laying down telecommunications netuorks, rationalising data standards, creating 
appropriate hardware environments and developing a sound basic business systems foundation...'’ (pp. 80-
81). For the dependent sectors, the IS strategy is more business led. Once the business
■Î
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imperatives are worked out, IS is seen as an enabler of these business imperatives. For 
the drive sectors, the firms search for less obvious strategic gains, and thus the IS 
strategy is opportunity led - a mixture of infrastructure investment and business 
direction (ibid., p.82).
The above frameworks are examples of the frameworks that are classified under the 
three broad classifications: awareness, opportunity and positioning. However, these are 
not exhaustive. As mentioned earlier, Earl argued that these frameworks are 
complements rather than substitutes to each other.
I
Information vs. IT for competitive advantage:
I
King et al. (1989) present another classical and rational perspective which argues that 
both information and information technologies have different strategic implications and 
thus the distinction between the two is important. Information technology “ includes both 
the hardware components that make up the information system architecture and the system software that 
enables it to function as an integrated w hole” . Information, on the Other hand, refers to the “data 
that has been evaluated in such a way that it alters our expectations or our view  o f  the alternatives that are
available. Here, it also refers to the analytic software that facilitates this use o f  data” .
IT depreciates over time since its potential for adding value decreases as time goes by. 
In contrast, information appreciates as time passes. The new uses of information and 
better understanding of it cause this appreciation in worth.
In line with the other classical articles of the 1980s. King et al. provided examples to 
demonstrate the strategic implications of differentiating between IT and information, 
and using IT and information collectively. Moreover, their empirical work 
demonstrated that IT managers were aware of the distinction between the strategic use 
of IT and information within the following areas: "suppliers relations, customer service, product 
service, new product planning, cost com petitiveness, and market segmentation”.
24
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In addition to the above, King et al. identified a number of enablers and inhibitors that 
affect the successful exploitation of information resources. The facilitator factors are:
Existence o f  extensive computing facilities;
- Strong technical support staff;
- Technology leadership position relative to the industry as a whole; and
- Strong market or financial position”
The inhibitors are:
D eficiencies in the planning process;
- Lack o f  clearly defined developm ent priorities;
.
- Insufficient management support for strategic application development efforts”
There are similarities between King et al. and Earl’s (1988) findings regarding the 
facilitators of successful implementation of information resources. For example, Earl 
discussed some of the IT implementation enablers such as the extension of the internal 
systems where he reported that the majority of the systems he studied were 
interorganizational extensions of information systems that already existed internally (p.
140). In addition to the above, organisational support was another enabler that Earl and 
King reported. Weill (1990) supported King et al. in reporting the importance of a 
strong market position in providing the firm with more power to exploit the strategic 
advantages of information resources.
I
Human resource IT and competitive edge:
Broderick et al. (1992) wrote that information technology used in human resources 
could be exploited to develop competitive products or services. Their framework may 
aid managers in having a better understanding of how human resource IT (HRIT) can 
support or help to achieve competitive objectives. The framework is based on a) 
defining the human resource objectives and the type of decisions related to these 
objectives, b) describing computer applications and the related decisions these 
applications are designed to improve, and c) matching the objectives with the 
applications that provide the best support.
Broderick et al. defined three competitive strategies as being the main drivers for HR 
competitive objectives. These are:
- Cost leadership strategy: This strategy aims to enable the firm to become a low cost 
producer.
- Quality/customer satisfaction strategy: The emphasis of this strategy is on improving 
the work methods, customer relations, and/or product/service as a means to controlling 
prices.
- Innovation strategy. The emphasis of this strategy is on differentiation and this may be 
done through creating new products/services, and new working methods.
The following table specifies the HR objectives that are associated with the three 
competitive strategies.
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Broderick et al. discussed three types of applications which are transaction processing, 
reporting, and tracking systems; expert systems; and decision support systems. The 
authors’ framework then matched these applications with the HR objectives and 
competitive strategies. Their conclusion was that the three types of computer
Problems with SIS frameworks:
Î
H R  C om petitive O bjective Firm C om petitive S trategy
•  People working harder: High output for a given labour cost •  Cost leadership
::;S-
•  People working smarter: continuous improvements. ® Quality / customer
satisfaction
;
•  People working with vision: workable discoveries •  Innovation
applications could be used differently to achieve each of the HR competitive objectives.
A;
The prescribed strategic information systems (SIS) frameworks, Doyle (1991) argued, 
are not problem free. He identified the following problems associated with them.
The fact that there are many frameworks may indicate that none is adequate. These
frameworks represent onlv part of the realitv. illuminating a particular aspect of the
.environment while leaving the rest in the darkness. like marriage, one may not be able 
to tell until after the event whether the framework was a success or not. Like marriage too, there are 
the problems o f  fatal attractions, evasions o f  the real problems, and so on. For the worst o f  reasons 
one may be seduced by a framework." (Ibid., p. 274).
The relativity of the framework to the place and industry is another problem with 
these frameworks. Most o f the frameworks that were discussed earlier were a
■ :
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product of the dominant American business culture, and they emerged, and may 
thrive and survive mainly because they reflect that culture. One may question their 
suitability for other cultures. The other issue is that these frameworks are unable to 
address the requirements of the different industries. For example, Porter’s value 
chain model does not work if the firm is not a marketing or a distribution company- 
“ Where, it has been asked, is the supplier in a solicitor's business, or in a financial services 
company..?” . The frameworks also have limited implications for public sector 
organisations since they consider mainly the profit making organisations.
The frameworks as described by the literature assume implicitly that they ‘exist 
outside time’. That is to assume that they are as valid tomorrow as they are today. 
The problem with these frameworks is that they may prove to be irrelevant as new 
factors, which these frameworks have not considered, may emerge within the 
changing environments. That is, the effectiveness of these frameworks may 
diminish over time as they are anchored in the environments they were bom in, and 
these environments are ever changing.
Frameworks may act like cages. They may inhibit the vision as much as they free it. 
By following frameworks, an organisation may believe that real insights only exist 
externally to the organisation itself. This would result in filtering out ideas 
generated internally. The ideal situation is that in which the organisation develops a 
sense of owning the problem as well as the processes to solve it. This is more likely 
to happen if the insight is developed within the organisation, an issue that the 
imported frameworks may do little, if anything, to encourage.
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Interaction between strategy and IT:
The argument presented in this section aims to 
explore the nature of the interaction between 
technology and strategy as presented by Itami et al. 
(1992). Itami et al. argued that there are three 
forms of relationship between strategy and 
technology. In the first form of relationship,
t-i
Straieg> _ C o m c m p o ran c o u & 
M atch  ,
t* l
Strategy " Technology
which, they state, is popular in the literature, the Figure 8: C on tem poraneous m atch betw een  IT
. . .  « tind stra teg ytechnology in this case determines the limit of
opportunities open to the firm. Or stated differently, the strategy is constrained by the 
capability of the technology. If the firm wants to adopt a more aggressive strategy that 
goes beyond the capability of technology, then it has to broaden its technological base. 
They argued that this form of relationship is static and directional from technology to 
strategy (see Figure 8). Itami et al. claim that the relationship between the technology and 
strategy is dynamic and may take another two forms as well.
Strategy ^ Technology
t-1
Strategy ^  Technology
The first of these two forms is when the 
contemporaneous relationship between strategy 
and technology results in creating technological 
capabilities that are in excess of the current needs.
Itami et al. consider technology as one of the 
invisible assets that have a dual role of being an 
input to the strategy and at the same time being an 
output of the implementation of strategy. The 
accumulation of technology in this case is a by-product of learning by doing from the 
implementation of the strategy. The current strategy cultivates the future technolog) 
(see Figure 9),
Strategy Technology
Figure 9: Strategy' cu liivating  tech n o logy
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The other form of the relationship is that in 
which the current technology that the firm 
possesses or its commitment to technological 
development affects the cognitive process of 
strategy development. The deep knowledge 
that people in the organisation may possess 
stimulates the generation of new ideas about 
products or ways of approaching the markets.
These ideas may be implemented first in a
fragmented manner. However, later on, efforts may emerge to integrate these scattered 
initiatives, usually by top management (see Figure 10).
t-t“i
Strategy
Strategy T echn ology  ,
S trategy T echnology
Figure JO: T echnology d riv in g  cogn ition  o f  strateg}-
IT strategy formation:
This section reviews the literature related to IT strategy- formation by shedding light on 
the formal rational perspective which is then contrasted with a socio-political 
perspective.
Formal-rational approaches:
The formal rational school views organisations as system s with coherent purposes and 
shared goals, and seeing the strategy formulation process as a series o f  logical steps.." (Walsham. 
1993, p. 144). There are six premises underpinning the formal rational approach which 
assumes that the decision makers:
•  “can evaluate all the relevant information
• can select the most appropriate course o f  action
•  can formulate a strategy
29
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The strategic planning in this approach is characterised as being an outcome of a
direction. (Ibid., pp. 54, 55).
which is rationalised, decomposed, and articulated, than strategic thinking and thus it 
needs to be called instead strategic programming.
. . .
■*
are able to implement the strategy 
can improve performance 
can enhance com petitive position” (Currie, 1995, p. 53)
deliberate formal process and directed by rational and analytical thought which results in
.a framework or model outlining a series of sequential steps. The responsibility o f the 
Strategy formulation lies with the senior executives who imbue the organisations with
Mintzberg (1994) argued that strategic planning refers more to strategic formalising.
The rational-prescriptive strategies, e.g. those informed by Porter's competitive forces. t
are market-led, and the internal issues of the organisation design are assumed to be 
adaptive (Fincham, 1995, p. 9).
There are criticisms of the formal rational approach however. Formal rational 
frameworks, for example, are criticised for being divorced from reality and failing to 
explain or influence success or failure; they require massive amounts of information that 
confuse rather than assist decision makers; they fail to address the problem of
implementation: in reality it may not be feasible to meet the assumptions underpinning 
the rational behaviour which is related to gathering all of the relevant information and 
then prioritising and evaluating it by the decision makers; and it may lead to technical 
failure, since the rational approaches may depend on traditional performance 
measurement criteria such as ROI, short-term returns and top-down management 
investment which are not appropriate for the new technical climate (Currie, 1995). In 
addition to the above, the rational approach tends to ignore the social and political
30
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processes that influence the strategy development and implementation (Fincham et al. 
1994).
IT strategies may be addressed as substrategies within the business or corporate 
strategies, or they may be formulated in ways illustrated in the following examples from 
Earl.
The information 
triangle:
strategy
How?
What? ISstrat^y
•Business Unit -  Corporate 
•Demand Oriented 
•Business Focused 
•Business with IT Who?
IT strategy ^  
*,Scope and Architecture 
•Supply Oriented 
•Technology Focused 
•IT with Business
•Administration and 
Organization
•Roles and Relationships
•Management Focused
•Business and IT
As a means of avoiding the 
confusion associated with IT
strategies, Earl (1989, 1996)
identified three levels or domains 
of IT strategies, which he
, , , 1 • r  . Figure II: The inform ation stra tegy  triangle (Earl.addressed as the information 1996. p. 48 ,^
strategy triangle (see Figure II).
These three domains are IS strategy, IT strategy, and information management (IM) 
strategy.
The IS strategies are concerned with defining the IT needs of the business strategies. 
These strategies are supposed to be business-driven and therefore owned and influenced 
by general managers. The strategies are formulated to exploit competitive advantages or 
achieve business goals. The IS strategies produce a charter for the IT strategies, 
identifying what a firm should do with its technology.
The IT strategies, on the other hand, are concerned with technology policies. These 
strategies tackle questions related to the architecture, technical standards, and vendor 
policies. They are concerned with how to provide the IT solutions raised by the IS 
strategies. The IT strategies are handled by technologists because their technical nature
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is not easily understood by non-technical senior managers. Moreover, the IT strategies 
are of a long term nature.
The third domain of the information strategy triangle is the information management 
(IM) strategies which are concerned “ with putting the management into IT or with which way was 
IT to be managed”(p . 486). The IM strategies deal with ‘who’ questions. They spell out 
who has what responsibility and authority for managing the information technology and 
systems’ (IT/IS) activities and policies (Earl, 1996, p. 497).
They define who has what responsibilities, the nature of relationships, and roles. 
Moreover, they are concerned with the management processes and control associated 
with the IS and IT strategies.
The organisation 
framework (OFF):
fit 1O rg S trategy i IS S trategy j
B u s in e ss  ; O rgan ization A lign m en t O pponunttjj
Intent ! C on tex t SB L G roup 1
IM Strategy | IT Strategy
R o le s R e la tio n sh ip s, S cop e Architecture
F orm al Inform al 1 C aDabilitv P o w er '
In addition to the three domains 
of the information technology 
triangle- IS, IT and IM strategies-
that originated in the 1980s, Earl orgamsano„alf„fran,e.,orkfEari. 1996. p.
added the organisational
dimension to the above model and stressed the need to maintain a fit among the four 
domains (Earl, 1996). Within each of the four domains of the organisation fit 
framework (‘OFF’, see Figure 12), Earl defined two components and two imperatives. 
The organisation strategy components consists of business strategy and organisational 
choices - structure, management control systems, and policies and procedures. The 
organisational strategy imperatives consist of strategic intent, which captures what the 
strategic advantage is and how it is sought, and the context, which represents the 
organisational culture, ethos, and management style. Each of the organisation strategy 
components and imperatives needs to be clarified in relation to the other information
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strategy domains. Therefore, the charter of processes by which organisation strategy 
influences the other domains is through clarification.
The IS strategy domain consists of two components, which are alignment and 
opportunity. The alignment component is concerned with identifying the required IT 
support to business strategy, while the oppoitunity component is concerned with 
exploiting new businesses or new ways of doing businesses through innovative uses of 
IT. The IS strategies are addressed at the strategic business unit level and at the 
corporate or group level. Tliese two levels of analysis represent the imperatives of this 
domain. Innovation is the process through which the IS strategy influences the other 
information strategy domains.
The IT strategy components consist of scope and architecture. Scope is concerned with 
defining the technologies that will be included in the IT strategy. Architecture is 
concerned with the framework that derives, shapes, and controls the IT infrastructure. 
The imperatives of IT strategy are capability and power. Capability is concerned with 
knowledge-asset, skills, and activities needed for competence in achieving the defined 
scope. Power is needed for implementing and monitoring the architecture. The output 
of the IT strategy that would affect the other information strategy domains is the 
foundation. This is concerned with the ways in which the infrastructure is to be built, 
and the management of the architecture.
The last domain of information strategy is the IM strategy. Its components are ‘roles, 
which are concerned with defining the responsibilities and authorities within and outside 
the IS function, and the relationships amongst those involved with the information 
strategy. The imperatives o f this domain are the formal and informal organisation that is 
needed to fit roles and relationships. The output of the IM strategy is described as 
processes of constitution which are concerned with governing the IS function (Earl. 
1996).
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Forms of strategic planning:
Earl (1993)^ identified five general approaches of strategic information systems
planning (SISP) based on studying 27 organisations in the UK. These SISP strategies 
are the business-led approach, method-driven approach, administrative approach, 
technical approach, and organisational approach. A brief discussion of each is provided 
below.
The first approach is the business-led approach of SISP, which was adopted by six 
firms. This approach emphasises the role of the business in leading the SISP and not the 
other way around. The responsibility of the SISP lies with the IT managers who have to 
study the business plans of firms in order to produce the SISPs. There are problems
i Iassociated with this approach, however. The goals of the business plans may not be 
clear or may be very broadly and loosely defined in such a way that they may not meet 
the requirements of the SISP planners. The remoteness of the users from the SISP may 
create implementation and inertia problems.
The second approach, the method-driven, was adopted by four firms. The adopters of 
this approach used formal methods and techniques for the formulation and 
implementation of SISP. Outsiders such as consultants may be invited to aid in 
formulating or implementing the method-driven technique due, to the lack of expertise 
amongst the firm’s personnel in this area. One problem with the invitation of 
consultants is that their strategy might not be adopted, since it is perceived as the 
outsider’s strategy. Moreover, the consultants’ strategy may be unworkable since it may 
fail to consider the informal processes within the firm, it may be perceived as a threat to 
some of the personnel, or it may require high expenditure and hence be abandoned. The 
method-driven technique may have some strengths however, such as encouraging the 
firm to analyse in greater depth their IT requirements.
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The third approach to SISP is the administrative approach. It was found in five firms. 
The emphasis of this approach is on resource planning. The different functional areas 
may submit their IT requirements to a committee for evaluation based on a certain set of 
criteria. Problems with this approach may relate to the greater bureaucracy 
underpinning the SISP, lack of expertise within the committees to evaluate the strategic 
projects, which results in their decisions being restricted to narrow financial criteria, 
lack of creativity due to adherence to inflexible rules, inclination to select the cheapest 
rather than the more appropriate IT solutions, and possibility of inertial and political 
conflict among the management. The advantages of this approach, on the other hand, are 
related to encouraging personnel to understand how their systems operate, involvement 
of users and different functional areas in the proposals, which may have strategic 
implications, and enabling a tightening of the resource allocation procedures.
The fourth SISP approach is the technological approach, and it was adopted by four 
companies. This approach is technical in orientation. It aims to determine blue-prints 
or architecture for SISP. Its emphasis is on rigorous analysis and building a robust 
infrastructure. The disadvantages with this approach are as follows: it is time 
consuming, it may be too technical for the managers to understand, the plans may be 
rejected or only partially accepted, and they may impose rigidity on the business.
The fifth SISP approach is the organisational approach, and it was followed by seven
companies. This approach emphasises the continuous integration between the IT and
the other functions. Moreover, the process stresses the organisational learning as a
means of developing SISP. The SISP is the responsibility of multi-disciplinary teams.
The IT specialist plays an important role in these teams, advising business managers
about the ways IT can be capitalised upon to serve their business goals. IT strategies are
.developed over a long period and they are approached in an iterative fashion from a 
series of sub-strategies. The author advocates the organisational approach over the other 
approaches since they have a higher success rate. The emphasis on the organisational 
approach brings us to discussing socio-political approaches to strategy formation.
“ ■'ï
Socio-political approaches:
The other school of thought which contrasts with the formal-rational approach to 
strategy formation, perceives strategy as an outcome of a social and political processes.
strategy chapter.
"Ibid . .  p. 12 
Ibid.. p. 12
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Cited in Fincham (1995), the processual perspective perceives strategy formation as a 
process of negotiation. Scholars like Mintzberg and Quinn stress the counter-rational 
reality in their approach to interpreting the nature of strategy formation. They describe 
strategy as emergent and incremental and being influenced by the flow of day-to-day 
operational decision making. Moreover, they reject the mechanistic distinction between 
strategy formulation and implementation. They perceive the two as intertwined and
tcomplex processes in which politics, value, culture and management style interact to 
shape the strategic action. Strategy, they contend, is formed rather than formulated and 
crafted rather than planned. More about Mintzberg and Quinn’s work will be presented
Kin the strategy chapter.
.Fincham discussed the pluralist perspective which perceives organisations as 
encompassing political as well as rational action. This is traced in Bums’ (1969)^ earl) I
work. Scholars like Pettigrew (1987)^ and Knights and Morgan (1990)'^ stress the role 
of micro-politics in shaping strategic decision making. Walsham (1993) stresses the
need to understand the IS action from studying the different contexts that influence and
■
get influenced by IS action. More about Walsham’s work is discussed within the
Currie (1995) reported findings of a number of case studies where IT strategies within 
firms did not follow the formal rational processes but were rather ad hoc in nature.
These strategies were influenced by financial decisions rather than investigating the |
alternatives, and adopting the optimal solutions. The remainder of this section discusses
%
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the nature of strategy formation based on empirical work reported by a number of 
scholars.
Knights and Morgan (1995) criticised the rational and the processual discourses as being 
ahistorical and failing to examine the diverse consequences of adopting a strategic 
approach. They contended that the genealogical informed analysis of strategy formation 
provides a more illuminating understanding of the strategic discourse. Knights and 
Morgan (1991) defined genealogical analysis as “.. an attempt to show that particular discourses 
are historically constituted by specific processes in which existing discourses are changed and adapted 
into a qualitatively different set o f  practices. Genealogical analysis is neither a ‘history o f  ideas’ nor a 
‘history’ per se. Instead, it seeks to show  how social relations o f  power and knowledge are reconstituted 
to create new ways o f  seeing and acting." (p. 254). Though the genealogical analysis does not 
claim that it exhausts all the determinants causing the strategic discourse, it aims to 
uncover those conditions without which the discourse might have not arisen.
Knights and Morgan defined two key levels to examine how strategic management 
emerges and becomes established in a particular organisational setting. The first level is 
concerned with examining the ke>' conditions within the industrial context under which 
the discourse has developed. The second level of examination moves downward to the 
organisation setting to examine how the specific discourse is translated into specific 
practices.
The authors’ article focuses, amongst other things, on examining the slow and uneven 
development of strategic management in the UK's financial services sector, and on 
providing an account of the conditions that made it possible and plausible for the 
strategic discourse to emerge within the insurance and pension industry. They wrote 
that, on the industry level, though there were many life insurance companies, the 
competition between them was limited prior to the eighties. These companies operated 
in an environment which they felt they knew and controlled. This environment was 
unproblematic and did not require the type of solutions that the strategic discourse 
claimed to offer. However, deregulation was brought to the financial industry during
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the eighties and the associated changes in the environment constructed the need for a 
strategic change that emphasised competition rather than co-operation.
On the corporate level, Knights and Morgan studied the relationship between IT and 
corporate strategies in a life insurance company. They described the ‘sudden incursion 
of strategic discourse" (p.208) through a new chief executive who in turn employed a 
former colleague to head the IS division. The new IS manager introduced new planning 
and monitoring mechanisms which were perceived as an aggressive approach as 
compared to that adopted in the industry. The case study then discussed the conditions 
that lead to sacrificing IT strategies for the sake of meeting short term goals or the 
political demands of influential managers within the organisation.
for here we find that when there is a conflict between an agreed strategy for IT systems 
renewal and the objective o f  retaining market share in pensions distribution, the IT strategy is put 
on the back burner. Yet paradoxically, it was the changing nature o f  the market and the 
regulatory conditions o f  financial services that had placed a strategic imperative on the demand 
for flexible and highly responsive information systems in the first place., what our case indicates, 
however, is how quickly strategic commitments will be sacrificed in order to meet short-term 
sales targets or the demands o f  politically influential managers or functions in the organisation..“
(p. 206)
Their case study provided an illustration of how strategic management developed in 
discontinuous, accidental, contested, and uneven ways as a result of varying 
interpretations, political processes, and short term interests of business. They believed 
that the strategic discourse and practice were in continuous flux, subject to change in 
meaning, and open to reinterpretation. According to Scarbrough (1997, p. 173), their 
model is a push model emphasising the push elements that bring the strategic discourse
projects were linked to the parallel new ways of classifying IS initiatives. Moreover, his
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into the concerns of the management. '3
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Scarbrough (1997) approached the issue of strategic IS from a social constructionist f
perspective. This approach, viewed in terms of the IS function, attempts to construct
new ways of classifying and justifying IS initiatives. Such attempts are perceived as a 
response to the dynamic competition between the different expert groups, and a 
response to the uncertainty raised by the changing technological and sectoral
'Ienvironment. Scarbrough argued that the emergence, aim, and success or failure of IS
cases showed that the institutions and sectoral context as well as the internal structuring 
of expertise, especially the role of IS function within the management, play important 
roles in favouring or inhibiting the new categories of actions associated with the 
strategic IS. iI
The determination of the status of IS initiatives as strategic versus nonstrategic has 
implications for the management and the direction of the IS projects. Much of the 
literature, Scarbrough argued, handles this question from a normative rational 
perspective that bypasses the organisational processes involved in arriving at such a 
distinction.
The factors that are behind the strategic classification of IS initiatives have theoretical 
and empirical elements. The theoretical element views the determination of the 
strategic status of IS as a socially constructed process resulting from the interaction of 
the IS expertise with the wider organisation. The theoretical element is tested 
empirically in a number of Scottish financial institutions. Scarbrough contended that 
the classificatory categorising of strategic IS is a social process involving the interaction 
of the differing expertise of those within the IS function, accounting, and general 
management. Scarbrough referred to social constructionism as the way social actors 
construct the realities that confront them.." (p. 172), hence consensus and social acceptance are 
the most important validations of truth and claims.
Scarbrough argues that the social construction approach that he followed is concerned 
with the forces that "pulf the strategic language and practices into particular contexts. 
He contrasted this with the ‘push’ forces of the institutional and discursive approaches. 
He argued that each used different instrumentalities. As to the social construction 
approach, the most important instrumentalities were related to the role of 
strategic/nonstrategic distinctions as a powerful system of classification. As 
demonstrated with Earl’s framework of the frameworks, the discourse and practice of IS 
management is replete with frameworks and typologies that consultants and scholars in 
this field play a major role in refreshing. The frameworks play a role in imprinting the 
knowledge base of the professionals on the organisation’s practices. The development
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classificatory systems may be used as 
cognitive systems for reworking the Relationship ----------------
between expert Systems of
reality. The organisations may J^ÎKÎaism classification
management e g. Mcfarlan el a!
assimilate them only when specific structure (1983i
Unstable
of classificatory frameworks is partly intellectual, and partly political. The 
interprofessional competition provides a second means for developing new 
classificatory systems. The expert groups seek to exploit the IS initiatives in ways that 
enhance their stature. Moreover, the strategic classification provides an incentive for 
realigning the relationship between the expertise in IS and other areas of expertise, 
particularly accounting- through, for example, enabling the relaxation of the accounting 
criteria and hence realigning the boundaries between IS and accounting. In addition to 
the above, Scarbrough contended that creating a stratégie classification of IS projects 
enables IS experts to access the decision making arena that they were long excluded 
from, in addition to enabling the management of uncertainty associated with the advent 
of new technologies.
As mentioned earlier, the demand for strategic IS involves a tangling together of both 
political elements as well as technical ones. The IS/IT literature contains a lot of 
classificatory systems to determine the strategic status of IS/IT. Examples are the 
McFarlan and Me Kenney matrix (1983), as well as those of Porter and Millar (1985) 
and Wiseman (1985) which I 
discussed earlier. These
Smble_______________________ Unstable
Stable —  +
social and economic conditions
-  or +  = degree o f incentive to develop new
fa\our their adoption. Scarbrough ciassificaioo systems
developed a matrix defining the key
social dimensions within which a S ocia l construcnon  o f  c la ssifica tory
classificatory systems such as that of McFarlan et al might be adopted. The first 
dimension of the matrix is related to the relationship between the knowledge of the 
expert group and the emergent tasks confronting them. Where the relationship between 
the expert knowledge and emergent tasks is stable, the existing classificatory system is
more likely to be entrenched. However, where the relationship between the expert
::r
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knowledge and emergent tasks is unstable, it is most likely that new classificatoiy 
systems be sought. The second dimension of the matrix is related to the relationship 
between the expert group and the other professionals. This relationship is contingent on 
the historical development of the sector and the organisation as well as the 
interprofessional competition. The stability or instability of this relationship determines 
the likelihood of entrenching the existing classificatory systems or searching for new 
ones. The matrix provides an exploratory map for the sociological analysis of 
classificatory systems.
Fincham et al (1994) studied the stn.*»
appropriation of technology and the 
development of strategy from a
D ecision-M aking IruTovation
anagenwn
o f  Expertise \
management of expertise perspective. In / /  D,smbw.on of Knowledge
Power o f  E ig x n  Groups
their theoretical framework (see Figure 14) /  Ecor>omic viii.daupn qf.Knoü______
E ip er tisc  Formation and T ech n o logythey argued that in the short to medium Deploy men, of Eypemse
term the available expertise influences the l^anagemen, of Expertise
firm’s strategies and decision making and <rmchameiai. I994.p.5j
define the boundaries and limits of what their developments are. These decisions in turn
affect the design and implementation of technology. The cycle is closed when the newh
developed and implemented innovation adds incrementally to the existing expertise
skills. In the long-term, the relationships between technology, expertise, and strateg)
unify thought and action.
Fincham et al. argue that the knowledge resources available to the organisation shape 
the development and implementation of organisational strategies, and the knowledge is 
embedded within networks of individuals and groups. Accordingly, the strategic 
practices around IT become less of a top-down initiative as they require the interaction
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In conclusion, Scarbrough’s empirical work stressed the importance of social relations 
and expertise in empowering the adoption of new concepts and categories. Moreover, it 
contended that the ability to assimilate new information is dependent on the availabilit) 
of prior knowledge and the diversity of expertise within the organisation.
of expertise from different organisational levels which possess both the technical and 
organisational knowledge and as the intentions of top management are mediated by their 
dependence on the technical expertise of the IT and other groups. The organisation 
policies and strategies emerge as a result of a competition between claims and rival 
claims of these expert groups, and as they attempt to enrol others in the process of 
defining how the organisation should proceed. Through communication and alignment, 
a common vision and an alliance between the competing factions is reached and a 
strategy is shaped (Fincham et al, 1994, 1995).
The authors (ibid., 1994) argue also that the sector is constituted by the behaviour of 
networks of actors including the experts. The ideas about the opportunities within the 
market and the instrumentalities to exploit these opportunities may be channelled 
through these networks. Their influence on the organisational strategies may be 
determined by the extent that the interaction of networks are amenable to the local 
negotiation of the internal players.
Expertise has a number of dimensions. These include cognitive, political and economic 
ones. Cognitive knowledge may have different forms and may vary from formal 
knowledge, constituting the universal and generic aspects of expertise, to informal 
knowledge, representing the tacit knowledge generated by experience. The local 
knowledge of users, which is concerned with the idiosyncrasies of a firm’s ways of 
doing things, may be regarded, as equally important as the universal and generic aspects 
of expertise. Therefore, the participation of the different players holding different 
knowledge in the development of IT systems is considered crucial. The different groups 
of experts within the organisation may compete politically to offer their seiwices and 
establish their authority against others. The power struggle amongst the expert groups is 
influenced by a number of aspects. The acquisition of the required knowledge, the 
legitimisation of the claimed knowdedge through, for example, professional 
accreditation, and the tradability of forms of expertise within the labour markets are 
factors that have an influence on the forms of expertise bargaining power.
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The evolution of new bodies of knowledge and strategies is influenced by the ways in 
which organisations form and deploy expertise. The formation of expertise may take the 
form of employment of specialists, training and experience, and career development. 
Firms may develop in-house expertise or depend on the external labour markets as a 
means of gaining knowledge of newer techniques and alternative methods of systems 
development. The deployment of expertise may be achieved through collaborative 
networks which have formal aspects, such as hierarchical command structures, or 
informal communication lines.
To sum up the above argument, strategy and technology are perceived as a joint aspects 
o f innovation, and effective formation and deployment of expertise is essential for the 
development of IT. The participation of the different expert groups in the development 
process results in opening up further contributions to the strategy. The process of 
developing IT is described in this context as part of a strategic interchange process 
(Fincham et al, 1995).
Role of social networks in affecting behaviour 
and economic action:
43
Are economic institutions formulated merely because of economic opportunities and 
pressures, or are they instead affected by the social relations that surround these 
economic institutions? Granovetter (1985. 1992) attempts to provide answers to the 
above questions through emphasising the role of social relationships in affecting 
economic institutions.
Granovetter claims that much of the literature written in this field is concerned with the 
oversocialized or undersocialized perceptions of human action, but both these 
perceptions of human action underestimate the role of social relationships in affecting 
these economic institutions.
___
In the undersocialized conceptions, it is believed that atomised actions on behalf of 
isolated individuals who struggle to pursue their self interests would mostly affect the 
formation of the economic institution’s goals and activities. In contrast, the 
oversocialized conceptions stress the role of the norms and habits dominating the 
society in making the individuals behave in compliance with these norms. Both views 
rule out the effect of the social relations that affect economic institutions.
Granovetter’s argument is between the two conceptions. He advocates that economic 
institutions’ goals and activities be embedded within the social networks’ goals and 
activities. These networks may provide the required backing that the economic 
institutions need to emerge and prosper thereafter, or instead constrain these institutions. 
Granovetter contended that these social networks play a role in creating trust and 
discouraging malfeasance in economic life. Both the undersocialized and oversocialized 
conceptions, he argued, fail to provide an explanation about the source of trust and 
malfeasance in the economic life. In addition to the above, Granovetter stressed the 
importance of social networks in determining whether the economic transactions be 
carried out within hierarchical firms or instead under market processes. The 
characteristics of these social relations or networks dictate the degree of trust and order 
that may accompany them. The pressure towards vertical integration represented in the 
hierarchical firms will intensify when these social networks are absent or when the\' 
produce disorder, malfeasance, opportunism and conflict. However, such pressure 
toward vertical integration would be absent when stable networks generate standardised 
behaviour between the firms.
As will be discussed in the case studies and the analysis chapters, the Bahraini banks 
maintained an intimate relationship with their vendors. These relationships were 
important channels through which tacit knowledge affected the banks’ strategies. 
Furthermore, there were other formal and informal relationships with other institutions 
that affected the Bahraini banks' strategies.
Mintz and Schwartz (1985) provided an empirical study about the role of social 
networks within the banking industry in the US. The authors stressed the intimate
“' I
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relationship between capital flows and directorate interlocks. The authors argued that 
financial organisations were mostly at the centre of these interlocks. The banks were 
eager to invite members from other organisations to sit on their boards. Similarly, they 
usually send their members to sit on other organisations’ boards. Such arrangements 
provide the banks with a greater opportunity to widely scan the market and be able to 
process information that is crucial for decisions related to the flow of capital to the 
borrowers. Business relations as well as personal relations play a role in determining 
the members of the boards that would be invited to the organisation.
Swan (1996) stressed the importance of understanding the role of social networks in 
constructing, shaping and diffusing the required knowledge for innovation. These 
networks may be formally constructed between suppliers and customers, affiliated 
companies, between firms collaborating on projects providing mutual benefits, and so 
on. In other instances these networks may be informal. Professional associations 
provide an important means through which knowledge is transmitted.
The role of social networks is exhibited in the case study of Choi and Gannon (1996). 
They contended that high-technology firms were increasingly aligning themselves with 
financial institutions. They argued that “ technology is driving the formation o f  strategies around 
strategic alliances” (p. 8). An action that was also exhibited by the banks in my case 
studies, Choi et al. reported that 15 banks aligned with IBM for proprietary 
development. The case study also reported alliances amongst the banks. Some of these 
banks offered services to other banks based on their expertise.
This section of my literature review focuses on some of the scholarly work which
.explores the influence of institutions on organisational behaviour. It starts with a 
theoretical background of institutional theory then presents empirical work analysing the 
effects of institutions on banks’ IT adoption behaviour.
C ited  in Scott . W. (1 9 9 1 ) ,  U n p a c k i n g  Institutional A rgum ents .
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In his article, “Unpacking Institutional Arguments”, Scott (1991) argued that the most
important contribution of the institutional theories was the reconceptualization of the
different environments that organisations are embedded in. One facet of these
environments that Meyer and Rowan (1977)'* drew attention to was related to that in
which the institutionalised beliefs, rules, and roles, which represent the subtle symbolic
elements, play a role in affecting the organisation’s forms independent of technical
requirements and resource flow. They added that the more institutionalised the belief
systems and ‘cognitive categories’ are, the more human actions are defined by ‘taken-
for-granted routines’ associated with these categories or belief systems. Moreover, they
argued that organisations may be subject to multiple institutional environments that may
be in competition, if not in conflict, in defining what is perceived to be rational through
understanding and interpreting the meanings associated with these institutionalised
structures. Scott and Meyer (1991) differentiated between two sets of environments that
impose different set of requirements on the organisations operating in them. The\
differentiated between technical environments and institutional environments. In the
technical environments, organisations are rewarded by the effectiveness and efficiency
in their production systems and work processes. In the institutional environments, on
the other hand, organisations are rewarded by their conformity to the rules and
expectation systems predominant in these environments. The technical environments
and the institutional environments represent two dimensions in which organisations may
.vary. Scott and Meyer prescribed where organisations could fit on the institutional ’ 
technical dimensions based on the pressure and requirements imposed on these 
organisations by these different environments (see Figure 15). Based on this classification 
they identified four propositions defining the impact of these environments on the 
organisation’s structures:
“organisations in technical sectors will attempt
to control and co-ordinate their production Stronger
Technical
activities, buffering them from environmental envirorments 
influence. Weaker
Institutional environments 
Stronger Weaker
utilities; banks; 
general hospitals
Ptiarm;
general
manidacturir  ^
cad  cals
mental health 
clinics; 1 ^  
agencies; churches
restaurants; health 
clubs
Organisations in technical sectors will succeed
to the extent that they develop efficient 15: com bin ing technical a n d  institu tional
environm ents (Scott an d  M eyer, 1991, p . 124)
production activities and effective coordinative 
stiTJctures.....
•  Organisations in institutional sectors will succeed to the extent that they are able to acquire types o f  
personnel and to develop structural arrangements and production processes that conform to the 
specifications o f  established norms and- or authorities within that sector.”
In their article ‘The Iron Cage Revisited DiMaggio and Powell (1991) wrote that 
structural changes in organisations, especially those related to highly structured fields, 
are less driven by competitive and efficiency forces, and more driven by forces that 
make these organisations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient. 
DiMaggio and Powell identified organisational fields as “ those organisations that, in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognised area o f  institutional life: key suppliers, resource and products 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products” (p. 65). 
A highly structured organisational field consists of organisations that respond to an 
environment which is made up of the organisations’ responses to this environment. In 
the early phases, organisations may display variations in their forms and may be driven 
by initiatives to improve their performance. However, once the organisational field 
becomes well established and once innovation spread reaches a threshold point, an 
isomorphic process makes these organisations more similar and may constrain their 
options to change.
The process of isomorphism may take two forms: competitive isomorphism and 
institutional isomorphism. Competitive isomorphism embraces a rational system that 
emphasises the desire for achieving competitive and fitness measures. Competitive
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isomorphism may apply to open markets in which free competition exists, and ma) 
provide an explanation for the behaviour of early adoption of innovation. However, it 
may not provide an adequate account of the modem world of organisations, DiMaggio 
and Powell argue. The institutional isomorphism may supplement the above view. It is 
driven by the organisations’ desire to gain institutional legitimacy and social fitness.
DiMaggio and Powell identified three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphism is achieved. These are coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and 
normative isomorphism.
I
Coercive isomorphism occurs due to formal or informal pressures on organisations by 
other entities on which these organisations depend for survival, or due to cultural 
expectations to which these organisations should adhere. Mimetic isomorphism is 
pursued when organisations model themselves after other organisations, which are 
perceived to be more legitimate and successful, to cope with uncertainty. Mimetic 
developments may have ritual aspects to enable those adopting them to gain legitimacy 
and to demonstrate that organisations are trying to improve their work conditions. 
Normative isomorphism stems primarily from professionalization. Shared norms may 
develop in centres such as universities and training institutions. Moreover, these norms 
and new work models may infuse across the organisations through professional 
networks and personnel filtering.
The three isomorphic processes can proceed without necessarily contributing to the 
organisations’ efficiency. These isomorphic organisations may be rewarded due to their 
similarity to their population through, for example, enabling them to transact with the 
others, attract personnel, and gain resources due to the legitimacy gained from this 
isomorphism.
Scott (1995) wrote that institutions consist of three pillars: cognitive, normative, and 
regulative. These pillars interact collectively to shape social behaviour.
sa;
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The closest to the rational paradigm is the regulative pillar, in which, social behaviour is 
controlled through a process which involves the capacity to impose rules, and ensure 
conformity to these rules through imposing punishments or rewards.
In the normative pillar, social behaviour is shaped by conforming to the predominant 
nonns and values. The normative pillar (and the cognitive pillar) move away from the 
rational paradigm. Actors adopt these choices not to maximise their utilities but 
because they are expected to conform to these norms and values.
The cognitive pillar emphasises the importance of constitutive frameworks in defining 
the identity of the actors and defining the guidelines for appropriate choices associated 
with those identities.
The three pillars of institutions are embedded within different carriers. According to 
Scott these are cultures, social structures, and routines. Cultures, according to Scott, are 
carriers that rely on “ interpretative structures- on codified patterns o f  meanings and rule systems" (p. 
5 3 ) .  The interpretative schemes have a reciprocal relation with behaviour. They inform 
and constrain the behaviour and in the same time get shaped by it. The cultural systems 
may be interorganizational or they may pertain to a particular organisation or 
suborganisation. The second type of carriers are social structures. These represent 
patterned expectations connected with social networks. These social structures 
empower and constrain behaviour and at the same time are affected and reproduced by 
the behaviour. The third type of carriers are the routines, which represent habits, 
patterned activities and procedures which are based on predominant beliefs and 
knowledge.
Abrahamson (1996) studied management fashion and contended that it is influenced by 
institutionalised norms, among other things, as will be discussed next. He wrote that 
theories of fashion in aesthetic forms are used unmodified to explain management 
fashion. These theories argue that sociopsychological forces are mainly responsible for 
shaping management fashion. Abrahamson contended instead that fashionable 
techniques must appear as rational - prescribing efficient means to effective ends - and
49
progressive - adopting improved management techniques as relative to the older ones. 
Moreover, he contended that both sociopsychological forces, and technical and 
economic forces compete to shape the demand for management fashion. Fashions are in 
demand because they satiate the psychological needs of fashion followers, resulting 
from frustration and boredom, which may lead to striving for novelty and status 
differentiation. Fashions may also be looked at as gratifying psychological drives for 
individuality and novelty relative to those who are out of fashion, and at the same time, 
conformity and traditionalism by using techniques of those who are adopting the 
fashion. There will be a tendency for organisations of lower status to adopt these 
fashions to look like organisations of higher status and hence increase the homogeneity 
within the industry. Meanwhile, organisations of higher status feel that they are under 
pressure to seek newer fashions to differentiate themselves from organisations of lower 
status. Technoeconomic forces may also shape the demand for fashions. These forces 
may be related to macroeconomics fluctuations or political forces. The technoeconomic 
changes in the environment may create incipient preferences among fashion followers 
for certain types of techniques for narrowing the gap opened by the changes in the 
environment. Management fashion setters - consulting firms, business schools, 
management gurus, and mass media organisations - sense and satiate incipient demand 
for new types of management fashion, and at the same time they shape the demand for 
management fashions b> articulating particular techniques that meet the incipient 
demand of the fashion followers.
Abrahamson also argues that management fashion is shaped by norms of rationality and 
progress. His theory is built based upon neoinstitutional theory, particularly that of 
Meyer and Rowan (1977). Meyer and Rowan argued that organisational stakeholders 
expect their organisations to be managed rationally through selecting the most efficient
■means to important ends. However, these means and ends may be ambiguous, and in 
these cases, managers must create the appearance that they are in line with the norms of 
rationalit}' by adopting the management techniques that the organisational stakeholders 
perceive as the rational means to manage the organisation. Conformity with the rational 
norms may become essential to gain legitimacy from the stakeholders and hence gain
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their support to enhance their organisation’s survival. Abrahamson extended Meyer and 
Rowan’s argument by contending that it is not just norms of rationality but also norms 
of progress which govern management behaviour.
To sum up, management fashion is shaped by sociopsychological and econotechnicaJ 
forces, the demand of fashion followers and the supply of fashion setters, and |
institutional pressure to conform to the norms of rationalit}' and progress.
A case study of change and industrial response.
Morris et al (1996) presented a case study about Midland Bank’s innovation of re- 
engineering its cheque processing. Midland’s initiative took place as a result of a r
number of factors related to pressure for cost reduction, especially after it had 
experienced a reduction in its profitability, and a change in the top management, man> 
of whom were recruited with experience of the US market. The bank’s centralised 
processing system was considered as a success to which top management commitment. I
project management, past experience of centralisation, human resource management, 
and internal marketing all contributed.
Morris et al. questioned the reasons behind the lack of exploitation by other banks of 
this innovation though it proved to be cost-efficient and had other quality benefits that 
could be applied to other projects such as card vouchers processing. To understand the 
banks' behaviour, Morris et al argued that we need to explore the managers' 
assumptions about the process of technical change, and about the sources of competiti\ e 
advantage.
As discussed earlier, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) described the banking industry as a 
highly institutionalised field. The organisations within this field, according to the 
institutional theorv'. tend to seek survival and stability through adopting the prevailing 
norms. These prevailing norms and taken-fbr-granted assumptions work as a force 
spurring the organisations in this field to homogenise. Moreover, these conventions and 
taken-fbr-granted norms create a high psychological switching cost. To overcome the |
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psychological switching cost, change has to challenge the prevailing norms and 
conventions. A major implication of institutional theory is that IT innovations depend 
on how well they fit the conventions and norms, in addition to the anticipated 
competitive benefits. There are areas of similarity amongst the banks that can’t be 
explained with reference to costs. For example, they tended to compete using more or 
less similar approaches such as expanding their retail network rather than differentiating 
their services, and covering broadly the same market segment and providing similar 
products with a similar charging structure. In terms of innovation, the banks have 
moved more or less at the same pace despite their differences in suppliers and 
architectural specifics. The industry norms with regard to processing innovation 
favoured collective management of such projects. As for Midland, change occurred 
mainly because of the bank’s crisis, new recruits in the top management who possessed 
different point of views and were exposed to different standards and norms due to their 
past expertise outside the retail banking and the UK market, and an ability to sell the 
new innovation internally. As for the other banks’ disinclination to copy Midland's 
innovation, it reflected the other banks’ leaders’ perceptions about the nature of 
competition. The banking community did not perceive back-office processing as a 
source of long term competitive advantage despite the amount of savings derived out of 
it. Moreover, Midland Bank was not perceived as a benchmark exemplar, and much of 
what it had done was not consistent with the industry norms.
This case demonstrated that technical innovation may be resented, despite its technical 
and financial benefits. Moreover. Morris et al argued that banks tend to move 
cautiously, avoid using untried technologies, innovate in broadly similar ways, and 
distrust firms that do not have a successful financial histoiv.
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Organisational change and inertia:
The previous arguments which I presented within the literature review discussed the 
push or pull forces influencing the adoption of IT. The following argument explains the î
' i-'-stickiness within industries or organisations that may inhibit or slowdown organisational
Ichange.
Hannan and Freeman (1989) argue that organisations are characterised by relative inertia 
in their structure. The pressure for this inertia emerges due to internal and external |
factors. High sunk costs, immobility of resources, and internal politics are among the 
internal factors that cause inertia. On the other hand, legal constraints on entry and exit 
high costs of obtaining information related to the external environment, and a fear of 
losing legitimacy when incurring a major change are some of the external factors that 
cause inertia.
Arguing that there is a strong inertia in the structure of the organisation does not mean 
that there is no change at all in the organisation, but instead it may mean that the 
changes in the organisation may happen at a slower rate than those of the environment.
3
Hannan and Freeman argued that the selection process prefers those organisations that 
are reliable and accountable to those that are not. Reliability and accountability require 
the organisation to be able to maintain its structure. In this case the very factor that 
allows the organisation to be more reliable and accountable causes inertia in its 
structure.
levels of inertia may varv’ within the organisation. It is expected that the level of inertia 
is greater in the core levels of the organisation than the peripheral parts. Inertia is also 
believed to increase as the organisation grows in age. The older the organisation is, the 
more it is able to reproduce its structure than younger organisations. Reliability and 
accountability increase with age, and as a result the mortality rate decreases. Hannan I
and Freeman did not provide a determinate relationship between the size of the
organisation and the rate of change. On one hand, it is believed that inertia will be I
5 ^  1
Chung (1991) studied the relationship between the structure of information system 
technology (1ST) and competitive strategy. The Miles and Snow strategic typology was
prospectors
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higher in larger organisations, but on the other hand, these large organisations possess 
the required resources to implement successfully these changes more effectively than |
smaller organisations.
Quantitative empirical work within the strategic 
information systems / technology (IS/T) field:
In addition to the above qualitative empirical work, e.g. Fincham (1994), Scarbrough 3
(1997), and Knights and Morgan (1995), there have been a number of quantitative 
studies, many of them conducted by Ph.D. students. Most of these quantitative studies. I 1
. Iargue, are narrow in scope. For the sake of completeness, I report them here but I ha\ e 
not found them helpful in contributing to the qualitative empirical work reported earlier.
I
selected as the base for the competitive strategy dimension. This typology classifies 
strategies into four basic types which are prospectors, defenders, analysers, and reactors. §
K'"Since, by definition, a reactor strategy lacks any consistent reaction to the environment, 
it is not included in this study. What follows is a definition of the other three types of 
strategies: |
“A prospector is an organisation with an aggressive com petitive strategy that attempts to pioneer 
in product market developm ent”
"A defender has a tendency to maintain its present products or customer base, with little nev, 
product developm ent in efforts to secure niches within its industry”
i;“An analyser tends to have organisational attributes that combine those o f  defenders and
As to the 1ST structure dimension, the degree of centralisation of 1ST and the degree of 
integration of 1ST have been selected as two of its components. The degree of
'fcentralisation refers to the extent to which the development and implementation
"1
I
activities within the organisation are eentraiised in one control location. The degree of
integration is measured by horizontal integration and vertical integration. Horizontal
integration refers to the exchange of data across applications, while vertical integration
involves access to operational and managerial strategic data in the same system. The
research findings indicate that there are significant relationships between the
organisational competitive strategy and 1ST structure, and this relationship affects the
competitive advantage of the savings institutions which where the subject of the stud).
Centralisation and integrated applications were associated with the defender strategy.
Decentralisation and less integrated applications of 1ST were associated with the
prospector competitive strategy. In addition to the above, the findings revealed to mean
.that each strategy type was equally effective in the savings institutions, and were 
interpreted that each of the strategies may lead to a competitive advantage once these 
strategies are effectively implemented.
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Zahir’s (1992) empirical work examined the effects of IT on performance and the need 
to align organisational processes and structure with IT. His literature review reported 
that there was a controversy about the effect of IT on performance at the economy level 
as well as the firm level. Some of the literature reported negative effects of IT on 
performance, others reported no effect of IT on performance, while others argued that IT 
has a positive effect. According to Scott Morton (1991), those firms that demonstrated a 
positive impact from major IT applications must have successfully transformed 
themselves in terms of business processes and structure. This approach has its roots in 
the structural contingency theory that assumes that organisational performance depends 
on the coalignment and fit between organisational structure and the context of the 
organisation that includes the culture, systems, and technology. Moreover, the 
coalignment must also be between the organisational factors and external 
environmental conditions in order to achieve a superior performance. However, some 
of the literature indicated that there is a direct effect of IT on performance.
The empirical study failed to support any positive direct effects of IT on performance. 
Moreover, it failed to support the proposition that IT has indirect and positive effects on
Î
• Market share gains lagged behind the adoption of the ATMs. For a medium sized 
bank, the lag was about four years.
• The effects of the ATM adoption on efficiency was much weaker than the effects on 
market share.
• The ATM adoption affected strongly the business level measure, i.e. income.
• The adoption affected all but the very smallest banks.
• Large banks gained more than small banks.
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performance which is mediated by changes in the organisation’s structure. The 
researcher attributed his second finding to the small size of companies surveyed which 
did not allow an explicit modification in their structure as a result of introducing a major 
IT application. The empirical work supported the proposition that IT has an indirect and 
positive effect on performance which is mediated by changes in the organisational 
processes. This finding emphasises the importance of introducing the appropriate 
modification to the organisational processes for exploiting the potential benefits of IT.
Peffers (1991) investigated the effects of adopting ATMs on a number of issues. These 
ranged from studying the effect of early adoption of the ATMs on the market share, the 
effect of the adopter’s size on the market share, the sustaining of the adoption effect, the 
impact of the ATMs on efficiency, and the effect of the adopter’s size on efficiency. 
The finding of this empirical work is summarised below.
* Relative to non-adopters, all but small banks gained market share due to the 
adoption of ATMs;
• When comparing the earliest adopters with the later adopters, larger banks gained 
more than smaller banks. The smallest banks neither benefited nor lost relative to 
the non-adopters because of being the earliest adopters.
• The earliest adopters were more positively affected than later early adopters.
• The effect on income lagged behind adoption by four years and then it started to 
increase over the performance measure period.
The above were quantitative positivist research studies which focused on studying 
narrow aspects of IT adoption behaviour within the financial services sector. The) 
studied the relationships between a number of variables and went no further than 
analysing the statistical association between these variables. As I have argued in the 
methodology chapter, a case study approach which is based on understanding how the 
participants in the financial services sector construct their realities and behave 
accordingly, and which aims to understand the different contexts of the phenomenon 
under investigation would provide richer insights than a narrowly focused superficial 
quantitative approach.
Conclusion:
The chapter started with discussing the rational perspective which attributes a strategic 
role to IT and perceives the organisation as being consistently concerned with 
maximising its utility through exploiting IT as a strategic resource. Belonging to this 
school, the MIT research, reported at the beginning of the chapter, studied the impact of 
IT on organisations in the 1990s. This research project generated a map of the terrain 
comprising five levels of IT-induced configuration with increasing levels of business 
transformation and potential benefit from IT. A UK study on the applications of IT in 
the UK financial services sector was then reported. This study revealed that radical IT 
developments could transform not just the businesses but also the industry structure as a 
whole. In addition to the above, the chapter reported the work of scholars propagating 
how managers might act rationally in their pursuit of competitive advantage from IT. 
An example of these scholars, was EarTs ‘framework of the frameworks’ that aimed at 
guiding managers in this direction through drawing attention to the need for awareness.
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opportunity and positioning. The thesis also discussed several rational approaches to IT 
strategy formation. In passing, I referred to the problems associated with the above 
rational frameworks and models as had been reported by Dole (1991).
A major critique of the rational perspective is that it pays too little attention to the 
influence of the social, political, and cultural factors over the process of strategy 
formation and development including that of IT adoption. These perspectives are 
addressed in the fields of strategy and organisational sociology. Therefore, the second 
part of the chapter focused on the theoretical and empirical studies that recognise 
cultural and political influences on organisational and strategic decisions, including 
those related to IT. Some of the key concepts, reported in this part of the chapter, 
include the need for a genealogical analysis to understand the strategic discourse 
through uncovering the conditions without which this discourse might have not arisen. 
Another approach to studying strategic IS was through the social constructivist 
perspective propagated by Scarbrough which recognises the influence of the interaction 
between the experts and professionals and the emerging knowledge in inhibiting or 
favouring a given IS strategic discourse. The management of expertise is another 
approach reported, studying the strategic discourse through exploring the relationship 
between expertise, strategy, and technology. Other key concepts paid attention to the 
institutionalised patterns of behaviour, the behaviour of networks of actors, and the 
consequences of organisational inertia for the strategic discourse and IT adoption 
decisions.
Without complementing the rational perspective with the socio-cultural. political and 
institutional perspectives, I argue that our understanding of the strategic IT discourse 
would remain immature. This has led me to extend my literature review over these 
school of thoughts, aiming to provide a holistic approach to studying the strategic IT 
adoption, and provide the needed sensitivity for analysing the qualitative data gathered 
from field work.
Î
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Chapter three
Research Methodology
Introduction:
■t
This chapter discusses the research methodology and the path that I followed in 
conducting my empirical work and analysis. This process was emergent, as will be 
discussed in the coming sections. The chapter discusses the aim and objectives o f the 
thesis, the qualitative approach, the nature of the empirical work, the data analysis, the if
use of computer software in the analysis process, triangulation and limitations.
Aim of the research:
I Started my research project with a broad area of inquiry related to understanding and 
providing an account of information technology adoption within the Bahraini banking 
industry. At the outset of my research project. I did not adopt any frameworks to test as 
I believed that most of these were developed in cultures that differ from the one that I 
was inquiring about. To clarify this point further, I would like to quote the following 
analogy:
"The tabula rasa  approach reminds me o f  the story o f  a detective who was following a suspect 
along a street at night, and the suspect dropped something in the gutter at a dark point in the road.
Finding this action suspicious and suspecting that some vital evidence had been aispensed with, 
the detective decided to look for it. However, it was too dark to see anything at that point, so he 
moved further down the road to where there was a street-lamp, and looked for the e\id en ce  
there!... he will never find what he is looking for. It would be far better to get down on his hands y:
and knees and feel around in the dark.." (D ev, 1993, p. 228).
I
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aimed to:
by the informants;
• understand how the banks approach collective IT projects if any; and
• understand the influence of the banks’ cultures on their IT strategy / adoption
initiative.
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My inquiry, then, was inductive and aimed to explore and describe the adoption 
behaviour of those banks based on what they were doing rather than verifying any 
hypotheses. To further borrow from Dey (1993, p229), I started my inquiry with an 
open mind rather than an empty head. The literature that I had reviewed prior to the i
field work acted like the Tenses’ or perspectives for perceiving the empirical world f  
(Seidel et al, 1995, p. 56).
■i:I focused on the following objectives as I immersed in the field work. These objectives
• understand the process o f IT strategy formation within the different banks;
• understand the role of the different stakeholders in shaping the banks’ IT strategic 
vision, including that of the vendors, consultants, and other role model banks; I
• understand the role of IT, and the drivers of IT strategies and initiatives as perceived
h
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Qualitative approach:
Table I summarises the characteristics of qualitative research.
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II adopted a qualitative approach to my inquiry as I believed that this approach was more 
suitable to the type of investigative questions I raised above.
Denzin and Lincoln (1994, p. 107) argued that quantitative research may strip from 
consideration other variables that, if considered, may alter the findings. Qualitative data 
through providing contextual information may ‘redress’ that imbalance. Moreover, 
imposed theories or hypotheses - as in quantitative approaches - may have little meaning 
within the insider views of the studied entities. Whereas qualitative data are useful for 
uncovering insider views. They argue also that qualitative data are more capable of 
providing insight into human behaviour, as they are more connected to the meanings 
and purposes the human actors attach to their behaviour. I
3#yi
T:
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Table I: Characteristics o f  qualitative research id le d  in Silverman. 1993, pp. 20 -29)
Bryman (1988)
taking the subject’s 
perspective
Describing the mundane 
detail o f  everyday settings
•  Understanding actions and 
meanings in their social 
context
Emphasising time and 
process
Favouring open and 
relatively unstructured 
research designs
Avoiding concepts and 
theories at an earlv stage”
Hammersley ( 1990)
"The use o f  everyday
contexts rather than 
experimental conditions
A range o f  sources o f  data 
collection (the main ones 
are observation and
'informal conversations’)
A preference for
‘unstructured’ data
collection (no prior
hypotheses, no prior
definitions)
A concern with the ‘micro’ 
features o f  social life ( ‘a 
single sitting or group’)
A concern with the meaning 
and function o f  social action
The assumption that 
quantification plays a 
subordinate role"
Hammersley (1992)
“A preference for 
qualitative data - use o f  
words rather than 
numbers....
A preference for naturally- 
occurring data- observation 
rather than experiment, 
unstructured versus
structured interviews...
A preference for meanings 
rather than behaviour - 
attempting ‘to document the 
world from the point o f  
view o f  the people 
studied’..........
A preference for inductive, 
hypothesis-generating 
research rather than 
hypothesis-testing.."
Berry (1993, p. 225) argues that "Qualitative research i s ... best used for problems where the results 
will increase understanding, expand know ledge, clarify the real issues, generate hypotheses, identify' a 
range o f  behaviour, explore and explain individual motivations, attitudes and behaviour....” .
Based on the above. I argue that the qualitative approach suited my research 
requirements since I w'as concerned with understanding as well as describing the 
phenomenon under investigation. Issues such as the banks’ cultures and their 
relationship to IT adoption emerged from analysing the informants’ narration. As will 
be described in the case studies and the analysis chapters, I identified different cultures 
based on the metaphors and analogies the interviewees used in their discussion. Such 
metaphors and analogies were rich in presenting these organisations’ world views and
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fhow these world views were interlinked with their adoption behaviour. Adopting a 
qualitative approach enabled the capture of subtleties within these institutions
Another criticism of the qualitative approach is the high level of subjectivity associated 
with it. Elaborating on this disadvantage, Miles (1979) writes that :
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Disadvantages of a qualitative approach:
i
My experience in adopting a qualitative approach is consistent with that reported in the
literature about the disadvantages of adopting this approach. Miles (1979) and King
(1994), for example, argued that the process was very labour intensive and time
consuming. I found this to be very true during all the phases of conducting the
qualitative approach. Arranging and conducting the interviews were very time
consuming. Transcribing was another labour intensive operation that consumed much
of the researcher’s time. The output of the transcribing process was an overload of
transcripts. Exploring the different possible wavs of coding these transcripts, writing up
.the case studies and creating matrices to enable cross case study analysis contributed to 
the labour intensive process.
’’the analyst faced with a bank o f  qualitative data has veiy  few  guidelines for protection against 
self-delusion, let alone the presentation o f ’‘unreliable" or “ invalid conclusions to scientific or 
policy-m aking audiences." (590).
While subjectivity is an inevitable feature of qualitative research, there are a number of 
steps that can be taken to minimise its effect. Conducting several interviews with 
several different informants in each organisation, and careful documentation of the 
materials allowing the reader to judge the waiter’s possible biases, were two steps used 
in the present study.
%
Conduct of empirical work:
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The aim of this section is to map the path that I have taken in conducting my empirical 
work. The process took the form of inductive learning, starting with a blurry vision rjs
leading me on many occasions into blind alleys that forced me to take U-tums. In other 
instances, I set out take short cuts that proved to be long ones. Marking my footsteps in
.;:,3this ‘journey’, I claim, is not any less important than arriving at my destination, for it 
demonstrates how the inductive learning evolved.
■;2
Pilot studies: s
At the outset of my research project, I conducted two pilot studies. The first pilot study 
was conducted in Scotland with three banks. The informants that I interviewed were a 
senior manager- in Automation. R&D; a manager from Migration Strategy Planning: 
and two senior managers working with a major IT project. Yin (1994) says that “the pilot
i
case may be chosen for several reasons unrelated to the criteria for selecting the final cases in the case
•Sstudy design. For example, the informants at the pilot site may be unusually congenial and accessible, or
'Ithe site may be geographically convenient, or it may have an unusual amount o f  documentation and ®
data  in general, convenience, access and geographic proximity can be the main criteria for selecting
the pilot case or cases." (pp. 74, 75). The accessibility to the three Scottish banks encouraged
3me to conduct the pilot studies then. At that early stage of my research project, these 
pilot studies were experimental and of a 'laboratory role' aiming to provide me with 
insights about the possible approaches to my research project.
I conducted the second pilot study with three banks in Bahrain, and it took around three 
months in 1994. I concluded that it was not feasible to adopt a quantitative approach to 
survey the 19 commercial banks in Bahrain, as I suspected that the response rate would 
be very low and that would disable any statistical generalisation. Moreover, I decided, 
based on the second pilot study, to focus my thesis on the Bahraini market and discard ::r
_ ___
the British market as it was easier for me to access Bahraini banks than British banks. 
The pilot studies were based on semi-structured and unstructured interviews with
L Local Bank
; Group i p
r Branch o f  a
fo re ig n  Banking
D om estic  Market
(?) '"Group
informants within the three Bahraini banks.
Main field work:
In the main field trip, which took place 
between September 1994 and March 1995, I 
interviewed informants from eight banks- 
three local banks, and five branches of 
foreign banks- which brought the total
;
I
number of banks that I interv iewed in the . Ba.k. parUdpa.ing in my field
second pilot study and the main field work to
eleven banks. The local banks operated mainly within the domestic market ( though 
some of these banks had had limited international operations), whereas the foreign 
branches were part of a global network of branches operating internationally (see Figure 
1). The informants within these banks were either part of the strategic apex or linked to 
it. In three of the eleven banks, I managed to interview the general managers. The 
interviews of a total number of 32 informants were analysed ’ (see Table 2). Since I used 
similar methodology in both the second pilot study in Bahrain and the main field work. I
in terv iew ed  oth er  inform ants. H o w ev er  du e to the tim e lim itation s I have had to d iscard  th ese  in terv iew s.
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.included the second pilot data in the main study, and therefore the conclusion that I 
arrived at from the eleven banks was reasonably valid.
Table 2: Informcrs’ positions Bank
CEOs L2, F3, F4
Support Units: Strategic planning 
senior managers; IT managers; 
operations managers; services 
managers and information 
management managers
L I, L2, L3, L4 (two informants), L5 (three 
informants). F t, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6 (two informants)
Business units: Head o f  SBUs and 
other vice presidents and senior 
managers
L2, L3 (two informants), L4, L5 (three informants), 
F2, F3 (two informants), F4, F5, F6 (two informants)
Maykut et al (1994) defined eight characteristics of qualitative research. Amongst these 
characteristics are the emergent designs of qualitative research and purposive sampling. 
To quote Maykut et al;
“Any student or researcher can, however, appreciate the experience o f  carrying out one’s research stud> 
and discovering a feature for which one's research design did not allow consideration. It is this ver> 
notion o f  pursuing important or salient early discoveries that undergirds qualitative approaches to inquir>.. 
Important leads are identified in the early phases o f  data analysis and pursued by asking new questions, 
observing new situations or previous situations with a slightly different lens, or examining previous^ 
unimportant documents. This broadening or narrowing o f  what is important to study ... and the 
consequent sampling o f  new people and settings is anticipated and planned for, as best one can, in 
qualitative research designs.” (p. 44)
My interviews in some banks led me to information about different patterns worthy of 
investigating in other banks, where I later conducted interviews. For example. I 
interviewed Local 1 st based on my interview with the IT manager in Foreign 6 , These 
two banks differed in their IT adoption approach. I was interested in understanding the 
processes that led these two banks in their adoption and strategy development 
behaviour. Accordingly my (sample) evolved over the course of study.
The interviews with some of the banks widened the scope of inquiry. I sensed important 
forms of relationships between some of these banks and other organisations, e.g. 
vendors and consultants, which affected the banks’ IT strategies / adoption decisions. 
Accordingly I approached four of the main IT vendors inquiring about their role in
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During the main field work, I did not waste any opportunity to speak to informants 
within the financial sector. I was aiming then to explore the different faces of the 
phenomenon under investigation. Some of these interviews were discarded, however, as 
they were not closely linked to the themes I developed later on, e.g. the interview with 
American Express.
Collective case studies:
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influencing the banks’ adoption decisions. These informants were managers in direct 
contact with the banks. In addition to the vendors, I interviewed one consultant after his 
bank client had mentioned the consultant’s role in formulating their strategic plans.
One of the banks mentioned their initiative to launch a shared network amongst the 
banks. This story opened a new line of inquiry for me where I investigated the banks' 
attempts to redesign their business network based on using IT collectively. I managed to 
get different views about this issue from the different participants that had had a 
stakeholding interest in the project, which I put together to permit the version of the 
story reported here.
I
AStake (1994) discussed three types of case study - the intrinsic case study, the 
instrumental case study and the collective case study. The intrinsic case study is 
selected when the focus of the inquiry is to understand a particular case. In contrast, the 
instrumental case study aims to provide an insight into an issue or a phenomenon - the 
case itself is of secondary interest. In the collective case study design, the case studies 
aim mainly to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon in a larger setting of 
cases. Duncan (1997) wxites that the selection of cases or sites is based on theoretical 
rather than statistical considerations. Moreover, these cases may be selected to represent 
the polar extremes of a phenomenon for example.
I
I opted for a collective case study design through selecting the extreme polar of the 
phenomenon to enhance my understanding. Following is an example of these polar 
extremes of the adoption behaviour within the banks;
• Nature of strategy formation process
• locally formulated vs. imported
• formal vs. ad hoc
• Relationship with the vendors:
• intimate-strategic vs. threatening
• IT/IS application development practices:
• in house vs. 'off-the-shelf
• The above forms were embraced within
• local banks vs. Foreign banks 
» small banks vs. Big banks
Method of data collection:
Yin (1994) defined six main sources of evidence for building case studies:
"documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and 
physical artefacts" (p. 79).
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Role of the researcher:
Cited in Walsham (1995. p. 75).
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I depended heavily on interviews as the main source of data collection. Walsham
(1995) argued that interviews are the primary source of data collection for interpretative
.case studies when the researcher plays an outside observer role. The interviews enabled 
me to access the informants’ different interpretations about the phenomenon under 
investigation. Moreover, I was able to draw pictures of their cultures based on the 
narrative stories, the expressions, and the metaphors that they provided in the 
interviews. This would be less possible to comprehend with other means of data 
collection. I have to say, however, that my construction of the story was highly 
influenced by my subjectivity and my understanding of their stories. In line with my 
argument, Van Maanen (1979)^ calls the interviewee's data first order data and the 
constructions of the researcher second order concepts.
Walsham (1995) identified two roles for the researcher, as an outside observer or an 
involved researcher. I played the role of the outside observer where I visited the 
informants in their natural environmental settings. The advantage of adopting this role 
according to Walsham is that the researcher is not perceived as having a direct personal 
stake in the interpretations or outcomes and therefore the interviewees would be more 
open to air their interpretations given that enough trust is developed between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. The disadvantage of this role, however, is that the 
researcher is not present in the organisation on many occasions and may fail therefore to
■develop a direct sense of the inside world of that organisation. Moreover, important 
aspects related to his research topic may be not shared with him because they may be
:perceived as too sensitive or confidential to be shared with an outsider.
Degree of interview structure:
I developed different lists of questions that aimed at guiding my interviews. These 
questions were not meant to be restrictive but rather to provide guidance to the interview 
should there be a need for it (copies of these questions are provided in the appendix). 
King (1994) argued that qualitative interviews are not relationship-free. I experienced 
this in my interviews. Trust developed with some of the interviewees. These 
interviewees actively shaped the course of the interview, going beyond the questions 
that I prepared to provide me with an insight into the phenomenon under investigation 
and pave the way for approaching other banks or other organisations, as mentioned 
earlier.
In other settings, I failed to achieve the same “intimate’ relationship with the 
interviewees. In such circumstances, the interviewees usually seek to get the interview 
over as quickly as possible, with enough detail and enough feigned interest to satisfy the researcher that he 
or she is getting something o f  value but without saying anything that touches the core o f  what is actually 
believed and cared about in the research.." (Easterby-Smith et a l  1991, p. 77).
Other sources of data:
In addition to the interviews, I used other secondary sources for collecting data. These 
were consultants' reports, annual reports and, to a lesser extent strategic planning 
documents..
Methods of capturing the data:
Most of the interviews were tape recorded. According to Patton (1980)^:
“A tape recorder is part o f  the indispensable equipment o f  evaluators using qualitative methods. 
Tape-recorders do not ‘tune out’ conversations, change what has been said because o f
C ited  in Hart (1 9 8 7 . p. 2 9 0 )
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interpretation (either conscious or unconscious), or record words more slowly than they are 
spoken, in addition to increasing the accuracy o f  data collection, the use o f  a tape recorder 
pennits the interviewer to be more attentive to the interviewee. (P. 247)” .
The main disadvantage of this method of data capture, however, was the discomfort that 
a number of interviewees felt in the presence of this machine. Some o f these informants , |
requested that I switch off the tape recorder whenever they wanted to keep issues that 
they perceived as sensitive off the record. Others provided me with a shallow type of 
data when been tape recorded. However, through the informal discussion that took 
place prior or after the formal interviewing, these infomiants were more willing to share 
their experience in the absence of the tape recorder.
ISome interviewees refused to be tape-recorded, and I had to rely on note taking. A main 
disadvantage of this means of capturing data is that the interviewer needs to be 
professional and fast enough to capture as much data as possible, which I found to be 
very difficult to do. I therefore argue that tape recording, which the majority of the 
informants accepted, was essential for capturing the data without losing any of them. 
Moreover, the tape recording technique allowed me to use Nud.lst in the analysis 
process.
Data analysis:
There are no 'off-the-shelf rules for analysing qualitative data. King (1994) pointed out 
that the notion of producing a 'cookbook' of instructions contradicted the flexibility and 
openness of the qualitative research methodology. Nonetheless, the literature suggests 
some broad guidelines. Huberman and Miles (1994). for example, prescribed four 
iterative stages for data analysis which are data collection, data reduction, data display 
and conclusion drawing and verification. Dey (1993) provided the following metaphor 
to describe the process of data analysis:
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"You can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs. And - to extend the aphorism - you can't 
make an omelette without beating the eggs together. 'A nalysis’ too involves breaking data dowm 
into bits, and then 'beating’ the bits together.... the result o f  this process... is som ething quite 
different from what we started with.” (p. 31)
He described the process as iterative, starting with the data and then flowing to 
describing, classifying, connecting, and producing an account (pp. 30 -62).
In the following subsections I provide a description of the steps that I went through in 
my analysis.
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On-site reflection:
Though I did not start formally analysing my data until I had returned from the field 
work, the informal analysis - in the form of informed intuition - started while I was 
conducting the field work. As I mentioned earlier, I sensed the need to inquire about 
the role of the vendors in shaping the banks' adoption decisions and hence I approached 
the vendors. This objective evolved as a result of interpreting the narration of some of
the bank informants. Other issues that I inquired about as a result of early analysis were 
the shared network project and the role of the different stakeholders in this process, and 
the different approaches in adopting / developing the strategies of IT which led me to 
selectively include certain banks in my sample.
Transcribing the interviews:
The formal analysis of the qualitative data started with transcribing the interviews. 
Emphasis has been made in the literature on this process, to quote King (1994):
“This discussion o f  data analysis makes the assumption that the researcher has available full 
transcripts o f  interviews. Difficult and time-consuming though transcription is, there really is no 
satisfactory alternative to recording and fully transcribing qualitative research interviews.” (p. 
25)
ïThe transcribing process was a very labour intensive work. The time required to 
transcribe each hour of an interview may vary. For example, Hart (1987) reported that 
transcribing an hour of the interview would require four hours while Pidgeon at al 
(1996) reported that it would take from eight to ten hours to transcribe an hour of a tape. 
It took me around fifteen hours to transcribe an hour of a recorded interview. The 
informants’ accent'^ was an important factor in determining the speed of transcribing. 
For example, I interviewed Bahrainis, British, Indians, Pakistanies. 
Canadians/Americans, and informants with a Chinese accent - of Hong Kong 
nationality. The hardest and most time-consuming to transcribe was the Chinese accent.
II
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I invested in a good quality tape recorder with a microphone sensitive enough to pick up 
interviewee responses and filter away any noise in the surrounding environment. This 
investment paid off by providing good quality recorded interviews, which eased, to 
some extent, the agony of transcribing.
Nature of qualitative data:
The data 1 obtained from the field work 
were like snapshots (see Figure 2 ). Some of
ConceptConcept
Snapshots 
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concept A
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tThese databits often did not fonn a 
complete or inter-linked stor\*. In other 
instances these snapshots or databits were 
related to a chronological event or events 
that had happened in the bank. Nonetheless, the informant talked about these events a 
bit here and a bit there whenever he remembered something related to the topic that he
Figure 2: Snapshots o r d a ta b its  an d  their re lationship  
w ith concepts in the transcrip ts.
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had talked about previously. The raw data were messy and unorganised which spurred 
me to consider using an automated means to manage my 'messy’ qualitative data.
Computer-aided approaches:
Before I continue describing my analysis process, 1 would like to provide a brief 
background about the use of computers in qualitative data analysis, followed by a 
description of Nud.lst which I used in my analysis.
Richards et al (1994) discussed the different groups of computer application programs 
which are used in qualitative data analysis. These programs are based on the concept of 
the code-and-retrieve feature, which is the minimum facility that these programs provide 
the qualitative researcher for managing and analysing his,her qualitative data. Richard 
et al argue that the code-and-retrieve method enables theory to emerge. This can be 
done through an iterative process o f assigning labels or codes to concepts emerging 
from the data and then exploring the relationship between these concepts. The output, 
from studying the text, assigning concepts to it, exploring the relationship between these 
concepts, and linking them can be re-fed into the computer database for further 
examination and analysis, a process which they called 'system closure*.
Richards et al grouped the qualitative data analysis application programs into the 
following groups:
• Code-and-retrieve. This group of application programs enable the researcher to 
assign codes to databits within the text and then retrieve them. An example of this 
type of software is Ethnograph. The software enables, among other things, retrieval 
based on Boolean searches, supports managing the documents into sets called 
catalogues and then restricts searches to certain catalogues, and displays occurrence 
of codes in files of specific text portions.
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. 'S-Rule-based, and logic-based theory building systems. These two types of program
enable more explicit developing and testing of theory. The rule-based systems
.provide advanced code-and-retrieve functions such as searching the text and then 
“autocoding” the findings. It allows theory testing through Boolean searches for co­
occurences of codes. Moreover, it allows system closure through referring the 
outcome of the searches back into the system. These features are performed b> 
production rules in the form of “if conditions Cl to Cn hold for some data, then 
perform action A on the data” (p. 455). An example of this type of software is 
HyperResearch.
The logic-based systems provide more sophisticated features such as theory
generating and testing. AQUAD is an example of this type of software. It enables
linkage analysis through, for example, searching for positive and negative cases that
are located within certain distances within the text, e.g. “to what extent do codes A
and B occur within textual distance d” (Richards et al, 1994, p. 456). Sophisticated
.users can use the logic programming language 'Prolog’ in designing their search
' ■?;
routine and in testing their hypotheses.
• Network systems. These systems allow the presentation of theory in the form of 
nodes that are represented in the form of a tree or a hierarchy of concepts with 
different levels of abstraction. These systems allow the retrieval of data from these 
nodes at the different hierarchical levels and enable system closure. Examples of 
these systems are Nud.lst and ATLAS/ti (Kelle, 1995, p. 12).
Among the above systems. Ethnograph was the least sophisticated system and might 
have been sufficient for my data management requirements. However, I used Nud.lst 
mainly because it was being used in the University of Glasgow, a factor that 1 
considered should I need any practical help. In addition to that, the developers of
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Nud.lst in cooperation with Cran field University were active in promoting and
Use of Nud.lst in the anaiysis process:
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supporting the software, which in turn positively affected my decision to use it. 
Description of Nud.lst:
I
Nud.lst consists of two main systems, the document system and the index system.
:Within the document system, the researcher can introduce his documents and perform 
search and retrieve techniques on these documents when needed. With the index system 
the researcher can conceptualise the main themes and represent them by nodes arranged 
in a tree or a network of hierarchy structure. Each of these nodes can index databits 
within the documents stored in the document system. The researcher can perform 
sophisticated searches within the nodes of the index system and then place the findings 
of these searches into nodes that can be used for further searches and analysis.
One of the drawbacks of qualitative research is the huge and messy data sets that 
researchers have to handle. I therefore attempted to embark on using a computer 
system, Nud.lst, to help me in organising my data.
To analyse the qualitative data, I wanted to break down the data into databits and then 
relate these databits to concepts or categories. This process required great familiarity 
with the data at hand. Moreover, it required going backward and forward between the 
text and the categories that represented the conception drawn from the databits of the 
text.
Dey (1993. p. 100) suggested the following possible sources for generating categories:
« "Inferences from the data
Initial or emergent research questions 
Substantive, policy and theoretical issues
'I
• Imagination, intuition and previous knowledge”.
.In addition to the above sources, Dey described three strategies for categorising:
a ‘bit-by-bit’ approach in which the categories are generated through studying the 
smallest databits of the text and then building concepts of bigger grain size based on 
interrelating and comparing the smaller concepts or categories;
a ‘holistic’ approach in which the researcher predetermines the main themes that he 
or she wants his categories to grasp and then starts to subcategorise these broad 
categories later on in the analysis. This approach is more feasible when the Iresearcher is certain about what he or she is looking for in the data at the outset of 
the analysis: and the
a ’middle-order’ approach in which the categories are developed based on broad 
preliminary distinctions that may be based on common sense categories. The 
researcher does not commit him/herself in this strategy to a predefined framework. 
The analysis can move in either direction, towards more refined distinction through 
further subcategorising or towards a more integrated approach through integrating 
the middle-order categories.
At the outset of the categorisation phase, I explored the bit-by-bit approach. This 
approach suited grounded theory (Dey, 1993, p. 103), an approach that I shifted focus 
from later on as I ran out of my most valuable resource, time, and faced difficulties in 
properly designing Nud.lst index system. As I spent such a long time counting the
blades of grass - by following the bit-by-bit approach - 1 tended to lose sight of what the
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field looked like. Similar experiences were reported by other researchers who followed 
this approach in which they were sceptical about their direction. For example, Singh
(1996) reported that she failed to progress in her research project and focus her line of 
inquiry based on the categories she generated. Instead she depended on her memos that 
she wrote. The following is a quotation narrating her experience:
i
“Though ways o f  coding are not meant to be prescriptive, the detailed manual approach 
(Richards & Richards {developers o f  Nud.lst}, 1992, p. 42 ) sets standards that are hard to ignore 
at the early stages o f  a study. This attempt at open coding was productive, but it effectively froze 
coding for w eeks as I faced the nearly impossible task o f  analysing the text in detail when 1 was 
unsure o f  the central themes o f  the study. I didn’t know a better way, but I feared that in this 
dismembering o f  the interview, the context and meaning would be lost. N ot sure o f  what 1 was 
doing, and only knowing that this detailed questioning o f  data so early in the analysis, was not 
working, I continually asked, Am I doing it right?” .
Dey (1993, p. 104) argues that the selection between the above three strategies of
categorising could be a question of pragmatism rather than principle. When time is
tight, he discourages adopting the bit-by-bit approach as it is the most time demanding
-one, “with the result that som e parts o f  the data are never properly analysed.” . The ‘holistic’ and the 
‘middle-order’ approaches may provide a better option to cope with the time constraint.
I opted to categorise my data based on broad categories that I derived either from my 
questions or I envisaged as I became more familiar with the transcript at hand. These 
categories, or nodes, did not, howe\er, restrict me in my analysis as I deleted some of 
them and collapsed others. More about these categories will be discussed later on.
Abandoning Nud.lst:
As mentioned earlier, Dey (1993) prescribed 'description’ as a key element in the 
qualitative data analysis. The 'description’ may encompass the contexts, the intentions, 
and the processes of the phenomenon under investigation. Gable (1994) and Walsham
(1995) write that providing this kind of 'thick description’ is essential for enabling an 
understanding of the phenomenon. Stake (1995, p. 40) argues that qualitative research
uses narration to maximise the opportunity for the reader to gain an understanding of the 
case study. I took the decision, therefore, to present my ‘thick description’ in a case 
study format. In order to enable cross case analysis later on, I aimed to structure these 
cases more or less in a similar way through adopting ‘grand’ categories embracing the 
topics that I wanted to analyse. These ‘grand* categories formed the bases for reporting 
my case studies in more or less comparable manner.
The Nud.lst index that I 
designed based on the categories 
or nodes I created violated a key 
principle that the developers of 
Nud.lst prescribed. Richards 
and Richards (1995, p.89)
require that for creating a 
Nud.lst index, "one topic or idea 
should occur in only one place in the
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Figure 3: C o lla tin g  opera tions to  p ro d u ce  new nodes
index system". This type of violation disabled further use of Nud.lst without substantial 
amounts of time being spent to modify the Nud.lst index. What follows is an 
elaboration of this subject.
Richards and Richards (1995) defined two types of categories or “nodes’, the ‘factual 
categories' and the “referential categories'. The factual categories may embrace, for 
example, all text relevant to the foreign banks (by creating a node for all foreign banks) 
versus all text related to the local banks (another node created for the Local banks). 
Referential nodes or categories, on the other hand, would include, for example, all text 
related to issues such as ‘perceived role of IT’ (by creating a node for this category) or 
“process of strategy fomiation' (by creating another node for this category) regardless of 
who said it. In this design one can proceed to examine, for example, how the foreign 
banks differ in their strategy formation from the local banks through using the ‘union'
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command in Nud.lst (see Figure 3). The outcome of a ‘union' search operation could be 
the production of a new node that contains texts related to the local banks’ IT strategies 
verses another new node that contains the text related to the foreign banks’ IT strateg) 
formation process. These two new nodes could be studied for further analysis and 
thereafter entered into the Nud.lst system to enable further searches and analysis.
My index system was designed in a way that each of the factual categories, for example 
each of the banks in this case, had separate node. Moreover, the referential categories, 
e.g. perceived role of IT, formation of IT strategies, and culture, to mention three, were 
not located each under a separate node, but instead they were duplicated for each bank, 
e.g. LI would have children nodes such as ‘perceived role of IT’ and TT strategy 
formation’, as would all of the other banks. This was a serious violation of the Richards 
and Richards principle on which Nud.lst was based. By following the way I designed 
the Nud.lst index, I aimed then to use Nud.lst to help me manage my data so that for 
each case study I would have more or less similar categories embracing the databits or 
the snapshot related to these categories, so that I could easily write the “thick' 
description forming these case studies. Meeting this goal, however, disabled me at a 
later stage from analysing my qualitative data based on the ‘hierarchical category 
analysis’ that Nud.lst was designed to support. This was the blind alley that I went 
down which brought my partnership with Nud.lst to its end as I did not have enough 
time then to redesign the Nud.lst index based on its designers' principles.
There were many advantages I gained from using Nud.lst, however. As I mentioned 
earlier. Nud.lst enabled management of the messy qualitative data by enabling me to 
group them in categories. It also facilitated laying out the structure of the case studies. 
The most important advantage, which any researcher would appreciate, was enabling me 
to comprehend the massive amount of data that were generated from the interviews. In 
addition to the above, the experience that I gained was valuable in giving me the needed 
expertise for embarking on Nud.lst in my future qualitative research projects.
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Description of the categories:
I include in this section the main categories that formed the ‘thick description’ provided 
in the case studies. These categories were not predetermined at the outset of the analysis 
phase. However as the blurred vision got sharper they became more identifiable. The 
following table summarises my broad categories:
Table 3: Categories and their broad preliminary definition
Business focus The informants’ perception o f  the factors that affect their 
competitiveness and the banking industry environment in Bahrain.
Perceived role o f  IT How the informants perceived the role o f  IT to their banks. Moreover, it 
includes the replies o f  how  the banks were different or alike in using IT.
Main IT developm ents The main IT systems that the informants talked about.
Reason for embarking on 
IT projects /  driver for the 
strategy
The reason for embarking on IT initiatives or strategies.
Formation o f  IT strategies Responses o f  the informants describing the process o f  strategy formation.
Relationship with the 
vendors
The informants’ perception o f  their relationship with the vendors.
Role o f  IT manager in the 
process o f  strategy 
formation
The IT managers’ role in the process o f  strategy formation.
Relationship between  
business strategies and IT 
strategies
The possible relationship between the two strategies.
Banks' culture What I perceived as the elements that could draw a picture o f  the banks' 
cultures.
Problems associated with 
the adoption o f  IT
Replies related to the informants’ concerns and problems associated with 
their adoption o f IT.
J
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Dey (1993, p. 102) recommended defining and redefining these categories as the 
analysis evolves. The above categories provided me with broad guidelines for writing 
and analysing my cases. However, they were not restrictive. I had to collapse some of 
these categories as there was redundancy in the topics that they embraced, or it was 
more appropriate to keep them under broader categories. For example, I collapsed the 
‘perceived role of IT category’ into the culture category, aiming to identify the main 
features of the different cultures, and I included the “role of IT manager’ and the 
‘relationship between business strategies and IT strategies’ under the ‘strategy 
formation’ category. This type of category collapsing, called “laddering’, takes place as 
part of refocussing the analysis process (Esterby-Smith, 1991. p. 111).
Production of matrices:
no matter how w ell you understand things at the case level, you are faced with the spectre or 
overload and unmanageability when you try to draw meaningful cross-case conclusions.." (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994, p. 177)
The above quotation describes the difficulties that 1 faced when I wanted to analyse the 
multiple case studies. To overcome this problem, I tended to form matrices for the 
grand categories I developed. As mentioned earlier, data display was one of the 
qualitative data analysis phases that Huberman and Miles (1994) described. The 
matrices that I developed aimed, therefore, to assemble the data related to each of the 
case studies in a standard format to enable my cross case analysis (examples of these i
matrices are provided in the appendix).
Thick description and the main themes:
As I mentioned earlier, the collective case study approach that I followed aimed to 
explore the polar extremes of the phenomenon under in\ estigation (refer to page 68). I 
provide a ‘thick description’ of these case studies in Chapters five, six, and seven, which 
discuss the foreign banks, the ad hoc local banks, and the rational local banks
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Stake (1994, p. 241) describes triangulating as the process in which the researcher uses
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respectively, aiming to preserve the integrity of the story, and provide an insight of the 
contexts of each case study. The categories that I created with the aid of Nud.lst helped 
as a scaffolding for structuring each of these case studies. Moreover, some of these 
categories acted as the main themes around which I wTote my thematic chapters (8, 9.
10, and 11) where I contrasted the different cases with each other.
I
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Triangulation:
A A
multiple procedures including ‘redundancy of data gathering’ to reduce the chances of
any misinterpretation. Miles and Huberman (1994. p. 266) describe triangulating as the 
process of using different measures to confirm the findings.
My strategy for triangulating depended on using a multiple case study approach.
interviewing different informants within each site, and attempting to examine other
.related sources such as the hanks' strategic documents and consultants' reports. This 
approach, according to Stake may serve to "clarify meaning by identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen” (p. 2 4 1 ) .  My success in triangulating depended also on how 
cooperative the organisations were. In two banks, I was not able to interview more than 
one informer. Moreover. I faced limited success in getting access to the banks' strategic 
documents. In the majority of the banks, however. I succeeded in interviewing se\eral 
informants, which made this technique and the multiple case study approach the main 
techniques 1 used in triangulating.
; l l
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Limitations:
Formal analysis took place after 1 had returned from my field work. This could be 
counted as one of the limitations, as I was limited in my ability to exploit the emergent 
nature of qualitative research that widens or narrows its focus based on the iterative 
process between data collection and data analysis.
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One of the ‘nightmares’ about data analysis is that the data at hand are not able to 
illuminate what they are supposed to (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 77). The 
probability of facing this problem may increase as the culture becomes more 
conservative about airing information related to its members’ practices. Based on my 
experience, I found the banking sector to be very conservative in its openness. Some of 
the interviewees (three informants out of the thirty two informants) refused to be tape 
recorded, and some interviewees informed me that they were uncomfortable about being 
tape recorded and were conservative in their answers to my questions. This type of 
problem may face those researchers who play an outside role, such as I played.
Despite these problems. I argue that the qualitative methodology that I adopted was 
most suited to answering the type of research questions I posed at the beginning of this 
chapter. 1 managed to overcome many of the above limitations through asking m y  
sponsor, Bahrain University, to waite directly to the head of the banks and hence gain 
the needed support from the top management for interviewing the informants. 
Moreover, interpersonal relationships were an important facilitator for gaining access to 
the majority of these banks including the regulatory body. In many of these banks. I 
knew personally (or others recommended me to) the informants and hence trust, which 
is a valuable resource for the researcher, existed between them and me. In these 
interviews, the informants were veiy open and willing to share their views and
■à;experiences. These interviews were the most valuable ones for my research project.
Chapter four
Bahrain Financial Services Sector
Introduction:
This chapter discusses the features of the financial services sector in Bahrain. Its aim is 
to provide the reader with a background to the scene in which the case studies - the 
commercial banks - operate.
The chapter starts by providing a brief historical background about the Bahraini 
economy. Then it sheds some light on the main changes that have occurred within the 
Gulf economies and their effect on the banking sectors in these countries. These 
changes had affected to some degree the banking industiy in Bahrain and were behind 
some of the changes that occurred within the Bahraini banks that I will discuss in the 
culture section. The chapter concludes by describing the Bahraini monetary system.
Economy:
The state of Bahrain is located half way down the Arabian Gulf, around 24 kilometres 
from the eastern cost of Saudi Arabia. Bahrain consists of an archipelago of about 33 
small islands, with a total area of 705.55 square km. Bahrain Island is the largest of 
these and it counts about 85% of the total area of the State of Bahrain. The population 
of Bahrain in 1993 was around 538,085 inhabitants (Statistical Abstract, 1995).
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Bahrain gained its independence on the 14 August 1971 after it had been legally 
described as a ‘protected state’ by the United Kingdom. On the 21 September 1971 it 
joined the United Nations (Bseisu, 1984).
Before 1930, Bahrain had been dependent on trade and pearl fishing industries as the
1932 marked a turning point in the modem histor\' of Bahrain. In that year, oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities, which transformed the economy and the social life 
of the country.
The economy from the early seventies onwards may best be described as diversified. 
The government of Bahrain followed a diversification strategy to overcome the 
declining oil revenue. The Bahrain aluminium plant was the earliest industrial project 
marking the new era. The aluminium smelter marketed 446,200 tons of aluminium in 
1993. Surrounding this project, there were a number of ancillary projects and services 
that depended on the production of the aluminium smelter. These were Bahrain
' Crude oil production decreased from 27.973 mn US barrels in 1970 to 14.650 mn barrels in 1994, (Bseisu, 1984, p. 
64 and Statistical Abstract, Dec. 1995)
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main sources of revenue for the country. However, the introduction of the Japanese 
cultured pearl resulted in the collapse of the pearl industry, an event that created a severe 
recession in the Gulf region at the time.
.1
A
The economy of Bahrain between 1930 and late sixties may best be described as a one 
commodity economy which depended on oil as the main source of income to the 
country. However, the production of oil from the main land decreased starting from the 
early seventies’, providing only a modest revenue to the country as compared to that of 
the other Gulf states. Currently, the Bahrain oil industry is concentrated in exporting 
refined products rather than crude petroleum (Capital intelligence, 1994). The refinery 
of Bahrain processes imported oil from Saudi Arabia in addition to the Bahraini crude 
oil. In 1994 Bahrain processed a total of 88.787 mn barrels, out of which 75,716 mn 
barrels were imported from Saudi and 14.650 mn barrels were Bahraini crude 
(Statistical Abstract. 1995).
I
ïAluminium Company which markets the output of the smelter, Bahrain Aluminium 
Extrusion Company, an extrusion plant; International Bahrain Aluminium Atomiser, a 
powdering plant; and Middle East Aluminium Cables which produces wire, to name 
some (BMA, 1994).
The other course of diversification strategy took place towards the services sector. 
Tourism was one of the services sectors that received attention. However, the major 
expansion in the services sectors was in insurance and to a greater extent in banking. In 
the insurance sector, a multi-national insurance company called the Arab Insurance 
Group with an authorised capital of 3 billion dollars and paid up capital of $150 mn was 
established in 1981 (Bseisu, 1984). As for the banking sector, by the end of 1992 
Bahrain hosted seventeen commercial banks, forty seven offshore banks, fortv* one 
representative offices, and twenty one investment banks. In 1994, this sector including 
real estate contribution was around 20% of the GDP. The commercial banks 
contributed less than 5% of the GDP (Statistical Abstract, 1995).
Table I : Percentage contribution to GDP by type o f  economic activity
Agriculture & Fisheries 0.9
Mining & Quarrying 15.7
Manufacturing 17.6
Electricity & Water 1.7
Construction 6
Trade, Hotels & Restaurants 11.4
Transport and communications. 11,8
Finance & Real State 20.1
Social & Personal services. 5.2
Public Admin. 19.5
Source: Statistic A bstract 1994 . Central Statistics O rganisation, Balirain
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This section discusses some of the key economic changes that happened in the Gulf
II
flEconomic factors affecting the banking
industries in the Gulf states, a historical 
perspective:
economies during the 70s to mid 80s which influenced the banking industry in Bahrain.
The Gulf Co-operation Council countries (GCC), Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, may share more or less similar characteristics 
amongst themselves. The economies in these countries are highly affected by changes 
in the oil revenue that forms a major source of income to these governments.
The sharp increase in oil prices during the late seventies and early eighties positively 
influenced the government’s revenues and subsequently the domestic liquidity in the 
GCC countries.
The banks had high liquidity, which made it possible for them to meet the growing 
demand for credit lending. Some of these banks were willing to lend hinds on the basis o f  
name rather than balance sheet and, in many cases, they were serving the interests and businesses o f  their 
major shareholders (ESCW A, 1987, p. I).’’
The domestic markets were limited in terms of the business opportunities open to the 
banks. Lending was done mainly to finance commerce, construction, and real estate. 
Investments in the real estate markets were then recovered in relatively short time. This 
encouraged speculation in the real estate markets which were booming in most of the 
GCC countries (ESCWA, 1987, p. 2). Moreover, there was a tendency amongst the 
banks to participate heavily in international loan syndication to seek new business 
opportunities.
8 8 1
1985 was a turning year for the economies of the GCC countries. The sharp decrease in 
oil prices and the depreciation in the dollar triggered a series of negative economic 
events. The GCC governments restricted their spending polices to meet the shaip 
decrease in their revenue. This policy contributed to the recession that hit the region in 
that period. As a consequence of these changes, the structure of the banks’ lending 
shifted away from the real estate and construction sectors to other sectors, such as the 
industry and services sectors.
The recession hit the real estate and the stock markets then in many of the Gulf states. 
Many of the participants in these markets were unable to meet their debt obligations. 
Consequently, the banks’ profitability suffered, especially in those banks that had 
accepted buildings, lands, and stock shares as a collateral (ibid., p. 18). The percentage 
of non-performing loans to outstanding loans increased drastically. In some countries, 
like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the non performing loans were about 45% of 
outstanding loans (ibid., p. 5).
The world debt crisis also contributed to the profitability problems of the GCC banks. 
Most of the banks that participated in the Euro-dollar syndicates suffered when 
countries like the Latin American countries, for example, failed to meet their 
obligations. For example, Latin American debts were tradable in the secondary markets 
at around 30-35%. Many of the Gulf loans were barely recoverable at all (Cunningham, 
1989).
As for the 1990s, many of the banks, including the Bahraini banks recovered and 
produced profits, though the second Gulf crisis in 1990 left some scars on the 
performance of some of these banks.
The above changes may provide some explanation for the changes that occurred within 
the Bahraini market which had influenced the banks’ strategy formation and thereafter 
IT adoption behaviour, as will be discussed in more detail in the coming chapters.
!
89
The financial services sector in Bahrain:
Structure of the financial market:
Central
Bank
Commercial Offshore Investment Specialized Others
Banks banks banks banks
20 47 25 2
Source: Statistical Abstract 1995. 
State o f  Bahrain, Central Statistics 
Organization.
F igure I: F inancial institu iions o pera tin g  in Bahrain f l9 9 4 ).
I
The financial sector in Bahrain, as Figure 1 indicates, is made up mainly of commercial 
banks, offshore banks, investment banks, specialised banks, and other financial 
institutions such as brokers, money changers, investment advisory and representative 
offices. All areas of the Bahrain banking scene are regulated by the Bahrain Monetajy 
Agency (BMA), which plays the role of the central bank. The BMA maintains a close 
relationship with the Bank of England (Cunningham, 1989) from which has advisors. 
The BMA was the first bank amongst the Gulf states that adopted the Bank of England's 
"loss provision matrix” that requires specific resources to be set against the loans 
(Cunningham, p. 9). The banking institutions supervised by the BMA receive one of 
three types of license. These are full commercial bank (FCB), offshore banking unit 
(OBU) and investment bank (IB) licenses. Figure 1 summarises the number o f these 
banking institutions in 1994.
I
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allowed to issue any checking accounts or check books.
borrower (Cunningham, 1989), and the disappearance of Lebanon as a regional financial
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Investment and specialised banks:
In 1994, there were 25 investment banks. These banks are allowed to perform merchant 
banking business, especially securities business. These institutions provide limited
banking activities such as accepting deposits from banks or non-banking institutions 
outside Bahrain provided that these deposits exceed certain limits. These banks are not
The specialised banks, on the other hand, are represented by the Housing Bank and the 
Bahrain Development Bank. The Housing Bank is fully owned by the government and 
its aim is to advance housing related loans. The Development Bank, on the other hand, 
aims at supporting industrial and business activities in Bahrain. It is owned by the 
government, other banks and the private sector.
The offshore banking units (OBUs):
As mentioned earlier, the decline in the oil revenue obligated Bahrain to diversify its 
economy. The services sector came under consideration as a possible source of revenue 
then. In 1975, BMA announced that it would develop Bahrain as an international 
banking centre. Thereafter, Bahrain was successful in attracting a relatively large 
number of offshore banking units.
The OBUs are banks or branches of foreign banks that are licensed by the BMA to cany 
out banking operations outside Bahrain. Tliese offshore units are not allowed to deal 
with the residents of Bahrain other than the government or the fully licensed banks. 
(Bseisu, 1984),
The surplus of liquidity that was caused by the high oil revenues during the eaii) 
seventies created a demand in the region for regional financial institutions sophisticated 
enough to absorb these surpluses rather than allowing them to be deposited abroad. The 
proximity of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, a main source of these surpluses and main
centre due to its civil war, enhanced Bahrain's ability to establish this regional centre 
(Bseisu, 1984).
Î
The total assets of the OBUs has fluctuated over the years depending on the economic 
prosperity in the region. It fell from over US$72 billion in 1989 to US$51 billion in 
1991 and then it rose to US$70 billion in 1992 (Capital Intelligence, 1994). Their 
contribution to the Bahraini GDP in 1994 was 8.1% (Statistical Abstract, 1995).
The major portion of the assets and liabilities of the OBUs was within the Arab world. 
However, the Gulf crisis in 1990 increased the importance of the USA in this 
distribution, as the following table indicates (Capital intelligence, 1994).
Table 2: D istribu tion  o f  a sse ts  an d  lia b ilitie s  o f  O B U s
1983 1988 1993
Ass Liab Ass Liab Ass Liab
Arab Countries 46.8 65.5 40.7 62 34.6 48.3
North America 3.6 4.3 7.1 6.8 19 16.4
Western Europe 24,9 20.5 20.8 16.7 22.1 19.8
Offshore Centers 9.6 7.4 7.4 8.4 7.7 18.6
Other 15.1 2.3 2.3 6.1 16.6 6.9
Source; Capital Intelligence, Jan. 1994. P.O. Box 3585, 6-8 Paphos Road, Limassol, Cyprus
Commercial banks:
My thesis focuses on studying the commercial banks in Bahrain. Some of these banks 
carried two licenses, full commercial bank and OBU licenses, which enabled them to 
perform domestically and abroad. The commercial banks’ markets are protected and 
regulated by the central bank. Each of the licensed financial institutions is restricted to 
offering only what its license permits it to offer. Moreover, none of these institutions 
can compete in the other’s market, e.g. the offshore banks cannot compete domestically 
with the commercial banks and no non-commercial banking institutions can offer 
banking products and services other than the commercial banks.
Bahrain was the first country amongst the Gulf states to have a banking industry. The 
first bank operated in Bahrain in 1921, followed by another bank that operated in 1944. 
Both of these banks were branches of foreign banks. The first national bank was
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established in 1956^ (Arab Communications, 1993). These banks were operating 
domestically at the time and were providing rudimentary services such as:
■‘Opening o f  current accounts, savings accounts and time deposits for individuals and 
corporations.
Lending to businessmen and traders; by means o f  overdraft, loan agreements and the discounting 
o f promissory notes or post-dated cheques.
Financing imports and re-exports, through letters o f  credit or bills collection sent to importers in 
Bahrain.
Effecting remittances abroad for residents o f  the island either for trade or personal purposes." 
(Bseisu, 1984, p i2)
During the seventies, the growth of the commercial banks’ activities in terms of assets 
followed the pattern of the economy and was highly influenced by the revenue of oil 
(Ibid., p. 13).
In 1994, there were 19 commercial banks, out of which two banks were operating based 
on the ‘Islamic’ financing principles. The majority of the commercial banks were 
foreign banks. However, there were six banks which were either fully Bahraini banks or 
joint venture banks with Bahraini capital. Around 12 of the foreign banks were 
branches of foreign banks. The total assets of all of the commercial banks grew from 
1,228,0 million Bahraini dinar (BD) in 1983 to BD2,618.9 mn in 1994 (Statistical 
Abstract, 1995).
Bahrain business Director,', 12th Edition 1993, Published by Arab Communications
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In 1992, there were seven banks that controlled around 82.6% of the domestic 
operations (Capital Intelligence, 1994). The following is a break down of the banks' 
market share:
Table 3: C o m m erc ia l banks' m arket sh are-  
B ahrain  o p era tio n s  on ly (1 9 9 2 )
Assets
BDmn
%
Local Banks 1399.4 70.1
Two main foreign banks 249.1 12.5
Others 347.3 17.4
Total 1995.8 100
Recalculated based on Capital Intelligence figures.
Banks' lending structure:
One of the concerns about the Bahraini economy is that it is small as compared to that of 
the other Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE ( see Figure 2). The domestic 
market was described as being overbanked with too many Bahraini dinars chasing too 
few business opportunities, to paraphrase one o f the banks’ informants.
Kuwait
6%
Bahrain 
3%
Qatar Oman 
3%
Saudi
49%
Figure 2: GCC Countries Commercial Banks Credit 
Source: Econom ic Bulletin, 1995, G ulf Co-operation Council
Table 4 represents a summary of the lending structure of the Bahraini banks to the 
different sectors. During the seventies, all of the banks perceived personal financing as 
a marginal business and most competed in financing the construction and trade sectors. 
However, the changes within the Bahraini economy shifted the focus to the personal 
sector, starting from the early eighties. Personal lending increased from 10.6% in 1978 
to 33% in 1993 making it the leading sector in terms of banking lending structure. The 
informants within the banks that I interviewed claimed that the competition was veiy 
stiff in this area as these banks tended to copy each other's products. The manufacturing
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Isector was next in importance to the personal sector as there was a greater tendency 
from the government to seek private sector support for its development projects. Trade 
financing was the traditional financing sector which was most linked to the market 
conditions in Bahrain. It was ranked the third most important sector in 1993.
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Banks
Construction Trade Persons Manufctrg&Ming Govemmt Transprt&Tours Agricult Others
1978 136.27 77.5 36.33 44.46 15.96 18.95 1.59 10.34
1979 153.11 96.21 41.1 51.83 19.37 16.48 1.72 15.38
1980 162.69 118.02 51.35 57.58 19.26 19.12 0.77 25.36
1981 149.09 145.35 89.32 44.51 7.87 13.84 0.93 44.4
1982 166.22 175.86 121.3 38.86 23.92 12.83 1.18 28.38
1983 196.93 173.83 128.22 61.1 25 12.19 1.06 32.2
1984 173.07 177.92 150.39 109.61 30.73 20.9 1.9 43.13
1985 180.28 168.6 147.33 96.44 34.4 11.25 0.58 39.13
1986 175.76 145.52 153.04 80.62 73.61 10.63 1.06 38.7
1987 145.59 113.81 161.94 70.11 169.66 17.65 1.23 33.3
1988 160.41 118.07 139,03 75.68 61.28 24.02 1.2 26.88
1989 131.23 107.08 166.78 85.63 45.73 32.17 5.5 25.9
1990 100.02 112.49 183.25 137.214 12.28 64.34 0.72 28.95
1991 91.63 118.5 167.64 143.3 14.7 30.7 1.7 28.46
1992 85.279 129.89 210.176 158 7 17.8 15.7 0.38 36.15
1993 97.035 149.37 246.299 167.8 30.8 11.9 0.88 42.28
Structure of Banks' credit in Bahrain (mn BD)
Sources:
Sharoqi. Mohamed, 1993, The Development of Bahrain Economy: 1971-89 
(in Arabic), BMA publications 
Economic Bulletin, Economic Research of the GCC Countries. VII, 1992 
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, BMA, Sept. 1993
Structure of Banks' credit
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ICommercial banks' profitability:
Islamic Banking:
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The commercial banks’ profitability suffered as a result of the non-performing loans that 
they incurred. These banks had made substantial provisions for the bad debts that they 
incurred in that period, a factor that negatively influenced their profitability.
The above changes within the economy and within the banks’ profitability had had a 
major influence on the banks. In the culture section, I discussed the radical changes that 
had taken place within a number of the banks. These radical changes were influenced 
by the economic changes that I have discussed above.
a
IIn addition to the traditional banks, Bahrain is focusing on becoming the financial centre 
for the Islamic banking institutions. In 1993, there were 18 Islamic financial institutions 
operating in Bahrain. Other conventional banks, e.g. Citibank, opened what they 
referred to as ‘Islamic Windows’ to serve this niche of the banking market. These dealt 
in diversified activities including commercial banking, fund management, insurance, 
and offshore banking (BMA, 1994).
The Islamic banking system operates on the bases of profit sharing, mark-up sales and 
equity participation. The general guidelines for these institutions is that money is only a 
store of value and means of exchange. It has no interest value in itself and therefore it
. yshould not earn money by being idly deposited in the bank (ESCWA, p. 27). Profit in f
these institutions is therefore derived from direct investment in productive ventures or 
from provision of tangible services rather than monetary investments that attract interest 
(BMA, 1994).
Chapter Five
Foreign bank case studies
Introduction:
This chapter introduces six case studies on the foreign banks. These cases aie 
grouped together based on their similarities. The total assets to these foreign bank 
groups are provided below. For reasons o f confidentiality, I did not include these 
statistics in the individual case reports.
Total assets of the 
foreign banks in 1994
Largest group US$ 290,801,590,503
Second largest group US$ 139,456,859,438
Third largest group US$ 74,883,001,554
Fourth largest group US$ 53,534,658,113
Fifth largest group US$ 11,785,993,749
Smallest foreign bank US$ 1,542,480,000
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Foreign Bank One (F1) 
Introduction:
Foreign Bank One (F 1) is an international bank, which is established in around sixty- 
countries. The bank has operated in Bahrain since the mid-seventies with a very small 
number of branches and a total of 70 employees. The bank’s branch in Bahrain is 
directed by its regional office, which is responsible for five other countries in the Gulf
region, Pakistan, and Africa.
This case summary is based on interviews with the regional Information Manager (IM).
Business focus
“Corporate banking is highly strategic in Bahrain and in the network. We provide all sort o f  
finance for our corporate customers. The 'know-how' o f  the business advice., i f  you want to open 
a business in other countries w e provide expertise., i f  they want to establish som e sort o f  a 
business we are able to advise them since our branches are in almost every country. In this sense 
it is difficult for a local bank to com pete with us. So we are more towards the multinational 
com panies or the big corporate or trading business." The Information manager.
,1,
yÿ.:.
I
who is responsible for the IT scene within its branches in the region.
«
The above quotation summarises the bank's business focus in Bahrain and in the
international markets. The bank capitalised on its extensive international network in
serving its internationally operating corporate clients. The informant believed that the
.local Bahraini banks have had a competitive disadvantage with regard to serving 
international corporate business as they lacked the necessary international network. The 
cost of dealing with the same bank internationally may have been more attractive to
-'.1
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international clients than dealing with several smaller banks that were not as well 
connected, as is the case with local banks. The bank’s strategy aimed at building a close 
relationship with the international corporate clients to provide them with consultancy 
services within the markets in which they operate. To support this kind of relationship, 
the bank built its services around providing its clients with access to a variety of 
strategic information, as well as enhancing its response to its clients’ needs.
Although in general corporate business was more strategic to the bank than its retail 
business, in some major international markets such as the USA, Hong Kong and the 
bank’s home country, the bank’s main business was retail banking. Within Bahrain, the 
bank focused on serving the corporate niche, although retail business was part of its 
daily activities.
Deliver}
systems
Linking the 
Clients
O nline
processing
Main IT developments:
As Figure 1 indicates, during the seventies, the 
bank operated on the basis of batch processing connecti«t>. 
systems. In the eighties they transferred to an 
on-line processing system, and in the nineties 
the emphasis has been on providing delivery 
systems linking the international clients to the 
bank’s system. Connectivity progressed
accordingly from an isolated island of systems and databases, to internally interlinked 
systems, and finally to global bank-client interlinked systems.
Batch
P rocessing'
70s 80s 90s
Figure 1: M ain  IT  developm en ts in FI
1 0 0
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Both of the above systems were directed at the retail banking business,
• Remote Letter of Credit generating systems;
• Electronic banking;
I
The bank was in the early stages of implementing "client server technology” and
downsizing its IT environment. The informant perceived this approach as following the
.trend in the international market in which a bank diverged, either downsizing its IT
infrastructure or continuing with the mainframe environment. Each of these IT 
.infrastructure strategies may require large investments. The down-sized client-server IT
environment may provide users with more flexibility in terms of applications that they
may run at their workstations, in addition to costing less in terms of technology than the
mainframe option. Nonetheless, migrating from a mainframe to a down-sized
environment would require the investments of large sums. Continuing with the
mainframe environment would also be an expensive option due to the high cost o f the
mainframes. The informant said that they were studying each option, and they had not
.yet determined whether to downsize their IT infrastructure on a large scale basis. It is 
worthy to mention that in Bahrain, the retail banking system was installed on a client 
server technology.
The following are the systems that the informant mentioned while talking about the 
bank’s main IT developments:
• ATMs;
• Phone banking systems (yet to be introduced after implementing and testing 
elsewhere);
'Ï*
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International Cash Management System;
Role of IT and business strategy:
...som e international branches here like Philips, like British Airways, like KLM, they require the 
financial information o f  their branches here to consolidate., our system are more driven to the 
need o f  their corporate level..
The above quotations illustrate the role that IT plays and its connection to the business 
strategy of FI.
The bank was not focusing on retail business. As for Bahrain, the bank was restricted in 
the number of branches it could open. Accordingly, retail business was not perceived as 
strategic to the bank, since it would require an extensive branch network to enable the
1 0 2
The above three systems were mainly developed to meet the needs of international 
corporate clients.
Î
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In another two months w e w ill have a system settled in the branch from early next year. We will 
introduce telephone banking. That is for the retail customers. For the corporate, the telephone 
banking hardly works... w e w ill introduce., electi’onic banking., it is tested in Singapore. PC to 
PC communication, the corporate customers can enter their request on a PC to inquire about their 
balances, interest rates, exchange rates and can send a transaction for money transfer. They can 
capture all o f  this on PCs... For the Multinational companies, we enhanced what w e call a Cash 
Management for them that the customer can link to our computer and make inquiry from any 
branch that deals with [Foreign Bank One] world wide.
.. in our priority, it would be the electronic banking more important than the telephone banking.
For the corporate banking, IT is a tool to help, but more important is how the corporate customer 
and the bank build up their relationship. That very often takes time. Both are going together. The 
bank may grow with the customer. The relationship is more important than the bank with the 
retail customer. For the corporate very often their business is our business because the bank has 
high exposure, so for this kind o f  relationship, IT is only a tool or some kind o f  facility to help, 
but more important is the mutual benefit and mutual trust... In our advertisements w e emphasise 
on the way in which w e will be able to help the customer, IT is important, but it is not highly 
strategically important. It is som e sort o f  facility.
1
bank to compete with the local Bahraini banks, which had a competitive advantage over 
FI in that respect. There was not a large enough volume o f retail business to encourage
the bank to invest in some IT systems, such as credit cards, in Bahrain. To quote the 
informant:
supporting this business was also perceived as more strategic than that supporting the 
retail business, as quoted earlier.
There was a threshold level of services that the bank perceived as being crucial in order 
to support their business. Beyond these "basic needs” the bank perceived IT as less 
important in generating business, and was thus conservative in its spending on IT. To 
quote the informant:
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“.. business volum e., we have always to find a balance between cost and profit, for a foreign bank 
here with one branch, it is very difficult to find a balance..”
Retail banking was not perceived as a strategic business for the bank, nor was the retail 
delivery system, such as phone banking. Nonetheless, the bank had to introduce it 
because norms dictated it To quote the informant talking about the retail banking 
business:
for most o f  the bank’s branches, they are more corporate or investment banking oriented, the 
retail may not be important, but we need to provide this kind o f  services..”
Since corporate business was perceived as being strategic to the bank's network, the IT
i:
To our close competitors, I w ould say that our IT is not better than theirs. We are able to meet 
the basic needs...
.to bring yourself up to the state o f  art o f  technology is very expensive..
..we don’t want to be the market leaders o f  technology because you are talking about much 
higher cost...”
IT Strategy Formulation:
Centralised top-down approach:
The formulation of IT strategy within the 
bank was centralised from the headquarters 
level and then filtered down to the branches 
(see Figure 2.)
IT Strateg}' 
rormulktion
Top-D ow n /  CoDimittee
at
H eadquarter
j  IT strntegy 
B m n c h e j /  M ilntennnce and 
CahencemenlJ
Bottom-up
Figure 2: IT strategy formation within FI
At the headquarters level, there was an "IT 
council” that consisted of two members from 
the managing board and three senior
executive vice presidents (SVPs) (see Figure 3 ). The IT council’s main objective was to 
determine the bank’s overall IT strategy, its priorities, and its budget. Below the IT 
council, there was an IT steering committee that consisted of senior executives. Their 
main responsibilities were to set up detailed IT strategies and policies and to follow up 
the execution of these strategies. Under this committee came the Application Systems 
Implementation (ASI) department, which was responsible for the implementation and 
development of the systems. Also under the IT steering committee came the Information 
Management (IM) department, which worked in co-ordination with the ASI department.
■I
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It was responsible for defining the users’ requirements and the user acceptance tests and 
for distributing the developed systems to the branches throughout the regional IM 
offices. For every six to eight countries there was a regional IM office.
Bottom-Up: IT strategy maintenance:
Adapting the main IT strategy to the unique requirements of each branch was a bottom 
up approach, as Figure 2 indicates.
The regional IM offices were responsible for delivering the branches’ IT needs. The user 
needs filtered up from the branches to the headquarters via the regional IM offices. 
Decisions on whether to meet these requirements were centralised at either the regional 
office or the headquarters.
Depending upon how important the 
required IT system was, the development of 
IT systems took place either within the 
branch (if the system was only important at 
that branch), at the regional office (if the 
branches belonging to that region would 
benefit from the proposed system), or at the 
head office level (if the system was in  P n im r r v
perceived as being important for the 
Group’s branches world wide).
IT council. 2 board M embers, 3 Senior EVP  
*  D eterm in e  S tra teg ie s . P n o n t ie s ,  and  se t  b u d g ets
IT steenng committee:
* S e t  d e ta ile d  IT p o l ic ie s  and  
stra teg ies .
IT International
efine users
System s
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Figure 3: IT s tra teg y  form u la tion  a t FI
It is worth noting that the informant stressed upon this top-down approach as being the 
main source of the bank’s IT strategy world wide. Nonetheless, he also mentioned that
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there was a bottom-up influence from the branches to shape the grand strategies. These 
initiatives represented the branches’ struggle for more resources.
Economies of scale:
%
At the head office level, the objective for developing systems was to achieve economies 
of scale and to reduce development and maintenance costs. Accordingly, the bank 
encouraged international solutions and centralised all development decisions made at 
the regional offices which co-ordinated with the headquarters. This policy required the 
standardisation of the systems around a common platform, wliich dictated the creation 
of relationships with main vendors to enable the implementation of the bank’s IT 
strategies world wide.
Develop for high potential markets then universalise:
Slow Responsiveness:
Opting for international solutions slowed down the bank’s responsiveness to changes 
within the markets, especially the local needs of the branches, as the informant explains:
%
I
As a policy, some systems were developed for some markets that have high business 
potential and then universalised to other markets at a lower marginal cost. The 
telephone banking system was an example of this. The bank was in the process of 
implementing and testing it in countries other than Bahrain. Once it had been 
successfully introduced elsewhere, the system would be introduced in Bahrain at a 
minimal cost. It is worth noting that other local as well as international banks had 
preceded Foreign 1 in introducing their own phone banking system.
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“ ...it was serious, som e time also it takes a very long time. Som etim es I have to make my own 
decisions and say OK lets do it. It may take one or two years... they always look for international 
solutions and it takes a long time... from time to time I have to make my own decisions and take 
the risk. The head office may return to me and say ‘Hey! What are you doing?!!”
Follower In the market, not a leader:
The informant believed that the bank was at a competitive disadvantage when compared 
to its main competitors, which included not only banks, but other financial institutions 
as well. The informant believed that leading the market in terms of technology would 
dictate a higher cost for the bank, something the bank was reluctant to bear To quote the 
informant:
j
“..compared to our close competitors, our IT is not up to their level. Our competitors are not onh  
banks but also other financial companies because w e are doing investment banking. We don't 
want to be the market leaders because you are talking about much higher cost..” .
“...at the moment we are very far behind them, but next year w e will catch up by providing 
electronic banking. We will be in line with the Hexagon services..”
The bank’s IT strategic thrust was, therefore, to defend rather than to lead the market. ■
:
For example, the bank’s electronic banking system - "International Cash Management 
System” - was designed in response to a similar system introduced by another 
international bank perceived as a technology leader by Foreign 1.
As for the local Bahraini market. Foreign 1 was not a leader in implementing its ATMs 
nor the phone banking systems. Flowever, it was amongst the first wave of banks to 
introduce electronic banking.
Development of application systems:
The bank's application systems were developed through three channels. The most 
important one was the bank’s own IT expertise. This process was perceived as being
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the regional Information Manager who was not a permanent resident in Bahrain, but 
only occasionally visited the branch in Bahrain to look after its IT needs.
Relationship with the vendor:
systems.
costly, risky and taking long time to implement due to the scale of the projects. To speed 
up the process, the bank depended to a lesser extent on outsourcing. However, this 
approach held a disadvantage. By outsourcing, the bank might have missed an 
opportunity to develop internal expertise in implementing and maintaining the systems 
on a world-wide scale. In addition, the bank depended to a lesser extent on “off the 
se lf’ packages to meet its application requirements.
Role of the IM manager:
There was no formal IT department within the bank in Bahrain due to its small size. The 
determination of the IT requirements for the branch in Bahrain was the responsibility of
, „ ; i X
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The bank maintained a close and long-term relationship with IBM. Its systems were 
standardised and upgraded within the IBM platforms, and it had progressed from IBM 
system 34 to system 36 and finally to the AS 400 series over the last two decades.
The bank’s relationship with IBM was maintained at the headquarters level, since this 
was where its IT strategy was formulated. All branches were requested to adopt IBM
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The international cash management system (ÏCM):
Driver o f ICM:
C ited  in an internal p u b lica tion  ab ou t ICM .
Drivers of IT strategy:
Matching the competition- a defensive measure:
“W e are different than other banks like Citibank, they are market leaders. If we are not the 
market leaders, we need to be the market followers otherwise we will lose our business., so what 
other banks do is very crucial...
“We are not leaders in term o f  technology, we are followers. Our IT is more business driven or 
[competitor driven]. ATM , electronic banking., since the other banks already have so we better 
have or it is very difficult to convince the customers to come to you..
.
The above quotation summarises the main drivers of the bank’s IT strategies. IT was 
adopted as a competitive necessity. Since the others had it, this bank also had to offer it, 
otherwise it would lose its competitive stance in the market.
Foreign I was in the process of designing a system that would enable its international 
clients to manage their cash positions. The project was a step beyond the electronic 
banking system that linked the local clients with the local branches. With the ICM, the 
international clients would be able to link internationally instead of just locally. To 
quote a senior informant who participated in developing ICM:
“.. electronic banking was just providing local customers with an interface to the local branch. 
For the top o f  the market, i.e. com panies which are truly global in their scope o f  activities, it's no 
longer enough...” .
As for the driver in developing the ICM system, another senior vice president' who 
participated in the development of ICM said:
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Supporting the bank's business strategies:
...som e international branches here like Philips, like British Airways, like KLM, they require the 
financial information o f  their branches here to consolidate., our systems are more driven to the 
need o f  their corporate level..
Pressure from the international clients rather than local clients:
à
“ ..from a defensive point o f  view  you have to provide these services or you will lose the market. 
However, there is also a positive objective. The w hole purpose o f  the project is to increase the 
volum e o f  the payments. In a way it is funny that payments have not been regarded as core 
business. Treasury, loans, issues, that was banking. But run o f  the mill business is just as 
important. In the first place, payments tie yo i 
certain volum e, it can become quite profitable...
u to the customer. Secondly, once you realise a
In the above quotation, defending the bank’s position was the first driver that the 
informant mentioned. Other drivers were linked to the bank’s business objectives. 
These included creating a more intimate link with the international clients; where clients 
lead, a bank better fo llow ..” , and creating business opportunities from the payments, “.. once 
you realise a certain volum e, it can become quite profitable.”
As mentioned earlier, the bank’s business was focusing on serving a specific niche in 
the market, that of international corporate clients. Systems such as the ICM supported 
the bank’s business focus. As indicated in Figure 1, the bank’s IT systems allowed the 
bank to interlink with its international clients and, hence, supported their business 
strategy.
Q. Was there any pressure from institutions either within Bahrain or outside Bahrain to adopt 
certain IT systems?
Informant: it is more at the corporate and network level. Pressure from Bahrain is not so much, 
because the market here is not so sophisticated as that in London, N ew  York, the customer is less 
demanding and less sophisticated than the other multinational..
The big local firms like A1 Ziani, A1 M oyeed, etc.. are more local chain oriented than
multinational oriented some international branches here like Philips, like British Airways.
Like KLM, they require the financial information o f  their branches here to consolidate., our
1 1 0
system are more driven to the need o f  their corporate level..
I l l
The above quotation demonstrates that the bank’s IT strategies were influenced more by 
the needs of the international than the local clients.
Improving efficiency and service quality:
The other drivers for the bank’s IT strategy were related to improving the bank’s 
internal efficiency and providing better services for the customers. Security of the 
bank’s systems, speed of processing, and availability of information were among the 
most important issues the regional IM manager discussed. To quote him:
“.. internally as we discussed earlier, to have a better control on our activities and to have better 
information and fast and accurate information. So at the end o f  the day w e are not onl\ 
improving our efficiency which means that we are saving cost, but also providing much better 
and faster services to the customer and providing new products for the convenience o f  the 
customer...”.
IT crucial for the bank's operations:
“.. IT is everywhere. You are talking about high volume o f  transaction and a very limited staff... ;f:
for handling the transactions for handling the general ledger, I can't imagine [did not continue his 
sentence] ... for the operations, w e have to rely on IT... the back office staff are getting less and 
less, we need humans to contact the custom ers...”
The above quotation was in response to a question on specifying the IT systems that 
were strategic or operational in nature to the bank. The IM manager’s response indicated 
that IT has played a major operational role in reducing the bank's dependence on human If
intervention in the back office operations.
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Foreign Bank Two (F 2);
Introduction:
Foreign Bank Two is a regional bank that operates internationally.
Business Focus:
The deputy manager was responsible for credit management in the international
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I interviewed two informants from F2. The first was the EDP manager, an Arab national 
who had been in banking for 20 years. Fie worked with international banks such as First 
National Bank of Boston before moving to Foreign Bank Two. During his career, he 
progressed from programmer, to analyst, to senior analyst, and was promoted from 
within the bank to head the EDP section of the bank’s branch in Bahrain. His 
educational background was in computer science. The second informant was the bank's 
deputy manager. He was a 40 year old Indian national, with an MBA degree and 18
years of banking experience, 5 of which he had spent in Citibank and the rest with 
Foreign Bank Two.
The bank’s branch in Bahrain operated in two different markets, the local and the 
international. In order to operate in the local market, the bank had acquired a Fully 
Commercial Bank (FCB) license from the Bahrain Monetary Agency, while to operate 
internationally from Bahrain the bank had acquired an Offshore Banking license. f
' î
Factors affecting the competitiveness of the 
bank:
the ability to follow  into the various things..’ 
creating a trustworthy image; and
markets, more specifically, Eastern Europe, India, Pakistan and the Gulf area. Within 
the Gulf area the bank concentrated on two major markets, first, the Saudi market, 
followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) market.
■|
In Bahrain, the bank was involved in the retail business. Unlike some local banks that 
encompassed every segment of the retail market. Foreign Bank Two focused on high- 
worth individuals and businesses.
i,.:0.
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Within the international markets in which Foreign Bank Two operated, the bank’s main 
competitors were the local banks operating in these markets. The criteria that 
determined the bank’s competitiveness, as perceived by the deputy manager, were as 
follows:
•  quality o f  service and the ability to respond quickly.." [the] ability to understand the needs c: 
the customers,.” ;
pricing;
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“ ability o f  the borrower to get a good rate from the bank” .
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IThe deputy manager believed that the bank’s competitors, especially those in the Saudi 
market where many of the bank’s major clients originated, held a competitive 
advantage, as they were able to deliver cheaply since they were located within the same 
geographical area.
Role of IT as Perceived by the Deputy Manager:
IT as a means of operating in other geographicai markets:
As mentioned earlier, the bank operated internationally. Some of the regional markets, 
especially the Saudi market, were perceived to be highly strategic for the bank but due 
to regulatory reasons, F 2 did not have a physical presence in that market.
IT played a vital role in operating beyond the Bahraini market. EDI played an 
operational role without which the bank would not be able to perform its activities: t
“ .. for us it is bread and butter. Without technology, we are out o f  business. So for an offshore 
centre, IT is the bread and butter”.
The deputy manager mentioned that they were using different media for EDI such as 
Telex, Router, and Swift. Since all of the banks were using these media similarly for 
their operational requirements, mainly to achieve speed and security, the bank gained no 
competitive advantage by using this type of technology.
IT was also perceived as playing a 
strategic role in enhancing the
Deliveryresponsiveness of the bank in /  \  systems
^  \  to the
Clients
C lients’ premises
1 r to enhance 
connectivity and 
efficiency from 
within the bank
O
O
o
if
Bahrain to its world-wide clients, \ I— 7
with special attention paid to the —
Role of IT as perceivedclients in Saudi Arabia. IT  was by the deputy manager
perceived as a means of creating a
Îlink with the international clients through enabling them to interlink with the bank's 
systems, and thus initiate transactions from wherever the clients were. Such an 
initiative was perceived as being important as it speeded up the bank’s response to 
clients’ requests through cutting down the manual processing of transactions. This type 
o f technology was provided only to a limited number of clients due to the cost of the 
system at the time.
No less important than using IT beyond the boundaries of the bank, the bank in Bahrain |
■"’I
also observed a strategic role for using IT within the boundaries of the bank, to reduce
the response time to international clients making international calls. To achieve this, the 
bank embarked on a project which included renovating its PCs, linking them through a 
LAN on one hand, and on the other, linking them to the bank’s mainframe system. The 
aim was to enable the bank’s officials to respond immediately to international clients 
whenever they called. Advancements made by IBM - who designed its AS 400 system - 
in opening up and linking to the PC environment enabled the bank to improve this
■Îresponsiveness:
' focusing on the offshore unit, IT is very vital in all our aspects even in our dealing with our 
customers., our customers are offshore. We don't have the ability to meet the customer on a da\ 
to day basis, we have to use various means to communicate with him., he has to access us on line 
for various things. Most o f  the time w e speak with them on the telephone, but any other form o f  
technology would support this..
Î
.. we don't have physical contacts .. as w e get a request from a client outside, w e process it and
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we send it again. So w e are only like a processing centre in the middle and all the ties in and out 
are all technology related..”
Ephemeral nature of IT:
Despite its crucial role for the bank’s business, the deputy manager believed that, due to 
the ephemeral nature of IT, the bank was not able to gain a sustained competitive
advantage over other banks through its use. Nonetheless it gained a competitive parit) 
with the others since it was a follower in the market. Any profitable IT system can be 
replicated within a short period o f time, which can change a comparative advantage to a 
comparative parity, as he explained in this quote:
“.. the tecltnology being used by all banks Is more or less the same. If you say, without the 
technology, can you do business? N o, because it becom es an essential feature. From time to time 
there are differences in IT that makes you more com petitive but this is overcome in a short 
w hile., because i f  that is the feature that makes more profit then every bank will go after it and 
buy it. You may have 3 months or 6 months advantage, but not longer than that...
like the V isa cards, now everybody can issue a V isa card. It is no longer something 
sophisticated... Until 1993 we did not have any V isa card issued over here., but now we caught 
on., because customer financing business caught on..”
The ephemeral nature of IT was due to the availability of systems the bank could 
buy or outsource through the vendors, as quoted below. As for F 2, it made 
strategic links with its vendors to keep the bank in line with the pace of change 
in IT. More about the strategic relationship with the vendors will be discussed 
later on. “ .. I think there are values in sharing products or services because as I said earlier, 
nothing w ill be unique about this business six months from where it is. If it is a business that I 
want to do, I can get in to it within six months and even less. In som e o f  these things the product 
that you can sell is fast to replicate.
.. if  w e want to go after a particular business and IT is a requirement, you can always subcontract 
the IT business..
we have a good link up with M icrosoft and with IBM... I think that in due course we will be able 
to deliver other things that are needed by the market..”
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Supportive rather than directive role:
Both of the informants, the deputy manager 
and the EDP manager, perceived the role of 
IT as being supportive to the business 
strategies rather than directive: Rolf of
Business Trends
EDP muBager «ad 
IT as perceived by
it is difficult to see IT heading tlie depuiy mamagcr
business, because by itself IT can’t deliver
anything.... I guess at more central level at general management when they try to put things 
together, the IT people may have bigger role., it is there but it is difficult to direct business with 
IT..”
A More strategic role for WAN and electronic banking within the 
coming five years:
To compete with the international banks, and to overcome the disadvantage that the 
bank had when compared with local banks operating in the bank's strategic markets 
such as the Saudi market, the deputy manager believed that there would be an increasing 
strategic role for an electronic banking system linking the bank to its remote clients and 
the wide area network (WAN).
He claimed, however, that for the time being the pressure from the bank’s clients was 
insufficient to warrant immediate changes, leaving enough room for the bank to catch 
up with its competitors. His rationale for the above account was as follows:
117
I
I-
the Hexagon system, which is quite a sophisticated system and people w ho have used different 
systems tell me that it is one o f  the best, OK but by itself, the Saudi British Bank... does not 
mean that they w ill have a significant advantage, because it is one o f  the components in the 
whole process. I think in due course technology will become more important..
... many customers don’t have that flexibility, they are not a triple A rated companies... I think 
that time and type o f  business factor is still little way away. It g ives enough time for the other 
banks to catch up...”
The EDP shared the same views. He observed the following:
• the banks were similar to each other in the way that they used IT;
• the banks drifted in the same direction the IT was leading them to;
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Simitar roie IT played for the banks:
Both informants believed that the banks were utilising the technology in very similar 
ways. As mentioned above, the deputy manager believed that there was no sustained Icompetitive advantage derived from using IT, and the effects of IT were perceived to be 
ephemeral, as they were easily copied within a short period of time.
■ 'I
• the bank’s guidelines for adopting IT were its requirements and its IT status as 
compared with its competitors:
.. I would say that the usage o f  technology is the same for every bank., you have a requirement, 
you are falling short o f  something, you know that you are weak on that point and you have to 
enhance it., as far as I can see. if  >ou want to utilise the technolog) you have to be governed by 
these roles. There is no way that \o u  can be better than the other banks. Techno log)., we are 
going with it. We have to understand it., we have to be able to use it. I don’t know that there are 
differences o f  using IT between this bank and other banks.. I w ould think that the objectives and 
directions are the sam e..”. 1
Main IT developments within the bank:
3’ which runs on an AS 400.
System openness and internai integration:
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Historical Background:
According to the EDP manager, the bank started automating its operations in Bahrain in 
1980. Before that date, the bank operated manually.
The first system that was installed in the branch in Bahrain was IBM system 34. The 
bank then upgraded to system 36 and finally to an AS 400. As for the software system 
the core banking operations run on a Kipiti system. At the time of this interview, the 
bank was in the process of upgrading its Kipiti banking application system to ‘Equation
The bank was in the process of upgrading its 386 PCs to 486 PCs and giving its 
employees more PCs to cover the different functional areas. IBM had made its AS 400 
system open to communicate in a PC-based environment. The bank selected the “token 
ring” communication system to interface the AS 400 with the LAN. Moreover, it 
introduced client-server technology in the bank. The reason for upgrading the PCs was 
to enable the users to use the Windows applications that run faster on 486 PCs.
;
Accordingly, the bank’s employees could access both applications placed on the server
as well as the AS 400 system from their PCs.
The link between the PCs and the mainframe would not have been possible without the 
advancements in both the IBM AS 400 architecture, and the “Equation 3” software.
Delivery systems:
Delivery systems such as the ATMs were introduced into the bank in 1989-1990.
Phone banking was recently introduced (1994). It provided two main services, one to the 
public in which information about the bank’s services, exchange rates, and interest rates 
were disclosed, and the other to enable the bank’s clients to bank through the phone 
banking system.
Enhancements to electronic banking were in the pipeline. The system was mainly 
designed to enable the corporate clients to interact directly with the bank’s systems from 
their premises. Through this system, the clients could generate their Letter of Credits 
(LCs) and Letter of Guarantees (LGs) automatically, in addition to transferring funds 
between their accounts.
Another project that was in the pipeline was the creation of a Wide Area Network 
(WAN) upon which future delivery systems could be based.
The bank also introduced some IT based products in 1993 such as the Visa charge card. 
At its headquarters level, the bank was evaluating the introduction of a system to 
combine multiple cards into one card, and was in the process of linking the Visa card 
system with the ATMs. The bank was preceded by other banks in Bahrain in introducing 
the credit cards and linking them with the ATM systems. The branch in Balirain was 
offering Visa cards only to a limited number of its customers - the high worth 
customers. Other local banks were very aggressive in their card business. They were 
providing the cards to a wide range of clients, regardless of whether or not they had got 
an account with that bank. In response to the competition from other banks, Foreign
1 2 0
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Bank Two was in the process of increasing the volume of its Visa business by providing 
the card to a wider range of its customers.
Other projects:
The bank was in the process of automating the fund transfer system in its branches so
■"c
that the Swift system could be used without the need to manually transfer the 
transactions from the branches to the main office in Bahrain. This project was expected 
to decrease the workload in the main office and enhance the branches’ response to its
clients. “Equation 3” was needed to interconnect Swift to the AS 400.
'if
Reasons for embarking on IT systems:
As will be discussed later in this case study, the bank maintained a long relationship 
with IBM, which included progressing with IBM platforms. To use the EDP manager’s 
words;
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f'Progress with the hardware vendor:
if  IBM are stopping to support the system .. if  the technology m oves up and you stay behind, 
it is wortliwhile to catch up with the up to date technology and to up grade yourself..
.. Our main office kept rethinking o f  re-enhancing and redoing things so they came out with 
system 36, and we went for som e time with it until we heard that IBM are upgrading all o f  their 
mainframes to AS 400, which w e have now. So now we are nearly at the top o f  the range. W e are 
catching up with technology as w e progress with IBM ..”. f
Î
Limitations of the old infrastructure:
The major developments that the informants discussed were related to redesigning 
upgrading the bank’s infrastructure. As will be mentioned next, upgrading the AS 400 
enabled the mainframe system to be linked to the PCs, which had been upgraded to 486. 
In addition, the introduction of the LAN enhanced the responsiveness to the clients, as
Improving efficiency:
The EDP manager gave a number of examples of how the new system was expected to 
improve efficiency within the bank. The following quotation describes how the client
1 2 2
mentioned earlier.
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A major infrastructure development was the upgrading of the computing system from 
system 36 to AS 400 and then upgrading the AS 400 to a higher model in the 400 series, 
to enable it to run “Equation 3”. Without upgrading the hardware system it would net 
have been feasible to install “Equation 3”.
“Equation 3” enhanced the bank’s ability to meet more of its business IT needs, as new 
modules could be added to the main system whenever there was a need. This feature had 
not been feasible within the bank's old system:
“.. with IBM 36, I could not put corporate banking, because it was too slow, it did not have the 
capability. But now with the A S 400, a different architecture, the system  Is able o f  sending and 
receiving data freely..”
“‘..[with] the credit risk management system, the credit manager w ill have a better control over 
the customer. We w ill know how  much we are exposing ourselves, what is the profitability from 
this customer, is it worthwhile going to this customer or not... Equation 3 has a very powerfji 
reporting features, and another feature ..it has a multi-language support. So it can be tailored :o 
our requirements...”
server technology and the PC environment were expected to improve the employees’ 
efficiency:
we came into a conclusion that a lot o f  people are using spreadsheets. A lot o f  people are 
doing a manual work. At the end o f  the month they are getting behind. W e thought that it would 
be the best way o f  enhancing these people by buying a new hardware and training them properly 
so they transfer all the manual task into an automated tasks. The objective o f  this exercise is to 
make life easier for them and to enable them to finish their work at a very short tim e...”
“Making life easier” was the phrase that the EDP manager repeated on several
M
occasions:
“when the system is faster it w ill make life easy for everybody, also this w ill make life easier for 
the customers..
O.K. we thought o f  ourselves., to make life easier for everybody, but at the same time we thought 
about the customer..”
The goal behind the update was to enhance the efficiency of the employees through 
using new tools, some of which were analytical.
Agreements with different institutions were made to train the employees in the use of 
the new tools that they would be exposed to. The EDP manager said that there were 
training activities taking place at the headquarters level in which he had participated. 
IBM arranged some of these training activities. Microsoft applications that run on the 
PCs were among the tools on which the bank’s officers would receive training.
Another example of how the new IT arrangements would improve efficiency was 
mentioned earlier in the discussion of the new “Equation 3” risk management system 
enabled users to make better decisions once they were better informed about their 
position and their clients.
In order to achieve a faster response rate, the bank was in the process of automating its
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for renovating the bank's IT systems. These objectives could be achieved as a result of 
improving the bank’s efficiency, according to the EDP manager.
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manual filing system. Moreover, they were also in the process of increasing the 
integration of the bank’s remote locations and enhancing the bank’s ability to access %
data from any location.
Availability within the network:
Some IT initiatives were introduced in Bahrain because they had been developed by the 
bank elsewhere and introducing them in Bahrain required a minimal marginal cost. The 
informant gave examples of systems that were developed for what the bank perceived as 
key markets, and then the systems were introduced to other markets. One example of
'la­this was telephone banking. The bank developed it to meet the market requirements
within the bank’s home land, and then pushed it onto the network so that other branches
could benefit from the developed systems. The following quotation by the informant
describes this driver for some IT initiatives:
' our London office may need certain things because they are facing competition in that 
market. When that is developed by the bank or bought from outside and it is in use in London, 
then adding it to other location Is suggested. They can do it because it does not cost very much... 
and it is already working in one location. It does not mean that the other branches that were going 
to get it have not thought about it, but it did not feel that it is crucial...”
improving the services and increasing customer loyalty:
Improving services and, subsequently, customer loyalty to the bank were also reasons
I
The delivery systems and IT related products, such as credit cards, were mainly directed 
at the “high worth” individuals, as the EDP manager had called them.
i
      . .
Matching the competition:
A salient driver of IT strategy was the competitors:
we look at the competition which we consider all the time., and we try to develop on that 
basis... see what they are providing... see is it needed by our customers or our target market...”
The EDP manager referred to IT systems that the bank had provided in terms of their 
competitive necessity, since other banks were also providing them. Even though these 
systems did not generate revenue for the bank, the bank still had to keep up with the 
technology:
"... phone banking, we have [spent] thousands and we made not a penny out o f  it.. 1 am providing 
a service and it is there but I am not getting any thing out o f  it... but why we went into phone 
banking, w e have to go, to catch up with other banks, with technology...
"... you com e and say you have the ATMs why don't you use it over here. Somebody will come 
and say it is too expensive. But soon you find that the other banks are providing the ATM s, you 
have to [provide it too]., whether you have ten customers using the ATM s or 100, you only know 
after som etim e...”
“ .. when w e thought about the ATMs, we looked at the customer., but the amount, the numerous 
amount w e were spending to buy the NCR ATM , buying the tower NCR, buying the software, 
buying the communication for that., we have to serve the customer right, and when everybody is 
doing that we have to catch up. There is no way around it..”
“ .... the technology progressed and all the banks have to progress with it..”.
Improving the bank's image:
all o f  the successful banks have to up grade. They have to catch up with technology. There is 
no way that you leave yourself behind. Everybody in the front. They are talking language that 
you don't understand. 1 think that this will give a very bad image to the bank and it w on’t be an> 
good for anybody...”
The quotation above shows how the EDP manager perceived the importance of catching 
up with the competition. IT is important because the others are doing it, and in order to 
build a good image for the bank they have to “catch up” with the technology too.
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Business needs and customer service:
Relationship with Vendors:
Networks between the banks:
and its connection with Citibank, and the British Bank of the Middle East and its 
connection with the Hong Kong and Shanghai group.
Another reason for embarking on IT strategies was to serve the bank’s business 
strategies. An example was the renovation of the bank’s 386 PCs and upgrading them to 
486 PCs, which were linked through a LAN and integrated with the AS 400 system. The 
aim of this project was to provide the bank’s international customers, especially the
?
Saudis, with a prompt response.
Since F2 is a wholesale bank, the strategic role of the electronic banking system in the 
coming years for supporting the bank’s business goals internationally was stressed by 
the deputy manager.
The deputy manager believed that the international banks in Bahrain and in other 
regions - especially the Saudi market - in which the bank competed directly with the 
resident banks, held an advantage by being part of a wider network. Through this tf 
network they acquired the know-how assets for adopting their IT systems. Examples of 
these network connections in Saudi Arabia, mentioned by the deputy manager, were the 
Al-Faranci bank and its connection with the French banks, the Saudi American Bank
4':
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To keep the bank informed about the latest trends in IT, both the deputy manager and 
the EDP manager said they had established close relationships with the hardware and
the software vendors.
...;e
¥As will be explained in the coming section, on the strength o f its strategic relationship 
with other system developers, IBM became a strategic partner for the bank.
Strategic Reiationship between the hardware and the software 
vendors:
'In my meeting with Gulf Info. Tech. (a pseudonym), a local IT vendor, the marketing 
manager mentioned that there was a strategic alliance between IBM and many software 
houses that developed applications for the financial market. Such a relationship created 
a switching cost for the banks that were dealing with IBM.
Kipiti, a software company, was one of the main software houses that maintained a 
strategic relationship with IBM, according to the infoimant from Gulf Info Tech. In my 
interview with International Bank Two, I wanted to investigate more thoroughly this
type of relationship between IBM and Kipiti so I asked the EDP manager whether there 
was a strategic relationship between IBM and the software houses. He replied:
“ Well definitely. I think that Kipiti has done that. In fact Kipiti was dealing with IBM ver> 
strongly, especially for the enhancement o f  their super machine [AS 400]... they sat with IBM 
and said w e want to utilise your system and understand it more., they understood the integrity of 
their system, and what is the relational databases and how to utilise it for the Kipiti system. I 
think that there is a very strong co-ordination between IBM and Kipiti people. So that is why 
every time there is a change, they fully understand the concept., on that basis they designed  
Equation 3”.
IBM and Kipiti were repeatedly mentioned by the informants when discussing the 
renovation of the bank’s system. Other banks such as Local Bank One were also users of
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IBM AS 400 and the Kipiti Equation 3 system. These examples show the type of 
.strategic relationship between the hardware and the software vendors.
Networking with the vendors- A strategic reiationship:
Strategic reiationship with IBM:
In the absence of networks between F2 bank and other international banks - similar to
!
.iï
the networks amongst the international banks discussed above - from which they could 
seek knowledge asset about the strategic use of IT, the informants said that the bank 
sought its vendors’ aid to acquire the “how” knowledge about their strategic approach to 
IT. Such relationships with the vendors helped the bank to:
• catch up with the competitors;
• develop/update the bank’s IT infrastructure and systems (hardware and software);
• decrease the perceived risk of system development failure;
• develop training programs to utilise these systems;
• provide consultancy services;
As a consequence of the bank’s relationship with IBM and Kipiti, it had made reciprocal 
agreements with other banks who were also clients to the same vendors. These 
agreements allowed the bank to use the other banks’ systems as a backup whenever 
there was a failure within their system. Therefore, the fifth point that I would add to the 
above list would be:
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provided training for the bank’s staff;
I#
.g.
.• to create links with other banks, who were clients to the same vendor, in order to 
enhance the reliability of the banks’ systems:
we are not at the head o f  the list nor are we at the bottom. W e have an on going development,, 
we are working with different companies which are developing software and hardware., we have 
a good link with M icrosoft and IBM..
.. we don’t have a tie with other banks, but we do have a tie with hardware and software 
developers and specialists in banking systems like Kipiti which has an office in Dubai., because 
w e use our accounting system as Kipiti, whatever developm ents they have, they keep us 
informed., they update us. W e have training programs with them. There is a new thing that w e are 
finalising, with IBM also, because we are in many locations and som etim es w e have to make 
institutional arrangements there are back up facilities and also com m on hardware in different 
locations..
I... the fact that w e are linked to one or two does influence what w e do. I f  we find that particular house is overtaken and not developing, we may break that relationship and go somewhere else..
... you can buy from a vendor who can give you a turn key project on a particular utilisation so 
you don't have to spend your time developing it in house or going and buying it from another 
bank..
.. we listen to the people who are associated with us, so IBM may com e up with certain things 
and they will advise us. W e consider them as consultants..”
The above was the deputy manager’s argument about the role the vendors played. The 
EDP manager shared the same views with the deputy manager. His views about the role 
of the vendors are summarised by the following points:
• played the role of the informant of any changes within the technological 
environment;
provided the bank with the required expertise and insights about how to achieve the 
bank’s goals;
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# reduced the failure risk associated with initiating and implementing major IT
projects.
can be added to the above list o f vendor roles:
[the informant then read in Arabic the following: improve the work through reducing the
managerial hierarchies] so the hierarchy has flatten down [the EDP manager continued in 
English].”
”.. we embarked on these new hardware, they came in and w e sat with them and we said this is
The influence of IBM over the bank was not just in the adoption of the IT system, but it 
spelt out the way in which the bank organised its IT division. Though I do not have a 
full description of how the bank’s IT international division was structured, from what 
the EDP had said, it seemed more likely that the bank had consulted IBM about the way 
that the organisation of the division was carried out^ The organisation was flattened to 
reduce the levels of hierarchies, as was the case at IBM itself. Therefore, the following
: t
• played the role model for the bank with regard to its division organisation;
-■;
• The above may provide an account of why the bank maintained a long-term 
relationship with IBM. The EDP manager added another account which was no less 
important than the above. He said that there was a long-term relationship between 
the two in which they as a bank knew IBM well.
“ .. some times it is a very risky business when you plan for som ething and it does not com e right. 
You see yourself investing and your investment go away.
What we do in this bank, this department, w e always go into the market and study it proper!). 
and Ï told you for this computer re-engineering [ he meant the renovation o f  their IT systems - 
then he talked about the organisation structure] .. we knew that IBM has .. flattened all the 
hierarchy, and they were very successful. We said if  IBM could do it, why can't we do it. W e said 
why can't we be more productive and constructive on our approach..
Si
An interesting observation was that Local Bank One, which maintained a close relationship with IBM. was 
talking about flattening their hierarchy; however, there was no reference in that bank to the role of IBM in 
adopting this type o f structure in their organisation. Was that the recommendation of the consultant, KPMG. or 
IBM?
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IT strategy formulation:
The formulation of IT strategy was centralised at the head office level. Any major 
investment decisions or new architecture designs within the bank's branch in Bahrain 
were centralised and approved by the headquarters.
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the picture that we want to see., what is the best way o f  doing it..”
“.. because there were too many technical aspects about it that we did not know., so they were 
enlightening us as they came along..”
it is worthwhile to continue with them, because first o f  all we have a lot o f  knowledge about 
IBM., and we were for som e time with them, that’s why we stick with IBM ..”
Relationship with the software vendor - strategic ties derived from the bank’s 
relationship with IBM:
?
The bank had maintained a long relationship with the software vendor, Kipiti. It seemed 
that this relationship derived from the bank’s relationship with IBM. As mentioned in 
the main developments section, the bank started with IBM system 34, then system 36. 
and lately it has upgraded to the AS 400. The bank’s commitment with Kipiti came as a 
result of its commitment to adopt the AS 400.
It is worth mentioning that the agreements between the bank and the vendors were made
■by the bank's headquarters.
The EDP manager participated in a yearly 
meeting that included all EDP managers of 
the bank from all the branches world-wide. 
The aim of these meetings was to get 
feedback from all the EDP managers and 
discuss the bank’s IT strategy with them.
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In order to formulate the bank’s overall Figure i: form u lation  o f  i t  strategy  
corporate strategy at the headquarters level, there was a business steering committee that 
included the business’ divisional managers as well as the head of the IT division. 
Members of the business steering committee met on a yearly basis with their shadow 
managers from the bank’s branches to get feedback from them.
As Figure 1 indicates, the formulation of the IT strategy was influenced by feedback from 
the branches. For example, the quotation provided below describes how the bank's 
overall IT infrastructure was influenced by the complaints from the branches about IT 
infrastructure deficiencies in supporting the bank’s business needs:
“.. for Instance the upgrading into the A S 400, when we thought that the system was slow and we 
had problems, w e wrote to our head office and they said that they were already discussing and 
hopefully we will get it. EVERY TIME WE HAVE PAfNS A N D  PROBLEMS WE START 
CRYING- I need a system, this system is not giving me what I want, this system is becoming 
very slow ,.” .
The EDP manager described how the branches’ IT requirements were sent through the 
EDP managers' communication channels to the head office. It is worth noting from the 
quotation provided below how the bank’s IT strategies where highly dependent on ‘off 
the shelf modular systems such as ‘Equation 3’:
“ What we do, every year w e talk to the users., what you require? We get their feedback. We 
consolidate with all the branches and we send to the main office. This year, 1995, I need Swift. 
To connect all o f  the com m ercial branches to Swift, I have to have a sort o f  software on my AS
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400  so I have to have Equation 3. The system w ill generate the conformation for me, the advises 
and the m essages., so I don’t have to key them again.,”.
Defining IT needs for the branch in Bahrain:
infrastructure needs and then to seek solutions from the headquarters.
It also seemed that the EDP manager played a political role in exerting pressure on the 
headquarters for acquiring more IT related resources. One example was his attempt to 
upgrade the AS 400 so that “Equation 3” could be used. The EDP manager had failed at 
the beginning, but won his case later on. However, in every case, the final decision was 
made at the headquarters.
Slow responsiveness due to the centralisation:
The bank introduced its ATMs and phone banking only after the leader banks in Bahrain 
had done so. The EDP manager argued that their commitment to an international IT 
strategy affected their response rate:
Within the bank’s branch in Bahrain, there was a steering committee consisting o f the 
branch CEO, the head of the departments within the bank, and the EDP manager. 
Through interacting with the representatives of the other departments within the bank, it 
was the EDP manager’s responsibility to define the branch IT requirements and
l:
I
".. actually we have schedule and we rely heavily on our head office. As people com e from the 
head office, it takes time. The other banks may talk to a vendor and they will bring it. In our case 
w e talk to the head office and they have a schedule and you have to abide to that schedule. That 
is why we are a little bit behind..”
f
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Role of the EDP manager;
134
Both informants, the EDP manager and the deputy manager, described the EDP 
manager’s role as supportive to the bank’s corporate strategies, rather than directive.
The deputy manager emphasised that the EDP manager’s role was restricted to defining 
the means through which the users’ needs and the business goals could be met, b\ 
determining whether the bank had the appropriate IT infrastructure to support the 
business and user goals. If this was not the case, it was his responsibility to define and 
seek the necessary IT solutions and implement them.
the treasury, the corporate finance or the syndicate business that you try to push, it is their 
people that say that their focus is the way the bank has to go. N ow  each o f  these have techno log) 
needs to support it, or need certain improved level o f  technology. W hatever direction the bank 
takes, the technology manager has to work with them. But he w ill not say focus on this particular 
area., it is a supportive role., it is again like the operations, the back office  processing, whatever 
direction the institution goes, the back office has to support that..”
The EDP manager worked as a liaison with the headquarters. Through his reporting
lines with the head office and through his participation in the yearly meetings at the
'
headquarters, he channelled the IT needs to the headquarters and sought solutions from 
them. I
Business strategy:
Business strategy 
steering committee
Feedback' Grand strategy overall guidelines
Regiona
Branch
Branch/Region
strategy
The formulation of the business strategy at Head office
the branch in Bahrain was directed by the 
overall corporate strategy of the entire bank, 
which originated at the headquarters. As the 
deputy manager described it (see Figure 2 ), 
the process was a two-way exercise. The 
overall goals and policies from the head Figure 2: B usiness s tra teg y  fo rm u la tion  
office represented the guidelines for the regional branches to follow, while, the regional 
branches provided feedback about business opportunities to the headquarters. According 
to the EDP manager, since the bank branch in Bahrain was operating in different 
markets within the region, it had more flexibility to design its own strategy, as long as it 
conformed to the guidelines included in the overall business policies set by the 
headquarters. For example, the bank could not go into financing mortgages in the 
Middle East region since that type of business was against the policy of the 
headquarters. The bank subsidiaries, such as that of Australia, had more autonomy in 
setting their strategies compared to other branches.
Management attitudes towards IT adoption:
Both informants said that there was an appreciation by top management for the role that 
IT played in supporting the bank’s business. Moreover, they appreciated the top 
management support for IT initiatives such as the renovation of the branch infrastructure
■ïiï
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system and the adoption of new application systems such as “Equation 3”, which needed 
large investments back for acquiring the technology, and training the branch staff in 
Bahrain to use it. Without the top management support, these big investments and 
changes in work processes could not be achieved. Nonetheless, the EDP manager said 
that due to the large investments that the bank had made in IT, it was cautious and 
“choosy”, and would wait until the IT systems had been in use for a sufficient length of 
time before it gave consent to big IT projects:
we always try to be choosy, to search, to study... before w e buy any thing, the people at the 
eight offices set and decide. W e are little bit conservative on this approach, that is why w e don't 
have problems..
. . ... it is worthwhile to catch up with the technology and upgrade yourself... W e are spending in fact 
millions., now we have signed new contract with Kipiti for Equation 3. W e have paid around half 
million pounds for that..”
Problems associated with the adoption of IT:
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The bank’s cautious approach delayed upgrading the AS 400 and implementing 
Equation 3, though those at headquarters revised their decision later on:
"iüOnce I wanted to upgrade my AS 400, and a team came from the head quarter and said wh> 
do you want to upgrade, only the other day you invested half a m illion on buying it. When the) 
walked out they said you don’t need it. I did not need to invest at that time. But now after 
Equation 3, after the calculation they are convinced that definitely there should be a change 
before we go to Equation 3..”
1
Resistance to change:
Both of the informants, the deputy manager and the EDP manager, argued that the 
adoption of IT was accompanied by resistance to change from some of the bank's 
employees:
 •
“Q. Is there any cultural gap between the business people and the IT people?
we listen to people who are associated with us so IBM may com e up with certain things and 
they w ill advise us. We consider them as consultants..” .
Informant: Sometimes it exists. Sometimes w e want to enhance and som e people don’t want to 
change. T echnology is running very fast, there are people in the bank who don't want to change... 
obviously there are some resistance from other people, different thinking o f  mentality between 
them and us. The thing that those old people who are being in authority for quite some time... 
They keep changing them to bring fresh blood to the bank.
.. som e times there is a clash o f  ideas and they have to go by what we say., now when we 
encourage them to go from manual, and to bring these new PCs, som e say that I am happy doing 
this manual report. We say no there is som ething called Excel... w e are trying to close that gap. 
But resistance is there., it clashes with the EDP progress. We want to progress and the guys want 
to put back..”. The EDP Manager.
“ .. som e people don’t like to change. And they change reluctantly. U nless they are forced to use it 
on a day to day basis they try not to..” . The Deputy Manager.
According to the deputy manager, the bank uses “the carrot and stick” approach to 
.introduce change within the working environment. Training was the strategy that the 
deputy manager mentioned as the means to create an environment in which people could 
comfortably use the new tools that IT offered to them with minimum frustration. The 
“stick” that the informant talked about was the salary and promotion packages that were 
available. People that were less willing to adapt to the new job requirements would 
receive less support from the bank;
“the stick is when looking at the salary packages and other packages that com e with you in 
terms o f  future advancements with the organisation... i f  you are sticking to your old ways then 
you have to advise those people that the bank can't support their type o f  thinking..”
To achieve change in the perception of the organisation with regard to the role of IT, the 
informant believed that continuous education was the key to achieving this goal. The 
bank’s relationship with IBM was a source of education to the organisation. To use the 
informant’s words:
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Foreign Bank Three (F 3)
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Introduction:
Foreign Bank Three was a subsidiary bank of the Islamic Financial Group (pseudonym), 
registered in Europe. The Islamic Financial Group owned more than 50% of the bank's 
share, while the remainder o f the shares were owned by citizens from the Gulf region. 
The bank operated internationally from Bahrain where its head office was based.
This case summary is based on my interviews with four informants; an Executive Vice 
President (EVP), a Senior Vice President who was head of the IT department, a Senior 
Vice President within the investment department, and the bank’s CEO. All interviews 
took place within the informants’ offices and were tape recorded except the interview 
with the CEO who preferred that I take written notes.
The EVP was 46 years old with 20 years banking experience in Europe, USA, and the 
Middle East. He joined the bank in 1986. His educational background was in 
accountancy, business administration and banking. His nationality was non-Bahraini.
The Senior Vice President - IT manager was 37 years old. He had had 12 years 
experience in IT, of which 9 years were in banking. The informant had worked with 
international banks, such as Chase Manhattan, before joining F 3 in 1988. His 
educational background was in mechanical engineering, and his nationality was non- 
Bahraini.
The second Senior Vice President was working within the investment department and 
was 33 years old. He had obtained his ECCA qualification from the UK. He had 
worked as an internal auditor and financial controller and then as an investment manager 
within the investment department. He joined the bank in 1988 and was a Bahraini 
national.
Business focus:
Serving a niche in the market which attracted more 
competitors:
Foreign Bank Three was operating based on Islamic principles and was serving “the 
Islamic banking market niche”.
The EVP estimated that sixty billion dollars were been handled within the Islamic 
financial institutions, a fact which attracted conventional banks to enter the same type of 
business.
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The CEO had worked with Citibank before joining Foreign Bank Three. He was a Gulf 
national. No date was available for when he joined the bank, although he started 
working in the bank before the above informants.
Ï
Islamic banking is comparatively new when compared with the conventional banking 
business. Nonetheless, it has been experiencing increasing competition as more 
conventional banks entered into this type of business.
I
Conventional banking institutions such as Citibank, for example, entered into this type 
of business and competed directly with F 3.
Mosharaka or Modaraba', etc..
• Development of investment instruments.
D ifferen t form s o f  Islam ic  ban king fin an ce.
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Foreign Bank Three started as an offshore wholesaler operating from Bahrain serving 
the regional markets.
The year 1987 was a turning point for the bank. It adopted an expansionary strategy and
directed its business internationally, within the markets of significant Muslim
............................................................population, with special attention paid to the South East Asian countries such as
Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan. The bank entered into the retail business and
.expanded its branch network in Pakistan. Within Bahrain, the bank had obtained a Fully 
Commercial Banking license and operated in the Bahraini market serving corporate
clients, businesses, as well as providing retail services to individuals. It did not focus, 
however, on consumer financing, as did other local banks within the same line of 
business.
The EVP said that the bank earned its revenue through the following services:
• Consultancy services
• Private banking services
• Different investment portfolios in projects with different risks and returns;
Banking services - finance of domestic and international trade, various investment 
accounts, current accounts, short term financing on the basis of Morabaha
IK
i;
:
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Role of IT as perceived by the informants:
All informants perceived IT as crucial to the bank’s ability to achieve its corporate goals 
and maintain a favourable image for the institution. This was particularly important 
since it was a newcomer into the market as compared with the well-established 
conventional banks.
The CEO described the relationship between the bank’s goals and Information 
Technology as a “Catholic marriage”, where IT could not be separated from the bank’s f
strategic thinking. Nonetheless, the informants believed that IT was not directing the 
bank’s corporate strategy. In contrast, the informants believed that the business |
requirements of the bank were directing the IT strategic thrust.
The EVP perceived IT as having a profound impact on the banking industry as a whole,
"5and on the bank-cHent relationship. Moreover, he perceived their IT as responding to 
the impact that IT made within their environment, and believed that IT was utilised 
universally since there was nothing unique about it. Investing in it, had, therefore,
I:become a competitive necessity.
Within the internal boundaries of the bank, the EVP believed that IT played a crucial 
role in enhancing efficiency by supporting the internal operations of the bank, which had 
had a favourable impact on the bank’s image. IT also enabled the bank to control cost 
factors, despite an increase in the volume of transactions:
"The other side Is being In a position to give the fastest and most reliable service to our 
customers. This could only be achieved through the electronic medium. N ow  when w e send a %
statement out to our customer, we are sure that the statement w ill reflect the reality. This has 
enhanced the confidence in our bank and it has improved the image o f  the bank tremendously..”
::
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The EVP also perceived IT as being crucial in supporting the bank’s strategy to innovate 
and introduce new products:
whatever product we develop now has to take in consideration the electronic data processing 
impact on it., that means our product division is in tune with the EDP department. Without the
house clearance from the EDP department, no product could be launched by us no matter ho% 
useful it may be..” .
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The Senior Vice President for credit marketing shared similar views and added that IT 
was crucial for enabling the bank to pursue its expansion strategies and penetrate new 
geographical markets. Moreover, he perceived IT as a means to improve customer 
services.
Within his own functional area, the Senior Vice President perceived IT as crucial for his
work, as a credit marketing and financial controller manager. The informant mentioned 
.that the application systems that ran on the bank’s main system and PCs were used 
heavily in his work. To stress the importance of IT in managing the bank’s credit risk 
position on one hand, and in interlinking the bank’s operations in the different markets 
with its headquarters in Bahrain, on the other, he gave the following example:
“..w e  have an open system with network... In Saudi Arabia., when they go wrong, immediate 1\ I 
can change from here. I can implement decisions to correct the deviation. Before I could not do 
this. 1 would have to wait until the end o f  the month until I get the report. Business means time 
Decision must be timely decisions..”
In order to assist the bank in providing better consultancy services, MIS was perceived 
as strategic to the bank, without which their decision-making qualities would suffer:
“... MIS plays a very important role. A business without MIS can’t operate. Imagine the managing 
director wants to know where we stand and what is the risk in one area. He can take decisions 
immediately. He can access our system from his house. He has the facility...”
Kg;'
factor that had enhanced the bank’s competitiveness.
The following quotation sums up the Senior Vice President’s perception about the role 
of IT:
•  “ IT plays a major role in achieving the objectives o f  the enterprise. It is a very important 
means. W ithout it I can't achieve my objectives.
•  It is very crucial for my expansion plan.
•  It is crucial in the day to day {operations}.
•  Crucial in enhancing my services.
•  .. IT enhance our decision making.
•  IT plays an important role within the financial institutions as a w hole. So the soul o f  it will 
span over each area...” .
143
He added that IT, and MIS in particular, played a strategic role in enabling the bank to 
evaluate proposals from potential clients in a speedier and better-informed manner, one
In my meeting with the IT manager, he shared similar views about the role of IT. These 
views can be summarised in the following points:
• “gain better market footing”
• “have better grasp of [the] market data and customer infonnation”
• support the banking products.
To quote the informant:
from the past one or two years, their vision is that they can utilise IT products to gain better 
market footing, and to have better control for their market data and customer information. I think 
the first factor that I mentioned is that they can utilise the IT products effectively for marketing ..
I
to the customers. I think that this is a very important vision that has been developed in the past 
few  years.”
In addition to the above, there was also the belief that IT played a similar role in the res 
of the banking industry, and that the other banks capitalised on it in more or less the 
same way. Such institutionalised belief created a reality for the bank to which they ha\ e 
aimed to conform:
“Q. D o you differ from your competitors in the way that you use your IT to serve you?
EVP: W ell.. I think this is more or less universal now. Any m odem  organisation is bound to use 
IT som ehow in the processing o f  its activities. W e may not be very unique in that. But at least we 
developed a sense o f  dependence on it, may be more than our competitors and w e have faith h  
investing heavily in it. In fact this what has put us ahead o f  the crowd.. “
Greater resources for the conventional banks:
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The IT manager named banks such as Citicorp, Chase Manhattan and Chemical Bank as 
being potential competitors for their offshore business. The informant said that these 
banks had more resources and expertise and were far more advanced in terms c: 
technological support than F 3. Nonetheless, the bank had put a great deal o f effort into 
bringing its automation in line with these other banks in order to meet the expectations 
of its clients. He said that such challenges had put a lot of pressure and a great burden on 
the IT division and resources.
Main IT developments:
Unique banking requirements:
There were no ' off-the-shelf application packages serving the banking industry 
available from vendors (e.g. IBM and their software partners), that F3 could depend 
upon for acquiring application systems that were tailored to their core banking needs. In 
this respect, the bank was perceived by the informants as disadvantaged compared with 
the conventional banks which were able to buy their systems’ requirements from the 
vendors and thus save in terms of development costs and risk.
Dependence on internai resources:
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As a consequence of the lack of external support from the vendors in terms of ready
made systems, the bank decided to depend on its internal resources and build its IT
systems from scratch. As will be discussed later, resources were directed to this project,
including more financial support, more recruitment, and changes in the organisational
.structure. As noted from the recruitment dates of the informants forming the top
management end. these three top management informants were recruited between 1986
.and 1988, the date at which the bank started its expansion strategy. The IT manager was 
.empowered with more authority after he had been supervised by the operations manager. 
He was promoted to a Senior Vice President reporting directly to the CEO.
Main deveiopments:
The bank started with little or no IT support. The bank’s internal developments were 
first directed at supporting the bank’s offshore operations and wholesale activities, but 
as their strategy changed, they started to develop systems to support their retail banking 
operations. ATMs were installed in the bank in Bahrain and phone banking was in the 
pipeline.
A major system that the bank developed was the Islamic Banking System (IBS), which 
was a modular on-line system that supported the bank’s core operations as well as their 
portfolio of products and instruments. The broad objectives behind IBS were related to 
supporting the bank’s operations, through building a modular system that allowed 
different application systems to be integrated with the main core system, as need arose, 
with minimal cost and maintenance, as well as providing an efficient MIS.
Scrapping the old system and building a new one:
The bank scrapped its old system, which was running on a Wang computing platform, 
and transformed all applications into an open system infrastructure design. With the 
open system infrastructure design, connecting new hardware to the core system was not 
a problem, as it had been with the old system.
A Local Area Network (LAN) was also introduced into the bank. Almost all users had 
had their PCs connected to a server through the LAN. In addition to this, they were 
connected to the UNIX environment on which their core banking system and databases 
existed. The users were thus able to run both the PC applications from the server and 
the main banking applications in the UNIX environment from their PCs. The IT
146
Reasons for embarking on the bank’s IT systems:
Expansion strategies and support of business goais:
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manager described the above infrastructure scenario as being the global trend which the 
banks had to follow.
The bank was embarking on a project to link its branches world wide. Moreover, they 
were plamiing to introduce a multilingual electronic banking system to enable their 
international customers to interlink with their systems. This electronic banking system 
was a future project that the Senior Vice President and the Executive Vice President said 
that they were discussing.
A main driver of the bank’s IT strategies was the bank’s expansion strategy, adopted 
since 1987. To assist this strategy, the bank needed the support of IT systems tc 
penetrate new geographical markets, and support their new line of business. Expansion 
in the bank’s branch networks, the introduction of new innovative products, and 
consultancy services were amongst the areas that needed major IT support:
■y;
as 1 said up to 1987, w e were very small offshore bank, with a limited balance sheet, serving i  
limited number o f  custom ers within a limited geographical location. But from 87 to end o f  94. iz 
about 7 years, we have expanded tremendously... and automation has been geared to adopt the 
change and the changing requirements o f the bank..” . The IT manager.
.. we have to be able to modernise our products to adapt them to the technology as w e grow. I car. 
see a high correlation between our survival and to our growth. These things are linked together. 
is IT that could put out the value very widely and make it more acceptable. Because you coulr 
not sustain a client by g iving them a very old fashion approach to business.”
” .. the main source o f  our revenue is basically service - banking service, investment consultamr. 
fees and that sort o f  things., w e drive our income from the management fees, on a d ifférée  
mutual ftmds that is managed by us. Another area that we are venturing in, is basically a venture
capital management type o f  thing. A ssisting companies to .. act together, and try to put some 
value on the existing assets to be able to float their shares into the public. So basically w e are 
consultants... And at the same time w e do a lot o f  investments in projects., analysis o f  projects .. 
as well as taking larger syndication to m obilise large credits for specialised purposes. 1 would say 
that IT has been useful in all four different lines o f  business which are the sources o f  our 
incom e..”
As will be discussed later, the expansion strategy was accompanied by a change in the 
bank’s culture and perception of the business implications of IT. Resources were 
mobilised to assist the IT division to come up with a new IT strategy to support the 
bank’s business strategies.
Create systems to meet the market needs in one area and introduce, once available, 
to other areas:
The bank developed its systems to meet the needs of markets with higher potentials; and 
once available in their network, they introduced them to other markets. One example of 
this was the phone banking system. The bank developed it in Pakistan, and once it was 
tested there, they were planning to introduce it in Bahrain.
Infrastructure related drivers:
The bank’s old IT infrastructure faced severe connectivity problems. For example, the 
bank had entered into the retail business for which the ATMs were essentially delivery 
systems. The Wang system suffered from connectivity problems that prevented smooth 
introduction of the ATMs.
The IT manager anticipated that there were other technical problems and infrastructure 
limitations associated with the Wang system, and hence it was a barrier between the 
bank and its strategic goals. Moreover, Wang was facing financial problems, which 
might lead to future problems getting support for the Wang system.
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The deficiency of the old infrastructure and gloomy future prospects of the supplier 
spurred the bank to scrap its old system and rebuild its system on a new basis:
“...we are on the UNIX environment, w e are utilising the U N IX  machine for data processing and 
using the network to get access from one user to another or to the main system and workstation. 
This is the change in the hardware globally. I f  you look at the global hardware changes that are 
taking place, mainframes are being eliminated and applications are being downsized or right 
sized., with the concept o f  open system and open computing, I think that organisations have to 
review their long-term and medium term technology plans. To review their existing systems 
strategy against the market trends. Because i f  you don’t do that then at a certain stage you will be 
forced to look at that strategy and if  you are forced, you have to really see things in a more 
confusion...
Support operational needs and improve efficiency within the 
bank:
I
... In our case we looked at the technology change, w e realised the technology change and we 
decided before our expansion plans... because we were going to a major expansion plan and we 
did not want to buy hardware that would be redundant after a few  years... so w e changed our 
hardware strategy ... w e have adopted a LAN based technology with UNIX servers to be 
implemented at all locations...” .
1
IT strategies were driven by the need to automate the bank’s core banking systems and 
back office operations. As mentioned earlier, due to the bank’s unique operations, there 
were no appropriate ‘off-the-shelf packages to support their internal operational 
processes. The bank depended on its own resources to achieve this goal.
The informants mentioned that improving efficiency was a target they aimed to achie\e 
by automating their operations. The IT manager said that re-engineering of the 
processes occurred whenever they automated a manual process within the bank. 
Improving efficiency through re-engineering their processes, as a consequence of using 
a LAN and other PC and main system applications, increased the bank’s responsiveness 
to their clients. Moreover, the use of PC applications had reduced the need for 
secretaries.
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Meeting the users' requirements:
Matching the competition:
The IT manager mentioned that meeting the users’ requirements was a driver for the 
bank’s IT strategy. The IT division was serving the needs of the bank’s users as well as 
the needs of users of other sibling Islamic institutions owned by the group.
J:
I
Matching the competition was a driver to the bank’s IT strategies, the CEO perceived;
we are competing with big banks, giant banks., our clients want the same service, we have to 
provide it..”
Systems such as the ATMs and related products, for example, were introduced mainly to 
match what the competitors were offering in the market:
the force that will push us is the com petition..”
“.. as you know, the plastic money is being the trend in the consumer oriented financial services., 
this has put a lot o f  [pressure] on the banks to modernise and put up with the competition b> 
adapting to the latest instruments and also adapt the operations to the electronic media..” EVP. 1
“.. in Bahrain the ATM market is quite mature, there are a lot o f  banks that offer this service so 
getting into a retail market without this tool would not be appropriate., so we thought that v.e 
need to have this tool or at least have an equal level o f  service with the other banks if  not 
greater., so that was absolute necessity and also since this service was not available in that form 
that we were proposing in Pakistan, w e could capitalise on that..” IT manager. I
The IT manager added that they were lagging much behind their competitors when the\ 
started without IT support in 1982. However, their strategies were aimed at catching up 
with their competitors:
“.. generally our competitors are every bank operating in this market.... If you are operating like 
an offshore bank, all banks that are operating in a similar manner are your competitors. N ow  if  
you see which other banks are operating like offshore, you will find names such as Citicorp. 
Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank, these western banks have long history behind them.... they've 
had better systems 10 years ago when we started without systems.. Today w e are not as much 
behind them as we were..”
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Maintain a favourable image:
The CEO as well as the other informants stressed the importance of IT in enhancing the 
bank’s image, especially as they were newcomers as compared to their old and well 
established competitors. As quoted above, the CEO wanted to match what the “giant” 
competitors such as Citibank were offering.
Improve customer services:
%
Imagine today if  I offer services and I have competitors like A1 Ahli Bank, National Bank. 
Tliey have telebanking system s, they have ATM s, imagine if  I com e and don't offer that services. 
How would they look at me. They w ill say that this is a very obsolete bank, inefficient bank. So I 
am under extreme pressure to enhance and improve my services to reach that level. To enhance 
and upgrade, I need the support o f  IT for all aspects. I rather need it more than them because I 
am a new bank.” SVP- Credit Marketing.
All the drivers of IT strategies discussed above are interrelated. The informants, while 
discussing them, referred to improving customer services as a primary objective for 
using IT in their banking business.
Formulation of IT strategies:
A top-down approach:
The informants argued that their IT strategies followed a top-down approach in which 
they were guided by the bank’s business strategies, such as their plans to expand, and 
their plan to enter the retail business after initially focusing on the wholesale business 
(more detailed discussion will be provided later about the relationship between the 
bank’s IT and business strategies).
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A grass-roots evaluation: I
The IT manager's role in IT strategy formation started with his grassroots evaluation of 
the IT infrastructure’s ability to meet the bank’s business strategies. He recommended 
that it was unwise to spend on the bank’s current IT infrastructure due to the major 
deficiencies with the Wang platform, as well as the gloomy future prospects o f this 
vendor.
As mentioned earlier, the bank opted for an open environment accepting different
hardware peripherals. The main system was UNIX, and the PCs were linked through a 
LAN using a client-server system. The banks’ future business systems were based on 
this environment. The IT strategy at this phase was more concerned with defining the
'IT structure and the technical issues related to migrating to the new structure. The IT 
manager was the product champion during this phase and he was the source of ideas and 
information for the top management:
"... with our expansion plan w e as technologists looked at that plan and saw how much w e are
going to invest on IT in this expansion plan. W e thought that this investment was huge... since 
the market was changing, the hardware and the software and based on our analysis and study o f 
the market, we thought that this is the right time to review our overall hardware and software 
strategy...”
".. the Wang went into chapter 11 and it was our responsibility to inform the management and 
give them different various solutions... similarly while changing the strategy, we have to go  to 
them and update them o f  what is the future perspective o f  future computing, the open system  
platform, the networking and so on. And based on our input to them, because they are not 
technical people, they relay on our input for that decision making so in order to make sure that 
w e get the best decision from them w e have to update them very thoroughly o f  what is happening 
in the market., because we don't want a decision that is taken and then regretted later on...”
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IT department formulates the IT strategies:
Committees:
Participation of the users in the systems development:
153
The IT manager said that it was his duty to formulate the bank’s IT strategy and then 
pass it to the bank’s top management for approval. He added that the bank’s IT 
strategies were based basically on the bank’s strategies;
"... IT strategy falls within the overall business plan o f  the bank. W hen w e have a plan for 
business we try to see where IT w ill fit into that and how IT w ill fit into it. N ow  once that has 
been defined then it is the responsibility o f  the IT manager to look at that business plan or that 
business requirement and then formulate his own system or IT strategy both in terms hardware 
and in terms o f  software..” .
There was an IT steering committee in which the top management, represented by the 
division heads, and the IT manager sat. The aim of this committee was to evaluate the 
bank’s IT strategies and approve them. In addition to the steering committee, the bank 
formulated ad hoc committees in which representatives of the users and representatives 
from the IT department sat. The IT manager said that there was a formal procedure that 
they followed in determining the users’ IT needs. Creating an effective liaison with the 
users was perceived as a crucial element in effectively initiating and implementing IT 
projects. The ad hoc committees were perceived as the means to include the necessary 
involvement of the users.
Kr
The users participated in the development of IT systems. Requests for automation 
within the different functional areas came from the users through their departmental 
heads. The Senior Vice President-financial controller, as a user, participated in the
I
between the two centres.
In-house development of systems:
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development o f the core banking system, IBS, which the bank perceived as one of its 
main strategic systems:
I had the opportunity to work as internal auditor, and I was m oved directly in the design and 
implementation o f  systems. Similarly I worked in financial control. The idea com es from the 
users’ departments, where they feel that they want to do something. Then they pass it to the head 
o f  the departments {then they get involved to design the requirements} what is the requirements. 
Then pass it to the EDP...”
Developments within two main centres:
There were two main development centres for the bank’s IT systems. The first was in 
Bahrain and the second was in Pakistan. Once the systems were developed and tested 
by one centre, they were introduced to the bank’s branches in other markets.
Participants from the two development centres participated in annual meetings. The IT 
manager in Bahrain was the liaison between the two centres, frequently travelling
I
As mentioned earlier, the bank depended entirely on its own internal resources to 
automate its systems because of the lack of ‘off-the-shelf systems. The unavailability of 
'off-the-shelf systems could be attributed to the unique operations that differentiated F3 
from the rest of the conventional banks, on one hand, and, on the other, the lack of 
standardised operations amongst the Islamic banks.
The bank depended on its internal resources to develop its business applications as well 
as any conversion tools to migrate or interface the different hardware and software 
systems with each other.
.•I
Relationship with vendor:
developing all of its systems’ needs, the most rational solution was to build its IT 
systems and applications around an open system environment. This opened up a new 
business prospect for the bank, as will be discussed later:
“..because we were using W ang, but w e felt that Wang was facing a financial difficulties. We put 
the question o f  what will happen if  the company faces liquidation. What would happen to me. 
Am I going to die? What if  I needed parts for my machine? Then we put options, one o f  the 
options was to move to another environment, IBM for example. Another option which all o f  us 
were happy and in favour o f  was to go for an open system concept and use any hardware you can 
use. My system is designed to accept any machine. We spent millions on it. We felt that to do it 
this way is once, and it is for ever investment. At least today I can sleep nicely. If Wang is dying, 
NCR is dying, no problem. I can change. Tomorrow, I can get another machine and it starts 
working without hindering my operations, and my future progress...” Senior V ice President.
.. 1
The bank perceived its relationship with Wang as a threat to its future IT strategies. 
Wang was going through financial difficulties and its future prospects were gloomy. 
The bank decided, therefore, to terminate its relationship with Wang.
The bank then evaluated some alternative scenarios: to seek support from other well 
established vendors such as IBM, or to go to an open system platform which supports 
different hardware environments. The bank opted for the second solution.
Selecting IBM as a substitute vendor for Wang was a solution that it evaluated. But
since neither IBM nor any other vendors were able to provide an “Islamic banking”
application system solution, the vendor’s relationship with the Islamic bank was not
.perceived as strategic. Indeed, it was concerned that such a relationship with the vendor 
could change into a threatening one, such as that with Wang, should any problems 
occur.
The bank decided, therefore, that since it was depending on its internal resources for i
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New line of business with excess IT capabilities:
The bank created a new subsidiary company, which marketed system applications and 
other IT related supporting services. The creation of this company came as a result of 
the bank’s investment in the internal development of its application systems and due to 
its commitment to the open system platform that enabled its application systems to run 
on different hardware platforms.
The excess resources in expertise as well as application systems enabled the bank to 
change the status of its IT department from a cost centre to a profit centre, selling its IT 
services to the market.
The bank’s decision to create a systems company was not envisaged when the bank 
started investing in developing its own systems and migrating to the open platform. 
However, its strategy of entering the IT services business came about as a result of its 
success in developing its internal systems from scratch.
The informants perceived that there was a niche in the market that needed IT support 
that was not available from other IT vendors. They believed that there was a good 
market opportunity for their subsidiary company, as more conventional banks, such as 
Citibank, and other newly formed Islamic banks, were entering the Islamic banking 
business. For these banks, buying 'off-the-shelf packages with after sales support was 
envisaged by F3 as being more attractive than developing in-house systems.
It is worth mentioning that sharing the bank’s IT systems with others, rather than 
restricting their use to only inside the bank, was the source of a new business scope for 
F3.
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we have to count on our experience and develop our own software, this software is ver> 
strategic for us. In fact we have started creating an information technology company as a 
subsidiary o f  the bank that w ill market this product to another institutions., I would consider that 
to be a very strategic achievement and a very strategic instrument that w e developed in house..". 
EVP.
"... many o f  the banks expressed interest in buying {our system}. Why? Because our systems are 
fully integrated, on-line, real time, and operate according to the “Sharia” requirements. These 
three requirements are not available with the outside systems. There are system s that are 
available outside. There are people who may offer such systems but they are not fully integrated. 
W e are the only bank with a full integrated, complete Islamic banking system ...” .
“.. while w e were developing that {the banks’ new IT systems} w e were enhancing our EDP 
department... W e can sell our system s to outsiders. We can generate additional income. This was 
not envisaged, absolutely, because that was a service department. But now w e felt that IT is 
becom ing gradually a revenue centre, because w e can sell that system, we can earn something..." 
Senior V ice President.
Role of the IT manager:
The IT manager played an informative role to the bank with regard to issues related to 
changes within the technical environment outside the bank, and the changes that were 
needed to be made within the bank:
“.. Our job  in addition to running the IT department is also to certain extent to update the 
management., o f  what is happening in the market..”
“ ..we have to go to them and update them o f  what is the future perspective o f  future computing, 
the open system platform, the networking and so on. And based on our input to them, because 
they are not technical people, they rely on our input for that decision making so in order to make 
sure that we get the best decision from them we have to update them very thoroughly o f  what is 
happening in the market..”
IT strategies that were related to the bank’s IT infrastructure such as what system to 
adopt and what other supporting programs needed to be developed were directed by the 
IT manager. Despite this, his strategies still needed the approval of top management.
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our old system was based on the concept o f  wholesale business. Providing wholesale services, 
we decided couple years ago that we want to provide different kind o f  services to our retail 
banking. This {led to} a com plete change to our systems and a com plete rethinking. It was not 
envisaged before. But w e changed it now. N ow  IT has to serve that {strategy}. This has affected 
the whole, even the system structure has changed. The number o f  staff has increased, their future 
developm ents has changed, the whole thing has changed up side down. Why? Because there is a 
change in the business strategy... set the IT strategy to help us achieving the goals o f  the business 
and not the other way around. The business goals w ill dictate the terms o f  the system strategies."
Af
He was also responsible for setting the bank’s IT strategies based on its business 
strategies. As mentioned earlier, these strategies were reviewed by an IT steering 
committee.
As for the business goals, his role was supportive rather than directive. He was not 
invited to all of the bank’s business steering committees. He was asked to participate 
only in those meetings where IT support had to be discussed.
Relationship between business strategies and IT 
strategies:
The formulation of the bank’s corporate strategies was done within a steering committee 
in which the bank’s CEO and division heads participated. The IT manager participated 
in these committees on invitation, whenever there was an issue related to IT.
The informants said that the business strategies capitalised on the IT strategies and not 
the other way around. Change in the bank’s infrastructure was driven by the bank's 
expansion strategies, as mentioned earlier:
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The IT manager added that due to the IT support, the bank was able to sustain its 
position within the niche that it had selected to operate from. For example, its IT gave 
the bank support to its retail position in Pakistan. It was the first bank there to introduce 
on-line ATMs. Moreover, IT was used to support the bank’s Islamic products, and 
hence support the bank’s presence within the Islamic banking niche:
“.. You seldom see Islamic syndication... Islamic syndications are new products and it needs 
automation and support as w ell. N ow  since w e created automated support for that, our business 
people were able with the backing o f  that support to go to the market and create a niche for 
Islamic syndication. We were pioneers in that...” .
Change in culture:
In my meeting with the CEO, he wanted to portray the bank as having a culture that 
appreciated the role of IT, and as being no less competent than other conventional 
competitor banks in capitalising on IT. He publicised the bank’s success in the 
development and marketing of the Islamic banking system and the creation of an IT 
services subsidiary company. On the notice boards in the bank, I observed clippings 
showing the CEO meeting with the local newspapers, in which he proudly announced 
the launch of their new system and the creation of the IT company. As mentioned 
earlier, the metaphor that he used to describe the relationship between the bank's 
strategies and IT was “the Catholic marriage”.
I observed that three of the top management informants that I interviewed held foreign 
banking experience. The fourth was educated about, and exposed to trends in banking 
in the UK. Such background experience on the part of the informants may have played 
a role in their adopting ideas and practices characterising the foreign banks’ practices.
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■AThree of the informants came to the bank between 1986 and 1988, the period during 
which the bank changed its strategies and top management team composition.
As mentioned earlier, until 1987, the bank was a small offshore bank. However, after S
1987, the bank adopted expansionary strategies in business and geographical markets.
This change in strategies was accompanied by a change within the bank’s IT scene both 
at the conceptual level, pertaining to the role of IT, and at the concrete level, pertaining 
to how the IT scene was organised and the type of systems used.
At the conceptual level, the bank used to perceive IT as having a narrow and marginal 
role, which was only related to some operational processes such as generating some I
reports or automating a billing system, for example. Now this role has changed, and top 
management perceive an intimate link between the role of IT and the bank’s business
Astrategies, its ability to compete with the competitors, its survival, and its level of
. Aïcustomer services. This change in the conceptual level was associated with support 
from the board and the top management levels.
“..{N ow } IT plays a major role in achieving the objectives o f  the enterprise. IT is a very A |
important mean without it I can’t achieve my objectives..
“Within [Foreign Bank Three], w e are highly automation oriented because our feeling within the 
management., that today banking could not efficiently survive and service customers without an 1;
efficient automation support.” Senior Vice President- credit management. 4
“.. the force that w ill push us is the competition., we are niche oriented because we {are} 
specialised, and you always have to protect that niche, you have to be innovative. You have to be 
able to give alternatives... you have to improvise and by im provising you put pressure on your ;l
IT.." EVP
Previously the cost of the system had hindered the bank in adopting IT. However, with 
the change in culture, cost was not the main criterion upon which the bank decided its IT 
strategies. The transformation from the old infrastructure to the new infrastructure was
j:
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driven by the strategic goals of the bank, which were difficult to quantify, rather than the 
cost of the project, which was very high if the strategic factors are not considered:
it was a very questionable event at the beginning, and the cost factor was very much on the 
high but we valued that IT is the way o f  the future., we may have a stronger view  for the value o f  
IT, and w e have put in our money where our mouth is, more than our competitors who are in the 
same line o f  business..}.
At the concrete level, the bank changed its IT organisation. Before 1988, there was an 
EDP section within the operations department. Heading the EDP section was a 
supervisor who reported to the operations manager. The EDP supervisor received his 
orders, which were operational in nature, from the operations manager. With the change 
in culture, this small section changed into an independent IT department, and from a 
cost centre into a revenue centre for the bank. The head of the IT department’s status 
changed from a supervisor headed by the operations manager to a Senior Vice President 
reporting directly to the CEO:
".. At that time 1 remember the person who was heading the EDP was not a very senior. Even in 
the reporting lines, the EDP was reporting to the operations manager. The operations manager 
was always looking at the operations point o f  view . So it was a wrong concept o f  looking at the 
technology.
.. a major transform, an overhauling one started from the reporting. Our reporting lines are 
different. We have a much higher value. Supported by senior vice president levels. Before it was 
by junior supervisors to managers level reporting lines., we have given them a kind o f  
independence.
.. 1 joined at the beginning o f  1988. I had the opportunity to work with different people at the 
head level. 1 remember at those days the EDP used to be small. You have two or three people., 
the main deficiency was the appreciation to the IT it was not as important as today. Before the\ 
looked at it as a small service department... Ahh.. design a system for billing for example., 
before you had no say. Just do this and he ought to do it without thinking why. N ow  the mentality 
has changed.
As mentioned earlier, there was a change in the type and function of the systems that the 
bank adopted.
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The bank’s staff changed the way they performed their daily operations. They became i
Enablers of IT strategy:
Bank participation in the development and implementation of the strategy.
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more closely linked to the application systems and used them in their daily operations.
,The need for secretaries, for example, was perceived to be less important as the 
managers preferred to carry out their daily operations by themselves by using the PC 
tools.
s
Another factor that marked a change in the bank’s culture, was the bank’s new 
recruitment policies that stipulated that new recruits should be computer literate in order 
to be able to cope in the bank’s environment.
'A
The following are the enabling factors of the successful exploitation of IT within the 
bank as perceived by the IT manager and the Senior Vice President.
Top management appreciation of, and support for the role of IT.
' you have the top management appreciation to the concept o f  IT. Real appreciation to what it 
is..
:
we recognised the importance o f  IT policy, IT benefits in general, years ago from the outset.
This is due to the know ledge o f  our top management. We have open vision about that. We ha\e 
management appreciation and management support for the change and developm ent..”
As mentioned earlier, the bank evaluated its IT strategies based on the strategic 
opportunities open to them rather than the cost of the system, which was huge at the 
migration phase.
___
" I l
%
:
As mentioned earlier, the Senior Vice President participated in the development of the 
bank’s core system in addition to staff from the different functional areas. Those 
participated in the ad hoc committee that was responsible for developing the system.
they did a remarkable job. This does not go to the EDP only, but it goes to the bank as a 
w hole. Because everybody participated in the developm ent o f  these system s..”
Competence of the IT department and leadership of the IT manager:
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The bank provided support to the IT department. As mentioned earlier, there were 
changes in the rank of the IT manager, in that he was promoted to Senior Vice 
President. There was also a change in the reporting lines to empower the IT department 
to play an active role. Moreover, the IT department was given more power to recruit 
employees o f the required calibre. Budgets for training were allocated to enable the 
division to achieve its targets.
'.. our strategy is to have our technology processing and developm ent independent {from other 
organisations). How to achieve that? It can't be achieved unless you have a com plete department 
strong and well supported to enable you to achieve that objective..
we have set up a specialised IT division headed by a senior vice president level. This is just to 
show you how important it is..
.. we have to have a [high] calibre staff. Continuous training on the job  or outside. Training is 
very important to gain new knowledge... a dollar spent on training w ill give a better return than 
any dollar spent elsewhere..
J.
... top management appreciation, and management support. They (IT division) get what thev 
need. Staff, training,., and co-operation with the other department. For example if  I want to upset 
the program o f  the EDP, I can stop them. The role o f  the management here com es to achieve 
coherence between the different departments., this can't be achieved unless the management 
appreciate the value o f  that...”
The leadership of the IT manager was crucial for the bank’s successful migration from
■ I
the old system to the new system. His role as informant to the management directed the
bank’s future IT infrastructure, and was behind their ability to market its application 
systems that were designed for an open platform environment.
• Existence of clear goals and objectives and maturity of the Islamic banking products:
The informant said that there were no clear strategies for the IT scene in the past. This 
situation had changed, the EVP argued:
w e sat on an ad hoc committee to review where we stand and to review our information 
technology within the organisation... w e realised that w e did not have clear strategy six years ago. 
W e put it into place and we reviewed it again and again. N ow  it stands solid and contributes a lot 
to the success o f  this institution..”
Moreover, the IT manager said that the nature of Islamic banking 10 years ago was still 
evolving, and its characteristics were not well defined as compared with the 
conventional banks. Ambiguity in the processes hindered the successful development of 
systems in the past. However, after the bank had been in the field for long enough, its 
business as an Islamic bank became more mature and better defined, which enabled the 
IT support unit to successfully assist the bank’s products and operations.
• Change in the perception about IT :
Changes in the perception of, and appreciation for, the business implications of IT were 
other enablers of the strategic use of IT within the bank. The Senior Vice President 
narrated a story about another bank that adopted similar strategies to theirs, but failed to 
capitalise on its IT systems. By narrating this story, he wanted to emphasis the bank's 
appreciation for the business implications of the role of IT.
one o f  the banks, without quoting them, felt that IT in today’s life is merely a small service 
department. That bank expanded. They reached a stage where all their expansion programs were 
jeopardised. They could not advance because there were no clear policies, no support. When they 
came to analyse what kind o f  system they have and how they operate, they realised that what they
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are doing is absolutely not comparable to their requirements... we recognise the importance o f  IT 
policy, IT benefits in general..”
“ .. IT is not EDP only, it is much wider. It include IT as a w hole. IT is not just processing as the 
old approach to it, it is not. W e recognised that one...”
Problems:
There were three main concerns for the IT manager.
Acquiring the right expertise in the market was a concern to the bank since it depended 
on its IT department to develop the internal system solutions,. There were a limited 
number of IT specialists who could meet the requirements of a specialised bank such as 
F3.
The work load on the IT department was a second concern for the bank. As mentioned 
earlier, the bank was responsible for fulfilling its own IT needs, in addition to those of 
the other institutions belonging to the group. According to the IT manager, some of the 
departments within the bank would have to wait longer before they could meet their 
requirements.
The third issue was following the pace of change within the IT technology. The IT 
manager said that this issue was not an immediate threat to the bank as long as the 
current systems were meeting the bank’s business needs:
".. Hardware is continuously changing. From an organisation point o f  view , you can’t change 
with the change in the hardw are in the market because o f  the fact that organisations have certain 
amount o f  investments in their hardware and they want to utilise this investments before the> 
move on. I think the critical issue here is to ascertain that is the existing hardware and software 
strategy serving the business needs o f  the organisation, if  the answer is yes, then there is no 
immediate need for change...”.
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Foreign Bank Four (F4) 
introduction:
Foreign Bank Four (F4) was an international bank, which operated a large branch 
network in more than 60 countries.
Business Focus
Ï met three informants, the bank’s local CEO, the IT manager, and a senior manager. 
The case study is based mainly on my interviews with the CEO and the IT manager, 
while a senior manager provided me with background information about the bank. All 
the interviews were tape recorded.
The banking environment - a  market of “iemmings”:
The CEO perceived the Bahraini banking environment as being crowded and over­
banked. Moreover, the market was not highly sophisticated, offering only limited 
lending opportunities for the competing banks that were highly liquid.
The banks had been mimicking each other in terms of their business approaches and the 
services that they provided. The CEO described their behaviour in the market as a
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‘lem m ing’ .. that jumps over cliffs and kills itself.. One goes in one direction, normally we will rush after 
them .. One gets competitive advantage., next year evervbody else has caught up with you..” . For 
example, Foreign Bank Four was one of the very first banks to enter the personal loan
?business. When the bank started approaching this segment of the market there were 
very few banks interested in this type of business; however, the majority of the banks 
followed thereafter.
The foreign banks, according to the CEO, were searching for niches in the market that 
they could best serve, as opposed the mass market that the local banks had more 
advantage in serving well. Due to the tightly regulated banking industry in Bahrain, the 
foreign banks were restricted to opening not more than fi\ e branches. This restriction 
had given the local banks a competitive advantage over the foreign banks.
The CEO believed that quality o f business, as opposed to quantity, was their target. As Ig;will be discussed in the coming section, the CEO believed that focusing on high worth 
individuals with whom the bank had long term relationships, rather than the mass 
market, was the target that they wanted to build their strategies around. The CEO 
believed that Bahrain was like Japan in terms of how the business was structured. There 
were a few big, wealthy families who had well diversified networks of businesses, and 
owned major shares of the commercial business. This was the targeted segment for the 
bank, as will be discussed later.
The above summarises the perceptions of the top management about the banking
<
environment in Bahrain. The coming section describes the segments the bank focused
I,on, as described by the informants.
1
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Market niches:
The bank operated within the 
following areas: corporate,
commercial, personal, and treasury
Business
Focus
C o m m er-^  ‘ Corporate  ^ ( Pereonal  ^ Treasury 
E s ta b U s h e d  D e v e l o p i n g ^  „  in r n m r(see Figure 1 ) .  The corporate business w ealth y w ealth y businesses occupation
Families Families Nationality
segment consisted of the big
corporations in Bahrain such as Gulf Figure l:  B usiness fo c u s  (F4)
Air, Aluminium Bahrain, Caltex, and Bahrain Petroleum Company.
The commercial business was divided into three main segments. The bank focused on 
serving the big, well-established wealthy families who had a presence at all levels o f  
industry..” . The bank had the advantage of already having long-term relationships within 
this segment.
The second segment of the commercial business included the families that had 
developed their business during the boom period, while the third segment was small 
businesses.
The bank was involved in trade financing the above segments. The bank’s large branch 
network of branches in over 60 countries gave it a competitive advantage over the local 
banks, which were limited in their international presence:
we have been here in Bahrain for a long time, and we have a very good connection, and our 
aim is to build on that., we have a good world-wide network., we have branches wherever you 
go, you as a consumer It is much faster and cheaper to deal with us than going to another local 
bank that has limited branches., the beauty o f  international banks is that you have a world-wide 
network., the advantage that we have if  we deal with an international network is efficiency, the 
speed o f  service and the cost effect., because if  w e deal with our own branch in America or the 
UK or the Far East... if  I want to deal with an agent bank, the time consumed there is more than
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that I need to deal with my branch., this is the advantage to your customers., if  I want to open an 
L.C. {letter o f  credit} and I go  to a third bank where 1 have to pay their com m ission and I have to 
follow  their rules and timing, the time is much longer than dealing with your branch...” Senior 
Manager.
The third area of business focused on by F4 was personal banking. The bank segmented 
this business based on nationality, income, and occupation into a matrix of sub- 
segments with different credit ratings assigned to each. F4 was one of the first banks 
that had widened its business focus, from serving the commercial segments to financing 
the personal market segments.
I
The fourth type of business for the bank was treasury businesses, in which there were 
only limited opportunities as there were few inter-bank dealings in Bahrain. This area of 
business was, as the CEO described it, a “.. support service to the other areas..”. Within this 
business area the bank mainly focused on deposits.
The CEO stated that the philosophy of the bank was to seek quality of business as
■
opposed to quantity. He believed that seeking a wider market share would be at the 
expense of quality of business, which they would have to forego if they entered into a :
cut throat type of competition. He did not want to enter into head to head competition 
with the local banks. He believed that serving the well established wealthy segment 
would be more rewarding than chasing the mass market segments since that required a 
larger local branch network and higher operating costs, capabilities that his bank did not 
have;
if  you are going for market share then., two things that normally get thrown out., pricing and 
credit quality, because you can’t go for credit quality and market share..
.. domestically, all the banks are chasing after a very small pie. Banks over the last few years 
tended, at least the international ones, tended to look at quality o f  lending as oppose to quantity..
169
.. in this environment, the private customer is not the driver o f  the business, the driver in the 
banking system are Kanoos, the Fakroos, the Jalals, the Yateems [the rich fam ilies]..” CEO.
The CEO perceived the bank as not being the largest player in the market nor the 
leader:
“.. we are not the largest player., nor the leading players in the market., and so therefore when 
we have a strategy, we keep our eyes open on what they are going to do..”
Business strategies:
The bank’s business strategies were short-term in nature, and were influenced by the 
group’s overall guidelines, as will be discussed later. However, there were pre-defîned 
business areas that the bank operated in for long periods of time.
The CEO did not believe in setting long term detailed strategies for the bank’s business:
“.. because you don't have a strategy for the whole bank., w e are not the largest player., not the 
leading players on the market., and so therefore when w e have a strategy, we keep our eyes open 
on what they are going to do., and really if  you said if  you have a fixed strategy, the answer is 
no., we have a horizon, and let say that my horizon is the end o f  December 1995, I know roughl\ 
where I want to be at that time, and I know roughly how to get to where I want to be., but the 
path I take literally has to be looked at every two months or eveiy three months., because 
strategic horizon these days is not more than six months ahead., let forget two or three year plans, 
that’s for communist planning, and that never worked..”
The bank had broad guidelines and goals set by the headquarters, on which the Bahrain 
branch acted to set their local strategies. The headquarters evaluated the attractiveness of 
Bahrain business environment as a whole. This evaluation was influenced by the 
stability within the Gulf area. Based on that, they set the guidelines for the branch in 
Bahrain:
What can affect Bahrain, Saddam Hussain m oves a division to the border with Kuwait., 
capital f l ig h t .. Iran com es into a conflict with the US navy for some thing and other flash point., 
there are so many factors that could affect Bahrain that you can't look so far forward..
..there are many influences on strategy. One would be external drivers for strategy... the bank is 
globally deciding that som e businesses are strategic and som e business are not strategic., now
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'Isome businesses are regarded as core businesses., personal banking is core, trade finance is core, 
treasury is core, corporate banking is core, but within each one o f  those areas, as I said before. è
you have different segm ents., so  w hile I say that treasury is core you might find that treasury 
deposit taking activity in Bahrain is core to our requirements, while interbank trading is not., so 
that is the external driver., what w e then do is take the external drivers and apply those external 
drivers in terms o f  the local econom y, the local business which exists in Bahrain..”
As for other banks in Bahrain, the CEO believed that they did not have strategic plans.
The time horizon that the CEO mentioned for their strategic plans was between
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When asked about whether the rest of the banks in Bahrain exercise strategic planning.
.the CEO stated that there were key players who were strategically planmng in Bahrain.
He mentioned the two main local banks. However, he differentiated them from the 
foreign banks such as his own in their approach to strategic planning. The foreign 
banks’ strategic plans considered investment prospects of Bahrain first and within these |
guidelines they sought opportunities:
“.. 1 think their [talking about another foreign bank] exercise is a broad based exercise which like 
ours would not look at business first o f  all but would look at Bahrain first o f  all, and you 
determine in terms o f  country risk whether you w ish to continue investing., i f  you decide that you 
have a threshold level o f  country risk .. you say yes fine where are the opportunities within tha: 
country risk for me to invest..”
months and one year. These plans were continuously revised and evaluated by 
committees that comprised the CEO and the heads of concerned business units.
âPerceived role of IT:
No competitive advantage from the bank's IT systems:
The CEO believed that their current IT systems did not give them a competitive 
advantage over their rivals. As will be discussed later, their main computing system 
was outmoded and suffered from efficiency problems. Moreover, the bank was 
committed to the centralised development strategy that its group followed, and therefore 
did not have autonomy to react to match the competitors within the local market:
;
in terms o f  do our systems currently provide us with a com petitive advantage, w e have to sa> 
no they don’t., they don’t in terms o f  our existing systems because we are not a stand alone bank.. 
w e are a global bank, therefore we have to develop a global system ..” CEO.
;
A quantum leap in service delivery:
A  migration to a new system, however, was expected to enable the bank to “make a 
quantum leap” in service delivery.
■I'-
ATMs to drive away the low income customers from the 
counter:
As mentioned earlier, the bank, was in the first wave of banks that installed ATMs in 
Bahrain. The CEO perceived its clients in a similar way to those of the airlines. The 
first class customers, those high worth clients that the bank perceived as making the 
quality business for the bank, received high quality personal attention from the bank.
Next came the second class clients, those that the bank served at the counter, and last
&
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Saving accounts that have a credit o f  300 Dinars a month.. 270 Dinars are im mediately sent to 
India., and the chap lives on 30 or 45 Dinars, he is not going to get counter service from any 
bank in town..” CEO.
Improving the internal systems -  a  strategic approach:
those of the west, and therefore directing the IT to the public was not a strategic option:
but here., lets assume that w e had 50000 customers. N ow  for Bahrain with a market o f
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came the third class clients, those who deposit their salary at the end of the month and 
have withdrawn almost all of it by the beginning of the next month. The ATMs were
i.put in to drive this lowest class of clients away from the bank counters and so release the 
bank employees from serving them, in order to serve the more strategic clients:
“ .. A lot o f  banks are looking at their customers the same as the air lines are looking at them., a 
first class, business class, and econom y. First class will get priority banking services, business 
class w ill get counter service, and the econom y class w ill get a plastic ticket and they w ill be told 
to go to a machine..
•p
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f.The CEO argued that the expectations within the Bahraini market were not as high as
“ .. for your people in Bahrain, lets say no most o f  them don’t need it at the moment, it is like |
saying are you going to give star war technology to Sudan., no., what are they going to do with it.
They don’t need it. If you look at the level o f  expectations and the level o f  need in Bahrain it is 
still comparatively low level to the w est..”
The strategic role of IT, as the CEO perceived, came from using IT within the 
boundaries of the bank rather than beyond it to the public. The CEO avoided 
approaching the mass market, as he believed that due to their limited branch network, 
they were not able to pursue this type of strategy. However, he believed that IT could 
play a strategic role in the bank through enabling it to control its cost though enhancing 
their internal system efficiency:
i
it w ill give you com petitive advantage but perhaps not to the., public, where it w ill g ive you 
competitive advantage is in your own internal systems where you cut cost..” Ï
500,000 people to go to a 10,000 customers, takes our growth from 10 to 20% in an environment 
o f  an intense com petition., so it is hardly likely that it is going to happen so therefore, our 
visionary requirements for IT are not going to be there to support {growth}, they are going to be 
there to deliver products, cheaper, more efficiently..”. CEO.
Information technology was expected to control the effects of the increase in transaction 
volume. The CEO argued that if the bank managed to control its cost through 
enhancing its efficiency by using IT, then in the long run it would enjoy a competitive 
advantage over the others:
“.. w e will be using IT primarily to drive down cost. But this is not a short term gain, this is a 
long term gain... you can put as much computers as you want, it is not the computer that cost, it is 
the software that cost us m oney., and putting this system in does not give you the dramatic 
savings, what is does, it nullifies the effect o f  cost increases, it means you could do more at 
today’s price and i f  you can do that in five years, then in years one through five you will have a 
competitive advantage..” CEO.
Efficient and cheaper delivery of products:
As mentioned earlier, one strategic area where the bank perceived a role for IT was to 
deliver its products more cheaply:
“.. if  you take product delivery then obviously it has a profit and loss connotation, because you 
have cost in terms o f  product delivery. IT reduces that cost.”
".. 1 would say first o f  all it would be an improved support for front end products., improved 
delivery to these products with view  o f  minimising cost o f  delivery.."
■*.. On our last major project that we did., it was cost., cost was the driver o f  last strategy ., cost and 
quality delivery., those were the two main drivers.. The last big project that we did was a trade 
finance ... a centralised system and it covered every thing to do with trade finance... excellent MIS 
capabilities to the system., very easy to operate ... totally modular*..”
IT supports business goals:
The informants perceived IT as a means of supporting their business goals. The trade 
finance system that the CEO mentioned earlier, and the personal loans system, which
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becoming integral part now., as you are aware we are into this information technology age, if  you 
want to deliver products faster into the market, technology has to play a role, and to that extent 
w e always support the business in insuring that such products are feasible and to make sure that
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was developed in a PC environment (to be discussed later), were examples of systems 
that were driven by the bank’s business goals. As mentioned earlier, the bank focused 
on serving the commercial segments through trade financing, and the personal segment 
through credit financing. Both of these systems supported these businesses.
The basic concept here is business driving IT., in terms o f  IT supporting business, it is
%
all routine course and any thing that is repetitive is performed through our system s..” IT 
manager.
we have a procedure within the bank... that IT is driven by the business... so IT developm ents 
is generally sponsored by the business itself..” CEO
Strategic MIS:
The CEO perceived MIS as strategic to the bank’s business. He expected it to enable 
his bank to pursue its strategy focus of chasing “quality” businesses. Moreover, the 
CEO stressed the important role that their MIS would play in managing their balance 
sheet.
.The IT manager said that the systems that they implemented in the PC environment 
enabled them to manage their provisions and keep them as low as possible.
“.. one o f  the largest areas o f  advantage that we are obtaining from IT is proper management o f  
our business. A clear analysis o f  segm ental profit, segmental cost, a clear analysis o f  margins, 
w e are able to determine which sectors o f  our business we should exit from, which sector we 
should increase..” CEO.
Crucial for meeting central banks’ reporting standards:
The bank was under the supervision of the central bank in its home country as well as
f
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iother central banks in countries where they had had branches. In Bahrain, the bank was
under the supervision of the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA). The BMA follows the J§standards of the Bank of England to a great extent, and it is keen to adopt any new 
policies while maintaining a reputable and stable banking industry.
Five day week and the big banks’ delivery systems:
The IT manager argued that the introduction of the competitors’ phone banking systems 
did not have any influence on the bank’s business. Moreover, he did not perceive any 
strategic role for phone banking systems.
The CEO narrated a story about the tension that was increasing between the foreign 
banks (especially his), and the big local banks. The conflict was about decreasing the 
working days of the week to five days instead of six. The CEO objected strongly 
because he perceived this approach as harming their business, which was not directed at 
the mass consumer market, but at the big merchants, whom he would not be able to
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The CEO perceived that reliable and efficient internal systems were crucial to gain the 
trust of the central banks wherever the bank operated. The CEO mentioned that they 
were linked through an E-mail system, which enabled them to consolidate their financial 
position in a speedy manner and thus meet the central banks’ requirements: Ic-'
After the BCCI scandal, the banking is becoming a more regulated industry, the central 
banking authorities require more and more information. The only way tliat you can provide it... 
is through systems our primary control is the [named his home country central bank] which 
monitor the bankers on a global bases, our secondary primary control would be BM A which 
monitors the health o f  our Bahrain segment in Bahrain, as all central banks, they will see ideas 
occurring in other ‘centrals’ and they will need to extend them to Bahrain. The only way w e can 
cope with that is through the management o f  that information technology through the 
development o f  management reporting that we have, It is vital.."
f
v' . '•!________  .... . . . .
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serve well as a result of the decrease in the number of working days.
The CEO perceived this proposal by the local banks as a move to force the mass market 
to utilise their phone banking systems more and hence gain a competitive advantage 
over the banks who did not have the system. The conflict had not been resolved at the 
time I was conducting this field work.
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Despite the IT manager’s claim that the rivals’ phone banking systems were not 
affecting their business, elsewhere during the interview he mentioned that the reason 
they had not introduced it was because of the deficiency in the bank’s old infrastructure. 
However, they were planning to introduce the telephone banking system after installing 
their new computing platform, which was capable of supporting the phone banking 
system.
This story shows how the banks were manoeuvring to get a competitive advantage 
through using their IT systems.
The following is part of the quotation by the CEO about the conflict over the five-day 
working week and how the conflict was related to IT systems and market segments;
[the two main local banks] are pushing six days production into five in the normal hours. Yes 
but there is a cost advantage., are you planning to get rid o f  staff? Are you planning to reduce 
cost? Are you pushing more into the system s? And was that the true advantage? Or these two 
banks feel that with their systems they can gain competitive advantage over the other banks by 
forcing customers to depend more and more on telephone banking and ATMs and as a result o f  
that the customers will m ove to these banks which provided the best services. They <r
miscalculated, they forgot that In this environment the private customer is not the driver o f  the
business, the driver in the banking system s are the Kanoos, the Fakroos,... these people are f
merchants and when it com es to being a very rich and influential merchants and you see a five i;
day w eek .. com ing through which may cause a significant cost to your trading business..”
Main IT developments:
The bank was amongst the first wave of banks that introduced ATMs. These ATMs 
.were interlinked within the region.
A second important historical project that the bank developed was linking the bank’s 
.branches in Bahrain electronically. Now any client can bank from any branch without 
the need to refer to his branch. Nonetheless, the senior manager said that the bank's 
systems were not full integrated.
ir
A major IT project that the bank was instituting was transforming from their old NCR 
computing system to IBM AS 400. The bank’s old system was outmoded, had 
deficiency problems and was not able to support other systems.
The lack of support from the bank’s regional office for the main system necessitated 
finding other means of supporting its consumer finance division (CFD) and its business 
which was unique to Bahrain. The bank opted for developing its consumer finance 
system on a PC environment that was connected via a LAN.
The transformation to the AS 400 enabled the bank to adopt an imaging system that 
aided the bank in storing and retrieving documents. Its adoption was encouraged 
because of a decrease in its price.
According to the IT manager, the systems that the bank developed for the retail business 
outnumbered those developed to support other areas of the bank. The bank was in the
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Reason for embarking on the above systems:
Follow the regional office IT strategies:
The bank acquired its main IT strategies and major developments from its regional 
office which, in turn, followed the headquarters’ grand strategies. These strategies 
aimed at standardising the systems. As will be discussed later, this policy failed in some 
cases to address the unique needs of the different markets.
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process of increasing the number of its ATMs, and introducing credit cards. As é
mentioned earlier, the bank did not have phone banking system as its old computing 
platform was not capable of supporting it. To support their trade finance business, the 
bank adopted a system that aimed at cutting down cost and improving delivery. In
addition to the above, the bank was considering automation of the front office.
%
The drivers for adopting the above systems were interrelated with the perceived role that 
IT played as already been discussed. IT played a role in improving internal efficiency 
and controlling cost, delivering products, facilitating better decision making, meeting 
the reporting standards of the regulatory bodies, driving away the less strategic clients 
from the counters to the ATMs, and enabling the bank to survive. However, the 
decision to embark on these systems was not taken by the bank’s branch in Bahrain. 
The main drivers of the bank’s IT strategies are discussed below.
Support the bank’s unique business needs:
The bank had to develop some of its systems in a PC environment to support the 
operational needs of its business goals. The grand-centralised IT strategies did not 
address these needs and the branch in Bahrain had to depend on its internal resources to 
develop small systems that were isolated from the main system.
To overcome the deficiency of the current computing system:
The bank’s NCR system was outmoded and it failed to support the bank’s business 
requirements. To use the IT manager’s words;
it is very difficult because as I told you it is very difficult to determine hew  much more 
customers or revenue you w ill generate by telephone banking, so may be that is one o f  the main 
reasons why we have not gone for it. Secondly in terms with interfacing with our existing 
systems because the systems are so obsolete and quite old in their concept and trying to interface 
with them may be a problem... w e just upgraded our systems now and probably w e may look at it 
in the near future..”
:i
The above quotation may describe why the bank had not embarked on introducing a 
telephone banking system even though it was the trend amongst the banks in Bahrain. |
Contained within the above quotation were two main reasons. The first will be 
discussed when I talk about the bank’s culture. The second reason was related to the 
inability of the main system to support telephone banking. There were also other 
systems with business implications which the main system was unable to support. The 
customer finance system, which was developed in a PC environment, was an example.
The deficiency of the bank’s computing platform was a driver for migrating from the 
NCR to the IBM AS400.
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Foitow the market trend:
The bank’s intention to introduce credit cards was a reaction to their competitors. The 
main players in the Bahraini market introduced Visa and MasterCard credit cards. 
Some competitors provided cards regardless of whether the client held an account with 
their bank or not. The majority, however, stipulated that the card holder should have an 
account with the bank.
Formulation of IT strategies:
Group IT strategies were initiated at the 
bank’s headquarters in Europe, and then
Feed back
H eadquarten i in 
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i  Office
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Main IT strategy 
Main systems
filtered through the regional offices to the Requests for
systems
bank’s branches in these regions. The bank 
aimed at standardising and centralising the 
development of its systems to achieve
Figure 2: form u la tion  o f  IT strateg ies at F4
economies of scale and control related costs
(see Figure 2). There were a number of problems associated with this approach, however.
Firstly, the systems needed customisation to be adapted to local environment 
requirements. Secondly, the centralised approach meant that the bank’s responsiveness 
to local needs was slow. The CEO, for example, believed that their system did not give 
them a competitive advantage over the other banks because they were not a stand-alone
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bank but a member branch of a group and had to fit within the overall strategy of this 
group:
The IT manager added that, due to the centralised process, the group was slow in
I
in terms o f  do our system s currently provide us with a competitive advantage, w e have to say 
no they don’t., they don’t in terms o f  our existing systems because we are not a stand alone bank., 
we are a global bank, therefore w e have to develop a global system ..” CEO
responding to the need to customise the bank’s global system to local requirements.
:
Thirdly, there were local business needs that were unique to Bahrain (e.g. the customer 
finance business), which the global strategy did not fulfil. The bank had to depend on 
its internal resources to meet these unique requirements:
“.. customer finance is a classic case., and we developed our own thing., because there was no 
group product available., how ever w e can’t stand by the sidelines and wait until the group 
develop such product..”
The bank had recently decentralised decisions related to IT from its headquarters to its 
regional offices. The bank in Bahrain had some autonomy with regard to standalone 
and minor systems, which did not exceed certain approved investment levels. Other 
major systems that the bank needed were the responsibility of the regional office. The IT 
manager played a crucial role in regard to this. He had two reporting lines: one to the 
bank’s CEO in Bahrain and the other to the regional office. Approval from the regional 
office was needed for any local developments. The regional office evaluated whether or 
not there was a regional interest in the project. If there was a regional interest, then the 
regional office would own the project and develop the system; otherwise the Bahrain 
branch would develop that system.
■f
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The IT manager participated in business committees by invitation. He was invited 
whenever there was an issue related to his area.
The process of defining the required support of IT to business starts within the business 
areas, to quote the IT manager:
product profiles are drawn, viability is done, functional aspects are drawn out., to develop  
whether the product itself is viable or not. But once they reach a conclusion and say w e must 
market this product, or get into this kind o f  business, they com e into IT and I do the costing on 
the IT side, trying to make compatible systems and help the business..”
The IT manager’s contribution came after the business requirements had been defined. 
However, when it came to defining the infrastructure requirements o f the bank, it was 
the IT manager’s contribution and insights that directed the IT strategy within the bank 
in Bahrain.
The IT manager also played a consultancy role within the bank. He proposed new ways 
in which the IT systems could help the business improve efficiency. The local IT 
strategy within the bank was concerned with proposing and defining the business 
implications of the IT systems, which the business people could then use:
there are times where I may have more input to offor to them, so it starts the other way around. î
Like ‘se lf  service terminals’ for example. It is an IT driven project in the sense that what is 
capable o f  doing, the technology itself has something that has to be brought out to the business 
man’s thinking. I have got to tell him o f  what it is capable o f  delivering .. and since I have the 
business background, I can probably suggest ways o f  incorporating certain products into this.
Like for example credit scoring, now se lf  service terminals and credit scoring go hand in hand, if 3
I can link up the tw o..” . IT manager.
All local IT developments were managed through a committee called the Product 
Management Committee (PMC). According to the CEO, “ the Product Management 
Committee runs the project, budget for it, watches the quality m ilestones..”. Representatives from
' .5
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the business units and the IT unit sat on the PMC committee. After the project had been 
developed, the acceptance of the project owner was essential.
As part of their services, the IT department had a process that they called “service 
quality management” to measure and promote the quality of services delivered by the IT 
department.
The ownership of the IT initiatives depended on the type of IT project. The business 
units owned the project and were held responsible for paying for it, if it was related to 
their areas. When the project was of a technical infrastructure nature, the initiator would 
be the IT manager and if the project affected the entire infrastructure, the CEO took the 
responsibility.
Time horizon for the centralised IT strategies:
“Q. What is the time horizon o f  the strategic plans?
184
For a bank of global operations, initiating and developing a global IT strategy requires 
long range planning. For example, it took the bank five years to implement one of its 
global systems. Their goals were based upon their past experience and their future 
expectations:
CEO: anywhere between one and five years depending on what the business is. Actual strategic 
planing is probably up to tw elve months ahead, however, in IT you can’t plan 12 months ahead 
you have to plan probably 3, 4, 5 years ahead and so.. 1 would say that IT involvement is a series 
o f  a rolling waves.... the big w aves that are coming in the distance, the big ones are your IT 
strategies that were started maybe four years ago. For example, w e have a single system that 
covers Singapore, Hong Kong, M alaysia, the personal banking system., which has been 
developed by IBM., that is an ongoing developm ent... but [the system] has been developed now  
for close to five years. And that is the sort o f  strategic vision that you have to take when you 
develop a new system..” CEO.
" i . V-
Based on the above quotation, directing the bank’s global IT strategies resembled 
directing big oil tankers: Decisions had to be taken a long time before a change in 
direction could take place.
Relationship with vendors:
The bank discontinued its relationship with NCR, migrating to IBM and installing its 
AS 400. As the CEO mentioned, IBM, also developed some of the bank’s major 
systems. The relationship with IBM was, therefore, in both the hardware and software 
areas.
Role of the IT manager:
Î
J
I
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The main investment decisions about IT systems were taken at the headquarters and 
regional offices. Similarly, all relationships with vendors supplying major IT systems to 
the bank were held at the headquarters level.
I
The IT manager said that he had had a hybrid background. He was an accountant who 
had taken a conversion course in IT. After that he had worked in different countries as a 
systems analyst before joining Bahrain. His background had provided him with the 
ability to understand the business and the IT scenes well. His role is summarised below:
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• His hybrid background enabled him to bridge the communication gap that usually
exists between the users and the technical staff.
* He played a technical role. He was responsible for the systems’ operations,
maintenance and quality of service.
He played a liaison role with the regional office, communicating the bank’s IT needs 
and implementing any global IT strategies filtered through to them from the regional 
office.
-:a
He also played an informative role. He considered himself as an internal consultant
informing the users about new ways of operating with the IT systems that they had. 
and informing the management about the implications of IT systems for their 
business operations. Moreover, he was expected to innovate systems that enabled 
the bank to deliver their products efficiently and in a competitive manner.
He was the driver of IT strategies related to the IT infrastructure in the bank.
With regard to his role in business goals, he was an advisor, expected to suggest 
ways of supporting business goals and products. However, he did not drive the
:business goals nor was he allowed to exceed his role as a supporter of business 
products. He was invited to business steering committees only when they 
considered an issue related to his department.
they have put me for one w hole year doing programming, system analysis and all o f  this stuff 
and after one year I came as a consultant. One year o f  exposure to the IT exposed me to the fact 
that people don't actually understand each other., and that is why I became a consultant., which 
basically 1 understand the business requirements, suggest idea solutions to them and to the IT guy 
and explain to him what the business requirements are. We need to work in conjunction.. Users
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can’t realise what machines can do for them, and technology guys are convinced that users keep 
changing their minds very often..” IT manager.
“.. The people in IT have a dual role. One is the system role, it means the ... development, the 
implementation, the maintenance and enhancement o f  the system s.. The second one is the 
information role, where they bring 
to the business who are really non­
technical people the potential that 
are available from new  
technologies..” CEO
(usines:
needs
Role of IT and IT 
manager: Supp^
He w ill com e in on product 
developm ent first o f  all., he is again in terms o f  cost, as we constantly seek to drive cost down, or 
maintain cost then he plays a very important role in terms o f  his information skills .. in other 
words, I know a product that can do this for you for half the price and it w ill save you this.. He is 
on the innovative side in determining how systems will be developed that w ill sell products., that 
will g ive com petitive advantage., and that is essentially his role in strategy., it is very much a 
support role., it is not a driving role.. IT does not drive our strategy, the business drives our 
strategy and the IT plays a very very supportive role..” CEO.
;
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Relationship between business strategies and IT 
strategies:
s
1
The informants stressed that business strategies, and their product delivery, needed to 
capitalise on IT to deliver at a lower cost. As mentioned earlier, the consumer finance 
system was an example of capitalising on IT to deliver products.
I
■I
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Transformation to the new infrastructure had a time lag effect on the bank’s ability to 
capitalise on its IT systems to meet its business goals. Transforming to the new IT 
environment needed as long as three years to complete, during which time the bank had
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Bank’s culture and IT:
i
to make do with the old environment, including all its deficiencies. The bank was not 
able during that period to capitalise on its main IT systems to meet its business goals.
ÿ;The IT strategy in the transformation phase was more concerned with the technical issue
of transforming to the new IT environment than dealing with the direct business needs:
w e were com pelled to accept the old system this year i f  I were to sit down and rewrite my
entire banking system today, let say to suit the A S 400 environment, it is a three year project., 
moreover, we have IT standards and concepts and strategies laid down. So there is always a time 
lag in such decision being made and to that extent w e are suffering .. it Is so bad that w e need to 
look at it..”
Îh
;
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This section discusses aspects related to the bank’s IT culture, which are summarised 
below.
The bank’s culture was shaped by its centralised approach to IT strategies. This type of
f:
centralisation created problems of responsiveness to the local IT needs. The group 
realised this was a difficulty so acted to decrease the level of centralisation by giving 
regional offices more autonomy. Despite this decision, problems of responsiveness to 
local needs remained due to the domination of a centralised culture.
a
Another characteristic of the bank’s culture was their cost consciousness. In its 
evaluation of the IT projects, the bank sought cost justification for them. The CEO, for 
example, mentioned that the bank was sceptical about the shared ATM network due to a
I
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T h e  bank used  the P C s to m eet th e  u n iq u e  IT n eed s  that th e  m ain  sy stem  w as n o t ab le  to  support.
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lack of desire to spend a lot on it.
' I
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The bank’s scepticism about the shared ATM network and its potential benefits may be 
attributed to the bank’s tradition of serving the wealthy segment of the market. *
Accepting cost uncertainty with a project that was not directed at this segment was 
problematic to the bank, despite the fact that it also served the consumer segment which 
needed this service.
A cultural gap was one issue that the IT manager mentioned. He talked about his role in 
bridging the gap that existed due to the pace of change within the technological 
environment. In addition, he discussed the inertia caused by established ways and norms 
of doing things, in addition to other factors such as the lack of knowledge and 
appreciation for the role of IT by the users. The CEO also addressed this problem, as 
indicated in the following quotation:
Certainly in Bahrain., a lack o f  understanding o f  the benefit o f  IT on the business side., this is 
historic., if  you don't educate your people into what a system can do, they wouldn’t even know
that they can do it., they w ouldn’t even think about it., so this year we are embarking on a major
policy education w e do run various courses, one is management o f  the IT. For the most part
we are progressing through a close contact between IT and the business...” CEO,
there are two problems here basically. Users can't realise what the machines can do for them. |
and technology guys are convinced that users keep changing their minds very often there are
times because o f  experience and exposure... you actually suggest better ways o f  doing the same 
thing to the user...” . IT manager.
Although both parties did not explicitly declare it, there was tension about the perceived 
role of IT manager. The CEO believed that the IT manager’s role was supportive rather 
than directive to the business goals, and therefore he was not invited to all business 
meetings. He was invited only to those meetings in which they wanted to discuss
possible IT support. The IT manager believed that a better arrangement would have
Sj
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been to give him a greater role in participating with the business units at the early stages 
of their product development, instead of inviting him after they had finished setting their 
goals. By doing so, they would be more efficient in the design of their services, and the
Problems:
Problems that were raised with regard to the adoption of IT were as follows:
likelihood of failure would be less.
The centralised IT strategy was not as responsive as the bank in Bahrain would have 
liked. The long communication lines resulted in issues getting “diluted” and, 
consequently, the responsiveness to the local market was not as fast as that of local 
competitors.
# The deficiency of the old IT system was a problem for the bank. a
* The regulations in Bahrain discouraged laying off employees. Therefore, 
substituting IT in the place of Bahraini employees was perceived as an obstacle 
against achieving a cost reduction strategy.
• Closing down the cultural gap was a challenging task. As mentioned earlier, 
education programs were designed to decrease the level of inertia amongst the users.
190
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Expanding the scope of the IT manager role was a concern o f the IT manager. He
wanted his participation to begin at an earlier stage in the business strategies.
191
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Foreign Bank Five (F5)
Introduction:
Foreign Bank Five (F5) was a joint venture bank between local investors and an 
international banking group. According to a consultant report, the bank is considered to 
be a smaller player in the market.
I interviewed three informants: the operations manager, the retail and private banking 
manager, and a supervisor within the EDP department.
The operations manager had been transferred to Bahrain by the group and had spent 
around six months in his current position. His previous experience was all with the 
group where he worked in the operations area. He participated in developing and 
implementing IT projects.
The retail and private banking manager started working within the banking industry in
1983 when he joined a leading local bank. In 1988, he joined Foreign Bank Five as a 
manager of corporate finance. In 1994, he headed the private banking unit.
The EDP supervisor joined the EDP unit with no computing experience. He gained his 
experience, which involved running the operations of the EDP, from working within the 
section. He was mainly responsible for the EDP operations.
- '
Business Focus:
Factors affecting the competitiveness of the bank:
The operations manager defined a 
number of factors that he perceived 
as having an impact on the bank’s 
competitiveness (see Figure 1). The 
social contacts and networks o f the 
top management and the local board 
of directors were perceived to be
S ocia l
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F igure I: F actors affec ting F5 com petitiven ess
crucial factors for creating business for the bank. The retail and private banking 
manager added that their marketing team contacts with the potential clients were crucial 
for business.
In addition to the social networks, the operations manager believed that achieving a 
competitive service quality and competitive pricing rates were two factors affecting their 
competitive position in the Bahraini market, which was characterised as being over- 
banked, with banks following each other closely. He perceived IT as having a potential 
effect on the quality of service and the ability of the bank to offer competitive rates. 
However, this was not the case with the bank due to their deficient IT systems, as v^ ili 
be discussed later.
:
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Bank's business focus:
F5 operations were in the retail, corporate, commercial, and treasury businesses. 
However, the informants believed that there was more business potential in retail than 
the other areas.
The retail and private banking manager mentioned that products such as letter of credits 
(LCs) and letter of guarantees (LGs) directed to the corporate and commercial segments, 
and personal loans such as home loans and car loans directed to the retail segment, were 
the most important sources of the bank’s revenue.
The bank, through its personal contacts with some of the major companies, had secured 
a niche in the market. A competent marketing team and the contacts of the local board 
members were perceived as important factors for securing this niche.
The bank capitalised on its world wide branch network to provide services to corporate 
clients willing to operate in Bahrain, or to local companies and businesses willing to 
finance their trade in other parts of the world. The retail manager perceived the bank as 
being more competitive in this area than the local banks, due to its global branch 
network.
The retail manager, however, perceived the bank as being more expensive in terms of 
their product prices than their competitors. They offered differential services with their 
products to make them more attractive to the clients. For example, they offered longer 
repayment periods on their loans than the other banks. Nonetheless, they had to revise 
their price strategies to adjust to the competition level from time to time.
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Role of IT:
Current IT systems are ''still in the days of the ark”:
The operations manager expressed his dissatisfaction with the IT scene in the bank. It 
was based on an outmoded batch-processing concept, and was inefficient in supporting 
the bank’s operational needs. It needed long hours of processing beyond the normal 
working hours, which dictated paying either overtime or shift allowances to the staff 
handling these systems.
As for supporting the business needs, the informant believed that their systems played 
only a minor role, if any, in supporting their business needs and had put the bank at a 
competitive disadvantage as compared to their rivals. It was not economically and 
technically feasible to upgrade the current IT systems. For example, these systems 
could not support phone banking, electronic banking, and credit card systems, which 
their international rivals had introduced.
to use an English expression, w e are still in the days o f  the ark. We have batch system which 
is falling apart at the seams. It is really in a terrible condition. Its value to the business... there is 
a value but it is minimum., {it} produces mountains o f  paper, probably more than necessaiy. All 
what we have done perhaps was you introduce a computer system which cost the same as 
employing however many ledger clerks with books., it is slow, inefficient, and really not a lot 
better tlian people filling in ledger books..
our system is perhaps ... you might relate it to an old, if  you know the Morris Minor, an old 
English car which was around when I was a child. Everybody is currently trying to put the 
electric windows in this car, which is absolutely wonderful, but the cost o f  doing so is to have a 
trailer behind the car with all the batteries and the equipment necessary to drive it..’'
The bank’s outmoded batch system affected their competitiveness as it prevented them 
from providing a quality of service similar to that of their rivals, who already had on­
line systems.
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Despite the deficiencies of the bank’s IT systems, the informants believed that IT played 
a more important role in the retail business than in the other areas. Its role is 
summarised by the following points:
• handles the growing volume of transactions, e.g. the ATMs;
• essential for increasing the size of the branch network.
A more important role for IT within the foreseeable future:
I
The retail and private banking manager did not perceive a strategic role for IT systems 
in his business area. He believed that IT did not play a role in supporting the asset side 
of the balance sheet, such as loans. Moreover, he believed that the bank needed
instead, a good marketing team that could create business links through personal
contacts.
“Q. Do you think that IT has affected your products?
Retail and private banking manager: N o, IT was not a major thing with regard to the above
products. We extend finance and w e are very selective in this area. IT has a useful role but it is
not a major role..
... increasing the assets means that you increase the loans and the overdraft, these are the main 
assets., deposits are liability for the bank. If I have a deposit and I pay interest and I don’t have 
assets to match, there w ill be assets mismatch. If I don’t use them, then I am going to lose. I have 
to increase my assets, I have to be competitive in the market. I need a strong marketing team that 
go outside and market my products., now this year we are making a budget for 1995, how are we 
going to increase our assets? There are many factors into it. The major thing is interest rate. If 
our rates are not com petitive w e need to adjust, are we efficient? I f  som ebody applies for a loan  
how long does it take to process {his application}.. I don't think that IT is highly involved to 
verily the status o f  the applicant..”
I
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The operations manager believed that IT would be a source of threat to the bank in the 
future as it develops further. In the retail sector, it would “make or break” the bank. 
The bank would have to introduce more efficient delivery systems to its retail 
customers, capable of providing services similar to what the competitors were
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providing, and enabling the bank to control the cost of the growing volume of 
transactions.
As for the corporate banking business, the bank’s current IT systems were perceived as
!
having only minor importance. Nonetheless, the operations manager perceived a more 
important role for their proposed electronic banking system, directed at the corporate 
segment. The future system would enable the clients to perform their banking activities 
from their premises.
The bank’s current system was also of little importance to the treasure business. 
However, it was planning to acquire some systems that the operations manager 
perceived as being important to generate revenue, such as Router Dealing System.
Figure 2 summarises the qualities that the
M odular " O n-lineoperations manager expected to see in their ^  j /
G reater
processing
capabilities
I
measure on a recommendation from the 
bank’s operations manager at that time in response to the rivals’ ATM threat, according 
to the EDP supervisor.
It is available any way:
The retail and private banking manager described phone banking as being of limited 
importance to the bank, due to the small customer base of the bank. Nonetheless, since
■S:
197
î
it was available within the group, they were planning to introduce phone banking to the
local market once they had revamped their old system.
Limited customer base and limited importance of some IT
strategic importance of some IT systems. The EFTPoS was an example.
Improve the bank's image:
Banks differed in the stages of development cycle, but were 
heading towards the same path:
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systems:
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As mentioned above, the small customer base of the bank decreased the perceived
The retail and private banking manager perceived a potential role for IT to improve their 
image through matching their rivals’ advanced systems:
if  you have more sophisticated technology, this w ill upgrade the image o f  the bank in the 
market,... I think that I need IT to improve the image o f  my department, I should bring this to the 
attention o f  the executive com m ittee. I say, 'w ell the other retail departments in the market have 
these systems and they are doing very w ell, if  you want us to com pete with them we must have 
this system ’..”
I
The operations manager perceived that all of the banks were using IT more or less 
similarly. However, the banks differed in their current position in the development 
cycle. F5 was falling behind the other banks in terms of its IT infrastructure and 
delivery systems. Nonetheless, the bank was in the process of catching up with its rivals 
through the provision of similar systems.
Main IT developments:
with NCR 9200. It upgraded its system 
within the series of NCR platforms. As
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The bank s system was batch oriented, F igure 3; M ain  i t  d e v e lo p m e n ts  w ith  F5 
which required ‘end of the day’ and 
‘end of the month’ processing. The upgrade from the NCR 9300 to the 9400 enabled Ithe bank to decrease the end of the day processing from 6 to 4 hours, which was not a 
significant improvement. The end of the month processing was problematic to the bank. f
as it needed longer hours of processing, which made meeting the month end central 
bank report requirements a burden on the bank's employees, due to the deficiency of 
their system.
Another problem of the batch system was its slow responsiveness to the retail clients.
When clients' salaries were transferred to the branches due to the nature of the batch
system, the accounts were not updated until da> s later, which prevented the clients from 
withdrawing their salaries as soon as they were credited to their accounts. To overcome 
this problem, the bank introduced an on-line system at the main office through which all 
salaries were transferred to the main office instead of the branches, enabling instant 
updates to the clients’ accounts. This was not an efficient remedy, however, as there 
were other problems related to the batch system.
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Around 1989, the bank introduced its ATMs to the Bahrain branch. According to the 
EDP supervisor, the introduction of the ATMs was in response to a competitive threat 
from the other banks, who had their ATMs prior to F 5.
The bank installed a number of ATMs in its branches in Bahrain, however, these ATMs 
were not as advanced as its competitors’ ATMs. Most of the ATMs in F5 were limited 
to dispensing cash. Only one branch had recently upgraded its ATM to accept deposits. "I
The core banking system was developed by the end of the seventies, and since then there 
had been no major developments. Nonetheless, minor developments were provided by 
local software houses to meet the unique requirements of the bank. IAccording to the operations manager, in 1994 the group was planning to introduce new 
systems operating in a UNIX environment to replace the old ones. The new systems 
were expected to enable a quantum leap in the bank’s efficiency and the quality of 
services it could support. I
The group was partially directed towards downsizing its systems. The EDP supervisor f
'9'said that they were expecting a new system, being tested in one of the group’s branches J
. . . .within the region, which would run on a downsized PC environment. The new system 
was designed to solve the technical problems of the old system. Moreover, it supported 
other systems, such as phone banking, that the old infrastructure could not support. ii
I
The bank was expecting its application systems (especially the ‘off-the-shelf |
applications) to be released to them through the communication lines from the bank 
headquarters. It was cheaper for the branch in Bahrain to get their systems by this ;
means, since they would not have to pay commission or tax to any third parties. This ?
gave the bank an advantage over the local banks. I
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Formation of IT strategy:
Absence of IT strategy:
Q: “When was the first IT strategy produced?’
Q. “Could you describe the IT environment within your bank, the main IT developments?”.
Other projects that were in the pipeline were the bank’s credit cards, the group-shared 
ATM network, telephone banking, electronic banking, and foreign exchange 
information system. All of these projects were expected to be launched by the group. 
As mentioned earlier, the bank was going more or less in the same direction of its rivals, 
the difference being, however, in the development stage.
The operations manager said that he was responsible for determining the bank’s IT 
needs. However, there had been no IT strategy within the bank for a considerable while. 
As mentioned earlier, the bank’s systems were old and outmoded, and had been with the 
bank for a long period of time:
Operations manager: “It has not been done yet., {he laughed}. I don’t believe that since we took 
the existing system there has ever been a formal IT strategy documented..
.. as I said, at the present time w e don't have a formal IT strategy. It is my target over the next 
few months to create one for here...”
The retail and private banking manager had not participated in any IT strategic planning
..."
activities. He said that these issues were not his department’s concerns. At the end of 
the interview, the informant apologised for not being able to answer all of my questions 
for he was not fully aware about the “computer”, as he described it.
Retail manager: “really I d on ’t have an idea about that, because as I said that is a separate 
department. I remember that the mainframe was launched in 1984. I don’t have much to say 
about the developm ents within this bank. We are marketing., w e don’t have any background.."
I
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Dependence on the group for acquiring their main systems:
The bank depended on its banking group for acquiring its IT systems. As mentioned 
earlier, the bank was expecting a new system to replace its old deficient system. The 
group was the source of this system and the source for the overall group IT strategy as 
well.
There were some local initiatives, however. The branch in Bahrain previously had 
requested some systems, such as the ATMs. The initiative to do this was taken by the 
operations manager, and the GM approached the group to acquire the systems. Usually, 
the headquarters evaluated whether any other branches within the region had any 
interest in the same project and then launched it into the region. The process of 
acquiring systems to suit the local needs required a lot of pushing from the branch and 
took time to acquire from the headquarters.
The board of directors had the right to reject projects from the group, due to the joint 
venture nature of the bank. The board of directors for F 5 in Bahrain was made up of 
representatives from the group who looked after its interests and local businessmen who 
fostered the interests of the local shareholders. The operations manager said that the 
group’s directors usually supported the group's solutions. As for the local directors, 
most o f them were businessmen rather than bankers and had little influence over the 
direction of the IT scene within the bank.
Time horizon for the bank's IT strategies:
The operations manager described their business strategies as being short-term in nature:
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‘Q. When was the first strategic plan produced?
if  you are getting into an IT strategy and it is going to take five years, it would basicalh  
require as part o f  that a conform ation that this strategy is likely to meet the foreseeable business 
strategy for the bank over the period that we are talking of. You can't divorce them. Having said 
that again, we are talking about a bank that is heavily into the retail market, heavily into a 
corporate and w e have treasury. And that three segments would remain the core o f  our business. 
That is clear and straight forward. What you might do in terms o f  business strategy, may perhaps 
perceive the products that you want to put forward, a wa\- o f  getting business, a way o f  being 
more profitable, g iving better service and perhaps add another things, such as do we want to do 
any business here with the Eastern Province o f  Saudi, which is not going to detract from what 
your underlying business is, it may add things to it..."
Operations manager: in 82, 83.. as part o f  our budget process, it has to be done twice a year 
because we have to do two budgets. We do a budget for the local directors, but we have to do a 
Group budget...
Q. What is the horizon o f  your strategic plans?
I
Operations manager: at the moment it is fairly short term, we are talking one year to two years.. I 
can’t actually talk too much about that... that’s confidential plans that is flying around with the 
board at the m om ent...”
As the above quotation illustrate, strategies meant budgets to a great extent, and they
were not longer than two years. The informant claimed that business plans were
directing IT strategies, which he claimed to be long-term in nature, around five years. It
was not clear to me as to how the short horizon business strategies were directing the
long horizon IT strategies. It seemed from the informant's answer that the bank’s local 
.business strategies had little influence over the group’s IT strategy. What did direct the 
grand IT strategies instead, were the established traditional lines of business that the 
Group branches were involved in for the long run, and for these well-established line of 
businesses, there were ‘generic' IT systems that became the norm to introduce within 
the banking industry:
Role of the operations manager:
The IT scene within the bank was the responsibility of the operations manager. He was 
the liaison with the headquarters and was responsible for defining local IT needs within 
the bank, although no previous studies had been prepared for the branch in Bahrain.
•1
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Relationship with the supplier:
F5 maintained a long relationship with NCR. It progressed through the NCR computing 
platform series. However, the relationship ended when the bank’s headquarters 
evaluated other vendors that could implement their new global IT strategies. In addition
to that, the bank seemed as it was drifting partially to a downsized environment. The 
one software vendor that the EDP supervisor did mention was Microsoft, from which 
the bank was planning to get its PC applications. The bank was in a turnaround phase in 
its IT strategy and in its relationships with vendors. The operations manager did not 
disclose any details as to who was the future vendor might be. ■3
Driver:
The main driver for the IT initiatives was the bank’s headquarters. The main strategy 
was expected to come from there, and when a strategy was not available from the 
headquarters, it was also absent from the branch in Bahrain.
The deficiencies of the old system and its inability to address infrastructure needs, as 
well as the bank’s business needs, drove the bank to embark on entirely new
?
infrastructure designs and systems.
There were other drivers, though minor in nature, which came from the regulatory body. 
The central bank implemented an automated cheque clearing system and requested that 
all of the banks buy encoding machines. However, the clearing system, operating within 
the central bank did not assist the bank in enhancing its operations. There was no benefit 
gained by the bank from the automated clearing system, as they needed to manually 
process the output from the central bank processing.. Moreover, preparing the cheques
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IT-related decisions were highly centralised within the headquarters which gave the 
bank in Bahrain little, if any, flexibility in deciding what systems they needed:
before sending them to the central bank required human interaction with the encoding 
machine, which was no different, in terms of efficiency, from the manual process that 
the bank had used. The encoder that they bought was perceived as an additional cost to 
the bank, which they had to accept.
I
Bank’s culture - IT is a “demanding mistress”
1
,The group, as described by the operations manager, did not have any commitment o: 
support for the branch in Bahrain, with regard to its IT needs:
It is a question o f  comm itm ent., perhaps I should say this, the bank that owned us has not hac 
that commitment, unfortunately..”
“.. our hardware is ten years old as well, and we can’t get a replacement for it. Again that is i  
question o f  how each bank operates, what freedom each territory has got in the investment ths: 
each bank is making at the head-office level in IT developm ent.. at the moment I would say th r  
we have a disadvantage because o f  that..”
.The local directors were cost sensitive, as they were more concerned with how much the 
system would cost than its implications to the business:
Q. "Wliat are the main inhibitors o f  using IT in the bank?"
Retail and private banking manager; "Cost o f  technology. You have to invest a lot o f  money. A 
small bank like {F 5} alone can't invest 2 or 3 million dollars on IT. This is the main factor 
The problem here is that the decision is not taken by one, there is always a committee and thee 
we introduce it to the management and if  they feel that this is a good product and service, thee 
they will see the cost, the cost is a major thing. This is mainly because o f  the size o f  the bank  
The L4 invest a lot o f  m oney and they will cover it in shorter time because they have a larger 
base. But for us, it w ill take longer years. The capital expenditure w ill affect the balance sheei 
At the end o f  the year they want to see good balance sheet, strong assets, good income. But when 
it comes to capital expenditure they will postpone it to the next years...”
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The above quotation may give a sense of the bank’s culture. As mentioned above, the 
bank was more sensitive to the cost of IT than its implications to the bank’s business. 
Pleasing the short-term interests of the shareholders was perceived by the retail manager 
as discouraging investment in IT. IT was perceived as a source of cost that was hard to 
keep up with. It was like a ‘demanding mistress’ that required more and more 
resources, as the operations manager described.
The operations manager narrated a story about his experience in participating in the 
development o f a main system at the headquarters. The following are the issues that can 
be inferred from the story:
A cultural gap existed between the systems’ staff and the users, characterised by:
• a lack of collaboration between the two parties;
• overly technical IT staff who were unable to communicate with the users;
• underqualified users who were unable to define their needs and appreciate the
• a perception that IT was responsibility of the systems unit, which resulted in the 
development of a system that was technically oriented rather than user friendly, 
something which lacked the acceptance of the users.
importance of their role in the development process; and
Î
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Problems associated with the adoption of IT:
The problems associated with the adoption of IT are related to those discussed in the 
case, particularly within the bank’s culture. The following is a summary of these 
problems:
• lack of support for IT strategies from the bank’s group and the local board;
• lack of IT strategies;
• deficiency of the systems;
• highly centralised IT decisions, lack of responsiveness to local needs, and a poor
ability to keep up with the developments within the IT environment; |
• existence of a cultural gap between the users and the technical staff;
• the size of the bank in Bahrain and its customer base were perceived as discouraging 
factors for investing in IT; and
increasing risk of failure as the IT project grew larger in scale.
:
This quotation from the operations manager discusses further problems associated with 
the adoption of IT within the bank;
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one o f  the main problems is trying to prove that adoption o f  particular strategy is going to pa> 
for itse lf and more. The project that I keep referring to at {named the bank home country}, the 
director o f  the international division required that som e business studies be undertaken to show 
that sufficient incom e be generated out o f  this project to more than pay the cost o f  the project 
That is a phenomenal task if  you think o f  the number o f  territories, which are close to 40. And 
the number o f  variables and all o f  these are based on system s that we don’t actually know. We 
don’t know the capabilities o f  the system. I don’t.
.. and the management perception o f  IT. That is another major issue. Management don’t tend to 
get involved with the details o f  a system. But they generate their own perception to what the> 
expect to get out o f  this system and you have one a heck o f  a job  to persuade them that they were 
wrong to create that perception, but in any case what the system is doing is worth it., beyond this 
the project is too big, it can’t be managed properly, insufficient resources devoted to it., the 
computer is very demanding mistress!... and you will find that you will never satisfy the users' 
needs any w ay..”
From the above quotation the following problems are inferred:
tendency to assess the IT initiatives based on quantifying their return which was not 
feasible as narrated above;
limited involvement of the management in the development process; and
a difficulty with meeting the expectations of the management and the users, as the 
systems initiatives tended to be run by the technical staff more than by the business 
staff.
Foreign Bank Six (F6)
Introduction:
Foreign Bank Six (F6) is an international bank with a large, world-wide branch network.
The informants I interviewed within F 6 were the bank’s deputy manager, the retail 
manager, the technical support (TS) manager, and the services manager. All of the 
interviews were tape recorded. There were other informants within the lower ranks who 
I also interviewed. However, this case is mainly based on the views of the above four 
informants who were part of the top management team.
Business focus:
The deputy manager described the banking industry in Bahrain as being overbanked and 
unsophisticated in the nature of its product demand. The banks, despite their different 
level of sophistication, were able to compete equally in this market.
The deputy manager added that the main factor affecting the competitive environment 
was price rates, and due to the low sophistication of the market, technology in areas 
other than retail was not a key factor in determining the competitiveness of the banks:
".. from my point o f  view ., what affects the competitive climate at present is only pricing. There 
are very few  customers w ho are looking for quality service. There is very little need on behalf o f  
the customers for sophisticated products., you can say that 90% o f  our customers have just 
simple needs - overdraft, loan, documentary credits, etc.-.. that is why the technology does not 
com e to it., at the end, it is pricing what matters..
The services manager added to price rates, social connections, innovative products, and 
technology, as factors affecting the banks’ competitiveness. As for social connections, 
the services manager perceived social ties in Bahrain as being very strong. Capitalising 
on these ties and establishing connections with the wealthy families were perceived as
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one of the means for capturing business opportunities for the bank. Technology, 
especially within the retail business, was a means of competing between the banks. 
Products such as credit cards and phone banking services were provided free of charge 
to the public, with some banks providing these services even to customers who are not 
their clients.
Perceived role of IT:
IT to manage cost within the giant Group:
•I
3
The informants believed that their bank, as a foreign bank, was not able to compete on
'equal footing with the local banks in every aspect of business due to the regulations 
affecting the Bahraini market. The foreign banks were restricted in the number of 
branches they were able to open and accordingly were not able to have branch networks 
as large as those owned by some of the local banks.
According to the deputy manager, the bank’s strategy was not to compete on prices but 
to build their strategies around their long relationship with their wealthy client base.
The retail manager added that they were seeking niches within their traditional broad 
business areas o f retail, corporate, and treasury. He defined the bank’s target market of 
customers sophisticated enough to buy their products as HWI (high worth individuals) 
and PME (professionals, managers and executives). The technical support manager and 
the deputy manager mentioned that a few years earlier the bank had shed a large number 
of accounts that were of low value to the bank in order to become more customer 
focused.
■I
IT was perceived as the means to manage the international giant banking group to which 
the Bahraini-based branch belonged.
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A primary role of IT within the giant banking group F6 belonged to was to control cost 
and promote efficiency which was perceived as intimately linked to promoting qualit> 
services. Manual transaction processing, according to the technical support manager, 
was the main source of cost as their MIS system indicated. Automating repetiti\e 
transactions was perceived as being the ‘heart of technology’, the TS manager claimed.
IT to create a global bank:
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A very strategic role for IT was interconnecting the group systems through a Wide Area 
Network (WAN). This distinguished F6 from its competitors including the international 
ones operating in Bahrain, which were not at the same level of global connectivit} . 
Without the communication aspect of IT, the bank’s systems would turn into isolated 
islands unable to deliver ‘global’ services.
Globalizing was achieved through the products the group offered to the clients and 
through interconnecting and controlling the internal processing of the group’s global 
operations. The bank offered a wide variety o f banking products and services that could 
be obtained from wherever the clients were located. Each client was considered as an 
international client with an international ID number assigned to him to enable him to 
perform his banking activities wherever he might be. Electronic banking systems, 
world-wide, connectivity of the group ATMs, and international alliances with 
international ATM networks were amongst the global products the bank offered to its 
clients. As for the operations, the group systems enabled the bank to operate as one 
bank rather than isolated banks. IT enabled centralising expertise and decision making, 
for example, through the group’s interconnected systems, where transactions beyond a 
certain level were directed to the concerned authorities outside Bahrain for approval. 
Moreover, IT enabled financial consolidation, control and monitoring of the branches' 
financial position at a world-wide level.
&
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?serving the corporate than the retail segment as the risk and return of the corporate 
segment were higher, the TS manager argued.
Strategic potential of IT:
IT played a very important strategic role for the corporate business internationally. The 
group electronic banking system was initiated in the mid-eighties as a defensive measure 
after it had lost major corporate clients to their American competitors. According to the 
retail manager, for the major international markets, their electronic banking system was 
a switching cost to their corporate clients. Internationally, IT played a more vital role in
Within the local Bahraini market, however, the case was different. IT was perceived as 
more crucial for the bank’s retail business than its corporate business, while IT was of 
lesser importance to the treasury business. The Bahraini market was more sophisticated 
in terms of retail related products. There was stiff competition between the banks for 
retail products. Keeping in line with the competitors was perceived as a competitive 
necessity, even if  there was no substantial return from that type o f service or product. 
To quote the retail manager;
our custom ers are increasingly sophisticated, they expect more and more, and our competitors 
Local Four and Local Fifth,, they are forever introducing new system s they are spending money. 
They are making life better for their customers... frankly, in som e cases w e lose money on them. I 
would be the first to admit that. But som etim es you have to launch what we call lose-leaders to 
retain custom ers and to live up to expectations..” .
The deputy manager, who was also the corporate banking manager, believed that for 
their corporate banking market, in contrast to the retail business, introducing products 
like electronic banking was a luxury that had had little strategic effect on creating 
business opportunities. He believed that the corporate market was not yet sophisticated 
enough for that type of product:
W hich is more important, {our electronic banking} or the other retail systems?... if  w e are 
talking the other w ay around., if  we say let’s decide to stop {the electronic banking} or stop the 
ATM, w hich one is more adverse to me., it is the one that serves the larger number o f  customers, 
the A TM .. electronic banking is serving only 30 to 40 customers., so i f  I stopped offering it, no 
other bank offer it., we offer it as Just something that Is different from the market. The usage is 
very limited. It is very nice to talk about it, it is a thing that is very nice to be proud o f .. but at 
the end o f  the day when you talk about money. Indeed we are giving it free to tell people to use 
this service., w e want to encourage them., this product is for year 2010  for Bahrain., not now..” .
212 I
Despite the huge inventory of IT solutions with the bank’s group, the small volume of 
transactions in Bahrain with regard to some operations made these systems cost- 
ineffective to adopt. An example was a treasury system that was available from the 
regional office but which the bank declined from adopting due to the relatively small 
volume of treasury operations.
IT as a competitive weapon:
The informants perceived IT as a competitive tool both internally and externally. 
Within the boundaries of the bank, IT was perceived as a tool for promoting efficiency 
and controlling cost. Beyond the bank’s boundaries, IT was perceived as a competitive 
tool through providing more delivery products o f a global nature to its clients.
As mentioned earlier, the bank had to launch some retail IT-related products as a 
defensive measure, despite their low return.
IT as a bane to the management:
:
I
The TS manager perceived the bank group’s MIS system as a very sophisticated one thai 
enabled the managers of business units to determine profitability by market, product, 
and client.
Despite the perceived advantage, the business unit managers, the deputy and the retail 
managers, perceived the system as a bane. Both informants argued that they were 
serving the system rather than being served by it. The deputy manager said that many of 
the users did not believe in the system.
Another system which did not satisfy the users, especially the deputy manager, was the 
main banking system (MBS) that replaced the bank’s old system, the CIF. The new 
system was not tailored to meet the bank’s unique requirements. Furthermore, there 
were facilities that the old system provided which the new system did not.
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when you are talking about MIS, I don’t think that we are here lucky with MIS., although we 
have a system ., but it ended up by serving MIS rather than the other w ay around..
I don’t believe that there is an MIS that is 100% accurate. I challenge any management 
accountant that says that my system is 100% right. These are m ostly based on assumptions, but it 
is better than having n o th in g ... it benefited us to see whether each cost centre is making profit or 
not., but so what !! what has it done for us? Although at the end o f  the day w e know, we have 
done nothing about it because we don’t believe inside, we d on’t believe in it., when we 
implemented that it was not on a solid base, always you have a doubt and always there is big 
problem when you are fixing the recoveries., who is going to charge what charges., how many 
times you are going to change your allocation o f  cost., there is som e cost, indirect cost, you don't 
know where to charge it., like for example, we are paying 200 ,000  BD  per annum as a 
commercial registration fees., to which cost centre you w ill allocate that?., i f  you allocate it to 
any cost centre you w ill ruin his profitability, and that cost centre w on ’t have any incentives to 
make business... It requires a lot o f  hard work for people to believe in it., within my organisation, 
especially the users do not believe in it., when they have their report, they just throw it away..” 
Deputy manager.
All of the banks are using IT more or less similarly:
%
The deputy manager believed that all of the banks were using their IT systems in more 
or less the same way, with a few enhancements that differentiated one competitor from 
the other.
As mentioned earlier, the informant believed that the banks in Bahrain were able to 
meet the unsophisticated demands of the local market. Therefore, the banks were 
homogenous in terms of their IT related systems:
“.. you have to be in line with the competitors, you should not be behind them.. 1 don't think that 
we are different., everybody offers the same thing., som e have som e enhancements but at the end 
o f  the day the basic requirements are the same., everybody has ATM s., but if  you have direct 
debit and EFTPoS, yes they are better than us..” .
Main IT developments:
Global Data Network:
The Global Data Network (GDN) was one of the most strategic systems for the bank. 
The GDN was proposed by the general manager of the technical support division at the 
bank’s group headquarters in 1983. The project aimed at providing financial services to 
corporate clients over a group-owned network. The project started with a vision of
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• Branch computer connections
• Group E-mail
• Limits Access (directing decisions related to transactions beyond a certain level 
to the appropriate personnel within the group)
• Other future services (that may not be planned for yet). 
“ /W a/n  Banking System” (pseudonym )
connecting seven group locations. A year later, the technical support division proposed 
widening the scope of the GDN to encompass all group locations and using it as the 
back bone of other global systems. The main benefit from the GDN lie in its future role 
in removing the cost associated with providing new information based services and 
products with communication facilities o f their own. The GDN provided support 
without additional investment for a number of systems, such as:
i
3
Global ATM/ International cash service 
Corporate database facilities
Î
Electronic Banking products
IÏ
I
"Main Banking System" (MBS) is a sophisticated accounting and central information 
system, compressing a family of system applications which access essential information 
from a central data base.
"MBS” was the back bone upon which other modular systems were built, e.g. EFTPoS.
credit cards, trade and credit information, fixed assets, income and expenditure, general 
. .ledger, securities, offshore banking units, treasury trading system, mortgage and finance, 
automated funds transfer, term deposits, demand deposits, etc..
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“MBS” was designed and developed in-house to replace and overcome the problems of 
the bank’s old system. The old system needed expensive maintenance and alteration as 
new systems were introduced. In contrast, “MBS” required minimal maintenance and 
alteration as it was based on a central data base that any new systems could share.
Electronic Banking System:
The bank group introduced its system as a result of a loss of two of its major
Trade finance system:
The bank was expecting an automated trade finance system from the regional office. 
The new system automated the entire trade finance transaction cycle.
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The informants considered MBS as the most important system in the bank as it ran the |
majority of their internal operations. It is worth mentioning that MBS runs on IBM 
AS400.
The group’s electronic banking system was perceived by the bank’s international | |
competitors as being one of the most sophisticated available, unmatched by their /?systems in terms of variety of services.
international corporate clients to its American rivals. When the bank introduced their 
electronic banking system in the mid eighties it was not immediately successful. 
However, advancements in the IT enabled the group to introduce more services through 
their electronic banking system.
F6 was the first bank in Bahrain to introduce its electronic banking system and, to f
encourage its use, it was offered free of charge to around 40 to 60 potential customers. I
The system provided a wide range of services such as a consolidated cash-management
'.'i.control, trade services, securities transaction administration and market information.
-  _______
other systems:
The informants mentioned other group systems that they were using in their operations 
such as the group e-mail system and the treasury system. All these systems were based 
on the “Main Banking System” and enabled global interchange of transactions and 
information.
Retail Systems:
Drivers of IT strategy;
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The bank was the first to introduce its ATM systems and phone banking system. The 
ATMs were globally interlinked with other global ATM networks. The bank’s phone 
banking was the first in Bahrain, but it was not as successful as its rivals’ systems due to 
the limited services it provided. The bank also provided credit cards.
There were other systems in the group IT inventory but these systems were not 
introduced in Bahrain either due to the low level of transactions, as the TS claimed, or 
the lack of sensitivity of the global IT strategy to local IT needs, as the retail and the 
deputy managers argued. The EFTPoS was an example of a systems that the TS 
manager believed was not feasible to introduce due to the lower level of transaction 
volume in Bahrain.
The drivers of IT strategy are divided into two broad categories: those that came from 
the banking group and local drivers.
The grand IT strategies developed by the group dictated what systems to develop and 
when the bank in Bahrain would receive them. The main banking system, the 
automated trade system, and the group e-mail systems were some of the compulsory 
systems that the bank had to adopt. The bank in Bahrain was not authorised to make 
any changes or enhancements to these systems.
-i
bank in Bahrain. To an extent, this has been eroded, because the other banks are very good at that 
sort o f  thing..” Services manager.
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The group was not as responsive to the Bahraini needs as to those o f the major markets. 
Competing in the major strategic markets dictated that the bank develop systems to meet 
their sophisticated competitive requirements. For example, the electronic banking 
system was developed to meet the requirements of corporate clients within the major 
international markets, and the global data network was introduced to interconnect the 
major international markets initially and, at later phase, smaller markets in other 
geographical areas. Achieving standardisation and economies of scale were amongst the 
drivers of the group’s global initiatives.
As for the local drivers, there were two main ones. The first driver was to enhance the 
bank’s internal efficiency. To quote the TS manager:
on the m icroscale in Bahrain, for exam ple, people like me together with other people who are 
in the business would com e by either seeing that the competitors are doing som e thing that we are 
n o t , or saying that we are doing this in the wrong way...”
The other driver was related to the competitors’ actions. The competitors, especially
'Swithin the retail business, were very active in introducing IT-related products. The 
bank’s phone banking system, though it was the first in Bahrain, could not match the
■ :services offered by local banks. Therefore, the bank was in the process o f upgrading its 
phone banking system.
“.. our customers are increasingly sophisticated., they expect more and more, and our 
competitors. Local Four and Local Fifth, are for ever Introducing new system s, they are spending 
money. They are making life better for their customers. Banks com pete with each other., some 
times we are prompted to launch products just as a defensive measure to reinforce the fact that 
we are not losing our grip on the technology lead we have.." Retail manager.
you have to make investment in new technology, to keep up with the competition. You can't 
say actually how  much extra business your ATM s will bring in. but if  you did not have them you 
would lose business. To an extent, it is a defensive measure.."
the {bank} did have a reputation for several years for being the most technologically advanced
■
The informants perceived themselves as having had their technological leadership in the 
market eroded by the competitors. Keeping a tight grip on their technological leadership 
was perceived as crucial for saving their image as providers of a high quality service.
The formulation of the bank’s local corporate 
strategies:
The strategic plans within the bank were highly influenced by regional and head office 
strategic plans. The local strategic plans were formulated within a top management 
steering committee. The CEO and his top management crew participated in this 
committee, in addition to members from the planning department at the regional office 
who came to Bahrain precisely for this purpose. The local strategic plans for the bank in 
Bahrain were guided and controlled by the strategic plans o f the regional area. Once the 
local strategic plans were formulated, the bank sent them to the headquarters for 
approval.
I
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The formulation of IT strategies:
The ”giant” banking groupes iT strategy:
The bank group’s IT strategies were centralised at its group headquarters level. All 
systems developments to enable the group to achieve economies of scale and have better 
control over the systems were made at group development centres. The banking group, 
as the TS manager described, never depended on any third parties for developing their 
systems. For small branches like Bahrain, the application systems were transferred 
through the group’s global data network.
A senseless giant:
The group's IT strategies considered first the needs of the major strategic markets in 
which the group operates. For smaller markets such as the Bahraini, the group was less 
responsive to the competition from local banks’ superior IT systems and the demands of 
branch users for systems more customised to the local needs.
219
The bank’s leadership in the market was nullified by the superior delivery systems that 
the local banks provided, which therefore enjoyed a competitive advantage over F6.
The bank’s group had placed Bahrain at the end of the queue with regard introducing 
new systems or performing enhancements on existing ones. For example, while the 
bank in Bahrain was waiting to acquire some features of credit card related technolog}'
...
from the group, a sibling bank within the region belonging to the same banking group 
sold this type of technology to a rival bank in Bahrain.
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Although the regional office had reacted to the bank’s local requests to upgrade their 
outmoded telephone-banking system, the proposed new system was not able to match 
the services offered by the local rivals systems:
because we are a big organisation, and because we are in a place like Bahrain, w e can be right 
at the end o f  the line. B ecause Bahrain is not a very big place ... we don’t get the system until 
near the end o f  the Une w hich means that som e o f  our main local competitors like Local Four has 
the flexibility to bring people from outside and design in-house solutions and often very good 
solutions..”.
Defining the iocai iT solutions:
s
Local IT affairs were considered as part of the duties of the services department. The 
bank had had no programmers or analysts working in Bahrain, and if needed they came 
from the regional office on a temporary basis.
As to the “ bread and butter system s” as the TS manager called them, the bank had had no 
control over what it was getting. The deputy manager said that everything was 
controlled by the regional office:
".. I don't think that this is done here, not in Bahrain, we are not responsible for formulating the 
IT strategy, we are receiving things from our head office. .Anything that they want to give us, be 
it version 5 or 6, they just dump to us. We can’t say anything. Som etim es we have no say in what 
they give to us..”
Despite its limited autonomy, the bank had had a steering committee in which the top 
management participated, in addition to the services manager, who was indirectly 
responsible for the EDP unit, and the TS manager, who was directly in charge of the 
EDP unit and reported to the services manager. This steering committee discussed anv
Time horizon for the bank group's IT strategy:
group’s IT strategies:
2 2 1
»
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problems or matters related to users’ IT needs, proposals to enhance its efficiency, and 
any new products that needed IT support. The TS manager was responsible for 
communicating with either the regional office or the headquarters since their approval 
was essential for any IT solutions the bank wanted to adopt. It is worth mentioning that 
the TS unit was not allowed to make any alteration or develop any systems, apart from 
minor systems that were developed on a stand-alone PCs.
Due to the global nature of the group’s IT strategies, their initiation and implementation 
were long term in nature. For example, the initiation and development of the group’s 
main banking system, “MBS”, was done over a 10 year period, while the EFTPoS took 
3 years to initiate and another 2 years to implement.
Relationship between business strategies and IT 
strategies:
Although the relationship between the business strategies and the IT strategies was 
defined more at the group level, the bank’s local business strategies capitalised on the
whatever we do in Bahrain is a subset o f  what we do in {our head quarter} ... since we are 
owned by the {group}” TS manager.
There were different phases to the relationship between business strategies and IT 
strategies. In the first phase, IT strategies were separated from business strategies. A 
historical case was when the bank first adopted the NCR ledger machine to automate its 
accounting books. In the second phase, the bank introduced locally networked systems 
to expand its branch network. This approach was linked to the bank’s business needs.
In the third phase, the relationship is at the banking group level. The old main banking 
system, CIF, had to be scrapped and replaced with a new system, since it was unable to
I
support the group’s business needs. Whenever new business products needed to be 
introduced, the old system required expensive alteration. Therefore, as mentioned 
earlier, the new system, MBS, was developed to provide support for potential new 
products while allowing changes to the main systems.
In the third phase, IT strategies became more integrated with business strategies. The 
electronic banking system, the trade related system, the treasury system, and the main 
banking system (MBS) were highly dependent on each other and based on the global 
data network. The products delivered by these systems were entirely based on IT, 
without which they would collapse.
"... With the old CIF system, it required expensive system maintenance and changes whenever 
there was a new product introduced. This caused the bank to crap the old system and introduce a 
new system that is more responsive to the business goals in a way that it accepts the introduction 
o f  new products with minimal changes to the main system. Other systems related to the bank's 
business were introduced and integrated to the main system. {Electronic banking}, {treasury 
system }, {trade system) were the main. Any new business products have to be interfaced with 
either o f  these systems. IT strategies and business strategies became more interlinked..
... I cannot add any products efficiently without looking at the core o f  my applications and the 
systems., any system that I design. I have to look to how it w ill interact with {M B S}, how it is 
going to be interfaced with my treasury, and it is going to interface with {electronic banking 
system }, so the product has to fit everywhere..” TS manager.
Relationship with vendors:
The TS manager said that the vendor played a primary role in providing a reliable and 
"immunable” platform system;
it is actually quite a primary role, because it is very difficult if  you are handling an 
organisation in the size o f  {our Group} to make a mistake. You have to have the vehicle to 
deliver a product ... it som etim es involves studies and hard negotiations with the manufacturers. 
Initially we identified IBM. It was their system 38 to be the strategic machine. Because it was a 
database structured. It was more immunable to run a database on it. We did make a study., and 
strategically IBM became the winner.
IBM certainly, it has been a strategic partner. It is a global relationship. I can’t determine a 
relationship here. It is determined at the head office level...”
Reliability of the systems and suitability to the group’s systems were the features that 
were sought from the vendor, the group’s back bone system, the “MBS” to which all
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other modular systems and delivery products were integrated, runs on IBM AS 400. 
Changing vendors would mean a world wide disruption to the Group’s operations.
The bank’s relationship with IBM started in 1982, after they had shifted from NCR. 
Since then, the long term relationship has continued at the head office level.
Role of the TS manager:
The background of the TS manager, who was directly responsible for running the IT 
scene within the bank, was in communications, electronics, and IT. He gained his 
banking experience through his work with the bank and was responsible for the EDP, 
office automation and the electronic banking system. The TS manager and his EDP unit 
were under the supervision of the services manager.
The TS had the following roles:
1. Advisory and informative role: The TS played an advisory role to the top 
management through participating in a systems steering committee. He also played an 
informative role in defining IT related solutions to improve the efficiency or secure a 
reliable processing of the operations within the bank. For example, he proposed and 
pressed the management to adopt a disaster recovery s\ stem for the bank.
2. Liaison with regional offices and headquarters: The TS manager also communicated 
local needs to the regional and headquarters offices and sought solutions from the 
group’s IT inventory.
3. Innovator role: The TS manager also played a role as an innovator of ways in which 
IT could promote efficiency and quality service within the bank, although, on a limited 
bases. For example, he fostered an IT system that aimed at eliminating the need for
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human operators in answering in coming calls by identifying regular callers and 
connecting them directly to the departments that might serve them best.
224
34. Responsible for technical infrastructure projects; The TS manager was in charge of 
any project related to the bank’s IT infrastructure.
5, Supportive role: The TS manager’s role was more supportive than directive to the 
bank’s business strategies. He had had no voting power in the steering committee.
som etim es I have to be quiet in these meetings. I try to use them as a platform to tell them 
what is going on or what the technology has to offer. Sometimes they are interested enough, then 
they w ill ask me to pursue things, or som etim es they will tell me to shut up (he laughed). It does 
not happen actually quite a lot. But m ostly all the things that I wanted to do they supported me.." 
TS manager.
Bank’s culture:
Regional office "do the thinking and do the doing":
a
The TS manager described the bank’s group as being the masters of their own fate in 
terms of using IT world-wide. Whatever they needed, they developed by themselves, 
depending on their internal resources, the TS manager argued. Moreover, he perceived 
the group as a world leader in terms of capitalising on IT, a leadership which was 
enabled by the group’s top management commitment.
the {Group} never bought a second party system, it never went to software houses. I think 
our motive Is to be the master o f  our destiny”
Despite their global control over their “destiny”, the bank in Bahrain was under a tight 
control from the regional office that gave the branch little autonomy over running its IT 
scene:
" ..w e  are also part o f  a very large group. W e know the market. Sometimes it seem s that w e lose 
touch but most o f  the time we are with the market., we can’t do everything like the [the big local 
banks]. We have our guidelines and limitations....
.. this concept about the exchange, 1 have not yet documented it. But as soon the exchange is in. 
I'll be looking at the software, and as soon as the ISDN is in, I am going to implement it. I will 
implement it. I will have a lot o f  opposition in the beginning, because there are certain people in
:;S
Who runs the IT  show? A cultural Gap:
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the regional o ffice who think that they should do the thinking and that they should do the doing. 
But they have the lack o f  creative thinking there...” TS manager.
The slow responsiveness and tight control from the regional office caused the bank in / 
Bahrain to lose touch with the local market, as well as to forgo its traditional leadership 
in some business areas. The process of acquiring additional IT resources from the 
regional office required political struggle with them. In some cases the branch had to 
bypass the regional office and refer directly to the headquarters to get support for their 
required IT resources.
Determining who ran the IT scene was a concern to the informants in the bank. The 
deputy manager, the retail manager and the services manager, all complained about 
some of the IT systems that they were using, such as the MIS and the 'MBS’. To quote 
the deputy manager talking about his problems with the MBS:
“ .. still, I am not getting what 1 want from my systems. Still I need more, and what I need is not 
available, but we used to have this in {our old system }. Five years ago we used to have this 
service., there are at present very good products that you can buy from the sh e lf, but because we 
are so big w e have to build everything within the organisation., this is why w e have the 
{M B S}... it is done by professionals, by technical people, it was not done by users. That is 
where we have a conflict between our needs and our technical people.. I don’t believe big is 
good., som etim es there are som e drawbacks..”
3;
The services manager attributed the users’ complaints to the bank group’s culture, which 
considered the technical people as being ultimately responsible for running its IT scene. 
The informant narrated a story about the main banking system, ‘MBS’, which was 
designed by the technical people but was unable to meet the users’ expectations. He 
discussed the traditional problems of exceeding the budget and lacking support for 
additional resources to design the system according to the users’ needs:
“ .. one o f  the problems I have with the {M BS} is that it is designed by technical people, it is not ; ; 
designed by users. O bviously it was written by technical people, and also it was designed by 
them and I don’t think that is right. The technical people put what they think is achievable, and 
what they think is convenient. It is not necessarily what the users want..
I have seen it with so many projects, they will be designed and written by the technical people.
They will have unrealistic time scale, they will not have sufficient resources attached to them, 
and they will end up cutting com ers, this bit cut o ff  and this bit cut o ff  and this bit delayed and 
eventually you w ill end up with a system that is nearly half what you want. I don't feel that 
sufficient resources have been put into it. I know it is costly, but you end up with a far better •Î3
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Electronic banking system- an IT unit concern:
Different views between the IT and the business units:
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system if they poured more resources into the {M BS} earlier, they would have saved money in 
the long run...”.
According to the services manager, each of the two parties, the users and the developers, 
had incompatible objectives. The users had a long ‘wish list’, while the technical people 
were confronted with limited resources. The result was dissatisfaction from the users 
and possibly delay in achieving the required goals.
Although the electronic banking system was mainly directed at the corporate clients, it 
was not under the responsibility of the corporate banking manager. The TS manager 
was in direct charge of the system, because o f his electronics, communications and IT 
background. However, he believed that the system needed marketing efforts to promote 
it in Bahrain rather than technical efforts. From this observation and the above, narrated 
by the services manager about MBS, it can be inferred that the bank’s culture perceived 
the IT people rather than the business people as being more concerned with directing the 
IT scene:
".. ! started as {an electronic banking system} manager... it was actually a mistake on the bank's 
side when they employed me. They thought that electronic banking had to do with computers... it 
was marketing..”
The TS manager said that the limited vision of the business managers worried him.
Though, they had an appreciation for IT, their limited vision affected their crucial 
support for it. This informant narrated how the disaster recovery project, though it was 
vital to the bank, did not got support from the top management because they were 
reluctant to spend on the project and wanted to use the group global data network for 
their backup although this was not technically feasible. The differing concerns and 
limited technical scope of the top management delayed the project, according to the TS 
manager.
si
There was a difference between the technologists and the bankers in the ways of 
thinking, the TS manager argued. Such differences might affect decisions related to 
what IT solutions should be adopted and how much would be a justifiable expenditure 
for it.
EDP as a taboo:
The TS manager was designing a training program to promote IT literacy amongst the 
users. The aim was to create a state of mind in the users that would help them 
appreciate the potential role of IT in their work, and enable them to define ways in 
which IT could automate repetitive work. The TS manager said that he wanted to open 
up the EDP unit and encourage the users to take the initiative in determining new ways 
for improving their efficiency. The IT literacy training program aimed at transforming 
the inherited culture that saw the EDP as an unapproachable taboo:
whenever there is a manual operation w e try to automate it. This is why we are embarking 
hopefully next year on a PC literacy centre., it is not meant to teach how  to use a PC, but to make 
them appreciate what PCs can do. We will involve everybody in the bank. The idea, would be 
‘training through Job experience” where everybody would be able to com e and play with it, and 
once they start appreciating what this can do for them, we will com e to the ideas o f  how we can 
do repetitive things through this., it will involve the staff through the IT scheme, instead o f  
keeping the EDP as a closed  department., when 1 took over here it was like a taboo, nobody was 
allowed to do this. 1 tried to open it., involve the people..”
3
Committees to achieve a mutual understanding:
The informants perceived the committees that they participated in as a means of 
achieving mutual understanding with regard to their IT needs. The top management 
including the TS manager, participated in a system steering committee where issues 
related to the bank’s strategies and IT needs were discussed.
Change in CEOs, change in IT support:
The international banking group had a policy to rotate its CEOs every 4 years. The TS 
manager argued that this policy affected local management support for IT solutions. 
CEOs may differ in their appreciation of IT and accordingly have different support for
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local initiatives. For example, the TS wanted to promote the electronic banking system 
that he was responsible for marketing by giving PCs to the few major clients in order to 
encourage them to try out the electronic banking system. With the change in the CEOs, 
his ideas were shelved.
A third drawback of an overly centralised IT strategy is related to acquiring resources 
for IT training. The bank in Bahrain had to acquire support from the regional office for 
running any IT training courses since it had no resources for local training:
Problems associated with the IT scene:
Too centralised IT strategy:
There were some drawbacks to the centralised IT strategies that the informants were 
concerned about. First, their eentralised IT strategy affected their responsiveness to 
initiatives of the local competitors. As mentioned earlier, the bank was the first to 
introduce systems such as phone banking. However, the local competitors were more 
capable o f introducing systems that delivered a variety of services. Thus, the »
centralisation of strategy prevented the bank from reacting to its competitors’ initiatives.
The lack o f autonomy affected the users’ satisfaction with regard to the systems they 
used. Some of the systems were too standardised to meet the users’ local needs, but the 
bank’s group was not responsive to changing the global systems to suit the unique i
requirements of the branches. The deputy manager said that a more liberal IT strategy 
that gave the bank some autonomy to buy off-the-shelf packages would solve some of 
its problems.
iS
the training for a new system requires a series o f  courses that need to be run for a period .. 
when we did the training for the {M B S}, it lasted for two months., the courses were developed  
again in {the regional o ffice}. We don’t have any dedicated training staff in Bahrain..” i
Technical Support manager.
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Under-resourced TS unit:
The TS unit needed more resources to support the users, according to the retail manager. 
The unit had plenty to do to meet the users’ needs, but it was underresourced in terms of 
employees:
The technical support department is underresourced. They are too busy, It is that they have too 
much on their plates. It is not normally that w e can’t do something, there is normally no problem
to their work. The deputy manager argued that the lack of competent product 
champions to market the new systems within the bank might be behind that scepticism 
to some extent:
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that can’t be solved. There isn’t normally enough people around to help. So really it comes 
down to lack o f  resourcing and the fact as a small country w e are put at the bottom o f  the list o f  
priority. We som etim es get things at the end..”
Resistance to change -  lack of product champions:
The informants were concerned about achieving a smooth transformation to the newh 
adopted systems. Furthermore, the users were sceptical about the value of some systems
“ .. we did not sell it properly, w e did not have a good team for it, w e gave it only to .. [the 
informant paused] .. w e thought whenever any o f  these things com e from the main office, just 
give it to a good clerk or good officer to handle It...” Deputy manager.
Moreover, the deputy manager argued that achieving change within the organisation was 
a concern to them:
“.. any changes you are doing, create a problem. To initiate any change, it create a problem.. 1 
feel that the major problem that faces any manager now is to face how to manage these 
problems., because any change represents a threat to some people, those who perform the job  in 
certain ways and may be o f  no more use, they will become afraid from losing their jobs and that 
is why they would make the change difficult for you, you have to prepare people for change, you 
have to rehabilitate people..” Deputy manager.
I
Chapter Six
Small Local Banks (Ad Hoc Banks) Case Studies
Introduction:
This chapter includes two case studies of two small banks which were similar in their 
approach to their IT adoption and strategy formation.
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Local Bank One (L1)
Introduction:
Local Bank One (Local 1 or LI) is a joint venture between local and regional investors. 
The bank’s market share of local operations in 1992 was around five percent.
I interviewed the operations manager, who was responsible for different functional areas 
including the IT scene within the bank. The informant’s educational background was in 
mechanical engineering and he had 20 years of banking experience. He had worked 
with Standard Chartered Bank in his home country, India, for 13 years after which he 
joined Local 1. The interview was tape recorded.
Business focus:
Local 1 started its operations in the mid-eighties. At that time it focused on the 
interbank market and developed a portfolio of fixed and floating rate of international 
notes and bonds. However, the bank was not successful in this type of business. In the 
late eighties, it reported a loss, followed thereafter by a change in its top management.
With the change in top management, the bank changed its business focus from investing 
in the interbank market to traditional commercial banking business within the local 
market. Due to its previous negative experience in the investment business, the bank 
avoided entering into business areas in which they did not have expertise. They became 
followers rather than leaders, the informant stressed.
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The informant did not indicate a clear segmentation of their market. However, be 
mentioned that they were offering a variety o f liability and asset products, and were 
involved in routine, unsophisticated treasury investments:
our bank is not focusing into some o f  the newer products that came into tlie market., we are 
certainly covering the whole range o f  liability side o f  products, covering the assets side of  
products. On the treasury side we decided that w e are not equipped to handling the fancy 
derivative type o f  products. In treasury market w e are dealing with the more basic routine. The 
systems that we got is adequate and geared for handling that entire range o f  products and 
services...”
Perceived role of IT:
IT is essential for the bank's operations:
One of the main tasks that the new management team accomplished when they came 
into office was scrapping the bank's old system and replacing it with a new system. The 
old system was not reliable in terms of its accuracy and needed a lot of manual 
intervention.
The new system aimed at automating the bank’s operations with minimal human 
intervention. Accuracy and reliability of processing, security against fraud, and 
flexibility in disclosing information from the different sites within the bank were some 
of the crucial goals that the new system was expected to meet. The operations manager 
perceived that their success as a bank depended on how efficiently the proposed system 
was able to handle their internal operations.
“.. everything is really IT driven... the w hole structuring is around a suitable IT packages that ;s 
available. Reliability is o f  our concern. O bviously, because it is others’ people money that >cu 
are dealing with. So you have to be absolutely certain that whatever you are doing is hundred 
percent correct, and most important thing is the security aspect, confidentiality and security that 
can’t be tampered with. So you have to have a system which provide you both o f  those ri'O 
things. It has to be flexible enough for the people to do certain inquiries to carry out their normal 
daily transactions....”
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processes... that is really going to affect us between now and the time when we have the new  
system integrated...”
Internal capitalisation on IT enables business plans and 
improves quality of service:
Essential for the bank's image:
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"4IT enables redesign of the bank's processes:
%
The new application systems were perceived as a means of redesigning the bank’s
■
processes to enhance efficiency:
■1f.
".. we are changing things around which we w ill change the way that we drive our business "ù
IT was perceived to play a crucial role internally by automating, both to the back office : 
operations, the front office operations. The aim was to enable the bank to provide a 
variety of products and improve the quality of service. Tlie products that the informant 
mentioned were traditional commercial banking services.
Match the competition:
IT was perceived as a tool for matching the competition. The ATMs were introduced as 
a means of matching the competitors. The introduction of products, such as credit cards 
were also in the bank’s plans to match their competitors:
it is our strategy now to go for these side products which are not your basic bread earner, but 
to keep you in the business to match the com petition...”
The operations manager also mentioned that the availability of some IT systems or 
related products was linked to the bank’s image and, despite their cost or expected 
return, had to be adopted to protect or create a favourable image.
used IT, the informant argued:
“Q. How this bank is different from other banks in terms o f  using IT?
Main IT developments:
A homogeneous market: all are providing more or less the 
same thing:
The informant perceived IT as being used by all banks in a similar way. Similar 
technologies and products were provided, although enhancements were offered by some 
banks. However, the market was homogeneous in terms of what it provided and how it
Operations manager: I don’t think that it is different. I think that all banks are basically doing the
same thing  if  you go  to all o f  the banks and collect all the products that they have, I don't
think that there is any bank in the Island today which is offering anything which the other banks y
are not. OK some banks are possibly offering a little bit more in terms of, like, ATM  link and 
VISA Cards.. L4 have it, F6 have it world wide within their banks., but i f  you look at the kind o f  
current account or the saving account or fixed deposit accounts, the normal retail functions, the 
customer loans, or the property loans, all the banks are doing the same thing. You call it a 
different name, but the product remains the sam e....”
The bank started its operations with a mainframe system and in-house developed 
application systems. According to the informant, the old system was not reliable in 
terms of its processing accuracy and it needed a lot of manual intervention. The
' %hardware and the software cost the bank a fortune, but failed to meet their objectives. I
With the change in top management came a change in the business strategies and focus 
and also a change in the bank’s old system. The new management had to scrap the old 
system and adopt a new one. However, they were restricted in terms of expertise and 
financial commitment devoted for this task.
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The bank’s new system was mainly based on off-the-shelf packages, as they did not 
have the resources to develop any in-house systems. Moreover, they were offering 
traditional banking services that most of the off-the-shelf packages were designed to 
provide. The operations manager identified an Irish company, Kindle, and its software 
system, “Bank Master” as being their strategic partners.
The Kindle systems were designed on an open system concept that allowed them to run
.on different IT platforms. The 'Bank Master' was designed to run on mainframes and 
PC environments alike.
The bank opted for an open systems architecture. They wanted to be free from the 
influence of the hardware vendors who directed the client in one direction or another as 
to what system to adopt, according to the operations manager. He also mentioned that 
most of the banks were on a mainframe system, thus were forced from time to time to
system.
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migrate to the next model of the vendors’ series as it was developed. Because this 
process was costly, LI wanted to avoid such costs by opting for an open, downsized
I
The operations manager perceived the downsized PC environment, based on a LAN and 
"client server’ technology, as being the trend in IT infrastructure. The cost of adopting a 
downsized infrastructure was lower than that o f adopting a mainframe infrastructure. 
Given the small size of the bank and the limited resources the operations manager was 
supported with, he recommended the downsized environment.
The downsized environment, the operations manager argued, enabled the bank to start 
with systems that fit its requirements and avoid paying for systems with extra capacity 
that was not needed. Using PCs and file servers enabled the bank to upgrade its systems 
at a minimal cost.
i
■A,-.;:...,::
The bank had started with a single office, then expanded by opening three additional 
branches after 1990. With the expansion, the bank embarked on renewing its LAN 
network, PCs, and file servers to enhance their processing capabilities. Moreover, the 
bank introduced another software system from Kindle company called ‘Branch Power" 
to enable networking of the branches as well as providing traditional banking services, 
such as printing drafts, signature verification at the counter, remote authorisation, etc.
In 1992, the bank introduced its ATMs. The bank was among the second wave of 
smaller banks that offered their systems simultaneously. Recently, the bank had been in 
the process of upgrading its ATMs by providing more enhanced ATMs with coloured 
graphics. It got a ‘bargain’ price for this upgrading from the vendor, who encouraged 
the bank to scrap the old ATMs and install new ones instead.
The bank was also embarking on front office automation to improve the quality of its 
service and to cope with the increase in the number of its client base. Moreover, the 
bank was planning to re-launch its credit cards, after stopping offering them for a time.
Reasons for embarking on the IT initiatives:
I
4.;3:4
There were several interrelated drivers to IT initiatives. The first driver is related to 
automating the bank’s core operations and delivering the basic banking services and 
products upon which the bank depended to earn its revenue. The 'Bank Master' and
.
"Branch Power’ systems aimed at automating the bank's core banking operations, 
including accounting books and business processes, as well as producing required 
reports for internal and external uses. The failure of the old system to handle the bank's 
operations and produce the required reports necessitated scrapping it to embark on the 
new system.
The second driver for adopting the ‘Branch Power’ system, was to enable the bank to 
achieve its business goal of expanding its branch network.
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The third driver for automation was to enhance the quality of services to customers. As 
mentioned earlier, ‘Branch Power’ aimed at networking the branches and automating 
the banking processes such as printing drafts, verifying signatures at the counter, 
enabling remote authorisation, etc. The aim of automating these processes, as the 
informant said was to reduce the queues at the bank’s counters and provide prompt, 
‘one-window stop’ service to the customer from whatever branch the client opted to 
bank from.
A fourth driver for IT initiatives was related to the increase in the number of 
transactions and customer base. The operations manager mentioned that the bank was 
embarking on upgrading its workstations and PCs to provide faster processing to cope 
with the increase in the business processes.
A fifth driver o f IT initiatives was related to conforming to the norms within the 
banking industry through adopting the IT related products and systems that were 
perceived as being a competitive necessity or crucial for the bank’s image. The 
operations manager mentioned that, in reasoning with the board of directors, what the 
other banks offered in the market was used as the benchmark against which the bank’s 
IT stance was evaluated, in order to seek the board’s support to reach the same level as 
the bank’s rivals.
".. so you tell them {the informant talking about the board o f  directors) that this is what the 
other banks are doing, this is what the competition is doing, these are the products that they are 
giving, here’s where we stand to them. These are the customers that approached us and asked 
about why w e are not offering these things. So you think in terms o f  these things then get 
support..”
".. you have a hundred and fifty thousand people. You spend one or two million dollars to bring 
something over a period o f  five years or ten \  ears.. from that point o f  view  it does not make any 
sense at all. But it makes sense o f  your corporate image. Cards., we were processing Master 
Cards over here, we gave it up because it did not make any sense, we were losing money on that. 
If not losing money, we are not doing any money on that, and yet we want to go back into issuing 
our own cards. Why! Business w ise it is not going to make any fantastic sums o f  money for me 
but it is a corporate image. 1 need to have my card out in the market. Because everybody else has 
his card in the market... even i f  I linked it with Visa, how many o f  my customers are going 
abroad and use the V isa connection. M ostly it is going to be used over here. For that my ATM  
cards and EFTPoS in the proposed network w ill suffice, and I w ill be happy. I don’t have to sign 
up with Visa. Because I have to pay them fees, to give them interchange commission every time I 
do a transaction with them. But still I must do all that because I must be linked to a big name... it
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is not just technology,, som etim es you don’t want certain thing but you are forced into doing 
them. You have to go along with them .,” .
The sixth driver was related to the vendor, rather than the business processes or 
requirements. The vendor offered the bank a bargain price to encourage the bank to 
scrap their old ATMs and install new coloured ATMs instead. According to the 
operations manager, the new ATMs had had no functional advantage, apart from their 
looks:
“There is a big company over here w ho are trying to discourage one particular brand o f  ATMs, 
because they are no longer being manufactured, they are obsolete technology. Although o f  their 
contract with us or with other banks they are forced to continue to service that particular 
technology until we decide to scrap it. But it is to their interest to make sure that we scrap it as 
quickly as possible by offering som ething new. So they are offering the latest technology at a 
very attractive price. They will say replace your old models w e w ill give you this at this price 
because it is beneficial to them...
.... the coloured ATM s enhancements. Y ou have now coloured enhancements, which don't realh  
serve any purpose except to attract the customer. Other than that they don't really help the 
customer or any thing (he laughed). Just another thing that makes it attractive.” ;
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The formulation of IT strategy 
proceeds through a number of 
stages, according to the description 
of the operations manager (see 
Figure 1). In the first stage, the 
operations manager, who is the 
product champion of any IT 
initiative, formulates a vision of the
IT strategy needed in the bank. F igure l :  F orm ulation o f  i t  s tra te g y  a t L oca l I 
Once this vision is clear to the
operations manager, the second stage starts, in which the operations manager prepares a
cost analysis of the proposed strategy and presents it to the top management. As a
i1:
i.
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product champion of the proposed strategy, the operations manager’s duty was to 
convince the top management, who in some cases accused him of representing the 
vendors’ interests, of his visionary ideas and strategies. Once approved by the top 
management, the IT strategy, especially when a substantial amount o f investment was 
involved, was presented to the board of directors for approval. The operations manager 
plays an important role in this process through defending his vision before the board. 
This process requires political skills to overcome top management resistance to 
spending. Once approved by the board, these strategies are implemented.
The operations manager said that the formation of IT strategy was informal because the 
bank was small in its size and because, he, who directed the IT scene within the bank, 
was responsible for different functional areas and was therefore aware of the bank’s 
requirements:
!
being a small bank, it is largely informal process. The informal process starts at looking at all 
levels to see what the competition is up to., what we need to do, what are the things that we see 
outside.."
, . | ï
There were different sources that Oporîtions manager
past experience
influenced the formation of the 
operations manager’s vision (see 
Figure 2 ). The first source of vision 
of the IT strategy was the operations 
manager’s past experience. His 
work experience with Standard 
Chartered Bank in India had
exposed him to how IT could serve Figure 2 : Sources o f  i t  s tra te g y  vision  
him, what systems to adopt and how 
to implement them.
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The second source of vision for IT strategies came from the bank’s business needs and 
user needs. Through contacts with the employees and the business managers, and 
through the top management steering committee in which the business managers define 
their business needs, the vision of what IT systems were needed came about. Moreover, 
through his day to day experience with the bank’s operations, the operations manager 
defined the problematic areas that needed IT support.
The third important source of vision came from what the bank’s rivals were offering to 
their clients:
my retail banking manager or my branch managers might com e to me and say; Look, this is 
what w e have heard, this is what w e have seen the other banks’ are offering. For instance when 
w e did not have the ATM s, all o f  our custom ers were saying: ‘why you did not have an ATM. 
all o f  the other banks where having an A TM ... why don't we issue an ATM  cards’.... people are 
not com ing to us because they say .... {w e} want to withdraw money on {the w eek ends} your 
bank is closed, while the other banks are g iving this service, we need an ATM. Then people have 
started com ing and saying: ‘why don't you  issue cards, eveiybody is issuing V isa and
Mastercards., why aren’t you issuing’., this is something that we started looking at, and this is 
something that we need to do..”
The fourth source of vision came from networking with the vendors, the vendors’
clients, and other banks in the region which acted as a role models to the bank, as the
operations manager described. As for the vendors, the operations manager had
developed a personal and official relationship with Kindle. Through exposure to the
software vendor’s systems he defined what to adopt. The vendor’s systems were
directing the IT strategy, since the bank IT strategy depended on off-the-shelf packages:
■
".. everything is really IT driven., your m anasem ent information systems and what you want out
o f  those systems., the w hole structuring is around a suitable IT package that is being available.."
I see something, 1 have seen the front o ffice  system. I like what I have seen. I see that the 
turnaround at the counter has decreased drastically .. [the informant was describing what other 
banks were doing]. I com e here and I ask for a product demonstration. I involve my branch 
managers, my retail banking manger, mv corporate banking manager..”
Moreover, the relationship with the hardware vendor was a source of vision about the 
downsized environment which the hardware vendor was breaching in the Bahraini 
market.
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IAn additional source of vision for IT strategies came from the relationship of the operations manager with the vendors’ clients. Through informal contacts with the 
vendors’ clients, the operations manager was exposed to their systems and plans about 
what technologies to adopt and how to adopt them.
,
what we tend to do was to approach Informally some o f  the other users o f  the Kindle software 
and discuss with them how they have done things or they are planning to do things but It is 
informal..”
Another source for creating a vision about IT strategies came from contacts with other 
regional banks who were perceived as being pioneers in using IT. The operations 
manager mentioned ‘Gulf American Bank’ (pseudonym) as a role model that the bank 
followed with regard to what to adopt. I noticed that Local 1 and ‘Gulf American Bank* 
had shareholders from the same regional country that invested in both banks. It was 
possible that the collaboration between Local 1, which is a joint venture between local 
investors and Gulf investors, and ‘Gulf American Bank’ was made possible due to 
networks of shareholders and board of directors.
1 think that the very fact that w e have seen what Is happening outside and how our customers 
get influenced by what the competition and what the other banks can provide them. Not 
necessarily banks in Bahrain, but 1 am talking also world wide. Therefore our attention was 
focused on {G ulf American Bank}, for instance, who provide excellent customer services. There 
entire IT is designed towards gathering customer information, and tailoring their products and 
services to meet the expectations o f  the customers. Obviously we have not got to that stage over 
here. But using other role m odels as a guide, we are trying to see how best, within the framewoik 
that we have, how best we can provide the kind o f  services which our customers are used to 
perceiving over here.... we fee! w e are the first bank in Bahrain to have such elaborate front 
office system which nobody else has..”
The bank's IT strategies were influenced by the amount of resources the board was
willing to invest. Historically, the bank had focused its IT strategy on building the
internal IT infrastructure based on a downsized environment to automate the main core
banking operations. At this stage, the bank avoided adopting any delivery systems, such
as ATMs, or IT-related products, such as credit cards. The reason was the high risk
.perceived from handling a relatively big project with the limited expertise available at
that time. The operations manager said that the bank did not want to go into adopting 
the ATMs and related communication systems before finishing automating their core 
banking operations and being sure that it was running properly. Moreover, the bank
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Relationship with the vendors:
Relationship with the software vendor:
avoided adopting credit cards because at that stage they did not have the required 
expertise to handle that kind of business. At the second stage, the IT strategy was 
directed more at adopting delivery systems, such as ATMs and credit cards. According 
to the operations manager:
“ It was part o f  our strategy at that point o f  time to ignore these services com pletely... there was 
nobody who could handle card processing. We did not have the technology for it... So what it 
would have meant at that point o f  time is .. w hile we were trying to get our core business in 
place, but we also started to look for som ebody to start looking at the card business, to start 
looking at EFTPoS devices, to bring in system s that don’t have to do just our basic interest 
calculations, debit and credit, but also link up to all kind o f  things, communications, w e would  
have to go for substantial communication set up., we would have to go for a software designed  
to handling all o f  these things separately and talking to each other. So in terms o f  the human 
resources we did not have this kind o f  human resources. In terms o f  financial resources w e did 
not want to .. we were going into a phase where the bank had been into operations for three years, 
had not produced the kind o f  profits that the shareholders wanted..”
Time horizon of the IT strategy:
The time horizon for the IT strategy was between 2 to 4 years. The relatively cheaper I f  
infrastructure of the downsized environment enabled the bank to upgrade or enhance its 
IT platforms to cope with expansion strategies or increased transactions and client base 
in a shorter time than in a mainframe environment, the operations manager argued.
.The informant also argued that the bank’s IT strategy was guided by its business 
strategies. The core business was not expected to change, so the IT systems were 
expected to deliver the same products over the long run with minor enhancements from 
time to time.
The relationship with the software vendor was strategic in its nature, strategic because 
the bank’s entire application systems were based on Kindle systems, as mentioned
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earlier: the ‘Bank Master’ and the ‘Branch Power’ systems, Kindle future developments 
and enhancements were expected to influence and inform the bank’s strategic vision 
since the bank’s vision was based on the off-the-shelf packages developed by Kindle.
Local 1 was the first bank in the Gulf to adopt Kindle software systems. The vendor did 
not have any representative offices in Bahrain, nor elsewhere in the Gulf. Nonetheless, 
the vendor offered to fly a team of experts to Bahrain, should the bank need any support
. gin implementing the software system. The operations manager said that the software 
vendor handled them quite well and was very interested in setting an exemplar to other
banks in the region through its success with Local 1.
1^
The operations manager stated the relationship with Kindle grew on both the personal 
and official levels.
The software vendor was also a source of relationship amongst the vendor clients. As 
mentioned earlier, the bank approached the vendor’s clients in order to gain ideas which 
influenced its IT strategies.
The operations manager, as the product champion of the IT strategy, was the link with
the vendor. Prior to serving LI, the operations manager had worked in India with 
Standard Chartered Bank which was dealing with Kindle at that time. This exposed the
operations manager to the software vendor and its systems.
The Kindle story:
Kindle is an Irish software company that started operations in the seventies and is 
strategically linked to ICL, a company for whose mainframes it created banking 
application systems.
Kindle systems and ICL mainframes were popular in markets that IBM, due to political 
or other reasons, was restricted from entering. The operations manager mentioned I
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African countries such as Zimbabwe, Gambia, Ghana, as well as India, as some of the 
markets where IBM was not present.
In India, the majority of the banks ran on ICL mainframe computers and their software 
application the ‘Bank Master’ that Kindle had developed. Standard Chartered Bank was 
among these banks that opted for ICL and Kindle systems. As mentioned earlier, the 
operations manager had worked with Standard Chartered Bank in India, where he was 
exposed to Kindle software.
Kindle changed its strategy from developing application systems mainly to ICL 
mainframes to developing application software to any major hardware platform. It went 
one step further where it made two versions o f its applications, one running on a PC- 
LAN environment and the other running on the mainframe environment. This strategic 
decision, according to the operations manager, made Kindle amongst the popular 
banking application software vendors world-wide.
l i
Relationship with the hardware vendor:
The hardware vendor was the representative agent of Compaq computers and Oracle 
relational database systems. The hardware vendor was a source of vision for the bank 
with ideas related to networking, relational database systems and the downsized 
environment. The relationship with the hardware vendor was of a long term nature and 
was based on mutual trust. According to the operations manager:
.... We went to a company that was at that time relatively small, they wanted to find a niche to 
them selves, and we were their first major break in terms o f  feasibility in the market. And 
suddenly they were attached to a bank, and the bank was placing orders with them for file savers, 
for work stations, for everything. They have grown substantially since that time. So they are the 
ones that say thank you to us, and we have found that they have been excellent. In fact w e are 
now looking again for placing orders for certain things and they are certainly ahead in terms o f  
placing orders.. Because we feel that we know them well, we have a very strong relationship....
!
Role of the operations manager in IT strategy 
formation:
54
Main product champion:
.The operations manager was the main product champion behind the IT strategic vision 
and its implementation within the bank. As described earlier, the operations manager 
was the main source of vision about what to adopt and how to structure the IT scene 
within the bank. According to the informant’s account, he played multiple roles within 
the bank and was responsible for a number of functional areas, including the IT scene, 
mainly due to the small size o f the bank.
‘Q. Are you the product cham pion‘d
Previous work experience as a source of competence:
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Operations manager: “Y es, I am. Sometimes I am accused for being the salesperson for the 
hardware and the software vendors, because I have to be convinced that whatever I am going for 
is the best. So when a question is thrown at me and I have to defend the products, it sounds like I 
am the sales person o f  the com pany trying to convince my fellow  o f  why this product is the best. 
So, you can say that I am the product champion..”
Previous job with Standard Chartered Bank exposed him to 
systems and vendors:
The operations manager’s previous work experience with Standard Chartered Bank in 
India was a major source of vision for his current position with LI. His previous work 
experience had exposed him to systems, provided him with expertise as how the systems 
could serve him, and how to implement these systems, despite his non-IT related 
educational background. With Standard Chartered Bank in India, the operations 
manager was responsible for implementing Kindle systems in his branch. According to 
the operations manager, he was comfortable with implementing the Kindle systems in 
the bank in Bahrain without any help from the vendor nor any third party. This 
competence was gained from his Standard Chartered Bank experience.
'■■I' '■ -1.
the first branch in India o f  Standard Chartered Bank that was computerised was in N ew  Delhi 
and I handled that. I am not a technical expert in the computer field, I have not done a computer 
training course or programming or something, but from a banking perspective, how a computer 
system work, what do we need from a computer system, how to set it up, those are the things that 
I can supervise, I can control and manage..”
Relationship between business strategies and IT 
strategies:
Following the bank’s losses, the bank experienced revolutionary changes in its top 
management and consequently, in its strategies. The revolutionary changes shifted the
!
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The operations manager argued that the IT strategies were mainly directed by the 
business goals. However, IT was mainly used for supporting the traditional banking 
activities rather than innovating. The business strategies avoided going into
sophisticated business areas, such as derivative products in the treasury market, and 
preferred the “more basic routine” business, as the operations manager described it, and 
this was reflected in the bank’s IT systems. For example, IT was used for handling 
expansion strategies and providing the basic banking services.
The bank’s culture:
A revolutionary change:
The bank experienced a revolutionary change in its top management and its strategies. 
The bank had started with a foreign top management team who focused on investing in 
international notes and bonds and paid little attention to the local market. The bank 
experienced sharp losses from its international investment portfolio. In addition to that, 
the bank had failed to establish a business niche capitalising on the trade flow between 
Bahrain and the regional country with which the joint venture was made. This was a 
vision that the bank had had at the outset of its establishment but failed to achieve.
246
bank’s focus from interbank investments to traditional commercial banking business 
that focused more on the local market and avoided investing in sophisticated treasuiy 
business.
The previous negative experience had made the bank’s board of directors cautious about 
adopting strategies that deviated from what others were doing in the market, so the bank 
opted for following in the market rather than leading.
New top management influenced by Standard Chartered Bank:
The new top management were made up of locals as well as foreigners. Half of the new 
management had past experience working with Standard Chartered Bank, either in 
Bahrain or abroad. This exposure influenced how the bank handled its IT scene.
Previous experience and spending on IT:
The IT systems that the old management had adopted were unreliable and inaccurate and 
had to be scrapped when the new management came into power. The old systems cost a 
lot but delivered nothing. As a result, the board of directors had lost faith in spending 
on IT. and gave little support to ideas that called for high spending on the bank’s IT 
systems.
The mandate of the new management was to create a new and reliable systems at a 
minimal cost to the bank. They expected little support, if any, from the board of 
directors for any costly plans. They were under pressure to create profits prior to 
requesting financial support for new systems.
we were going into a phase where the bank had been into operations for three years, had not 
produced the kind o f  profits that the shareholders wanted. So it was very difficult for the new 
management team to com e in and say hi guys, we are the new magicians, forget about whai 
happened in the p a st, but because w e tell you we are the best, believe us, and we will spend ten 
million dollars and we will g ive you a lot whole o f  things. The shareholders would have said, 
“hold on, who the hell are you! H ow  different are you from the other guys, put your m oney where 
your mouth is, show us the results and we w ill start talking to you’...”
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The small cautious bank:
The operations manager perceived that their being a small player in the market with If
limited resources affected how they approached adopting IT. They were cautious as to .S:
how much they were going to invest in IT.
V
Play it safe:
The bank avoided innovating within the market. The informant preferred that other
'
banks try new strategies first and then Local 1 would evaluate them and follow when
appropriate. The bank’s previous failure might be behind its board of directors*
conservative approach to innovating in the market. As the operations manager put it:
I think that w e are certainly not driven by technology. W e are not going to be a market leader 
in technology. We adapt and w e accept and w e review and then go for things. But if  you s a \ .
‘lets’ look at new products and let’s implement it and let’s do it before anybody e lse ’... it has not 
happened so far.... It is more o f  a question what the other banks are doing, let’s go and do it., are 
you sure that this w ill work? no. Let’s wait and see what the others are doing. Then we will do it  
I think that we are over-cautious., and also given our size and overall direction, the market 
segm ent that w e are targeting, 1 think it is counter productive for som ebody like us. We can’t 
afford to waste money., we can't afford to put too much m oney in R&D. I don't think that we 
have that kind o f  resources, that is the real lesson. If w e had that kind o f  resources perhaps our 
perception w ould change and w e would have gone for technology..”
I
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Local Bank Two (L2)
Introduction:
Local Bank Two (Local Two) is a joint venture between a number of private and public 
investors in Bahrain and other regional investors from the Gulf. The bank participated
«
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in creating other subsidiary financial companies within Bahrain and within the Gulf 
region, but its major operations were carried out locally, with its local market share 
estimated in 1992 to be around six percent o f the total local operations.
I interviewed three informants within the bank. The first meeting was with the deputy 
manager and the EDP manager. Since the informants were not comfortable with being 
recorded, I had to take notes instead. 1 was planning to interview each manager 
separately. However, they attended the meeting together, which made it hard for the 
EDP manager to air his views in the presence of his superior. At a second meeting, I 
managed to interview the EDP manager alone so he was more free to express his views.
That meeting was informal and I depended on taking note. The third interview was with 
the general manager. The aim of this interview was to further investigate the process of 
IT strategy and business strategy formation at the bank and to inquire about his role in 
this process, as I did not get clear answers from the deputy manager about these issues.
Though the meeting was tape recorded, the informant was not comfortable with being r-recorded so he was very cautious about what he said, providing general statements 
rather than discussing his experience.
II
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Business Focus:
Operating differently than the conventional banks:
Local Two operates differently from the conventional banks. It follows ‘Islamic banking' 
processes. According to these principles, loans are not bought and sold, and interest 
charges are not approved, the deputy manager explained. Local Two therefore accepts 
deposits from the public, who are considered as partners with the bank in sharing either 
the profits or (theoretically) the losses that may occur from the bank's activities.
Local Two concentrates on Murabaha business (financing resale of goods)'. It focuses 
on two segments for this type of business. The first segment is the public, with special 
attention paid to employees, who are classified by the bank as being “limited income 
clients”. This segment includes public sector employees who are of middle or low 
income. The second segment includes the traders and the merchants who own small to 
medium size businesses. The GM explained that the bank aimed to spread its risk by 
focusing on the wide range of customers within these segments.
An overbanked environment; however they don't compete on a 
price basis:
The GM perceived the banking industry as being overbanked and with limited business 
opportunities considering the number of participants in the market. Nonetheless, the 
GM argued that their strategy did not focus on providing the lowest price in the market. 
He perceived their bank as enjoying a niche that conventional banks could not easily 
target. There was, however, a second Islamic bank that had entered recently the market
■■1which formed a competitive threat to Local Two in many business areas. However, the
newcomer to the market did not focus on serving the mass “limited income clients” as 
did Local Two. Despite the distinction in operating principles, the bank competed with
■
  :
' S e e  th e ap p en d ix  for a d escr ip tion  o f  the Islam ic  Financing b u sin ess.
.
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the conventional banks in financing the same kind of commodities, e.g. cars, 
merchandise, real estate, etc.
Perceived role of IT:
Crucial for the bank's operations:
The deputy manager perceived IT as crucial for the bank’s operations. He used an 
analogy where he compared using IT for automating the back office operations as “using 
a gas cooker after they had been cooking on wood”.
Garish systems versus core systems:
The deputy manager distinguished however between what he described as ‘garish’ 
systems and core or ‘must’ systems. As to the ‘garish’ system, the bank was 
conservative in its spending on these systems. On the other hand, it perceived adopting 
the core systems as essential, transforming the bank from ‘cooking on wood’ to 
‘cooking on gas’, to paraphrase the informant. It was not clear which systems were 
perceived by the informant as being ‘garish’ and which were a ‘must’. It is worth 
mentioning that their existing systems were in operations for a long time and suffered 
from some efficiency problems.
"Vogue": the others are offering it, we should too:
IT played another role in conforming to the norms within the industry. The deput} 
manager described the adoption of IT systems as a ‘vogue’ amongst the banks, like the 
satellite systems and the ‘luxurious cars’ that people in Bahrain were rushing to acquire, 
though there was no real need for them. Telephone banking was the example that the 
informant gave. He perceived the adoption of this system as a means to conform to the
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A competitive necessity:
.® :i
norms or the ‘vogue’ within the market, rather than enhancing efficiency within the 
bank.
Meeting the central bank requirements:
à
Another role ascribed to IT was to meet the central bank’s requirements. The adoption 
of the encoding devices within the bank was enforced by the central bank, mainly to 
automate the cheque clearing system at the central bank. The adoption of the encoding 
system did not have any effect on the bank’s efficiency, other than adding another 
manual procedure o f feeding the cheques to the encoding machine and keying in the 
needed data for printing on the cheques with a magnetic ink. The bank did not alter its 
systems to automate the processes that followed receiving the cleared cheques from the 
central bank.
I
IT was also being perceived as a defensive measure to protect the bank’s client base. 
This was especially true for the bank’s ATM systems. ATMs were adopted mainly to 
match the competitors and be in line with banks that were similar in size and strength to 
Local Two.
More important role for the products on the liability side and a marginalized role 
for products on the asset side:
As mentioned above, the ATMs were perceived as being a competitive necessity to the 
bank. The deputy manager added that these systems affected the marketing of products 
on the liability side, such as deposit accounts. Without the ATMs, the bank’s market 
share in terms of deposit accounts was expected to suffer.
In contrast to that, the deputy manager perceived a minor role, if any, for IT in 
marketing or protecting products on the assets side, the ‘Islamic finance’.
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MIS important for decision making:
The general manager explained that IT played an important role in providing the 
management with the needed data necessary to take educated decisions. It was not 
clear, however, how sophisticated their MIS system was. To support his argument of 
how important their MIS was to their decision making, the GM showed me a hand 
written table of numbers, stating that the data included in it provided him with an insight 
into what decisions to take. I inferred from the fact that the report was hand-written that 
their MIS system might not be sophisticated enough to produce the required information 
without manual intervention.
» automating printouts of saving accounts;
• automating the printouts of the "Islamic finance' checks;
* automating the printouts of the investment certificates;
» introduction of a backup system;
Main IT developments:
The bank automated its accounting records in 1984. In addition to that, it incrementally 
automated the bits and pieces of its manual processes. The following is a list o f the 
main IT initiatives as reported by the deputy and EDP managers:
automation of the accounting records in 1984;
i
storing the customers’ signature images on the computer and making them available 
to the tellers for the front office operations;
Ï'
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• increasing the systems storage capacity. The aim was to store the transactions details
for one year as compared to six months, as was the case at rival banks;
• linking the branches on-line with the head office;
• introduction of ATMs in 1992 - 1993; and
• introducing phone banking in 1995
There were plans to automate the letters of credit and letters o f guarantee within the 
bank. The deputy manager perceived that this was the trend in Bahrain, since many of 
the other banks were in the process of automating these processes. There were 
additional plans to upgrade the bank’s ATMs, since the bank had been offered lower 
prices for this from the vendor.
It is worth mentioning that the informants gave no reference to redesigning their
processes as they were automated. Instead, their approach focused on automating the
bits and pieces of these processes, such as developing mini-application programs to 
.print investment certificates, which had previously been printed by the type wnters, and 
to print the ‘Islamic finance’ cheques, which were previously made out manually.
The bank’s IT developments were constrained by the capabilities of the current 
hardware system, which had been in operation for a long period of time. These systems, 
as will be discussed later, handicapped the bank from linking itself to its subsidiaiy 
insurance company.
2 5 4
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IT strategies:
In-house development of systems:
The EDP manager said that the core banking systems were developed in-house rather 
than acquired “off-the-shelf’. The informant said that due to the unique operations of 
the Islamic banks, there were no “off-the-shelf’ packages offered in the market from 
which these banks could select. Thus, developing their own systems rather than 
depending on “off-the-shelf’ packages was a phenomenon unique to the Islamic banks.
Collaborating with other institutions for developing the main 
application system:
The bank was aided by another Islamic bank, “Gulf Islamic Bank” (pseudonym), in 
providing the required guidance about what application systems the bank needed to run 
its core operations. This Islamic bank was one of the share holders of Local Two.
The in-house development of the application systems was made possible by 
collaborating with the vendor company, which was a subsidiary of “Gulf Islamic Bank”. 
This vendor aided other Islamic banks in the Gulf in developing their systems.
The vendor was also a source of recruits to the bank. For example, the EDP manager, 
who worked on developing systems for other Islamic banks, was recruited from the 
same vendor.
Lack of adequate support from the consultants and the vendors:
Despite the vendor’s support to the bank, the EDP manager aired his concerns about the 
lack of adequate support from the software and hardware vendors and the consultants in 
the local market. He claimed that they were not experts in how the Islamic banks 
operate and therefore were not able to guide them in their adoption decisions. The EDP
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manager stressed the need for a vendor’s guidance as to what the implications of IT are 
to a bank’s business rather than what pieces of a system to acquire.
Small EDP section, priority to the back office automation:
Later developments and enhancements within the IT scene in the bank were done 
through the bank’s EDP section. The section was headed by the EDP manager who 
supervised one employee. In addition to running the day to day operations, the duty of 
the section was to develop application systems, some of which systems were minor in 
nature. As mentioned in the main development sections, some of the application 
systems were concerned with printing records that had previously been printed 
manually. The EDP manager said that due to the under-resourced section, automating 
the manual processes took a long to accomplish.
Role of the EDP manager:
The formation of IT strategies:
I infer from the informant lack of response that there were no formal IT strategies for the 
bank. The informants stated that they depended on their internal resources to develop 
their systems. As mentioned earlier, their internal resources were made up of a small
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The EDP manager was recruited from the same vendor from whom the bank had 
acquired its hardware system. He had gained his experience developing application 
systems for the Islamic banks during his previous job with the vendor. This experience 
aided him in developing the in-house systems. Nonetheless, he did not have power over 
nor influence in running the IT scene within the bank. He claimed that his role was 
restricted to providing recommendations to management when required.
The informants did not answer my questions about how the bank formulated its IT 
strategies, the processes that they went through for adopting their ATM and phone 
banking systems, or who was responsible for formulating these strategies.
EDP section with two employees who were overloaded with responsibilities of running 
the operations and developing new systems. It makes sense to assume that due, to the
Iwork overload and the limited expertise and human resources within the EDP section, 
the bank’s informal IT strategies were mostly concerned with minor and incremental 
enhancements to the manual systems such as automating the printing out of investment 
certificates and loan cheques. Some of these developments were not integrated with the 
rest of the main systems.
Committees for major investments in IT:
The deputy manager claimed that the bank formulated committees for discussing any 
major investments in IT projects in which the GM, the deputy manager and nominated 
members of the board of directors participated.
Relation between business strategies and IT 
strategies:
I presented to the GM a graph describing hypothetical relationships between a bank’s IT 
strategies and business strategies. In the first type of relationship, the business 
strategies and IT strategies were totally independent of each other. In the second type of 
relationship, the business strategies capitalised on the IT strategies. In the third type of 
relationship, the distinction between business strategies and IT strategies was blurred , -i 
and the two strategies were almost overlapping.
Unexpectedly, the GM claimed that his bank IT strategies and business strategies 
belonged to the third type of relationship where the business strategies and the IT 
strategies were overlapping and the distinction between them was blurred. This 
contradicted the views of the EDP manager who claimed that the bank’s focus was on 
automating the manual operations within the bank, which had little to do with the bank’s 
competitive strategies. The GM’s views also contradicted the deputy manager’s views
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Bank’s culture:
A market niche serving the "iimited income clients"
in which the later argued that IT played a minor role in developing the asset side 
products on which they depended to generate their revenue. In contrary, the GM 
perceived that an advanced relationship between IT and business existed in the bank. 
This argument was made despite the nature of IT systems the bank developed, the 
limited resources the IT unit had, and the limited power of the IT manager.
There was a shift in the bank’s advertising approach. Their advertising messages had 
focused on the ethical issues of ‘Islamic’ banking. However, recently the bank's 
advertising messages were focusing on presenting the bank as an integrated bank which 
capitalises on IT to enable its clients to bank through any of its branches. It is worth 
mentioning that the other local banks were featuring their IT related services in their 
advertising campaigns as well.
The GM claimed that the bank was the first to target the “limited income clients” who 
formed a big slice of the employees’ market. The bank perceived itself as having a 
monopoly in the Islamic banking business, since there were no other institutions 
competing directly with it in providing finance facilities which conform to Islamic 
principles.
The GM perceived the ATMs as a threat to their business. He anticipated that the 
availability of these machines would encourage the clients who were mostly of a 
“limited income” to withdraw their salaiies and end up with zero balances at the 
beginning of the month. Such an effect was not desirable, since it would leave the bank 
with less deposits. The GM’s belief about the effect of the ATMs discouraged the bank 
from adopting the ATMs any earlier than 1992-1993. Only when close competitors 
adopted their ATMs did Local Two follow suit.
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There were other IT related-products, such as credit cards, that the bank resisted offering 
because of how it perceived the client base. The culture o f the bank was shaped around 
offering the basic needs of the "limited income’ clients. Quality of service was not part 
of this culture.
Conservative "cool temper" management:
The bank’s management was conservative in its spending on IT. The deputy manager 
described the bank as being different from the other banks which were more aggressive 
in their adoption decisions. He told a story about a rival bank that did not take its time 
in evaluating the available options and ended up scraping its system and buying another 
one later on. The deputy manager said that they did not want to rush in taking decisions 
that they might regret later on. He described their management as having a ‘cool 
temper’ that resisted temptation. He mentioned that they waited for two years before 
adopting their core banking system, and once these systems were in operation they were 
used for a long period of time. He mentioned that they had some hardware systems in 
operation since they adopted their first IT system.
It is worth noting from the example that the deputy manager gave above how the bank’s 
management perceived the high risk of adopting IT. The management were more 
sensitive to negative experiences using IT in the industry, rather than the positive 
experiences in the local market.
It seemed that their cautious approach to IT characterised their overall behaviour. The
GM mentioned that they were unlike the main two local banks who rush and compete
with each other and change their strategies very frequently. Local Two reacted only
when there was major pressure in the market that necessitated a response, according to
.the GM. The bank’s conservative approach might also reflect its escape from bad debts 
and loss problems that many of the local banks suffered during the early eighties, due to 
their lending behaviour.
The EDP manager contrasted the bank’s management with that of another Islamic bank
Cost a barrier to investing in IT :
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that was more aggressive in its spending on IT. Through this contrast, the informant 
wanted to show that the management’s conservative attitude affected the bank’s IT
scene. He gave some examples about the bank’s conservative attitude, which will be 
discussed next.
There were proposals to link the bank’s value chain with that of its subsidiary insurance 
company. However, it was not feasible to implement this project due to its cost. 
Neither the bank’s nor the insurance company’s systems were able to communicate with 
each other. The systems were old in their design, and the two institutions were not 
willing to invest in order to create this electronic link.
-f:
Another example that the informant gave was a proposal to link a number of the Islamic 
banks in the region. However, due to the cost of the project this proposal was also 
abandoned.
1
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The deputy manager expressed the bank’s worry about the proposed shared ATM 
network in Bahrain. He said that the bank was concerned about keeping up with the 
other banks’ spending since that was not consistent with their way of spending on IT.
Size of the bank and the payback period:
The GM perceived its small size as discouraging the bank from investing heavily in IT.
Due to its relatively small size, the bank could not afford to wait for a long period of 
time before breaking even.
,3Investing in developing expertise:
One of the EDP manager’s concerns was the lack of enough human resources within the 
bank to automate its systems. The EDP department was made up of only two personnel
who were burdened by running the daily operations. More expertise were needed in this 
area to enable the bank to cope with its IT development needs, but cost was perceived as 
a barrier.
Centralised Control:
Though none o f the bank’s informants mentioned it, informants from other 
organisations that had had contacts with the bank whom I spoke to mentioned that the 
bank’s decisions were highly influenced by the GM. The wishes, desires and 
perceptions of the GM were central to any IT initiative at the bank.
The delay in adopting the ATMs could be attributed to the GM’s perception that the 
ATMs would encourage their “limited income clients” to withdraw their salaries quicker 
than before and hence affect negatively the bank’s ability to lend the deposits in hand. 
The GM’s views discouraged the bank for a time from adopting these systems, though 
there were others in the bank’s management who had different views about the ATMs.
IT as a 'demanding wife':
The deputy manager described IT as a ‘demanding wife’ who burdens her husband with 
excess expenses to meet her endless desires. He gave the example of the bank’s new 
workstations which required enhancements and updates to their main systems. This 
meant that the bank needed to invest more than the cost of the workstations to adopt the 
new systems.
Garish versus core system:
One of the bank’s cultural characteristics was their classification of the IT systems as 
either being core and essential or ‘garish’ and luxurious. As mentioned earlier, the 
informants did not define what they perceived as core and what they perceived as 
‘garish’. However, from the manner in which they described their systems, I inferred 
that whatever system needed high investment may be classified as ‘garish’ and be
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I
postponed as long as possible. For example, one incident about the bank’s old systems 
concerned the modems that transferred data from the branches to the headquarters. 
Although they were slow, the bank did not bather to invest in acquiring more efficient 
modems since they accomplish their task.
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Chapter Seven
Formal Local Banks Case Study
introduction:
This chapter presents case studies of three local banks that shared similar 
characteristics in their approach to adopting IT. Two of these banks are big banks 
while the third is small in its capital base and branch network as compared to the other 
two banks.
I
I
Local Bank Three (L3)
Introduction:
Local Bank Three (Local Three) is owned by the private sector in Bahrain. The bank’s 
market share of Bahraini operations in 1992, according to a consultant report, was 
approximately six percent.
I interviewed three informants from the bank. The first was the head of the IT section, 
who was a Bahraini whom I interviewed him four times in his office. The second 
informant was an Indian senior manager of credit administration whose interview took 
around one hour in his office. The third informant was a Bahraini manager o f credit and 
marketing who was interviewed for around two hours in his office. All interviews were 
tape recorded.
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Business Focus:
The banking environment as perceived by the senior manager -  
credit administration:
The senior manager perceived the banking market in Bahrain as ‘overbanked’. There 
were 19 commercial banks serving a limited number of borrowers and depositors. 
Competition had increased as newcomers joined the market. For example, in 1993, a 
new bank joined the market and was expected to share the pie with the other eighteen 
banks. In addition to the new bank, there was Balirain Finance Company, a non­
banking institution which provided personal finance services to the public an area that 
the banks were targeting as one of their main business activities and hence exerted even 
more competitive pressure on them. The growth in population and the change in 
business opportunities in the economy spurred banks to change their target to the
I
personal finance business as a substitute of other businesses such as financing the 
construction sector that decreased in magnitude as compared to other business activities.
The informant believed that all banks were after the same type o f businesses due to the 
limited opportunities within the environment. He claimed that factors such as the small 
manufacturing base in Bahrain, the drop in oil prices, and the decrease in government 
expenditure had changed the business opportunities open to banks and made them shift 
their focus to other opportunities that they had not previously paid attention to, such as 
personal finance.
The bank perceived Local Four and Local Five as being its main rivals, despite the big 
difference in the size of capital and operations between these two banks and Local 
Three. Local Four and Local Five were the largest banks in Bahrain in terms of branch 
network and local operations. In order to compete with them, the bank considered 
increasing its branch network a strategic goal. The senior manager also mentioned 
foreign banks such as the Foreign Bank Four (F4) and Foreign Bank Six (F6) as its 
rivals. However, he believed it was hard to compete with these foreign banks for their 
depositors who had been banking with them for a long period of time and were seeking 
confidentiality.
Business focus:
The bank’s operations focused on Bahrain. Since its establishment in the late seventies, 
the bank was mainly geared towards serving the business community. According to the 
credit and marketing manager, the bank’s tactic to gain a greater share of this segment 
was to depend on providing personal service and to establish links with custom clearing 
houses. Through these links, the bank gained more merchant clients. The informant 
claimed that through their long focus on this type of business, trade finance, 
international remittances and foreign exchange had become the bank’s forte.
3
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The bank was disadvantaged by its capital base which was small as compared to the 
main two banks in Bahrain. Their capital almost quadrupled that of Local Three. The 
bank therefore perceived itself as not able to serve the complicated lending requirements 
of the largest customers. However, the bank participated in loan syndicates to some of 
these giant corporate clients.
I
Other banks in Bahrain have preceded Local Third in exploiting the consumer retail
;i:lbanking business. To catch up with them, the bank’s strategy aimed at expanding its 
branch network to secure more business. Increasing the deposit base of the bank was
sone of the main aims of increasing the bank’s branch network. According to the credit 
marketing manager;
it is difficult for us to compete on the larger clients., the larger the client is the more 
com plicated the product he wants., so  really we are not geared up yet to handle these large 
syndication., we never really manage a syndication, though w e participate in som e o f  these. We 
trnow that this is not our field, therefore, w e just restrict our activities to just participation... on 
the other side., consumer loans .. we are reasonably capable o f  servicing that sector... but mainly 
our main business com es from the commercial, the community development market., it is there 
because there is the highest return and it is there because there is the highest risk. But w e think 
that w e have been there in that market for a long period and w e know our clients and w e know 
who is good from not..”
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Role of IT to the bank;
Deficiency of current IT systems:
The bank’s IT systems were adopted in 1983-84. The role that IT played at that time ^
twas to automate the bank’s accounting records and to enable the bank to produce its i
financial statements on time. Since 1983, there had been no major IT change in the 
bank’s infrastructure nor application systems. The bank depended on programs that |
they had developed internally to run on PCs to meet the application requirements that 
the bank’s mainframe application system could not. These PC programs were, however, 
unprofessionally developed and not integrated. Many of the bank’s operations were 
operated manual.
II
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According to the IT manager, the current IT systems were expensive to operate as they 
needed a lot of manual intervention and required processing after normal working hours.
The most serious deficiency, however, was the inability of the systems to support the 
bank’s expansion goals. As mentioned earlier, the bank was in the process of increasing 
its branch network to compete with the main local banks in Bahrain in order to secure a 
greater market share of deposits and loan products. However, the bank’s infrastructure 
could not support more than five communication lines. The bank needed another five 
communication lines to support the additional five branches that they intended to open. 
The limitation of the bank’s system was a main obstacle to achieving the bank’s 
strategic goal and put the bank in a competitive disadvantage as compared to its main 
rivals.
The bank was also aiming to achieve growth in its commercial business market share. 
However, the current system did not cover this functional area of banking, despite its 
importance. It was not feasible to increase processing transactions without increasing 
the number of staff in the department. This option was expensive and expected to 
nullify the effect of gaining a wider market share.
f
There were other functional areas that were still operating manually or by the 
disintegrated application systems that ran on the stand alone PCs. These poorly 
designed systems were affecting the bank’s product delivery quality. The credit 
marketing manager complained that much of the needed reports were manually prepared 
based on seeking information from the different functional areas. He believed this 
affected negatively the bank’s responsiveness to its clients.
New vision and new role of IT:
The bank was in the process of renovating its IT scene with a new system. There was a 
new vision about the role of IT to the bank that was wider in its scope and more 
intimately linked to the bank’s business than the role that the existing IT systems had 
played in the past.
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Firstly, IT was perceived as an enabler to the bank’s strategies. With the new system, 
the bank would be able to fulfil its expansion targets, whether in the number of branches 
or in the market share of the traditional lines o f business. Moreover, IT was linked to 
service quality and product delivery, two broad goals of the bank’s strategic objectives.
Secondly, IT was perceived as a means for re-engineering the bank’s internal processes, 
through enhancing its communication channels and embarking on electronic channels 
for directing business transactions through them, the aim being to reduce the paper work 
and enhance the speed of processing. The informants believed that they could gain a 
competitive advantage over other banks through the efficient use of IT internally, and 
hence improving the quality of delivery and freeing more of its staff to personally serve 
their clients:
if  your red tape paper work is reduced, you automatically give the bank’s time to the clients, 
which now really we can’t; I don’t want to set with all o f  these p ieces o f  papers, I’d rather go and 
sit with a new client., this is a luxury that only become true with the introduction and 
developm ent o f  IT..” Credit marketing manager
However, the informants stated that this vision could be implemented in a second phase, 
after the required IT infrastructure that could support such vision was built within the 
bank.
There were other visionary plans to link the value chains of the clients with that of the 
bank: through an electronic banking system to enable the clients to open remotely letters 
of credit and guarantee through ‘corporate access terminals’, or by devoting lobby 
terminals for loan applications to consumer clients. The aim was to reduce the amount 
of paper work within the bank and enhance its responsiveness to clients. These targets 
were a vision that the bank management claimed they were planning to implement in a 
second phase after having built their new IT infrastructure.
Thirdly, the informants perceived MIS as an important tool for enhancing the efficiency 
of the bank and improving their quality of service to their clients through increasing 
responsiveness. With the old system, inquiries about the clients were performed 
manually, which necessitated that a longer time to respond to a given client application:
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one o f  the things that w e are looking for is a better management reporting system. At the 
moment we have certain information that com es from the IT department. But it is not enough, 
and it is not presented in the way that ought to be presented. It did not cover certain areas that 
are not linked to that system ., you have to get six or ten reports and you have to put them together 
because o f our system ., it is very difficult., there are many things that w e require to be done and 
what you really need is a fresh look, a brand new look.. I want auditors to be able to check th a t, I 
want a certain control to be done over the system ...”
“ .. I would like to see the full picture o f  my clients., i f  I have the right technology, I would like to 
just press a few keys and I w ould have a detailed picture.. I want to know more, I don’t want to 
go to a report or a file which is that big.. I want to have a file that is in the system, this makes it 
easier to me to respond faster to my clients. So MIS to my task is crucial..” Credit marketing 
manger.
Transforming the bank's image:
The bank had a rough time during the late eighties, when it lagged behind its rivals in 
terms of services and products it produced.. The credit and marketing manager argued 
that an important role that IT would play in his bank was to transform its negative image 
to a more favourable one: 1
“.. the other thing is that w e aim for is having a change in our image., w e want to be seen as a 
technology driven bank rather than a follower that have what other banks had five years ago.. I 
think that we can help our image considerably once we put the technology in.
269
.. we want to show the clients that w e are different., we want to change the image o f  being a slow 
bank., being the slow est in terms o f  technology development, we want to create an image that this 
is the bank that is grow ing... w e have the people, we have the management team, we have the 
right board, what we need is to change what is left., the system., it is image and the technolog> 
will help us in improving that im age.... I can’t be the village bank, if  you like. I f  w e like to grow , 
we need to be a m odem  bank.” Credit marketing manager.
Main IT developments:
):%
For nine years, Local Third was managed under a technical services agreement with 
Bank of America (BofA). Three senior managers, one of whom became the GM. 
seconded Local Three. During this period, the EDP section was developed with the aid 
of technologists from BofA. Consequently, the IBM system 4300 and the banking 
applications system Capital International Banking System (CIBS) were adopted.
Moreover, Local Three linked itself with the BofA electronic data interchange and paid 
fees for using it.
The IBM 4300 and CIBS applications systems served the bank in producing on time 
financial statements such as the profit and loss and balance sheet. Though the system 
was a real time system, it was considered by the IT manager as a primitive one. In 1986, 
the bank upgraded it to IBM 4361. From that time until 1992 no significant adoption of 
IT had taken place within the bank. To cope with the users’ needs during that period, 
the IT section developed in-house programs that run on PCs. These programs were 
poorly developed and integrated, according to the IT manager.
According to the informants, during this phase, there was a continuous pressure both 
from the market and from within the bank to develop the bank’s IT systems. However, 
for reasons that will be discussed later, the bank did not respond to this pressure. 
Nonetheless, the IT manager maintained a strong link with IBM, even after the 
agreement with BofA had expired. IBM representatives in Bahrain worked closely with 
the bank’s IT manager to prepare preliminary studies about the deficiency of the bank’s 
IT systems.
The preliminary studies prepared with the aid of IBM were passed to the board of 
directors in 1992, after a new GM had been appointed. Consultants were invited to the 
bank during that year.
The bank decided to scrap its old system due to its deficiencies in meeting the new 
strategic plans of the bank. A new IBM system, AS 400. was selected with a new 
modular application system. Equation 3. In addition to AS 400 and Equation three, the
bank was building its infrastructure based on using PCs and LAN environments that ^
were linked to the AS 400.
By the end of 1992, the bank had adopted its ATM systems. This was late as compared 
to other banks’ adoption of the ATM systems. However, the adoption was more or less 
in line with the other small banks that were of the size of Local Three.
:
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In 1993 the bank launched its credit cards. It was the second bank in Bahrain after 
Local Four to introduce its Visa credit card. The bank outsourced this business to a
• Enabling implementation of a better MIS system.
At a second phase the bank’s vision was to:
adopt ‘corporate access terminals’ to enable corporate clients to remotely open letter 
of credits and guarantees;
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regional financial company operating from Bahrain and serving the Arab countries. At 
the outset of launching the credit cards, the bank did not stipulate that applicants needed 
to open an account with the bank, a policy which was similar to that of Local Four. 
However, the bank changed its policy later on and restricted its card holders to those 
who had accounts with the bank. The credit card business was severely affected by a 
problem with the outsourcing company that issued and processed the Local Three Visa 
cards. As a result of this problem, the bank decided to launch another credit card. 
MasterCard, that it had not planned for previously. Moreover, the bank was planning to 
transfer the card processing to the bank itself despite the high cost.
i
The informants talked about a number of objectives that they aimed to achieve from 
migrating to the AS 400 system, Equation three, and the PC and LAN environment. 
Among these objectives are the following:
• enabling the bank to expand its branch network;
automating more functional areas. Special attention is paid to the trade finance 
system. The aim was to enable it to process more applications per day. The treasiuy 
was another of these functional areas.
Enabling the bank to re-engineer its processes based on the capabilities of the new 
infrastructure.
adopt a phone banking system;
It was not feasible to implement the above visions without migrating to the new IT 
infrastructure, according to the informants.
Drivers to IT initiatives:
Responding to their rivals’ initiatives was one of the main drivers of the bank’s IT 
strategies. The bank considered its rivals’ actions as a bench mark against which it
adopt ‘lobby terminals’ to allow loan clients to inquire about, and apply for loans 
without the need to interact with the bank’s employees;
improve the bank’s responsiveness to its clients through exploiting the LAN for 
.decision making.
The drivers for IT initiatives before 1992 came from within the bank, guided by the 
BofA programmers who aimed at automating the bank's accounting system. The IT 
department was the impetus for such initiatives even after the agreement with BofA had 
expired. The IT manager was the visionary as to what they needed to develop or to buy 
from the market.
Drivers for the turnaround initiative:
The main drivers for the turnaround initiatives, as described by the informants, came 
from outside the bank, from the market forces, and were reflected in the bank’s business 
strategies. Some of the drivers that the informants talked about were symbolic in nature, 
enabling the bank to create a favourable image. These drivers are described below: .1
Rival initiatives:
I
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determined its adoption targets and pace. The IT initiatives that Local Three talked 
about had either been adopted earlier by their big rivals (e.g. the ATMs and the credit 
cards) or were being adopted contemporary with other similar banks, e.g. Local Two 
and Local One whose IT initiatives were similar to those of Local Three and were 
launched at more or less the same time.
As has been reported earlier the bank wanted to create a positive image for itself by 
being in line with the others.
Protect its customer base:
The informants rationalised their IT adoption behaviour as a reflex to the competitive 
threat. Local Three suffered from a shrink in market share during the ‘hibernation’ 
phase it went through.
The central bank as a driver:
Local Three had experienced severe profitability problems in the past. As well as the 
other banks, it was requested by the central bank to provide certain financial reports 
about its activities at certain predefined dates. This requirement had forced the bank to 
rely on its MIS to produce the required reports for the regulatory authority. In addition, 
the bank, like all other banks in Bahrain, was requested to adopt an encoding NCR 
system to encode the checks sent to the central bank.
Business plans:
The bank’s business plans had also driven its IT initiatives. For example, the bank’s 
vision to increase its branch network, operating it as a profit centre, directed the IT 
strategy.
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Other internal drivers: 
Reducing operational costs and work pressure:
One of the drivers influencing the migration to the new system was reducing the 
operational cost of running the old system, which had required more staff. In addition to 
that, the bank had experienced an increase in the number of its transactions, which 
required automating some functional areas to avoid employing more staff to handle the 
increase.
Formation of IT strategy:
The no strategy era -  a ‘chaos’ development approach:
%
I
Prior to 1993, the bank did not have any formal mechanism for defining its IT needs and 
creating an IT strategy. The bank depended on BofA specialists for adopting its current 
system, IBM 4361, and its CIPS. Since 1986, there had been no major developments 
within the bank other than a ‘jungle of programs’ developed in a chaotic manner, which 
were poorly developed to run on the PC environment.
During this phase, the IT manager gave vision to the bank by alerting them of what 
ought to be adopted. He suggested the ATMs but his request was rejected by the bank's 
management among other things. Nonetheless, he succeeded in introducing SWIFT to 
the bank and untying the bank's expensive relationship with BofA EDI network, which 
did not provide as wide a coverage with other banks as SWIFT did. This step was taken 
after the bank’s contract with BofA had expired. Generally speaking, the IT initiatives 
during this phase were driven by the IT manager who was frequently in conflict with the 
head of the bank about the adoption of IT systems. Nonetheless the bank’s IT initiatives 
had insignificant effect on the bank’s business.
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The formal strategic planning era:
Formal strategic planning within the bank started in 1992, preceded by changes in the 
board of directors and the GM.
The initiative was started in 1992 by the IT manager in collaboration with the bank's 
vendor, IBM. They prepared an evaluation study evaluating the bank’s structure, the 
hardware and the software. This initiative was followed by another initiative by the IT 
manager in which he defined some of the areas in which user departments were pressing 
for more automation.
The newly appointed general manager then supported the IT manager’s initiatives and 
passed on the preliminary studies to the board of directors whose approval was needed 
for any major IT initiatives. The board of directors, which included new members, 
decided that a consultant was needed to aid the bank in setting its strategies.
The consultant helped the bank to formalise its business strategies and define its goals 
precisely. The consultants formed steering committees for developing the bank’s IT 
strategies, in which top management and representatives from the IT section and other 
support units participated. For the initiation and implementation of the first IT strategic 
plan, some of the board members participated in ad hoc committees.
Figure 1: Impetus summarises
the main impetus of the 
bank’s IT strategy as
discussed by the informants. 
The business strategies were 
the main impetus for IT 
strategies, they claimed. A 
second impetus of the
strategy was the diagnostic 
evaluation the consultant and
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the IT department had made, which concluded that the bank’s infrastructure needed to 
be changed to enable the business strategies to be implemented. In addition to that, the 
consultant formed groups in which representatives of the users participated to document 
their vision of the main automation requirements within each section. In addition to 
these three main impetuses to the bank’s IT strategy, the IT manager talked about an 
unstructured approach, in which, through daily interaction with the users or his exposure I;
to the bank’s operations, he defined the functional areas that needed to be automated:
3
it is the business strategy plan., for example, they proposed opening three branches for next 
year, w e did our strategy to find out what we need for the new branches, do we need to expand in 
our system or not, do we need to upgrade our hardware or not, do w e have the capabilities on the 
existing system s, some defined the requirements according to the w hole bank business plans, and 
in som e cases we, by chance, discover that there is a job  that is done manually; why shouldn’t we 
write a mem o saying that we found that this function can be automated? So it is through two 
ways, but the major method o f  defining the business needs o f  IT systems is through studying the f:  
business plan which is produced by the ch ief executive and his team ..” IT manager.
I
The IT strategy was implemented in two phases. In the first phase, the bank aimed at 
migrating to the new infrastructure and installing the new applications systems to 
replace the bank’s old banking system. In this phase, the bank also aimed at automating |
the main functional areas such as the trade finance and the treasury department. In a
i;second phase, the more revolutionary changes within the business processes were f
%
expected to be implemented.
Rote of the main stakehoiders in developing IT strategy:
Role of the IT manager:
The IT manager played an important role in providing the needed jolt for formalising 
the IT strategy process. This role was very restricted, however, prior to the changes in 
the bank’s board of directors and management.
The IT manager was the ‘champion’ behind triggering the IT strategy process. He
‘bombarded’ the management with memos regarding the bank’s IT deficiencies and the 
need for improvement. He also recommended some strategic IT systems such as ATMs, 1
though he failed to convince the board to spend to adopt them.
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The IT manager maintained a strong relationship with the vendor IBM. Both the IT 
manager and the vendor worked togetlier in breaking the static condition of the bank’s 
IT scene through diagnosing the IT environment and pinpointing its deficiencies.
The IT manager participated as the project manager for implementing the new IT 
strategy and migrating to the new infrastructure.
However, he aired his dissatisfaction with his reporting line to the operations manager 
who was not the decision maker as to IT requirements. He argued that a better 
arrangement could be achieved through his reporting directly to the GM, who was the 
main decision maker and the liaison with the board. The IT manager did not have any 
influence whatsoever over the bank’s business goals and strategies.
It is worth mentioning that the IT manager’s experience with the systems was acquired :
through on the job training and through his previous job as a joiner programmer with a 
manufacturing company. His educational background was in marine biology, totally 
unrelated his banking career. The IT manager had joined the bank just a few years after
:
its inception and had gained all of his banking experience through working within its IT 
department.
Role of the consultant:
The consultant was the champion who guided strategic planning in the bank. Feedback 
from the committees and the users' group representatives helped the consultant in 
formulating the bank’s plans. I inferred that there was an ownership network between 
some members of the top management and the international consultant employed by the
bank.
!:
Role of the vendor:
The relationship with IBM had begun as early as the bank’s technical agreement with 
BofA. As narrated earlier, the vendor worked closely with the IT managers in 
diagnosing the bank’s IT problems.
Role of the board of directors:
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The relationship with the vendor is strategic as the bank’s future IT strategies were 
dependent on the vendor’s hardware and software systems. The bank’s business goals 
depended on what the Kipiti system could support. As mentioned earlier, the bank 
opted for the ‘off-the-shelf modular package, Kipiti-Equation 3, to meet its IT needs.
The vendor played the role of informant to the bank, updating it about newly available 
technology within the field, and on some occasions, introduced its own consultants to 
the bank to promote their views about strategy-related issues. I infer that there is an 
owuership network between some of the bank’s board members and the vendor.
Representatives from the board of directors became directly involved in the ad hoc
committees which were concerned with turnaround strategies. They were liaisons with 
other members on the board. Moreover, they were involved in evaluating the newly 
proposed systems, and following up the implementation of the strategies.
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Relationship between business strategies and IT 
strategies:
The relationship between business strategies and IT strategies in this bank went through 
different phases.
In the first phase, there was no link between the two, and there were no formal business 
or IT strategies.
one tim e we had a professor from IBM., he came here and talked with the previous GM. He 
said to the GM would you like the IT manager to have an IT strategy? The GM said ‘y e s’, the 
professor said ‘do you have a corporate strategy’. The GM said ‘n o’. The professor said ‘how do 
you want the IT manager to formulate an IT strategy if  you don’t know what you want to do in 
the next five years’..” IT manager.
During the second phase, there was a
transformation in the bank’s culture, as will | \  Brings led  rrSlrale©^
be discussed later. For the first time, the
bank formulated business strategies that Irtenmiay
guided its business activities over the next
three years. IT in the second phase was Figure 2: R ela tionship  bet^^'een IT stra teg y  and
. , , , _ , , business s tra teg y  .#perceived as an enabler for the newly
formulated business strategies, and consequently, a link between the two was 
established. There was, however, an intermediary stage through which the IT strategy 
had to go before it could enable the business strategy. In this intermediary stage, the IT 
strategy was mainly guided by the technical issue of scraping the old infrastructure, 
which was a hindrance to the business strategy. The concern of the IT department I
during the intermediary stage focused on technical issues related to installing the new 
infrastructure rather than achieving ultimate business goals. During this transformation 
stage, the IT manager directed the project, since he had the technical knowledge that 
none of the business unit managers was able to handle. Once the bank had passed this 
intermediary stage, a direct link between its business strategy and IT strategy was easily 
established (see Figure 2).
.3#
Bank’s culture:
Ownership of the bank:
The idea of establishing the bank came from prominent businessmen in Bahrain. The 
shares in the bank were mostly owned by the private sector, in which merchants 
participated heavily. The bank’s board of directors reflected the power of its 
shareholders and was dominated by the business men who had founded the bank.
Ownership and bank’s business:
The merchants’ interests were reflected in the bank’s business. As mentioned earlier, 
the bank focused on trade finance and had developed considerable expertise in this field 
since the early days of its operations. This business direction was reflected in the bank's 
new business and IT strategies. One of the basic functional areas that the bank was 
automating was that of trade finance. The aim was to enable this section to process a 
bigger number of transactions and gain more business from the merchants’ who to a 
great extent owned the bank.
Ownership, world views and spending on IT:
Before 1992, the board of directors, which was dominated by the merchants, interfered 
in the bank’s IT decisions and discouraged any investments on developing the IT scene. 
The account that the informant gave explaining their ‘stingy’ behaviour with regard to 
spending on IT was related to the crises that the Gulf went through, such as the First 
Gulf War, and the decrease in the oil prices. Based on the informants’ accounts, the 
board perceived their world, as being very fragile and their response to any IT initiati\ e 
was it is ‘too early to adopt it’.
I infer that the board’s attitude reflected the cautious psychology of a merchant who is 
highly influenced by how his business is doing in the market. When he perceives that it 
is a time of recession, he tends to stop spending and concentrate on running the
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operations. As will be discussed later in this section, investing in IT to gain a 
competitive advantage was not perceived as a priority by the merchants who dominated 
the board.
-33
The profitability problem and the hibernation period.
By 1987, the honeymoon for the Gulf oil based economy was over. The region was hit 
by a harsh recession that affected the economies of all the Gulf countries including that 
of Bahrain.
Almost all of the banks had suffered from the recession. However, some had suffered 
more than others. Local three during that period was heavily involved in financing land 
and share speculators. These two markets, shares and real estate, collapsed and resulted 
in large number of bad debts to the bank. The bank’s debt problems were not just local, 
they were international as well. The bank participated in loan syndicates with countries 
in Latin America that failed to honour their obligations. By 1987, the bank was in a 
shaky financial position.
The hibernation period.
From 1986 to 1991, the bank went into a ‘hibernation’ stage. A new general manager 
was appointed to revise the bank’s credit policies. He acquired the inherited burden of 
doubtful loans. The general manager, according to the marketing manager, “did not think 
o f  growth, did not think o f  expansion, did not think o f  doing new business or financing new business. His 
objectives were to reduce these doubtful accounts and that was what he did” .
During this stage, all that mattered was cost. The bank’s IT scene was totally neglected. 
There were no new developments taking place, and any new proposed IT initiatives by 
the IT manager were discouraged by the general manager and the board. At the same 
time, other local banks were investing in developing their IT scene. For example, Local 
Four and Local Five introduced their ATMs in 1988. The IT manager of Local Three
proposed ATMs to the bank’s GM but he rejected the idea because of the cost.
i  
281
The revival era -  revolutionary changes:
Cultural Gap:
The most important symptom of the cultural gap within the bank was the delay in 
implementing some strategic IT systems and at a later stage, adopting the very systems 
that had been rejected before.
I recommended implementing the ATM system before Local Five, and because we are late, 
we lost a lot o f  customers, they went to Local Five., so the cultural gap is there even between the 
management and the IT. It is affecting the business opportunities. Recently, the case is different 
but previously it was w ider..” IT manager.
From 1991 on, the bank started to recover. In 1991-1992, the bank experienced a 
change in some positions of its board of directors. Then in 1992, the bank recruited a ■
new general manager with European banking experience. The new composition of the 
board and the new general manager triggered revolutionary changes within the bank.
These changes pertained to both the conceptual aspects such as the strategies of the 
bank, and the concrete aspects, such as the type of systems to be adopted and the 
position of employees.
The bank became more supportive of investing to achieve these changes. As mentioned 
earlier, the bank’s culture became more open to outsiders, such as the consultants and 
the vendors, it shifted from a ‘one-man-show’ to joint decision-making reached through 
the steering committees which represented the different stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
new board members became more involved in IT strategic decision-making through the 
ad hoc committees, and became more supportive to the changes taking place within the 
bank.
The cultural gap was present because the previous board of directors, whose approval of 
any major investment in IT was needed, did not appreciate the competitive role of IT 
within the banking environment. Some of the board members were of an older 
generation that was unable to comprehend the transformations created by technological
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,change. Another reason for the former board’s resistance to investing was related to
their perception of their bank as a supporter to the merchants' business, and therefore
they neglected investing in technologies related to the mass consumer market, such as
.ATMs. A third reason for the reluctance of the former board to invest in IT was related 
to their psychological formation as merchants and their high perception of risk when 
they sensed threatening signals from the economy.
The cultural gap between management and technologists narrowed with the changes 
brought to the bank. The new board members were more appreciative of the role of IT 
and more liberal in their spending. The formation of committees enabled a mutual 
vision that was guided by the consultant. Nonetheless, there was still controversy about 
to whom the IT manager should report, and his rank in the bank. The IT manager 
believed that a better arrangement could be achieved through creating a direct reporting 
line between him and the GM instead of through an intermediary, who filter his views 
from the GM. Moreover, he wanted to see his section become independent from the 
operations department, and he wanted to become part of the top management, enjoying 
the power to represent his views.
Need for expertise:
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The informants expressed their concern about the need for expertise from within. The 
credit and marketing manager believed that the bank needed expertise capable of 
transforming their appreciation of and willingness to in\ est in IT into a tangible return.
The IT manager expressed his views about the need for a 'business system analyst’ who 
would be a technologist, and at the same time, an expert in the bank’s business. The 
presence of such experts would help the bank in defining how IT could best serve the 
different functional areas within the bank.
r -.
High turnover in IT staff within the bank:
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The IT manager expressed his concern about the high turnover of his staff. He 
perceived the IT staff as a scarce resource that is expensive to train, develop and replace. 
The problem of high turnover of IT personnel was a result of the low status of the IT 
staff in the bank. This status needed to be revised to match the new role IT was playing 
in the bank.
;
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Local Bank Four (L4) 
Introduction:
Business focus:
Change in business opportunities:
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Local Bank Four (Local Four) is a joint venture between Bahraini investors and regional 
banks from another country in the region. The main operations of the bank are in 
Bahrain, though the bank have a few branches outside Bahrain. The bank is considered 
one of the two main players in the Bahraini market, with a market share in 1992 of s
around 20%, according to a consultant’s report.
At Local Four, I interviewed three informants, two from the IT department and one from 
a business unit. The informants’ ranks within the bank were Senior Vice President 
(SVP), head of IT, Senior Manager within the IT department (previously head of the IT 
department) and a credit marketing Senior Manager. All interviews were tape recorded. |
The senior credit manager argued that the Bahraini banking environment was 
overbanked and the market opportunities had changed in the nineties from those in the |
eighties. The government expenditure on infrastructural projects during the late |
seventies and the early eighties affected positively the construction sector and, 
indirectly, other sectors. The bank was highly involved in financing big projects and 
big corporations during that period. However, with the drop in the government 
expenditure there was a shift in business opportunities towards the consumer market.
i
 _____________  . . .  j
strategic businesses:
Local Four is also active in the treasury business, and has recruited a number of experts 
in this area to reinforce its business opportunities.
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The senior credit marketing manager argued that the bank was involved in all types of 
businesses. However, it focused more on the retail business. The bank has the second 
largest deposit base in Bahrain and the second largest branch network, just a few 
branches short of the largest branch network in the country. The large deposit base has 
enabled the bank to target the lending business to the consumer market. Local Four 
started targeting this business late, as compared to its main rivals in this type of 
business. Citibank and Standard Chartered. The bank’s business will continue to focus 
on retail banking which targets the consumer market, and expects this segment to grow 
faster than corporate banking business.
2
Corporate banking business is the second important area of business for the bank in 
Bahrain. The bank approaches this market through its corporate-relationship officers 
who establish personal contacts with the potential clients. The main rival of the bank 
for this business is Local Five. *
I
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Unlike its main rival Local Five, Local Four was not able to secure a sizeable amount of 
government business.
In Bahrain, as well as in other countries in the Gulf area, there is a large number of 
Indian expatriates who are a source of capital outflow to India. The bank wanted to 
exploit this opportunity and establish business links to India by opening a branch there.
The bank also has a regional presence either through branches or through subsidiary 
banks in some of the other Gulf countries. Its main business, however, focuses on the 
Bahraini market.
Î .
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Perceived role of IT:
Mass market versus a relationship market:
The credit marketing senior manager classified their markets as ‘relationship’ markets or 
mass markets. In the ‘relationship’ market, IT was expected to play a minor role in 
promoting the bank’s business and creating opportunities. The informant claimed that 
there were few construction, trade houses, and manufacturing entities that didn’t justify 
heavy investments in IT. For each of these entities, there were different lending 
requirements that required different processing. The bank’s strategy for tackling this 
type of market was through depending on ‘corporate-relationship officers’ who 
contacted these entities directly and looked after their business with the bank.
The credit marketing senior manager’s past experience with electronic banking was 
behind his views about the limited role of IT for creating business opportunities in the 
‘relationship’ market. The informant argued that, based on his past experience at 
Citibank, electronic banking faced limited success in creating business opportunities for 
the bank and did not justify the amount invested in it.
In contrast to the ‘relationship’ markets, the mass market or the consumer market, as the 
senior credit manager described it depended heavily on IT. Investing in technology and 
systems was considered very strategic in terms of determining what products to offer 
and how to compete in the market:
I can look at the market as mass market or relationship market., you look at them either as 
mass market, which you talk about consumer and retail and talk about large number o f  
customers., and you can look on to relationship market which depends on calling and making 
direct sale or marketing activities on one to one basis., we have to distinguish between these two 
markets, where you address technology defiantly., with the relationship market the technology 
tend to play good part but the underly ing strength does not com e from there. Although you will 
see institutions trying to put terminals in the offices o f  the companies or the trading houses to 
basically have access to their activities with the bank, which could or could not be a fundamental 
reason o f  doing business with the bank., on the other hand if  you look at the mass market o f  the 
large numbers, you are probably looking at ways o f  using technology as an edge to generate 
revenue through making your service more convenient, making your service more efficient, and 
meet your customer needs in a more efficient and cheapest w ay..”
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The informants argued that a main role for IT was to enable the bank to introduce new 
retail products. Some of these products were completely IT-driven in nature, e.g. 
EFTPoS, ATM cards, and credit cards.
Product delivery and sale capability closely linked to IT:
"... certainly, the product delivery and sales capabilities are becom ing more and more closely  
coupled to the IT platform that are used to deliver them. We deliver few products that don't 
require interaction with an IT platform...”
2 8 8
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Source of revenue to the bank - a business goal:
IT was perceived as a tool for enabling the bank to reach its business goals. As 
mentioned above, investment in IT was mainly directed to the retail side. As one of the 
retail goals, IT was perceived as the means for generating fees or commission income 
not subject to the interest rate fluctuation in the market.
Support new products and improve the quality of product 
delivery:
-■'s.
All of the informants stressed the role of IT in improving the quality of product delivery 
and supporting the bank in selling its services. To quote the SVP:
.".. w e don’t look at deploying technology solely for expense control, it is primarily driven for 
quality product delivery. A very aggressive market, the retail market, where w e invest the 
majority o f  our IT dollar w ill continue to be the source o f  revenue for the bank in Bahrain and 
elsewhere.."
IT has played a role in changing the way in which the bank marketed its services. The 
SVP mentioned that they have adopted intelligent systems that changed how they 
promoted their banking services. Their marketing officers were able to use the 
intelligent systems for suggesting potential products that may most suit their individual
clients.
a
Source of new deposit accounts through links with the 
retailers:
Protect the bank's client base through improving their loyalty:
The EFTPoS was perceived as a link between the bank and the retailers in Bahrain. 
These retailers were provided the EFTPoS devices free of charge, in return for opening 
accounts with the bank. The EFTPoS was perceived as a tool for increasing liability 
products, i.e. deposit accounts.
The senior credit manager argued that the bank’s priority was to protect its client base
from deteriorating. The next important goal was attracting new customers to the bank.
According to the informant, the bank had managed to acquire the largest market share of
credit card business. The IT senior manager claimed that it had managed to capture not
.less than 70% of the credit card market, which became the source of a commission 
income to the bank.
ft:Change in business processes:
Enable the branches to perform as independent business units:
The bank was in the process of changing its organisational arrangements by providing 
its branches with more autonomy, enabling them to frinction as business units less 
dependent on headquarters. The SVP perceived IT as the means for enabling the bank 
to achieve this through enabling the branches to deliver products depending on the 
distributed IT systems. Moreover, the new arrangements aimed at decreasing the 
amount of human intervention necessary, enabling the branches to deliver their products 
at a minimal cost.
I think that the bank is refocusing how it delivers it services with an eye o f  maximising the 
delivery capability using IT., in conjunction with that is distributing that capabilities as w idely as 
possibly can. The decrease in telecommunications and hardware cost, it is becom ing more and 
more practical to deliver these services and marketing tools at a lower c o s t .”
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of the lending processing needs of each of its clients. The credit marketing manager saw 
a limited role for IT in this market.
Automating internal processes as a means of gaining competitive advantage:
1
The vision that the SVP had was to automate all the mechanisms of product delivery. 
Although, this vision had not yet been achieved in the bank, it was a target.
Manage mass processing, automate decision making, and control cost:
For the mass market, IT plays a major role in processing mass transactions that require 
similar and repetitive processes. Cost control is one of the main objectives for deploying 
IT within this area. In addition to the above, IT plays a role in automating the decision 
making-process of some business. In this regard, the informants mentioned credit card 
business in which evaluation of applications was done through the system, the only 
times in which the bank’s staff interfere being when there are problems with the 
individual clients.
In contrast to the mass market, the ‘relationship’ market is more heterogeneous in terms
Automating internal processes was perceived as a mean of gaining a competitive 
advantage over rival banks. The senior IT manager argued that all banks were 
competing to produce the same products and services. They differed only in the speed 
and efficiency of their product processing capability. IT was the tool that they believed 
enabled them to compete with the others by promoting internal efficiency.
MIS to enhance decision making and provide more credibility 
to the bank’s internal control:
■-
The credit marketing senior manager stressed the important role that IT played in 
enabling better decision making within his business department and the rest of the bank.
I'
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The bank had embarked on adopting a sophisticated MIS system to enable the bank to 
manage its risk exposure among other things. As will be discussed later, the bank 
experienced a change in its board and top management due to the heavy bad debt losses 
it had incurred during the mid-eighties. As a means to managing its global risk, the
"Ibank embarked on the MIS system. By publicising this matter in its annual reports and 
elsewhere, e.g. consultancy reports, the bank aims to increase the credibility of its 
corrective measures as regards to its historical credit problems.
ÏE-mail to enhance communication and speed up decision 
making:
All of the bank’s staff were interlinked by an e-mail system which enhanced 
communication and speeded up decision making, the IT senior manager claimed.
Expanding the bank’s market:
IT was perceived as a tool to enable the bank to expand its market and compete with the 
money exchangers, a business that the other banks avoided due to the cost of processing 
as compared to expected revenue. To quote the SVP:
there are som e transactions that are labour intensive, such as issuing drafts or providing a 
money transfer, which is a b ig business at this part o f  the world. Remittances is a good business 
and unique to the G ulf and it presents a real revenue potential., i f  there is a lot o f  competition, 
then you have to do it efficiently, and at low cost otherwise the single function vendors such as 
the money traders w ill under cut your delivery o f  service. That is where w e are investing in IT r
right now., it w ill allow  all branch network to provide a m oney transfer capabilities and draft 
issuing in an automated fashion. B eing able to deliver that in a remote branch that is minimally 
staffed would not be possib le without significant investment in base system that can be used in 
our larger branches where there is larger traffic that justifies the investment.”
Main IT developments:
The seventies and the eighties -  the mainframe era:
I
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The seventies and the eighties and the early nineties were an era in which the bank’s 
main IT developments depended highly on the mainframe infrastructure design.
The bank started its automation in the seventies with an NCR ledger machine to 
automate accounting books. Next, the ledger machine was substituted with another 
NCR mainframe that was able to support around nine terminals.
In 1981, the bank started expanding its branch network as a competitive measure, since 
its main rival was embarking on a similar branch expansion strategy. The NCR 
mainframe did not meet the requirements of the bank’s expansion strategy and, 
consequently, the Tandem mainframe was recommended by the bank’s vendor. The 
rational that the IT senior manager gave for adopting this system was a dual processing 
capability that enhanced its reliability. There was a major disadvantage to adopting 
Tandem however. At the time, there was no ‘off-the-shelf applications systems which
.../I
could run on the mainframe, therefore, the bank had to depend on its internal resources 
for developing the applications systems that could run on the Tandem mainframe.
The competition with the bank’s main competitor was fierce. Both banks, Local Four 
and its main rival. Local Five, expanded remarkably in terms of the number of their 
branches and products. Local Four had to change its internal systems development 
policy. The bank perceived this as an obstacle hindering it from competing with its 
main rival and from developing its growth strategy. According to the IT senior 
manager, the bank needed an army of programmers to keep up with its systems 
development requirements, which was not economically feasible.
In 1986, Local Four changed its applications adoption policy and decided to depend on 
‘off-the-shelf applications packages. The bank adopted the NCR 9800 and Concept 
Financial System (TCFS) applications system. All of the banking systems were run on
292
the NCR and its companion, TCFS. Interestingly, the main rival of Local Four made the 
same move, adopting the same hardware and software systems.
Base 24, a strategic modular application system.
The bank did not scrap its Tandem mainframe system despite its adoption of the NCR 
mainframe. It decided to keep it for running the bank’s ATM network due to its dual 
processing capabilities and its higher reliability. This decision was taken because of the 
introduction by the bank’s vendor o f a modular applications system, Base 24, that ran on 
the bank’s ATM network on the Tandem.
Base 24 was the only applications system available that could run on the Tandem 
machine. It was capable of running 1000 ATMs, which was far beyond the bank's 
requirements, but it was purchased because there was no other option available to the 
bank if it wanted to keep the Tandem in operation. The senior manager gave another 
rational to their decision claiming that they wanted to provide the best solution by 
adopting the Base 24:
“.. the main purpose was to look to the best solution, the best software on tandem. This is one o f  
the best softwares available on Tandem., because we have the machine..
Comment: But at that time did the bank have the intention to introduce a Switch network in 
Bahrain?
Senior Manager: No. There was only one version o f  the Base 24, either you .take it or you go for 
another solution. To go for another solution you have to get the com plete thing, the hardware and 
the software. W e have the hardware, so our new investment is only on the software. This is why 
it is expensive for the {named their main rival} to get the Base 24. They have to buy the 
software with the hardware. They can't do that, they don’t have the justification to invest that 
money to run just 20 to 30 A TM s..”
Base 24 formed the nucleus of the bank’s retail systems. It enabled new modules to be 
added at minimal cost once the core was installed; it permitted the introduction of the 
EFTPoS and phonebanking systems, linking ATMs locally and within the region, and 
running a proposed shared ATM network in Bahrain. The senior manager claimed that 
adopting the core of Base 24 provided the bank with an advantage over its rivals by
enabling it to adopt these retail systems at a lower incremental cost than their rivals:
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"we introduced the point o f  sale because it was easy for us. We had the software and the 
hardware. What w e needed was just to buy the module for the point o f  sale and add it to our 
system  and that’s it, because Base 24 has many modules, one for the ATM s, one for the tellers, 
one for the point o f  sale, one for home banking, etc.. other competitors can’t buy the same system  
because they have to invest in the hardware as w ell...”
■I'
The excess capacity of Base 24 in running the ATMs enabled the bank to propose 
running an ATM network in Bahrain. The shared ATM proposal will be discussed later 
in this case report.
Unking ATMs with regional networks:
Local Four was the first bank in Bahrain and the region to adopt Base 24. Other banks 
in the region who were clients of the same vendor as Local Four then followed. The 
bank created a shared network with a number of banks in the region, including an 
international bank that has a global presence.
Unlike all o f the local rivals, networking with other regional networks and proposing 
running a local nation-wide network was not a new project for the bank. The bank had 
gained experience in these areas through its regional branch in another state in the Gulf.
The credit card business - a strategic option:
This strategic move enabled the bank to have its cards accepted world-wide by an> 
ATM machine accepting the Visa logo. The consequence of this move was to create a 
customer base that totalled 60,000 clients, a share that far outnumbered that of its rivals.
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The bank invested heavily in credit card business. First, it linked its ATM cards to Visa.
The bank went further and introduced its own Visa credit card. There was only one 
local rival that offered a Visa card. The other local rival offered a Visa charge card 
instead. The IT senior manager claimed that they had captured the major share of the 
credit card market, with a share of 20,000 card holders, whereas their two local rivals' 
share was 2000 card holders each.
 ;..T';„,
Telephone banking:
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In addition to the Visa cards, the bank introduced other credit cards such as Diner’s 
Club and Master Card. However, the bank’s IT systems were not capable of fully
-processing the transactions of these cards. Therefore, the bank went to a third party to 
outsource the processing of the credit cards transactions. The senior credit marketing 
manager claimed that, due to the deficiency of their internal systems, there was a 
pressure to adopt more advanced systems to meet the bank’s business goals. The SVP 
claimed that their retail business strategy focused on the credit card business due to the
.high demand in the market for such products, and they were pioneers in fulfilling the 
need for this service:
We invested into a project to connect to Visa, Master Card and Serries. W hen w e made a 
conservative analysis w e anticipated that the fee income from cash withdrawals w ill pay for the 
project in something like 18 to 24 months. The project paid for itself in six and a h a lf months. 
What we underestimated was the demand for the expatriate for the cash withdrawal during the 
nonbanking hours. And w e are the only bank that provide that, other than the British Bank o f  the 
Middle East that has connections to V isa...” SVP
I,:s
In 1993, the bank introduced its telephone banking system simultaneously with its main '
rival. Local Five. Both banks were preceded in introducing this system by a foreign 
bank. However, the foreign bank system was primitive as compared to the local banks’
.systems. Local Four asked the vendor to customise the phone banking system to 
provide a wide variety of services outnumbering what the other banks’ systems offered.
The aim, according to the informants, was to differentiate the bank’s system from the 
others. The IT senior manager claimed that they managed to introduce the phone 
banking system at a minimal cost since they had already installed the core system. Base 
24, and they needed only to buy the phone banking module.
EFTPoS System:
The bank managed to capture 75% of the EFTPoS market according to the SVP - head
of IT. The bank offered the EFTPoS devices to retailers free of charge. The senior 
.manager-IT claimed the bank had created a new norm in the market by introducing the 
EFTPoS. The new norm encouraged using the EFTPoS to substitute for checks, which
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were not widely welcomed by retailers. Both Local Four and its main local rival, Local 
Five, introduced their EFTPoS at more or less the same time.
Shift in architecture from dependence on mainframes to a 
downsized infrastructure:
Scrapping the old mainframe, buying a new one.
With the recruitment of the new IT manager, a new vision o f its IT infrastructure came
.to the bank. The new vision focused on a downsized environment in which 
‘client/server’ technology, local area networks and wide area networks were perceived 
as the path to future infrastructural design. The new IT manager had little faith in the 
giant mainframes and believed that they were expensive to acquire and maintain as
compared to the cost of downsized distributed network processors. He believed that the 
future lay with a downsized environment due to its decreasing cost and increasing 
performance and capacity. Therefore, the bank started investing in the downsized 
environment, with the aim of enabling the branches to become independent business 
units relying less on the headquarters to deliver products. The SVP - head of the IT 
department - argued that this new vision about its infrastructure would enable the bank 
to be cost efficient and compete directly with the money exchangers by cutting down on 
costs and producing the required banking products, e.g. money transfer and drafts, in as 
efficient and speedy a way as the single function money exchangers.
When I interviewed one of the bank’s vendors, he stated that the bank had recently 
bought IBM AS 400, and by doing so the bank joined the majority of the banks in 
Bahrain in acquiring this system. I have little information about what the new platform 
was serving within the bank. However, when I talked to an informant who worked with 
the company that outsourced the bank’s credit card processing, I was told that there were 
some disadvantages to the downsized environment. The major banking applications 
such as the credit card processing systems were mostly available on a mainframe 
environment.
296
A': •’
Intelligent workstations that change the work process:
Reason for embarking on the IT systems:
Competition, the main driving force:
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Another IT project within the bank was scrapping their old Tandem mainframe that had 
outlived its expected life.
The bank scrapped its old dumb workstations and adopted new intelligent systems that 
enabled the teller to perform multiple functional tasks from one screen, and market 
those products of the bank that may be of potential interest to the clients. In addition to 
the above, the intelligent system enabled a centralised supervision on the tellers. The 
new system changed the way in which the bank operated:
“ .. Currently, the branch network is supported by a 1970s style electro-mechanical accounting 
equipment. These are a {..} dumb like terminals that are today considered insecure from securit> 
perspective that can’t be managed remotely and the functions that they provide are quite limited. 
In the modem advanced banking environment, the workstations that the teller has, need to 
operate a full range o f  banking products and has to have a lot o f  intelligence in it. The bank 
should be able through these equipment to market other banking products that the customer 
might have interest in them. To do that you need an intelligent workstation that can do a log o f  
analysis. Run analytics on the customer portfolio and suggest investment opportunities or product 
opportunities for the custom er...”
In this section, I will discuss the most salient drivers of the bank’s IT initiatives, as 
mentioned by the informants.
■3
The informants emphasised the role of competition in driving the bank’s IT initiatives.
The senior manager within the IT department argued that the bank did not have ‘pre­
plans’, but all of their initiatives were sensitive to the competitors’ initiatives. The main 
attention of the bank focused on the initiatives of the largest local bank in Bahrain,
Local Five. Local Four and Local Five competed head to head with each other. Almost 
all of their IT initiatives were launched in response to, and contemporary with each 
other. For example, in the early eighties, both banks acquired NCR machines that ran a
,j3;
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maximum of 10 terminals. During 1981, both banks started competing in expanding 
their branch network. In 1986 - 1987 both banks acquired NCR 9800 and its 
applications system, TCFS. Telephone banking and the EFTPoS were launched by the 
two banks almost simultaneously, within just a few months. The same is true for the 
launch of credit cards, though Local Four was more aggressive in its marketing strategy 
than Local Five:
“ .. We are the second largest bank in Bahrain. Being the second largest we always look at 
number 1 bank in Bahrain which is Local Five. Local Five is our main rival...” Credit marketing 
senior manager.
as I have said in our previous meeting, here we don't have the strategy and plans to do certain 
things, here the market and the competitors are leading the bank to do what the market needs....
... the com petition in the market forces us to introduce the technology...
.. in 1981 the bank started thinking o f  having more offices rather than only one., so the two major 
banks .. started distributing many branches across the island, the competition started between the 
two banks, w henever w e put a branch they just open a branch next door., after getting what we 
though to be the good locations we started thinking about developing the branches then we 
started looking for application software to accommodate the linkage for these branches.. Local 
Five went to N C R  to support more than 9 terminals and we went to Tandem to support 256 
terminals...
Local Four introduced these systems with the other major banks and that was in 1988, like Local 
Five. The first bank w as the British Bank o f  the Middle East, but they were very limited since 
they were restricted by the central bank to open no more than five branches in Bahrain. W e tried 
to be the first, but due to som e technical problems we installed the A TM s just a few months after 
Local Five..
... now w e are changing to a card-oriented environment., we thought o f  the EFTPoS to allow  
those to use there cards at the places they need without withdrawing cash., and by doing so, we 
can keep their m oney and benefit from it.. Local Five were working on the same project at the 
same time., everybody kept an eye on the other., our strategy is competition-driven, we don't 
have pre-strategic plans..” Senior IT manager.
Competition barrier to IT initiatives- the shared ATM network story:
Competition was a main driving force for the bank’s initiatives as well as a barrier to 
any collaboration based on using IT collectively.
Five of the main banks in Bahrain, excluding Local Four, met and discussed the 
prospect of launching a shared ATM network and an EFTPoS in Bahrain. They reached
■Defensive measure - protect the customer base:
The credit marketing senior manager argued that their IT initiatives were aimed at 
protecting their customer base from switching to the rivals. Next to this goal, the bank 
aimed at attracting new customers.
The vendor signals the competitors’ intention:
The IT senior manager said that the vendors signalled the intention o f main rivals. He 
told a story about an experience in which the vendors came to the bank and hinted that
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the conclusion that it was too early for these projects to be implemented. The senior 
manager of IT in Local Four argued that the five banks delayed launching the project 
because their IT systems were not mature enough to develop it and they were also 
unprepared to spend on it. As for Local Four, it had the necessary IT infrastructure to 
launch the network. As mentioned earlier, the Base 24 was able to run 1000 ATMs, 
which exceeded the number of all ATMs in Bahrain. Local Four invited a number of 
smaller banks that were prepared to join a shared ATM network and asked them to sign 
a contract in which Local Four would run a shared network for the banks in return for a 
commission on the transactions run on the network. According to the informant's 
account. Local Five, who did not have the capacity to run or propose a similar network, 
protested to the regulatory body, who interfered and ordered Local Four to abandon the 
project. Later on, the regulatory body proposed running the national ATM network 
itself.
Based on the senior manager’s account, regulation and rivalry between the two main 
banks were the reason for abandoning the shared ATM network:
“.. we can run ATM s for small banks, you can use it as a switch. We proposed that to the banks 
and most o f  the banks responded positively to our proposals., we went ahead to implement it but 
we were stopped by the regulatory body because som e banks like Local Five complained and 
questioned why we wanted to do this. The answer to why because we have the best software and 
hardware and we can afford to do it..”
the other main rival banks had the intention of adopting a given system. Such signals 
drove the bank’s IT adoption initiatives.
Excess capacity in the bank’s IT systems:
The bank invested heavily in its IT systems, building an excess capacity that gave the 
bank the vision to propose and implement other IT-related products and services. The 
adoption of Base 24, and its ability to run 1000 ATMs enabled the bank to propose the 
shared ATM network in Bahrain which it expected to give the bank a monopolistic 
power over the network, since the size of the Bahraini market would not allow several 
nation-wide networks to be run parallel to each other, as some informants stated. 
Moreover, Base 24 and its excess capacity enabled the bank to participate in creating a 
regional ATM network with other regional banks.
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At the outset of adopting Base 24, which was capable of running the 1000 ATMs, the 
bank did not have a vision nor an intention to propose the shared network. It adopted 
this package because it was the only one available on the Tandem and because, 
according to the senior manager account, the bank wanted to be the leader amongst the 
banks in Bahrain by adopting the best product available.
Business strategies -  driver of IT initiatives:
The informants argued that their IT initiatives were business-driven. The development 
of the ‘global ATM card’ system and the adoption of the credit card systems were 
mainly driven by the bank’s business goal of generating income through commission 
fees, to mention one example:
-V
Essential for internal processing:
Infrastructure enhancement requirements:
1
it is largely business driven, believe it or not. I know that today we are looking at a card 
management system to do a whole host o f  functions to us. And we were looking at different 
software, different hardware that we can eventually run our own credit card portfolio... on this 
system. On the IT side point o f  view, they have this system that is running fine, or doing the job  
that it has to do for processing a simple credit card, but because o f  the business requirements and 
our need to be better all o f  the time, we are placing pressure on the IT to com e up with a system  
that would be able to do a w hole host o f  functions and services that we want that is today not 
available on the system that w e have...”
■I
The bank aimed to automate its internal processing and reduce the paper work as much 
as possible. Though they are moving in this direction, they have not yet reached full 
automation level, according to the SVP. The driver to internal automation was cost 
control, production of quality services and consequently, achieving a competitive 
advantage over the rivals.
Some IT initiatives were infrastructural-driven. An example was the scrapping of the 
Tandem machine that had been in operation for 15 years, and moving from the 
mainframe environment to a downsized environment. These initiatives came from the 
IT department.
Formulation of business strategies:
Formal strategic planning started around 1988. The bank invited a consultant from 
abroad to help in formalising strategic plans. It is worth noting that the bank’s main 
rival. Local Five, took the same initiative at more or less the same time, inviting a 
consultant from abroad as well. Though that both banks did not explicitly mention who 
had been invited to help them formalise their strategic plans, there were references from 
the informants about seminars and workshops which had been run by Arthur D. Little 
and in which both banks participated. One of the informants from Local Four allowed 
me to have access to some of the materials of these workshops which were run by
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The formulation of IT strategies:
The formulation of IT strategies within the bank had two main phases:
Improvised strategies:
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IArthur D. Little. It is most likely that both banks approached the same consultant either
to help them in their strategic plans or to provide training for their top management. :
I
The same consultant arranged for a workshop within the bank in which the top 
management participated. Its aim was to train top management to make their own 
strategic plans in the future.
."ïI
For formulating the bank’s grand strategies, there was a steering committee in which the
3,general manager, the assistant general managers and senior managers within the bank 
participated. Once the strategies were formulated at this level, they filtered down to the 
different functional areas with more detailed tactical plans and predefined i
responsibilities given to each unit. The senior credit marketing manager claimed that 
the bank followed the Management By Objective approach for monitoring the 
implementation of these strategies.
As an outcome of the strategic workshops, the market was segmented, allowing for the i
■"Iprioritisation of sectors, the identification of target markets and the assignment of these 1
segments to specific business units. The bank has a strategic horizon of five years for 
these plans.
r&:;i;v
'I
■I
In the first phase or era, the formulation of IT strategies was improvised, driven mostly 
by the bank’s main competitor and the vendor who provided insight about what was 
available and how it could meet the bank’s needs. During this era, the senior IT 
manager influenced business to some extent through his proposals as the main product
I
-  :
Formal IT planning:
The bank depended on consultants from abroad to aid them in setting their strategic 
plans. They formed a System Steering Committee (SSC) which was chaired by the 
bank’s chairman. Representatives from all business units and other functional areas 
participated in this committee. The IT department participants were: the SVP - head of 
the IT department - who was the secretary of the SSC, and the IT senior manager. The 
credit marketing manager represented the consumer banking unit. Business strategies 
were articulated in this committee, and how IT could support these strategies was 
spelled out, according to the SVP account. Moreover, any requisite from the users or 
the business units was presented to the committee for evaluation through the units’ 
representatives. The IT department representatives’ duty was to prepare a cost analysis 
of the proposed projects, and, once approved by the committee, these projects became 
part of the IT department’s strategies.
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champion for any developments. There was no formal mechanism for linking business 
goals to IT initiatives, nor was there a mechanism for involving users or representatives 
from the business units in evaluating the system. The senior manager proposed systems 
that he heard about from the vendor or seen at an exhibition or felt that the rivals were 
about to launch to top management. The initiatives were improvised based on the 
pulses coming from the market or the bank’s needs.
because the X system before Tandem, which was also used by Local Five, was able just to 
support 9 terminals., therefore, they w ent for a bigger N C R  to support more than 9 terminals, and 
w e went for Tandem to support more than 256  Terminals. The first step was the distribution o f  
services in the Island, also we were perceiving ourselves as quick providers o f  services at that 
time. W e had had in the branches long queues especially at the end o f  the month .. w e said O.K  
w e need to service just 22 locations plus som e new locations in the future .. in order to serve 
people, w e had to put more people on the counters., this meant that this would increase our 
operations cost., this have lead us to automating. A s you understand now from my story, there 
was no preplan for what we had., it was all cost, better service, and to be a leader., w e had had 10 
tellers in the main office, now we have around 40 tellers. The manpower is the most expensive 
resource. For the hardware, you will repay it in a number o f  years but the manpower it is very 
expensive...” 33c
“.. as I have said in our previous meeting, here we don’t have the strategy and plans to do certain 
things., here the markets and the competitors are leading the banks to do what the market needs..” 
Senior Manager - IT department.
During this era, the business units became in control of what was proposed in terms of 
IT support. They had the ultimate power over voting for or against systems whereas the 
role of the IT department representative was restricted to providing advice to the 
committee when required.
There is a high dependence in the bank on committees for implementing major IT 
projects. The informants mentioned that ad hoc committees were formed, which 
dissolve once a project was implemented and accepted by the concerned users or the 
business units, who chair these committees depending on the nature of the project. If it 
was a business-driven project, then a representative from the concerned business unit 
would chair the committee. If a project was an IT-infrastructure-driven project, then the 
IT department would chair the committee. Project managers from the vendor(s) usually 
participate in these ad hoc committees.
Role of the IT managers In developing the bank’s 
IT scene:
Two IT managers successively headed the IT department within the bank. The senior 
manager, who is Bahraini, headed the department first. During his period, he was the 
main product champion for running the IT scene within the bank. He depended upon 
the bank’s main vendor and the exhibitions and seminars that ran locally or abroad, 
either by the arrangement of the vendor or other parties, for building his visionary IT 
strategies. Whenever he was exposed to new systems that may be of value to the bank, 
he took the idea to his management and worked on convincing them to adopt it. During 
this phase of the bank’s life, the emphasis was on adopting mainframe technologies and 
adding to the bank’s IT scene bits and pieces of systems the product champion was 
exposed to. In this phase, the bank had neither formal business strategies nor IT 
strategies.
".. in the past there was a different management team., it was very difficult to convince them that
the future is for the technology for the automation.. I took a very long time since 1982, when I
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joined until 1987 until the entire top management team changed, then 1 started planning what is 
in my mind..” Senior manager - IT department.
The assistant general manager, an American recruited from abroad, succeeded the senior 
manager in heading the IT department. The AGM, brought a new vision to the bank 
that differed from that of the senior manager, influenced by his past experience in the 
American banking industry. He was behind the shift in the bank’s IT architecture, and 
was behind the adoption of the IBM AS400, a move that, according to an informant
1from IBM, was also influenced by the AGM’s past experience at IBM. During this 
period there was a cultural shift in which the power for developing the IT strategy 
shifted from the IT department to the business units represented by the Systems Steering 
Committee, The recruitment of the AGM was a consequence of the cultural shift, as 
will be discussed later. 3
Role of the vendor:
The bank maintained a close relationship with one of the regional vendors, a 
relationship that had extended since the bank started automating its system.
The vendor played the role of the informer to the bank and affected the bank’s IT 
strategies, especially during the improvised stage. The IT senior manager said that he 
worked closely with the vendor, who arranged for the participation of the bank’s 
officials in exhibitions and workshops. Through these initiatives, the IT manager's 
strategic IT vision was shaped.
The Tandem machine, the Base 24, and the ‘branch teller’ system were some of the 
major IT adoptions that the vendor played a role in incorporating as part of the bank’s IT 
strategies. The most important system was the Base 24. The bank’s adoption of this 
system enabled it to exploit new business opportunities and gain a greater market share. 
Base 24 allowed them to accept credit cards at their ATMs and connect themselves to 
other network switches in the Gulf. Furthermore, Base 24 enhanced their connectivity
305 I
to other systems more than was the case for the majority of its rivals, including Local 
Five, and, hence, provided the bank with a potential competitive advantage.
my own speculation however.
ft
The vendor became the liaison between its clients in the region. Consequently, shared 
ATM networks were created between Local Four and the regional clients of the vendor. i ■
who used the same system.
‘■"3
ft;
The advent of the AGM who succeeded the senior manager in heading the IT 
department, created a new link with IBM. From the informants’ accounts, however, it 
seems that the relationship with the first vendor had been stronger and more strategic 
from that with IBM. The relationship with the first vendor may have been enhanced (or 
dictated) by the shareholders who had interests in both the bank and the vendor. This is
Relationship between business strategies and IT 
strategies:
The relationship between business strategies and IT strategies took different forms. 
Historically, the business strategies were entirely separated from the IT strategies. This 
segregation of the two strategies was manifested in the adoption of the NCR ledger 
machine to automate the accounting processes, which had relation with the bank's 
competitive ability to do business.
At a later stage, the relationship between the bank’s business strategies and IT strategies 
became more intimate. At this stage, the bank’s business strategies capitalised on its IT 
strategies. This was exhibited in the bank’s strategy to operate its branches as strategic 
business units with grater autonomy from the headquarters. This strategy was enabled 
by adopting a different IT infrastructure to provide these branches with more processing
■ft'autonomy than the mainframe infrastructure. Another example of this relationship was
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the retail business dependence on IT systems, such as the ATM network, phone banking, 
and EFTPoS, for increasing its market share.
Based on the AGM’s account, the new infrastructural design that the bank was 
implementing would enable them to achieve cost leadership in some business activities.
There is another form of relationship in which the IT strategies gave a new vision about 
future business strategies. The excess capacity that was created from investing in Base 
24 gave the bank a vision that was not envisaged when the bank adopted the system. 
The business strategy of earning commission revenue from running a nation-wide ATM 
switch network was enabled by the bank’s excess IT capacity, which its rivals were not 
able to match. This nation-wide ATM network was not envisaged when the bank 
adopted Base 24.
There were instances where the business goals were hindered by the limitations of the 
bank’s old IT infrastructure. Based on the account of the credit marketing senior 
manager, their old credit card system was an example of an IT system that disabled the 
bank’s ambitious adoption of credit cards, therefore, the bank was in the process of 
adopting a more capable system.
Bank’s culture:
Rivalry with Local Five:
The bank was formed historically, according to a consultant report, as a counterweight 
to Local Five. The main strategic actions at Local Four aimed at defying its main 
competitor or were a counter measure to Local Five strategies. The bank raced head to 
head with Local Five in doing almost everything. Most of the actions of the two banks 
were replicated by the other: the IT systems were adopted at more or less the same time 
by the two rivals, the branch networks were expanded simultaneously by the two, and
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the dependence on the consultants for formulating the banks’ strategic planning was a 
phenomenon that happened concurrently in both banks. The initiative of the Local Four 
to introduce the shared ATM network in Bahrain and run it through its systems aimed at 
creating a leadership advantage and defying their main rival in the race to control the 
market. The demise of this initiative came about due to Local Five resistance and 
complaints to the regulatory body.
An innovative, defiant bank:
The bank is considered as a consortium bank in which almost half of its shares are 
owned by other regional banks. Its strong capital base empowered the bank’s ability to 
adopt IT systems which cost little, as compared to its capital structure. The informants 
described their bank as a daring one, which it does not refrain from spending on IT to 
gain a leadership posture in the market.
The bank’s innovative approach w-as articulated in the bank’s strategic documents. The 
credit marketing manager read me the following to support the view of the bank’s 
culture that he wanted to portray:
“Local Four assumes the role o f  unorthodox player in the Bahraini market. It creates an 
atmosphere and attitudes that eradicate the notion that we have always done it this w ay or we 
have never done it that way..” .
The IT senior manager claimed that the bank’s desire to be the leader in the market 
drove its improvised IT strategies before 1989. He further argued that due to the bank’s 
supportive top management, a lot was spent on IT systems, which enhanced capabilities 
and enabled the bank to propose systems that the rivals were not able to match.
Ownership by other banks’ enhanced expertise:
Local Four, through their regional branch and their shared ownership, owned an eighth 
of a shared ATM network in a regional country. Their ownership of the shared network 
enriched their expertise and decreased their perceived risk in initiating collective
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projects. As mentioned earlier, the bank took the initiative in proposing the Bahraini 
shared ATM network, and launched their regional ATM network by collaborating with 
other regional banks. Their operations in other regional markets, their ownership by 
other banks, and their past experience with the shared network they owned, made them 
more daring in exploiting new business opportunities in this line of business. In contrast 
to Local Four, their rivals were reluctant to enter a field that they had not experienced 
before.
Profitability problems followed by revolutionary changes:
According to a consultant report, historically, Local Four was a retail commercial bank 
It had a severe profitability problems in the early eighties. As a result o f the bank's 
large losses, revolutionary changes took place within the bank. New board members 
were assigned from representatives from the shareholders’ banks, a new top 
management was assigned, and more experts were recruited, among them the new IT 
manager. These changes brought with them new ways of thinking and doing. The 
bank’s openness to the consultants' reforms was one of these revolutionary changes. 
Some of these reforms are described below:
Change in the IT arrangements:
The IT manager became part o f the bank’s strategic apex. The head of the IT 
department became the Assistant General Manager rather than a senior general manage:. 
He became an integral part of the top management committees, through which his vision 
was communicated without any filters.
Dependence on committees in shaping the strategies:
The bank depended on steering committees in which representatives from the different 
units of the bank participated and in which decision making became more of a collective 
process than a ‘one-man show’. The more significant the strategies were, the higher the 
rank of the participants in the committees. These arrangements were not common in the 
bank before 1989.
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Identification of business goals:
The formal formation of business strategies enabled the bank to define in a more precise
manner its business goals and markets which were previously blurred to the bank.
Shift in power towards the business units representatives:
The new arrangements that were brought to the bank, shifted the power for IT adoption 
to the business unit representatives. Even for infrastructure issues, the assessment of the 
functionality o f these new systems was left to the users. The new arrangement 
destroyed the old culture, which had perceived IT as the concern of the EDP manager 
alone. As described earlier, the ad hoc committees were chaired by representatives from 
business units, when the IT projects were related to their business, and the IT 
representatives within the System Steering Committee were restricted to giving advice 
rather than having a vote on what system to adopt.
•I
•*.. we changed the role., in the past we were thinking that nobody understand the technology- 
except ourselves., whenever there was som ething related to the computer, we had to decide. This 
was wrong, you should give the user what they w ant...’ IT senior manager.
Cultural Gap within the bank:
The IT senior manager, who had previously headed the IT department, told about 
tension between him and the top management. He said that before the reforms of 1989 
and the invitation of the consultants to help in formalising the bank’s strategic plans, top 
management was sceptical about his directing of the bank’s IT scene, although none of 
the top management had the expertise to assess what he was doing. As mentioned 
earlier, the IT strategy before 1989 was a one-man-show in which the IT manager was 
the product champion for the bank. There was a wide gap between the IT manager and 
top management before the reforms took place in 1989.
The symptom of this gap in understanding between IT professionals and top 
management was represented in top management rejection of some IT systems that they 
had to approve due to immediate threats in the environment. For example, the proposal
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of a disaster recovery system in the bank by the IT manager was considered to have no 
relevance to the bank’s immediate competitiveness and hence was rejected. However, 
the crises of the Gulf war in 1990 made the top management re-evaluate their decision 
and adopt the disaster recovery system, but not until after the crises. Another example 
o f the gap between the top management and the IT manager was the bank’s rejection of 
the EFTPoS system. The senior IT manager approached the top management for 
approving the introduction of the EFTPoS, but they rejected his proposal. However, 
when the bank’s main competitor, Local Five, started working on its EFTPoS system, 
the bank rushed to adopt the EFTPoS. The IT senior manager gave more examples of 
the gap that existed between him and management, such as the resistance to adopting 
Base 24, which came, this time, from the board of directors. The senior IT manager 
attributed their resistance to their fear that Local Four would surpass the other banks that 
they belonged to.
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The bank recruited an American IT manager who had worked previously with Chase 
Manhattan bank and accepted his judgement. The formal IT manager said that, when 
the bank asked him to evaluate what it had done, he approved their previous 
developments, which eased the tension between the previous IT manager and top 
management.
The above anecdotes indicate the cultural gap that existed between the bank’s top 
management and the IT manager. This gap delayed the adoption of some IT products 
which the bank developed at a later date due to competitive pressure, or put the bank in 
a critical position, such as not having a disaster recovery system when the Gulf crises 
occurred.
Committees to bridge the gap between the technologists and the business 
managers:
The IT senior manager, as well as the other informants, claimed that this gap between 
the technologists and the management of the bank narrowed after the reforms within the 
bank and the formulation of the steering committees. Through discussing their strategic
i::
goals both parties approached a mutual vision. Nonetheless, the credit marketing 
manager argued that the cultural gap between the technologists and the business units 
also depended on the characteristics of those who participated in these committees:
"... I think it is through the process o f  SSC we deal with each other on a frequent basis. We try to 
understand and bridge the gap between what the business wants and what the IT can deliver. O f 
course, I have to qualify my statement., it always depends on the individual involved. Some 
individuals w ill be interested in what happens in technology and how it works and the concept 
behind it and som e might not be Interested..” Credit marketing senior manager.
Problems that affected the bank’s IT strategies:
Regulations:
Limited number of exhibitions and training programs:
The informants argued that the market was highly regulated and because of that they 
could not fully exploit their excess IT capacity to gain a competitive advantage over the 
other banks. They gave examples of the interference of the regulatory body in their 
proposal to run the shared ATM network, and their inability to install stand-alone ATMs 
without the need to open a branch. The informants claimed that some of their initiatives 
were delayed due to the regulatory processes that had to go through before launching 
some of their products.
In formulating his visionary strategies, the senior IT manager depended on the vendor, 
seminars, workshops and exhibitions that he attended. He claimed that these were not 
run frequently enough in the Gulf to expose the bank to the latest technologies and 
hence it may lag behind as compared to the other advanced markets. Moreover, he aired 
his concerns about the high cost of training in the field of IT for the top management 
which could hamper the banks from investing in these training courses.
:-:3
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The tenure of the expatriate managers:
The senior IT manager argued that the short tenure of the expatriate managers affected 
the quality of IT strategies. He claimed that the expatriates did not have an interest in 
long-range planning for the bank. Their plan horizon extended only as long as their 
contracts.
Achieving a mutuai understanding:
Bridging the gap between the IT representatives and the management had been a major 
problem in the past, the IT senior manager claimed. However, he argued that this gap 
had been narrowed with the new reforms that took place within the bank.
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Local Bank Five (L5)
Introduction:
Local Bank Five (Local Five) is one of the largest banks in the country, which has one 
of the largest branch networks, and in terms o f its domestic operations, it owned the 
biggest portion of the market share in 1992, around 32%, according to a consultant 
report.
The fourth informant headed the corporate banking unit, and had worked with an 
international bank before joining this bank. Her education was in business
I interviewed six informants within the bank. The first informant was the corporate 
strategic planning senior manager, an active participant in the bank’s corporate planning 
activities reporting directly to the CEO. He joined the bank in 1988. Prior to that, he 
had worked with some European companies through which he claimed that he had 
gained considerable experience about strategic planning. The informant is an Indian and 
has an MBA. The informant said that he had participated in the development several ke>- 
products, some of which were IT based.
The second informant was the assistant general manager (AGM) for IT, a Bahraini in his 
forties. His work experience had been with the computer divisions of two non-banking 
organisations prior to joining this bank. His education background was an HND in 
computer studies and an MBA which he had acquired while working at the bank.
The third informant, a Bahraini national, headed the corporate services department and 
was in charge of the financial control, the general services and the human resources 
units. He had been with the bank for 15 years during which time he was promoted 
through different positions, to his present rank of an assistant general manager. The 
meeting with him was the shortest, taking only half an hour.
:
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administration and she had had 15 years of banking experience. This informant 
preferred that I take notes instead of tape recording the interview.
The fifth informant headed the commercial banking unit. He had worked with an oil 
company as a programmer, then worked with Chase Bank in 1976 for one year before 
joining this bank as the head o f the EDP department. In 1982, he was transferred to head 
the corporate banking division. His rank was a senior manager.
The sixth informant was deputised as the head of the consumer banking unit and was 
ranked as a manager. He has been working with the bank for 12 years, although his 
educational background was in marine biology.
Business focus;
Factors affecting the competitive environments:
The senior manager of strategic planning unit described the Bahraini market as being 
overbanked, with many commercial banks active within a small market. The economy 
was highly dependent on oil prices and political stability within the Gulf. A large 
portion of the banks’ business was made up of trade, which highly affected by these 
factors. The banks, this informant claimed, became more conservative, or to use his 
vocabulary have the tendency to pull their plugs.. " and support the trade sector less 
when the economy was not doing fine.
Sensitivity to price and interest rates was a salient factor that affected the 
competitiveness of the participants in the banking industry in Bahrain. The informant 
mentioned that corporate clients were more sensitive to interest rates than retail clients. 
The former clients tended to switch to other banks with more competitive interest rates. 
The consumer clients, in contrast, were more sensitive to the flexibility of loan terms 
and the amount of the loan that each bank offered rather than interest rates.
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Information technology and systems were amongst the issues that the informants 
mentioned as affecting the competitive environment. They perceived different roles that 
IT played to the banking businesses. For example, for retail business, the informants 
perceived IT as playing a vital competitive role, whereas for corporate business, they 
perceived delivery systems as having a minor effect on creating new business for the 
bank.
To summarise, the following are the factors that the informants talked about as affecting 
the bank’s business:
• pncing;
• services and quality of services;
• financial strength;
• confidentiality;
• branch network;
• international network; and
• svstems.
I
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Business focus:
The bank operates at the domestic level as well as the international level.
Consumer banking unit. The unit provides a full range of retail services such as 
current accounts, money market accounts, savings accounts, time deposits, personal 
loans, debit and credit cards, remittances and unit trusts.
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At the domestic level the bank organised itself into three business units to serve 
different distinct market segments. These business units are as follows:
'^ "'1
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• Commercial banking unit. This unit provide its services to the small and medium-
-sized businesses with an annual sales turnover of US$5.3 million or less. The bank 
.subdivided this market into construction, trade, real estate, and services sectors.
• Corporate banking unit. The unit provides its services to domestic and multinational 
institutions with an annual sales turnover of more than US$5.3 million. For each of 
the bank's corporate clients, there is a relationship account officer.
At the international level, the bank organised itself into four units which are:
• Investment advisory;
• Treasury and capital markets investments,
• Trade finance and financial institutions group; and
• Foreign branch unit.
More about the circumstances that led to developing these business units will be 
mentioned when the bank’s business strategy formulation is discussed.
■'I
Perceived role of IT within the bank:
Traditional roie of IT  -  automating the bank’s processes:
The informants talked about the historical role of IT which had started by automating 
the bank’s accounting records and functional areas.
Product delivery:
The role of IT expanded to support the bank’s product delivery. IT was deployed for 
this task within the boundaries of the bank.
IT as a competitive and a defensive measure:
automate
Automate
Office Seement
Delivery
svstems
The bank’s IT initiatives were driven by the bank’s willingness to achieve competitive 
superiority over its rivals or to defend its market share from deteriorating. The new 
perception brought about a transformation to a phase in which the bank mobilised its 
systems differently in order to achieve the new role.
Delivery beyond the bank’s boundaries.
Î
Figure 1 describes the new role of 
IT, extending beyond the bank’s b a n k
boundaries. The senior manager 
of the strategic planning unit 
argued that this new approach of 
extending IT based services 
beyond the bank’s boundaries
, . . . Figure I: E xtended role o f  IT  b evo n d  the bank'saimed at creating a competitive boundaries
advantage, enabling the bank to
expand its market share and add to its customer base share. The new IT deliver\■
systems aimed at enabling the clients to interact with the bank’s systems directly
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without the intervention of the bank’s staff. With the new approach, the bank aimed at 
providing convenient services to its mass market - the consumer banking market - while 
attracting more customers and protecting the existing market share at the same time. 
The informant mentioned phone banking, the EFTPoS and its debit cards, and ATMs as 
the technologies beyond the bank’s boundaries. Some of these technologies, i.e. the 
EFTPoS and the debit and credit cards, were employed to generate commission revenue 
to the bank.
Enable product delivery to the international markets:
Support branch network:
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IT was perceived as enabling the bank to support its international business without 
having a physical presence in the international markets.
:.4
The bank embarked on creating the largest branch network in Bahrain. The senior 
manager of strategic planning perceived the large branch network as a means for 
securing a larger share of the retail business, which he attributed to the customers' 
banking habits. He expected that the retail customers would continue to visit the 
branches to conduct their banking business. The informants perceived IT as the means 
for enabling them to maintain and expand their branch network.
Ingredient of quality service:
Quality of service was one of the factors that the bank mentioned as affecting their 
competitiveness in the market. The senior manager of strategic planning perceived IT 
used in this context as a means for increasing the bank’s market share. He said that, in a 
declining interest rate environment, the banks have little room to manoeuvre in 
providing competitive interest rates. What they could do, however, was to differentiate 
themselves in terms of quality of service. The informant gave an example of the 
telephone banking system that was introduced to provide better service to retail clients.
I
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The head of the commercial banking unit perceived IT as a tool for enhancing the 
bank’s productivity which, in turn, was linked to its competitiveness. With the current 
arrangements in his department, the informant could not serve his clients on the spot and 
hence risked losing them.
Maintaining the bank’s leadership and institutionalising new 
approaches to the market:
IT played a different strategic role for the bank’s business units, based on the 
informants’ accounts (Table / summarises the perceived role). The bank invested heavily 
in deploying IT for its retail banking business. The delivery systems that the senior 
manager of the strategic planning unit talked about were all deployed to retail business. 
IT aimed at handling the mass of clients, on one hand, and, on the other, creating a 
revenue for the bank through the commissions earned from some of the delivery 
systems.
introducing the EFTPoS, the phone banking, and the ATM s, will generate more income to the 
bank.. Mainly we use IT to generate income to the bank, we use IT to speed up our service to the 
customers, we use IT to save cost..” . The consumer banking manager.
..y
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IT was perceived as a tool for keeping the bank in the leadership position compared to 
its rivals. The informant gave an example of the EFTPoS, which the bank introduced 
just a few months before its main rival. Local Four. The senior manager of the strategic 
planning unit argued that the EFTPoS was not as popular as other retail technologies in 
Bahrain since it was a new concept for the customers, who were more cash oriented. 
However, there was a growing trend toward using the system. The informant claimed 
that they were institutionalising new banking habits in the Bahraini market, and once the 
bandwagon had gained momentum, they would expect to reap the benefits of being the 
leaders in this type of business.
Different strategic roles for the different business units:
i
1
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The international and treasury banking unit embarked heavily on IT. The strategic 
planning senior manager perceived IT as an enabler of the bank’s international 
operations.
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In contrast to the consumer banking retail business, the delivery systems played minor 
roles, if any, in the commercial and corporate banking units. The commercial banking 
unit manager perceived the majority of his clients as not sophisticated enough to interact 
with the delivery systems. Accordingly, he did not perceive a strategic role for the 
delivery systems that went beyond the bank’s boundaries in generating more business in 
this area. There were no delivery systems directed at the corporate segment for the time 
being. The heads of the commercial banking unit and the corporate banking unit argued 
that direct personal selling and efficient relationship marketing teams had more potential 
to generate business than IT delivery systems. The commercial banking senior manager 
argued that IT could play a crucial role for supporting the quality of services provided by 
his business if it was deployed internally.
in our area, we are handling commercial accounts and we are dealing with unsophisticated 
people. Small merchants in the market., they d on’t know about accounts, they don’t know about 
the balance sheet, but they know one thing, they know about their business, they know they have 
to import and sell the goods, they don’t know exactly how much money they are making., 
technology here in commercial banking w ill not have a major impact. It is an internal tool. It is 
not an external tool. Our edge is not through technology, our edge is through extensive calling, 
the quality o f  marketing officers we have, and how much confidence they achieve with the 
client., you have to know that som e o f  the clients are uneducated., in my case there is nothing to 
do with technology unfortunately..” The comm ercial banking senior manager.
I
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Table 1: Perceived roles of IT to the business units
Business Unit:
Consumer banking
Commercial banking 
Corporate banking
International and treasury unit
Role o f  IT
* competitive advantage through 
delivery systems;
# generate com m ission revenue not 
subject to the fluctuation o f  the interest 
rates;
•  manage processing big transactions 
o f  the mass market;
•  control cost.
•  minor role for the delivery systems 
for generating business;
® no, or very limited delivery systems 
introduced to customers;
« dependence o f  direct selling efforts 
as a means o f  generating business;
•  future potential for the delivery 
systems;
•  deficiency o f  the current internal IT 
systems in supporting the internal 
processing;
® com petitive edge through deploying  
IT internally to improve the internal 
processes and productivity, and provide 
quality and prompt service to clients - 
role o f  the new IT systems.
•  Enable operations in treasury and
international business;
•  electronic links through EDI systems
with correspondence banks;
•  on-line systems providing
information about capital and stock  
markets;
•  strategic role o f  the information
provided by the IT systems.______________
.:4
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Ephemeral nature of IT and isomorphism between the banks:
There was a tendency of the banks in Bahrain to react similarly with regard to banking 
products and technology systems, the informants argued. This behaviour among the 
banks created an ephemeral competitive effect on the adopted IT systems.
ATM s.. I think it is a generic product now, everybody has. The same thing with telephone 
banking..
.. i f  w e invest in a system today for one million dinars. Local Four is more capable, they w ill go  
and spend two million dinars, Local Three will spend something, it can be copied..
Q. Is the bank similar or different than other banks in the way it uses IT?
A. I think currently., just similar, I think that everybody is doing the same thing, currently banks 
are not com peting on technology., it is becom ing too com m on., it is becom ing so standardised 
that everybody has the same thing, they may have a different brand label, but they offer the same 
thing..” Senior manager o f  strategic planning unit.
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“. . I  think that we were all m oving in the same way because that was the trend internationally, and 
now, these are not special system s and they are service based systems., there is a specific trend 
and everybody works toward that., they (the banks} were all going through the same phases, but 
there was this lag period., for the ATM s it was 3 or 6  months, and for the EFTPoS tw o or 3 
months, and the phone banking, it was one year som ething like that., but they were all having the 
same ideas in mind., may be the way it was designed differs .... I don’t think that we are different 
than the others..” IT AGM.
“.. we have competitor banks that wanted to do exactly like what w e have done, not after one 
year, but after five years, they saw  us doing w ell and they wanted to copy us., we are watching 
som e other banks but at the sam e time w e are used as the criteria, they watch us more than we 
watch them, we tend to be the leaders, o f  course there are certain things that other banks 
surprised us with., you have to react..” Commercial banking senior manager.
The senior manager of strategic planning mentioned that the banks’ dependence on 'off- 
the-shelf systems helped create a homogeneous environment amongst the banks.
■
Delivery 
' systems
Main IT developments within the bank:
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F igure 2: M ain IT  deve lo p m en ts -within 
L ocal Five
developed other systems to meet the operations’ requirements o f the other functional 
areas. However, due to the limitations o f the old system, the different functional areas 
were not fully integrated with each other. The heads of the commercial banking unit and 
the corporate banking unit expressed their dissatisfaction about their IT systems. More 
about this issue will be discussed later.
The bank introduced its Visa card in 1986, the ATMs in 1987, and in 1990-91 the phone 
banking system, followed by the EFTPoS. All of these systems were introduced 
simultaneously with the bank’s main competitor, Local Four.
Figure 2 lists the expected IT developments that were planned to take place within the 
bank, as described by the informants. These are listed below:
• change the bank’s IT infrastructure;
• adopt more intelligent MIS systems;
• integrate isolated functional areas;
• introduce LAN and automate the offices;
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create an accessible and integrated data warehouse; 
link on-line to global information databases; 
support branch automation; and 
develop more delivery systems.
Deficiency of the old system
I
I
;ï::
The systems that the bank had at the time this field work took place were fifteen to 
twenty years old, thus were not capable of supporting further improvements. To quote 
the IT manager:
in the strategy, they say th a t.. we want to Improve our delivery at the branches, we have these 
old m achines., either we change our system or improve it. W e told them that we can't improve it 
because this is the maximum limit., the answer is to replace the system ., we can’t support for 
more than one year..”.
The informants in the business units expressed their dissatisfaction, though indirectly, 
about their IT systems. Lack of integration with the other staff working within the same 
pool, lack of sufficient analytical tools, lack of on-line information related to the 
financial markets, and lack of on-line access to the needed information within the bank 
were limitations that the business units faced and hoped that the coming systems would 
improve. To quote the commercial banking senior manager:
”.. in our case we need to be able to interact between the marketing officers., between the 
databases. Our database at the computer systems need to be enhanced to be able to provide us 
with the information that we require, some market analysis needs to be added to the system to 
com e up with market intelligence., it is nice to have them available, it would reduce your hassle 
in going back and forth and waiting for that information and calling back the customer ..right 
now I have to go to the time deposit department to see what is the best rate, if  som ebody asked 
me .. ‘shall I buy sterling pounds?’ i f  he asks me today, I expect to press a button and see what 
the trend is in the sterling, the general direction., the expectations., the factors that affect the 
increase or decrease, a kind o f  an intelligent answer., that builds the trust, and here we gain more 
advantage over the others..”.
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Drivers of IT strategy:
Competition the main driver to iT initiatives:
The main driver for IT initiatives according to the IT manager was the competition. The 
senior manager of the strategic planning unit shared the same views with the IT assistant 
general manager and added to competition the bank’s desire to be a leader in the market.
“Q. What were the reasons for embarking on the systems that the bank have?
IT manager: One reason only. Competition. With no competition, people w ill not move." IT 
AGM
Revamping the system is driven by the competitors:
Other drivers:
business strategies;
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“.. I think the biggest driver o f  the bank’s IT strategy is our mission statement. B ecause in our 
mission statement, it is stated that we want to be a leader in technology in Bahrain., the second  
driver is the competition itself.. I f  we are lagging behind for a given reason, the competition  
forces us to look at our strategy and take action based on that.. Sometimes w e do it on a proactive 
basis and in others we are forced to take actions.. I would say that the tw o main drivers are the 
competition and our m ission statem ents..” Senior manager o f  strategic planning.
1,
According to the IT manager, the overall renewal of the bank’s IT system was also 
driven by the competitors:
“.. as in any other organisation, there is this life cycle, we are away behind our system life 
cycle., again, it is because o f  your competitors, not because you have to, but if  your competitors 
have more advanced techno logs’ and it is getting very rapid improvements in terms o f  
productivity, functionality o f  hardware and software, the sv stem that w e have is twenty years old 
and we have to move from there., we are reaching a point where the support w ill not be given to 
the hardware {by the vendor}.." IT AGM.
The informants talked about other factors that were relevant to their IT initiatives, some 
of which were discussed in the perceived role of IT section. The following is a list of 
these factors:
improving efficiency, productivity, integrating internally with the others;
improving and initiating more delivery systems;
improving the bank’s MIS and introducing other intelligence systems;
improving the quality of services through re-automating the branches and offices;
“revamping” the bank’s IT systems; and
automating the manual processes.
Rivalry, regulatory control and collaboration.
:i
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As competition was the main driver to the bank’s IT initiatives, rivalry between this 
bank and its immediate rival, Local Four, was also the main obstacle that delated the 
introduction of a shared ATM network in the country. Local Five perceived the 
initiative of Local Four to launch a shared ATM network as a threat to its competitive 
position as one of the two largest banks in Bahrain. It perceived the market in Bahrain 
as too small to support a switch network run by more than one bank, and felt that Local 
Four would enjoy a monopolistic power if it managed to introduce the network in the 
market based on its terms. In addition, Local Five was embarking on creating a large 
branch network as a means to strengthening its market share. Only Local Four was able 
to compete with Local Five on the branch network base. The creation of a shared ATM 
network in Bahrain by Local Four was perceived as a threat to the strategic advantage 
Local Five enjoyed from the branch network. Accordingly, the bank protested to the 
regulatory body, which interfered and proposed running a shared ATM network 
controlled by the central bank rather than by a given bank(s).
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the first problem with the EFTPoS.. the banks were unwilling to come together to have a 
comm on switch, because the fear was i f  there is a switch, you give up your customers to your 
competitors..
... the problem is that whoever has the switch, there is no doubt he w ill command the control 
basically, and very few banks would give up to that position, and that is why the regulatory body 
stepped in..
.. a project like the ‘switch’ in a country like Bahrain is good to be handled by an agency, that 
creates the least favouritism and bias., I w ould support it. That is the only way that all banks will 
do it simultaneously..” Senior manager o f  strategic planning unit.
The race for the EFTPoS system and the external regulatory interference:
Rivalry between Local Five and its main rival Local Four was also present when the 
informant talked about the EFTPoS system and the circumstances in which the bank 
launched its system.
According to the Local Five account, the bank wanted to launch its EFTPoS system but 
the regulatory body slowed things down. However, their main rival. Local Four, had got 
its system and was prepared to introduce it in the market, so. Local Five protested to the 
regulatory body. Accordingly, the Local Four system, was also delayed, and the two 
banks introduced their system simultaneously. It is worth noting that neither of the two 
EFTPoS systems was linked to the other.
Strategic planning within the bank:
The first formal strategic plan was produced by the bank in 1986-87. The consultant, 
Arthur D Little, was the main articulator of the strategic plan. Everything was done with 
the aid of the consultant until the strategy was ready for implementation when the bank 
took over the responsibility of control.
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Before 1987, the bank did not have a clear 
objective as who to serve, what and how. 
Relationships formed the basis upon which the 
bank's business was built. To quote the senior 
manager of the strategic planning unit:
Ckiuracteristics o f i ln te g k
before aad after 1987
Formal stratégie ptaiuim g 
Scgm entM ion o f  the maiLctN o  scg m en ta lio n  
B u sin ess  b a sed  on  
relationsh ip
F onnulatloa o f  Stratégie 
B u sin ess Uoitx
R cstm ctun ng posiüon s
we used to go after the mass market, we just 
go., we never understood our homogenous 
groups. There was nothing like consumer 
banking, nothing like commercial banking 
nothing like high worth individuals. There was 
only relationships...”
F igure 3: C h an ges in L oca l 5
aooroach  to s tra te g ic  o lan n in e
A period of change began in 1987. Market conditions changed, with oil prices declining, 
which had had a direct negative effect on the local economy. In turn, these negati\ e 
effects, according to the senior manager of strategic planning, spurred the bank to 
embark on its strategic planning exercise:
in 1987 we felt that the bank had had some degree o f  stagnation and the board o f  directors felt 
that we must do som ething more radical to generate more return basically. That was the need 
basically. The bank has stagnated...”.
The consultants played an important role in creating a revolutionary change within the 
bank.
The strategic planning exercise 
defined the bank’s market based on 
the customers’ homogenous 
characteristics (see Figure 4 ) . With 
the definition of these segments, the 
bank changed its structure. It 
formulated its strategic business 
units (SBUs) which were headed 
mostly by internal recruits:
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Figure 4: Form ulation  o f  SBL's in 
1987  stra teg ic  p la n s
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“ ..so the biggest thing that we achieved betw een 1986 and 1987 was defining these strategic 
business units and controlling it, measuring the performance and the profitability.... today 1 can 
manage each business unit very w ell by product line and by customer type. This helps me 
because today I am in a position to elim inate or modify services. I need to arbitrarily go and say 
just drop this customer. D on’t keep custom er x who may be eligible for a personal loan but not a 
business loan... that was the biggest change that the strategic strategy brought about... the 
formulation o f  the strategic business unit focusing, targeting, tailor made delivery to specific  
needs o f  each group..” Senior manager o f  strategic planning unit.
The formulation of the bank’s strategies:
The bank follows formal 
procedures for the development of 
its corporate plans. These 
procedures were highly influenced 
by what the bank had learnt form 
the consultants who sat the 
process at the very outset of the 
bank’s strategic planning exercise
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D evelopm ent o f  
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F igure 5: S tra teg ic  p lan n in g  fra m ew o rkin 1983. As the senior manager of 
strategic planning described, it was a top-down process from the board to the strategic 
planning committee then to the ad hoc committees. The model in Figure 5 describes the 
strategic planning process as followed by the bank’s SBUs.
Roie of consultants:
As mentioned previously, the consultants, played an important role in providing the 
bank with the required know-how to formulate its strategic planning process. From 
1983 up to 1991, the bank depended on the consultants in formulating its plans. 
However, after 1991, once the bank had acquired the know-how and developed 
expertise in this area, it depended on itself for formulating the plans.
“ .. the bank did their 1983-87 plan and 87-92  by Arthur D Little... they conducted the profiling  
session, wrote up the plan, and gave it to us to  implement... But basically when I came to the unit 
I said that we should not hire outsiders because... basically what they do, they can't com e and 
create something by their own, they have to speak and understand, they have their m ethodology ..
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to tell you what to do, but the source o f  information inside the bank. So w e said why don’t we do 
our planning by ourselves..”. Senior manager o f  strategic planning.
The bank’s dependence on its internal resources in formulating its strategies improved 
its learning curve, the senior planning manager argued. The bank continued its contacts 
with the consultants. These contacts formed a source of vision about the changes in the 
environment either within or outside Bahrain. The informant told me that the bank had 
been visited few days ago by KPMG to give an update on some studies about IT systems 
in Australia.
The corporate strategic planning unit:
The corporate strategic planning unit was responsible for the formulation of the bank's 
grand strategies.
in terms o f  responsibility, this unit is responsible for long range planning, three to five years. 
Generally, the corporate planning unit is involved in all global business and non-business issues 
o f a policy feature., once w e plan, the control o f  implementation is with the corporate planning .. 
the corporate planning responsibility is to oversee the whole thing and make sure that it is in line 
with what we have visualised in the plan and if  things are not as in the plan then the senior 
management is involved so that appropriate modification can be m ade..”. Senior manager o f  
strategic planning unit.
The corporate planning unit also played a part in the development of the bank’s products 
and services through participating in ad hoc committees with the concerned business 
units. The aim of their participation was to ensure that the business units would act in 
line with overall corporate strategies.
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Formulation of IT strategy:
Committees for the formuiation of the strategies:
The IT strategy, based on the IT 
AGM’s account, was built 
basically on the business 
strategy (see Figure 6). The IT 
strategy was formulated every 
five years, or whenever there 
was an overall corporate 
planning exercise within the 
bank. To quote the IT manager:
Overall 
corporate plans
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Figure 6: IT  s tra te g y  fo rm u la tio n  in L ocal Five
we build our strategy on 
the business strategy. There is a business strategy that the bank sets every five years, our job  is to 
take that strategy and com e up with a system strategic plan that is aligned to the business plan. ”.
To make sure that the IT manager fully understood the IT needs of the business plans’, 
he was invited to participate in the corporate planning exercise, but as an advisor rather 
than a decision maker, according to the IT manager. He did not have any power to 
influence the business plans of the bank.
As shown in Figure 6 , the bank depends mainly on two committees for formulating its 
corporate strategies and IT strategies. The formulation of the bank’s corporate strategies 
is centralised within a committee in which the CEO, the GM, and the head of the 
business units play an active role in defining the bank's strategic thrust. From this 
committee, a smaller committee called the IT steering committee is formed. In this 
committee participate the CEO, the GM, the IT AGM, the corporate services AGM and 
the senior manager of strategic planning.
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The responsibilities of the IT steering committee are to ensure that IT strategies are 
aligned with the bank’s corporate strategies and to follow up on the implementation of 
the strategies.
The heads of the business units do not participate in this committee. However, their 
requirements are communicated to this committee which has the power to accept or 
reject any of their requests.
For the implementation of the IT initiatives, the bank formulates ad hoc committees 
which include participants from the concerned business unit, the IT department and 
other support units.
Impetus of IT strategies on the macro and micro levels:
A top-down approach:
The IT manager differentiated between 
the macro and micro impetus of the IT 
strategic thrust (see Figure 7 ). At the 
macro level, the business plans mainly 
guided the major IT initiatives within the 
bank.
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Figure 7: Impetus o f  IT  stra teg ic  thrust a t L5
there is only one strategic plan that 
we have which is the business strategic plan, and everybody participates in that from the CEO. 
GM, AGM s and head o f  units..” . IT AGM
”.. what we don’t have in IT, w e don’t bring it from the grass roots, IT is always being done top 
down...” senior manager o f  strategic planning unit.
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To a lesser extent, users’ requests and complaints:
the automation o f  the various operations, that is a major contribution. W e go and automate the 
different areas, the different operations, the different manual transactions..” . IT AGM
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At the micro level, which is marginal in its effect on directing the IT strategy as 
compared to the macro level, the users’ requests and complaints were a driving factor 
for enhancing the systems. The IT strategy, at this level, is concerned with automating 
the manual processes that the bank’s old core system did not serve:
I
som e tim es w e need things to be automated, w e don’t want to do things manually, to give you 
an exam ple, recently w e started to charge an amount for those who are not paying on time. 
Instead o f  doing it manually, w e asked the IT people to automate i t . ” Consumer banking 
manager.
Impetus from IT manager for infrastructure projects:
The impetus for IT strategy comes sometimes from the IT department, as Figure 6 
indicates. The product champion for these projects relating to the infrastructure of the 
bank’s IT systems is the IT AGM. Due to the technical nature of such projects, his 
vision about the architecture design of the IT scene within the bank is taken in account. 
For example, the office automation being implemented at the bank was driven by the 
vision of the IT AGM.
I
f
4:
Role of the IT manager in IT strategy formulation:
As mentioned above, the IT manager is the product champion for any IT initiatives of an 
infrastructure nature.
In addition to that, the role of IT manager was to support business goals through 
implementing the needed systems described in the business plans (see the appendix at 
the end of the case for example o f IT systems supporting the business plans).
His role in the strategy formulation process was restricted to understanding the business 
goals, but not leading them. He was a ‘listener’ in the business strategies formulation 
committee, with no power to influence the business goal formulation.
we build our strategy on the business strategy. There is a business strategy that the bank sets 
every five years. Our job  is to take that strategy and come up with a system strategic plan that is 
aligned to the business plan ( ....)  w e get involved in the business plan discussion and so on, but 
we don’t have a separate process to com e up with a strategic plan (.,..) so the business says that 
we want to enter into the card system , so it is finished. Our strategy is to have a proper card 
system to be used at the tim e and date requested in the business plan..
Q. Do you participate in the initiation o f  the business plans?
IT manager: we participate but as a listener ( ..... ) the business is set by the business people. We
just participate to get acquainted and to understand the business issues and concerns rather than 
just read a report...” IT AGM
The senior manager of strategic planning described the IT manager’s role as reactive to 
the bank’s IT needs. He anticipated that this role needed to change and become a 
proactive one as IT became more complex and hard to the business people to grasp 
(more about this topic will be discussed in the culture section).
Roie of the senior manager of the strategic planning unit:
Some of the IT-based systems were initiated and directed by the senior manager of the 
strategic planning unit. A major project was the telephone banking system, an initiative 
for which the senior manager was the project manager. His role was to define the 
customers’ needs and then articulate the solutions provided by the system to meet these
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@needs. The informant mentioned that the role of the IT department in this project was to 
translate the goals that they defined into ‘a machine language system’.
Relationship with the suppliers:
The bank had maintained a long relationship with NCR. As mentioned earlier, Local 
Five progressed with the mainframes supplied by NCR. The ownership of NCR was 
taken over by AT&T and with this transformation, the old relationship between the bank 
and NCR extended to the new owner, AT&T.
The supplier as an informer to the bank:
AT&T played the role of the informant about the recent developments in the IT 
environment and their potential implications for the bank’s business^ The informant 
role that the vendor played was either through contacting with the bank directly through 
his account manager, or through seminars, consultants’ visits, and exhibitions that the 
bank was invited to. The senior manager of the strategic planning unit added that the 
vendor was also a source for informing and updating the bank about its rivals’ latest IT 
initiative trends.
T h is c la im  w as m ad e by th e b a n k 's  ven d or  w h en  I in terv iew ed  them .
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Figure 8 summarises the role of the supplier to 
the bank. The bank may discuss business 
goals it wants to achieve with the vendor, and, 
in return, the vendor may provide the bank 
with possible technical solutions for achieving 
these goals.
Bank
• Business 
Needs
Supplier
• Solutions
• Technical 
advice
• Information 
about new IT 
developments
• Information 
about the 
competitors.
w e are in touch with our suppliers who are
leaders such as AT&T. They keep us very f ig u r e  8  : R ela tionship  w ith the su p p lie r  
well informed o f  all the developm ents. Local
Five is the first target (...) because they can use us as a reference site. For any technology in 
banking, they try to sell it to us, because if  we sell it to you we can say that Local Five has bought 
it so it becom es a good reference site for them selves.
Q. Do you have a close relationship?
Senior manager: very close relationship. I said close relationship by virtue o f  our leadership. 
The suppliers themselves are interested in telling us what developm ents are taking place and 
where w e are lagging behind. So w e are w ell addressed. But they don’t force us to make a 
decision. (....) they meet banks more than we do, so they tell us what is happening there, so they 
are a very good source for information on the competitors activities...” Senior manager o f  
strategic planning.
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Relationship between the business strategies 
and iT strategies:
iT supporting business pians, not directing them:
According to the informants’ accounts, the business strategies capitalised on the IT 
strategies. The business plans gave sense and direction to the IT strategies, and the 
relationship between the two did not go any further than that. The latter did not have 
influence on shaping the bank’s business strategies, the informants argued. This 
relationship between the two was represented by the participation of the IT manager as a 
‘listener’ rather than a key player in the business strategy formulation.
I
»
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the key players in the strategies, are senior management from the CEO, the GM, the Deput} 
CM and then the business units heads..
Q. How about the IT A CM , is he there?
Informant: N o he is not a major player in the business strategies as such. We are not that much 
expanded in IT. It is still treated in our organisation as a support unit (....) to deliver this product 
or service or expectation. B asically when the business plan com es, a copy will go to the support 
units. Every support unit will see what is required from its end to be able to meet the overall 
business plan o f  the bank...” Head o f  the commercial banking unit.
Different type of relationship with the different business units:
Current strategic links:
The relationship between the bank’s business strategies and the IT varied, depending on 
the type of business. As to consumer banking strategies, the link between the two, IT 
and business strategies, was intimate. I managed to get access to one of the bank's 
strategic plans booklet in which a plan was outlined as to how IT would enable the 
consumer banking business plans (see the appendix at the end of the case).
Potential for strategic links in the future:
There were no current links between some of the business unit’s strategies, e.g. 
commercial banking and corporate banking, and IT strategies.
".. as far as I explained earlier, the business strategy is designed in isolation, at least I am talking
about my business unit. It is done in isolation o f  the IT strategy ( ..... ) it is not an advanced
relationship... where at the initiation stage {IT and us} get together and com e up with a 
strategy.... no, that is not taking place at this stage..” Head o f  the commercial banking unit.
Nonetheless, the senior manager of the strategic planning unit claimed that there would 
be a greater potential role for IT in promoting the businesses of the above mentioned 
units. In the near future, the IT strategies would support the internal IT needs of these 
business units and at a later stage it was envisaged that they would provide delivery 
systems which extended beyond the bank’s boundaries.
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Infrastructure 'bottle-neck*:
The relationship between the bank’s business goals and the IT strategies to accomplish 
these goals was weakened by the deficiency in the bank’s IT systems. The bank was 
going into a ‘bottle neck’ position in which the implementation of IT strategies that 
were directly linked to the business goals was preceded by a transformation stage in 
which the IT strategies were concerned with revamping the old infrastructure. Unlike 
the old infrastructure, the technical aspect o f new infrastructure would not limit the 
implementation of the business-driven IT systems.
Bank’s culture:
A market leader:
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N ow  I think it is something that you g ive to the customer, to his home, to his office and you 
put it on the road basically. For that obviously this system has a limitation, to my knowledge 
most o f  the banks have that limitation currently. And every bank has to look at upgrading it or 
changing it..” Senior manager o f  strategic planning unit
in the strategy they say that w e want to improve our delivery at the branches , we have these 
old machines., either we change our system  or improve it. W e told them that we can’t improve it 
because this is the maximum limit., the answer is to replace the system., we can’t support it for 
more than one year..” The IT manager.
The bank is one of the two largest banks in the country. The informants perceived that 
their role was to maintain their leadership, which they built over a long period of time. 
The bank's culture was formed by, and at the same time, supported this perception.
The bank’s IT adoption behaviour reflected its perception of their leadership role. To 
maintain this leadership, the bank was in direct competition with its main rival, Local 
Four. Both banks’ strategies focused on embarking on large branch networks to 
dominate the market, consequently both banks had adopted the technologies required to 
support these large networks concurrently. As to the other retail technologies, e.g.
ATMs, phone banking, EFTPoS, and credit cards, both banks adopted these 
technologies more or less within the same time.
The bank’s culture was geared towards supporting innovative products in the market. 
By doing so, the bank hoped to institutionalise new systems and banking habits in the
market.
Consultant directing the cultural change:
Change In the role of the IT manager:
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To achieve a change in the bank’s culture from what it was before 1987, the bank 
depended on the leadership of the consultants.
j
The consultants transferred decision making within the bank to the steering committees 
that they formed. Moreover, they set the ground for formalising strategic plans based on 
following specific frameworks. To enhance top management acceptance of the 
formalised strategic planning methods, and to prepare them to continue on the 
consultants’ path, the top management were sent on educational programmes in the 
States and the UK to acquire higher degrees in management studies. For example, the 
bank’s GM, its IT manager, and the corporate services assistant general manager had all $
acquired their MBAs while they were with the bank. The head of the commercial ;■?banking unit, amongst others, participated in tailored courses at Harvard. The top
:?■management were, therefore, more receptive to the formal strategic plans propagated by 
the consultant.
'
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There was a consensus among the senior manager of the strategic planning unit, the 
corporate services assistant general manager, and the commercial banking senior 
manager about the need to change the IT manager’s role from a reactive to a proactive 
one. Currently, the IT manager’s role is reactive, and focuses on supporting the 
business goals by providing the IT systems stated in the business plans. The informants 
argued that defining the implications of IT and then applying it to the different
_L: A-?- .
functional areas was becoming more complex and beyond the comprehension of the 
business units’ participants. This would dictate a more proactive role for the IT 
manager in the process of IT adoption , rather than the traditional reactive role.
the IT people have to be bankers, they are the guys that should be sensing the needs in the 
market and providing the high tech. solutions. Because what is happening, technology is 
becom ing so sophisticated that it w ill be beyond the scope o f  an ordinary banker to think o f  
solutions because they are very com plex..” Senior manager o f  strategic planning unit.
“ .. by the nature o f  their jobs, the marketing people or business units’ people are not technology  
driven, they are not technology oriented. They get Information about the latest technology from 
the IT department, the IT department would com e up usually with a proposal telling the business 
units that this is what is available..” Assistant general manager o f  corporate services department.
Proactive role for the IT AGM:
“.. from my experience, many IT departments just do what the users want without adding the 
creative part and without volunteering ways and means o f  doing it better, without volunteering to 
give them more than what is requested by the users..” Head o f  the commercial banking unit.
The new cultural change proposed giving a greater role to the IT manager in business 
goal formulation by linking his fate with his business partners’ fate.
'ï:
”.. if  you link up the goals o f  the banks together between the IT and the business units and you 
make it part o f  their reward system in the case o f  the IT., how much creativity they recommended  
to promote business .. so the incentive is important in addition to the many other things., you 
make the business plan the responsibility o f  not just the business unit head, but part o f  it goes to 
the IT, it is a shared goal, once that take place you see the incentive is clear and you w ill get 
ideas..” Senior manager o f  commercial banking.
ITo prepare him for his new role as a banker and a strategy developer manager, the senior 
manager of the strategic planning unit claimed that the bank took action to change the 
profile of the IT manager from that of a technolog)' engineer with a provincial view to 
that of a banker, with broader views about his role. As mentioned earlier, business 
skills of the IT manager were groomed by the courses that he had participated in at 
Harvard, and the MBA that he had got from the UK.
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Perceived need to change the bank’s culture:
The informants talked about the change in the bank’s culture that was triggered by a 
change in the external environment. With these new economic changes in the market 
the bank perceived a need to change its paradigm about how they get things done.
Creating a cultural change:
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cultural change is dictated by the market, a culture is a dictation o f  a certain situation in the 
market that lasts for som e tim e and then it reflects on the attitude o f  the people then it becomes 
part o f  the culture. W hen this environment changes, definitely you need to review the way that 
you do certain things, the set o f  mind, the mentality. You need to change all o f  these things to be 
able to cope with the strategy or the plan ahead o f  you, because part o f  the strategic planning is 
changing our corporate culture., (the informant continued by describing the changes in the market 
place that triggered the change in their culture)., there is a change in the market situation, the 
shrinking size o f  the market, the increasing number o f  players, and com petition, customers being 
aware o f  the hunger o f  banks for business, and they are taking advantage., we need to make a 
paradigm shift .. which is to m ove away from your existing paradigm..” Head o f  commercial 
banking unit.
The senior manager of the strategic planning unit perceived IT as ephemeral in its nature
since it could be copied easily. However, he perceived achieving a sustained
competitive advantage as possible through the bank’s ability to provide quality service.
which is, in turn, intimately linked to
the bank’s culture (see Figure 9 ). The ptoasses Catrds
informant defined four variables \
C h a p i n  the Quality c f  Cbmpetitive within the bank’s culture that, once boik’scuituE * 's a v ic e  ^
altered, would affect the quality o f the
bank’s services. These factors are the Trainii^
processes and procedures within the
bank; the amount of controls affecting
the front line autonomy and ability to
make decisions; the availability of the right technology; and the availability of 
appropriate training.
“..{IT } can be copied immediately, it is all ‘off- th e-sh elf these days, you can’t have a 
proprietary right o f  IT, but on service. It is a culture. You change the culture o f  the people, 
nobody could acquire it...
... for the cultural change, the target is the people... and all our ingredients will be procedures, 
technology and controls. We have to change these things, w e have to fine tune. Here the guy 
will change. Give him more authority, give him more training..” Senior manager o f  IT planning.
A cultural gap between the top management, the IT department 
and the head of the business units:
Power to influence IT strategy:
The head of the corporate banking unit said that the power to make decisions that
influence the bank’s IT strategies was centralised with the CEO, GM, senior manager of
strategic planning, and the assistant general manager of corporate services, who set the
bank’s corporate plan, decide what goals need to be achieved by the business units and
decide whether IT will be used to support these goals. The heads of the business units
provide their suggestions and recommendations as regards the IT systems that they need.
However, they lack the power to enforce their views. The lack of influence of the
business units heads over the IT strategies affected the support that IT provided to their 
. .units.
we don’t have a great influence on IT at this stage. We only submit our requests to be 
accommodated to the IT. But at this stage we are not in a strong position to influence the 
direction o f  projects or assignments..” head o f  the commercial banking unit.
Communication, team work, clear priority and top management support 
ingredients to the gap:
The head of the commercial banking unit pinpointed the areas that he felt needed 
attention. He perceived both the business units and the IT departments as 
complementary to each other; the users may have requirements that the IT department a
343
may not be aware of, and the IT department may be aware of a system which has an 
implication to the business units which the business units are not aware of. Currently, 
the communication between the two entities was not at its best, to paraphrase the 
informant. Moreover, attention from the IT department, joint team work with the 
business units, and a clear mandate from the top management to the IT department were 
needed to overcome the IT support problems.
"... it is two sided. One is that I have a requirement that the IT people are not aware of, two the 
IT have a service that is good  for me that I am not aware of. So through proper communication, 
which at this stage, is not at its best, to be frank with you here, it is not at its best....
.. I need as a unit head to know  the potential and capabilities o f  what IT can offer m e to promote 
my business. The IT w ould like to know my exact mission, what is it I am after, what business I 
am in as a unit. If that understanding is clear for both parties.... and not only that there should be 
dedication from the IT department.... (...) they may understand each other and the IT man 
knows exactly what it takes to help that business unit to achieve its goals, but he is not interested, 
he does not have the instruction he does not have the resources, he does not have the time, 
priority is not clear,...
Q. In reality is that what is happening?
Informant: I gave you what is the optimal situation. How much o f  it is done at our level, I think 
it leaves a lot o f  room for im provement..” Head o f  the commercial banking unit.
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1Case appendix: Quotation from the consumer banking strategy booklet showing the relationship between the 
business goals and IT systems;
"The con cep t o f  consum er banking revo lves a ro u n d  re la tion sh ip  banking know ing an d  su pporting  the 
cu stom er in a ll h is her fin a n c ia l ac tiv ities  w ith tech n o lo g y  th a t en a b les the consum er to exercise g re a te r  
m anagem en t a n d  con tro l over h is/her m oney
To achieve the above objective, the plan set out the following goals;
•  " segm en tin g  the m arket b a se d  on n eed  p a ra m e te rs
•  ap p ro a ch in g  new  m arket segm ents
•  m ove c lo ser  to  clien ts through expansion  o f  branch  netw ork a n d
•  in trodu ction  o f  technology driven  items. "
Technology Strategies
In sta ll .Additional T TMs 
In troduce E F TPoS  
Enhance A T M  p ro d u ct de livery  
E nhance vo ice  respon se system  
H om e Banking
•  .4 TM  - sh arin g
•  O ffice au tom ation  an d  e lectron ic m a il”
Operational strategies:
•  F ocus on qu ick  turnaround a n d  disbursem ent.
•  E stab lish  an efficien t co llec tion  m achinery.
•  S im plify  docum entation  a n d  procedu res.
•  E stab lish  off-site loan d isb u rsa l poin ts.
« fFiden in tern ation al links.
%
F
*
*
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Functional strategies:
B asis f o r  ach ievem ent o f  defin ed  g o a ls:
1- increase a sse t levels in the fo llo w in g  m anner:
a vera g e  ba lan ces 92  93 94 95
5 1 mm 62m m  68m m  75mm
through a com bined  s tra teg y  m ade up of:
a. E nhancem ent o f  ta rge t m arket p o p u la tio n :
b. R evision  o f  existing asset a ccep ta n ce  criteria :
c. In troduction  o f  new p ro d u c ts  e.g. re c e iv a b le  f in a n cin g  o f  housing bank, m ortg a g e  loans, con su m er loans 
f o r  expatria tes, cred it cards, loan  f o r  h ou se  renovation , ca r loans, etc..
d. ....
€....
f. Launch sta te  o f  the a rt tech n o logy in c lu d in g  au to m a ted  loan a p p ro v a l a n d  o th er p ro g ra m s to  reduce  
tu rnaround tim e fo r  { im provised?} cu sto m er service.
2 - Increase cu stom er d ep o s its  in th e  f o l lo w in g  m anner:
9 2 93 9 4 95
C urrent acco u n t 18m m 18m m 20m m 23  mm
S a v in g s  and savers ch o ic e  a cco u n t 75m m 8 1 m m 85m m 89m m
T im e d e p o s its 42m m 5 6 m m 5 8 m m 6 1 m m
a. In troduce h igh  tech n o log}' ap p roach  to  retain and attract cu stom er d ep o s its  b y  la u n ch in g  n e w  products
e .g . E F T P oS , V o ic e  R e sp o n se . R ecu rrin g  D e p o s it  S ch em es.
b. Increase A T M s, and exp an d  branch n etw o rk  to  attract net d e p o s its  in se le c te d  lo ca tio n s.
c. Im prove serv ice  qualit} at b ran ch es by in tro d u c in g  autom ated  s ign atu re v er ifica tio n  program  and  
in sta lla tion  o f  V erip hne m ach in es .
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3 - In crease fe e  in c o m e  as fo llo w s;
92  93  9 4  95
0 .4 4 2  1 .1 2 5  1 .4  1 .63  (m m  B D )
D e fin e d  strategy  for a c h ie v e m e n t o f  the a forem en tion ed  vo lu m e:
1- e n h a n ce  flat fe e  c o lle c t io n  lin ed  to  in creased  loan vo lu m e.
2 - Im proved  card v o lu m e  w ill g en era te  h igh er  m erch ant fees.
4 - . . . .
Product /  target group:
cred it cards;
g iv e n  s ig n if ica n t in v estm en t into our ex is t in g  infrastructure, e x c e lle n t a c ce s s ib ility  to  ca p tiv e  c lien te le  
m ade up o f  e x is t in g  a cco u n t h o ld ers , g ap s in the m arket p la ce , the cred it card b u sin ess  p h ilo so p h y  
w arrants rev iew . T h is  a c tiv ity  sh o u ld  n o w  be v ie w e d  as a p o ten tia l in c o m e  gen erator  rather than a mere 
an cillary  serv ice .
R ev ised  criteria:
® T o  m atch  co m p e tit io n , red esig n  e x is t in g  ru les and reg u la tio n s  and d e v e lo p  rev ised  g u id e lin e s  str icth  
in c o n fo r m a n ce  w ith  A M E X  criteria  (th e  lead er  in cred it card b u s in e s s -  th e w orld  o v er ) and  
m arket d eb it card to all d ep o s ito r s  o f  L oca l F iv e  h a v in g  a m in im u m  cred it b a lan ce  (to  be selec ted  
b y d iv is io n  head).
* A n n u a l fe e s  to  b e  w a iv ed .
•  C u sto m ers  to be o ffere d  both V is a  and M asterC ard.
Im pact: w ill result in in creased  u sage . A d d itio n a l u sage  from  m erchants
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Chapter Eight
Collaboration between the banks
introduction:
Until 1994 there was no collaboration between the banks based on using IT collectively. 
There were, however, two initiatives, one, by the central bank, to automate the cheque 
clearing system which was implemented at that period, and the other an attempt to 
establish a shared ATM network. The discussion of these two cases highlights, among 
other things, some of the institutional effects within the banking environment.
The automated clearing system:
The automated cheque clearing system was mainly initiated by the central bank. The 
objective of this system was to automate the cheque clearing process which took place 
under the roof of the central bank.
The effect of the clearing system on the banks:
Effect on the processes:
I investigated the effects of the automated clearing system on the processes of three 
banks, which were Local Bank Two, Foreign Bank Five and Foreign Bank Six. None of 
these banks changed their processes to benefit the automated outcome of the clearing 
system carried out by the central bank. The banks continued to post manually from the 
hard copies that they received after each clearing cycle from the central bank. The 
informants within these banks argued that the number of cheques that they processed 
each month did not justify automating the system, as they expected to gain little in
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terms of efficiency. As for their IT systems, ail banks were instructed by the regulator}' 
body to buy Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) technology to encode the 
cheques forwarded to the central bank. This process required additional investment by 
the banks in IT, which some of these banks perceived as a burden.
Competitive effect:
The automated clearing system had no effect on the banks’ competitiveness as all of the 
clearing of cheques was done by the central bank; none of the banks were earning 
revenue nor paying for the cleared cheques.
Reason for embarking on the system:
The informant within the regulatory 
body argued that the main reason 
for embarking on the automated 
system was to enhance the 
efficiency with which the cheques 
were cleared within the central 
bank. Despite this rationale, the 
statistics show that there was a drop 
in the number of cheques processed 
from 1985 to 1991, and then an 
increase between 1991 and 1994,
2000000fT 
1800000 
1600000 
1400000 
1200000 
1000000 
800000 
600000 
400000 
200000 
0
■  # of cleared 
checks
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
F igure 1: N um ber o f  c le a re d  cheques
Source: Statistical Abstract 1994, Central statistics 
Organisation, Directorate o f  Statistics, State o f  Bahrain.
I
f
1i
- ' f
!i
t
the year in which the automated system started operating. The inference may be dra\^n 
that the number of cheques was only one of the factors that rationalised the bank's 
adoption decision (see Figure 1). The other rationale, which may have been more 
influential on the bank’s adoption decision was their desire to become isomorphic with 
other central banks within the GCC countries that had automated clearing systems.
I
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Shared ATM network:
Absence of collaboration (1994):
Up to 1994, the banks did not collaborate among themselves to share an ATM network.
Some of the banks, i.e. Local 5 and Local 4, invested heavily in creating a large branch
.network - estimated to be two thirds o f the total branches in Bahrain - to capture a 
bigger share of the retail market. The rest of the commercial banks in Banrain owned 
only one third of the total number of branches.
The strategic advantage of the banks’ ATMs was restricted by the size o f the banks’ 
branch networks, since there was no common ATM network amongst these banks. 
Those with larger branch networks had the biggest strategic advantages while the rest of
the case with some of the local banks.
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Informants from the banks mentioned that no stand-alone ATM was allowed to be 
installed, as this type of ATM was classified by the central bank as a branch which the 
banks would have to pay license fees for. Each bank installed their ATMs mainly in 
their branches.
the banks were limited in their------------ ------
branch network as the ellipses in
Figure 2 indicates. The small banks
were either restricted in the number
of branches they were allowed to ^ ^  ^ ^ /Taax
open, i.e. the foreign banks, and
hence were unable to provide as ( f?) O
—  F 3many ATMs as the two big local
banks, or perceived the ATMs as f ig u r e  2: C om parison  on stra teg ic  p o te n tia l o f  the loca l and
fo re ig n  banks ' individual A TM netw orksvery expensive to invest in, as was

The strategic implications of the shared ATM network:
strategic implications to the small banks:
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that w ill be beneficial to us because w e have only one location in Bahrain, our card holder will 
go to any ATM and this w ill enhance our competitiveness., som e banks have a lot o f  ATM s in 
Bahrain, so why should they join ., why should they let ‘F I’ to use the network. This is ver> 
small market and the com petition is very tight and the population is only about half a million.."  
IM manager, Foreign Bank One.
I think there are a lot o f  opportunities., for example, if  they agree among them selves to have a 
national network, any customer from any bank w ill go to any bank and withdraw money, and it is 
an advantage to me as a bank., if  I have six branches, then I w ill have more than forty branches., 
my customers w ill be happy because they can go to any ATM  and withdraw money, my 
customers w ill be happy this mean that my customers will stay with me., the other thing is that 
small banks that don’t have the budget to have w ide range o f  ATM  network, they can depend on 
such sort o f  facilities., there are a lot o f  opportunities and a lot o f  benefits..” IT manager, Local 
Bank Three.
“.. the reason w e thought that it w ould be advantage to us to Join the W AN, because we have 
only two ATM s... Local Four and Local Five have their network all over the place. So why the) 
want to join!” IT manager. Foreign Bank Two.
“.. The banks that have larger market share would be reluctant because they will lose their edge, 
but on the other hand they can get som e fees, because if  som ebody else uses their system they can 
charge fees. It is a balance between the two. I think there is value in sharing products or services 
because as I said earlier nothing w ill be unique about this business six months from where it is.." 
Deputy manager. Foreign Bank Two.
" the only thing that 1 am looking for, is sharing ATMs., if  w e had shared ATMs, it would have 
helped a lot the market, the customers and Bahrain as a financial centre.. I feel very sorry for 
Bahrain that because w e had the idea ahead o f  all o f  the GCC. now w e find this ATM  sharing in 
Oman, in Kuwait, in UAE and in Saudi. But in Bahrain we don’t have it because o f  two banks 
they don’t want to.. I do agree with them., i f  I were Local Four or Local Five, I would not want 
Foreign Bank Six to use their ATM s, because they have 20 branches each and we have only five, 
others have only one. It is to my advantage...” Corporate Banking Manager, F6.
The shared ATM  is som ething that is going to proof our com petitiveness because .. it was a 
negative for a time for us when we wanted to expand but w e were not allowed., we alw a\s  
wanted to be part o f  a network because we as a foreign bank are not allowed to open man) 
branches..” IT manager, International Bank Six.
Ï:I
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The above are quotations from informants within the small banks expressing their 
attitude towards the shared ATM network. The small banks perceived that a large 
branch network is a critical success factor for securing a sound business in the retail 
market. To them, the most important 
effect of the shared ATM network is the 
competitive parity (see Figure 3) that they 
expected to gain from the network by 
securing access to the big banks’ shared 
ATM network. This advantage was 
expected to provide the small banks’ 
clients with the same banking
Figure 3: Perceived competitive parity  o f  the shared  
convenience that the big banks’ clients network - everybody is alike.
enjoyed, and therefore, diminish the
competitive superiority that the big banks experienced prior to the shared network.
Some small banks, on the other hand, i.e. F4 and L2, were cautious about the cost of 
joining the shared network. F4‘s general manager said that he would approach the 
matter very carefully by evaluating the cost of joining the network. As to L2, the bank 
was concerned about having to keep pace with the banks that are liberal in their 
spending on IT, which may influence the design of the network.
I
I
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Strategic implication to the big banks:
The big two banks were racing to create a big branch network equipped with ATMs as a 
strategic goal for controlling a bigger share of the market. Both banks spent a fortune to 
achieve this level of spread. Local Five considered the shared ATM network as a 
strategic threat, as they expected a diminishing value in their large branch network, in 
which they had invested a lot to establish.
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until now there is no joint benefits as we are leading and we are not w elling to go to any one 
and say {did not continue his sentence}., as being the largest bank, w e are away ahead .. we are 
glad to have people with us but the same question applies., what is the added value for us... if  we 
have a justification w e w ill do it..” IT manager. Local Five.
In contrast to Local Five, Local Four perceived a strategic advantage from the shared 
ATM network; however, only if it was run by them. The advantage that they were 
expecting was through earning commission fees from running the shared network. The 
more banks that joined the network, the higher the commission earned from the switch 
network. It was unlikely, however, that Local Five would submit to Local Four and join 
their network. In this instance, the strategic parity to the small banks would decrease 
since at least one third of the ATMs in Bahrain would remain outside the shared 
network. As for Local Four, the absence of Local Five would mean that fewer fees 
could be generated from the proposed network.
I
Agreement to delay the shared switch:
:Prior to the Local Four initiative to introduce a shared switch, which will be discussed 
below, five of the retail banks, according to the Local Four account, met and decided to 
postpone any attempt to introduce a switch network that could run the EFTPoS and the 
ATMs. As one of the reasons behind this decision, Local Four mentioned that none of 
these banks had a mature IT infrastructure to accommodate the new shared systems, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, they were unwilling to invest heavily in upgrading their 
outmoded infrastructure.
Local Four proposal to run the shared ATM network:
The competition between the big two banks was fierce. The initiatives of each bank 
affected the strategies of the other. Both banks embarked on expanding their branch 
network and established large branch networks as compared to the rest of the banks.
Similarly, both banks adopted contemporary IT systems such as the ATMs, phone 
banking, and the EFTPoS.
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The race between the two banks was resolved in favour of Local Four, when it adopted 
the Base 24 modular system that runs on the non-stop Tandem mainframe. The Base 
24 enabled the bank to run up to one thousand ATMs. At the outset of the adoption 
process, Local Four did not have the vision to propose a shared ATM network in 
Bahrain or elsewhere. However, the bank was guided by its vendor who proposed this 
software to the bank. Base 24 was the only application system that could run on the 
Tandem machine, according to the IT manager in Local Four. There was not any other 
system available that could run fewer ATM machines. Local Four had to adopt this 
system because they had invested in the hardware. By adopting Base 24, Local Four 
enjoyed an excess capacity in its IT capabilities that gave the bank its future strategic 
thrust. According to the Local Four account, their competitor. Local Five, did not have 
the motivation to follow Local Four in buying Base 24, as they would also have to 
invest in buying Tandem hardware. Such huge investment in the hardware and software 
was not justifiable to Local Five, since they did not envisage running a switch network 
in Bahrain, nor did they expect that they would need to run as big a number of ATMs as 
that run by Base 24.
With excess capacity in their IT environment, Local Four’s approach to the market 
became more aggressive. They perceived less competitive advantage driven from the 
ATMs, as all of the banks had adopted these machines which became a ‘generic' 
product that every bank offered. Local Four perceived a strategic advantage, however, 
by capitalising on their excess capacity through running a shared ATM and EFTPoS 
network to the other banks and earning income commission out of the their excess IT 
capacity that none of the rivals, including their immediate rival. Local Five, could afford 
to do.
According to the Local Four account, they approached a number of small banks who 
were willing to join, but before signing the agreement, the whole project was stopped by 
the regulatory body. Local Five perceived a strategic threat from Local Four’s initiative. 
They expected that local Four would enjoy a permanent supremacy if they owned the 
network, and because of the small size of the Bahraini market, Local Five would not be
354

able to nullify Local Four’s competitive advantage by initiating another shared ATM 
network.
The regulatory body initiative:
The regulatory body stepped in as a result of the Local Five’s protest against Local 
Four’s initiative. Their rationale was to prevent the monopoly of any bank over the 
network due to the small size of the country that did not allow multiple networks to run 
simultaneously. The regulatory body had two proposals; the first was to have an 
independent company formed by the banks to run the shared network and the second 
was to run the shared network by themselves. The second proposal was selected since it 
was closer to the culture of the regulatory body which promoted a tight supervision of 
the industry.
A
T
M
EFTPoS
ATM
Regulatory
Body Visa,
Amex,
Master/C
Diner,
ATM
Bank
Bank
Bank
etc..
Possible options.
Figure 4: Proposed Switch by the regulatory body
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The strategic implication of the central bank proposal:
Figure 4 represents the regulatory body shared network proposal. All banks would be
linked to a central switch run by the regulatory body. Any settlement between the banks
would be done through this switch. The proposal also included installing stand-alone
.ATMs. These ATMs would be either the responsibility of some banks, option A, or of 
the regulatory body, option B. In a later phase, the network would be linked with Visa, 
AMEX, Master Card, Diners, etc. As it was with the stand-alone ATMs, the link with 
the Debit/Credit cards would be done either through the affiliated banks or directly with 
the central switch.
The proposal allows the banks which do not have any ATM machines, such as bank B in 
Figure 4 , to issue cards to its customers to enable them to use the network.
Project fees:
The proposal suggested charging two types of fees. The first type is paid by the issuer 
bank - who uses somebody else’s ATMs - to the regulatory body to cover the cost of the 
switch. The clients of the issuer bank bear a portion of this fee.
The second type of fee is paid by the issuer bank to the acquirer bank - the bank whose 
ATMs were used.
The regulatory body initiative prevented Local Four from dominating the market with its 
proposed switch.
To the smaller banks, the presence of the two large banks in the network maximised the
strategic benefit driven for the shared network as the two banks owned more than two- 
thirds of the ATMs in Bahrain, and provided a spread to the strategic areas in the 
country.
%
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As for the big banks, the shared network transported the two banks into a new era in 
which the strategic advantage was not driven any more by the availability of ATMs, but 
rather by the fees that these networks generate when the smaller banks’ clients use the 
two big local banks’ ATMs.
The selection of Base 24 and Tandem:
The central bank selected the very software and hardware systems (Base 24 and 
Tandem) that Local Four adopted, and proposed its shared network prior to the central 
bank initiative. The credit for selecting these systems may be attributed to Local Four’s 
vendor who managed successfully to push its systems to a number of financial 
institutions in the Gulf.
I infer that the selection of the software by the central bank might be for reasons related 
to the central bank plans to link the Bahrain switch to other switches in the Gulf. Some 
of these switches use Base 24 and Tandem hardware. There is another possible 
explanation, however, for using these systems. Local Four refrained from joining the 
regulatory body network at the outset of the proposal. It could be that the central bank's 
initiative to select Base 24 and Tandem was to appease Local Four who would need to 
do less adaptation of their systems to join the central bank switch.
Local Four regional shared network initiative:
While the dispute between the main stakeholders within the Bahraini banking industry 
was taking place over the proposed shared ATM network. Local Four pursued its 
strategies to implement the shared network elsewhere. It collaborated with some other 
foreign banks as well as its sister banks, in which it had shares, to create a regional 
shared ATM connecting these banks within the Gulf region. Local Four was more 
successful in its regional attempt than the local one. The bank and its regional partners 
agreed to use Base 24 and Tandem as the nucleus for their initiative. The Local Four 
allied vendor was the supplier of the mentioned systems.
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àCulture -  Local Four initiative, and the lack of initiative of the 
small banks:
358
As quoted earlier, the small banks perceived the shared ATM network as a strategic I 
option which would provide them with a competitive parity with the big banks. The 
question that might be raised is, why did the small banks not collaborate among 
themselves to establish this shared network?
A possible rationale for the above question can be attributed to the culture of the small 
banks. Almost all of the small banks were followers in the market and belonged to the 
second wave of adopters that came approximately five years after the first wave of ATM 
adoption took place. These small banks perceived IT as a ‘demanding mistress’ and 
preferred to ‘play it safe’ in the market. It was unlikely that very conservative small 
banks would take the initiative and propose a shared ATM network to accommodate 
their joint needs. Moreover, some of these banks, because of the lack of top 
management’s willingness to invest in IT, were suffering such deficiencies in their 
systems that they were falling apart. These banks were unable to cope with the 
complexity of implementing new systems. The ‘know-how’ was a problem to many of 
them. Moreover, reaching a mutual agreement about the details of the shared network
%was a bottle-neck that they could not pass through. This resulted in the demise of some 
early proposals:
we did not approach any one here, I think we did once. An idea came from Local Four, and it 
was rejected altogether. There were other banks {who rejected the idea}. I think the picture was 
not clear as to what w ill happen to my transaction, who will bear that cost, and then who w ill do 
the clearing..” IT manager. Foreign Bank Two.
As for the small foreign banks, the control of the banks’ IT scene was centralised with |
the headquarters which were not concerned with the Bahraini market.
Local Four proposed the network because its culture was a ‘defiant’ one, willing to take 
the risk and devote the required financial resources. The bank’s alliance with its vendor, 
and with other international banks in the Gulf created an opportunity for the vendor to 
push its technology and to create a link between these collaborating rivals based on I

sharing an ATM network - e.g. Local Four was linked with one international bank and 
another regional bank in one of the Gulf countries; Base 24 was the nucleus for this link. 
Moreover, Local Four owned some shares in a switch network in one of the Gulf 
countries which runs on Base 24. The bank’s exposure to the creation of the switch 
network in that country decreased Local Four’s perceived risk associated with such 
projects an advantage that none of the other local banks were exposed to, including 
Local Five.
Discussion:
I
Influence of the central bank on the banks’ adoption behaviour:
Both cases demonstrate the influence of the regulatory body on the banks’ adoption 
behaviour. In the first case, the central bank coercively influenced the adoption of the 
MICR technology within these banks. This type of technology had no link whatever to ;the commercial banks’ business goals nor to their efficiency. Though the automated
system had the potential of improving efficiency within the commercial banks, these 
.banks did not re-engineer their processes nor did they adapt their IT application systems 
to accept the automated processes of the central bank. The bottom line for these banks 
however, was to comply to the central bank’s request and adopt the system regardless of 
how it was perceived.
:r
4The second case study demonstrates the influence of the regulatory body on the way in
'which the IT systems were deployed in providing services, e.g. not to use the stand 
alone ATMs beyond the boundary of the banks' branches, and also on the way in which 
the banking community’s competitive structure, driven by using IT collectively, was 
influenced by the regulatory body. The interference of the regulatory body disabled one 
of the banks from exploiting its IT capabilities to gain a competitive advantage by 
monopolising the network. This interference provided a protection buffer to other banks 
against the active rival’s initiatives.
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C ited  in Scott. R. (1 9 9 5 , p. 128), In stitu tio n s and O r g a n isa tio n s', Sage
The culture of the regulatory body cultivated accordingly certain IT initiatives that 
conformed to its culture and at the same time discouraged other initiatives that did not 
conform to that culture. For example, it was not surprising that the proposed shared 
ATM network be run by the regulatory body rather than any individual bank or banks 
collaborating without its intervention. Under this culture, the regulatory body played a 
major role in the collective IT projects which were more likely to be implemented 
successfully due to their influential power.
Response to the regulated environment:
Oliver (1991, p. 152)’ identified five general strategies for responding to institutional 
environments; these are acquiescing, comprom ising, avoiding, defying, and manipulating.
The commercial banks had to acquiesce to the tightly regulated banking environment. 
However, they differed in how they responded or reacted to this type of institution in 
their environment.
Examples came from Local Four in which the bank attempted to defy the tightly 
regulated environment through proposing the shared switch network and calling for 
other banks to join its initiatives, an attempt that did not succeed, as explained earlier. 
However, in the absence of the regulatory influence in the regional markets, Local Four 
was able to establish with its regional partners their regional shared network. I infer that 
by approaching the regional partners. Local Four delivered a message to the banking 
community in Bahrain that the shared network was becoming a reality it was able to 
create, regardless of the institutional factors inhibiting or delaying its establishment 
locally.
I
The tightly regulated banking industry and the culture of the regulatory body provided 
Local Five with the ability to avoid the competitive disadvantage it could have gone 
through had Local Four been able to implement its shared ATM network. As mentioned
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earlier, Local Five protested to the regulatory body which interfered on its behalf to stop 
the Local Four attempt. Despite this intervention, Local Four was able to manipulate 
the proposal of the regulatory body by enforcing its vendor’s systems, which minimised 
the cost of joining the switch network. Both big banks were also able to manipulate the 
allocation of charge fees for using the network to provide them with a competitive 
advantage from their branch network legacy.
The regulatory body, through their regulatory role, managed to ‘bang heads’ together
'.V
and brought all parties to an agreement or imposed one on them. As for the foreign 
banks in Bahrain, the coercive orders of the regulatory body eased the process of getting 
the green light from their headquarters to spend on joining the shared network. As 
mentioned earlier, decisions concerning the IT initiatives were to a great extent 
centralised within these foreign banks’ headquarters. The smaller banks in general 
seemed to play a passive role in the process of sharing the ATM network, though they 
were nervous about the cost implications of joining the network.
Though a comparison between the Bahraini and the British experience of establishing 
shared networks is beyond the scope of my thesis, I find it tempting to briefly discuss 
the effect of the regulated market on the competitive behaviour in each environment. 
Within the British deregulated banking industry (Howells et al, 1993), the attempts to 
establish an EFTPoS network went through different phases, from collective efforts to 
establish the network through an organisation (EFTPoS UK) in which all banks were 
participating, to the emergence of strategic alliances between the different groups of 
banks and, hence, collaboration between these allied banks to counter the initiatives of 
the others. This eventually led to the demise of the early initiative of the EFTPoS UK 
organisation. In contrast to the above deregulated banking environment, the Bahriani 
tightly regulated banking industry allowed no alliances nor strategic collaboration 
between the banks to emerge beyond its direct supervision. Collective initiatives 
became feasible only under the umbrella of the regulatory body.
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Drivers to the Initiatives:
There was a high level of inertia among the banks about adopting joint IT initiatives. 
Indeed, there was an implicit agreement among some of the key banks to reject the 
shared ATM network, and keep the status quo within the industry. The great uncertainty 
about what to do, the maturity of the banks’ IT infrastructure and the cost consequences 
o f the shared networks might have been behind this inertia.
The driver, however, for the shared ATM network came from one bank. Local Four, 
rather than being collectively proposed by the other banks especially the smaller ones 
despite their awareness of the strategic implication of the shared network. This might be 
attributed, as mentioned above, to the higher inertia level within the smaller banks, on 
the one hand, and the tightly regulated environment on the other.
The regional banking industries such as the Saudi and the Kuwaiti, for example, which 
had had their shared ATM networks, created additional pressure on the central bank to 
encourage the implementation of the shared network. The central bank desired to be 
isomorphic to the rest of the Gulf banking industries and appear to be as advanced as the 
others, especially as the central bank was promoting the notion that Bahrain was the 
financial centre for the region.
Similarly, the stimulus of the automated cheque clearing system, I infer, was more 
related to gaining a favourable image rather than just gaining efficiency within the 
central bank. The automated clearing system was perceived as a status symbol by the 
central bank that it wanted to achieve so as to be in line with the rest of the Gulf States. 
I infer that this driver had more weight than the rational efficiency account that was 
provided.
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Impact of Infrastructure on the banks' competitiveness:
The shared ATM case study demonstrated the influence of the maturity of IT 
infrastructure on the banks’ competitive approaches. To some o f these banks, like Local 
Four for instance, the maturity of the IT infrastructure was the main driver behind 
proposing the shared ATM network. On the other hand, the less advantaged banks, the 
majority of which were the small banks, were unable to pursue their strategic interest 
partly due to their disadvantaged infrastructure, a factor influenced by the banks' 
culture, as will be discussed elsewhere within the thesis.
Threshold size and strategic Influence of IT:
There were references in the informants’ narrative replies to the effect of size on their 
adoption behaviour. I infer from their reply that there was a threshold size beyond 
which the banks did not have the incentive to adopt some IT systems such as the ATMs, 
or adopt a wide branch network strategy because of their small customer base. 
However, beyond a certain threshold point in size, the banks were more able to adopt 
more aggressive strategies similar to Local Four initiatives.
Conclusion:
The shared ATM case study demonstrates the influence of the institutionalised 
regulations on how the banks approached the collective IT projects.
Moreover, it demonstrates the inertia within the industry that delayed the initiation of 
the shared ATMs despite their strategic importance to the banking industry.
The case study indicates that the joint IT project was shaped by the negotiation power of 
the main stakeholders who are influenced and influence the institutionalised regulatory 
norms within the industry.
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Chapter Nine
IT Strategy
Introduction:
This chapter provides an aggregate account of the themes provided within the single 
case studies. These themes were driven from the categories that described the IT 
strategy formulation, business strategy formulation, the relation between IT and business 
strategies, and the drivers of IT initiatives.
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Bryson and Currie (1995) contended that the underlying bases of IT strategy may be 
placed within two camps. The first of these perceives IT strategy as a formal rational 
process while the other perceives it as dependent on contingencies and therefore more 
ad hoc in nature. Bryson et al argue that these views are not entirely mutually exclusive 
in that there is a middle ground in which the IT strategy may share elements from both 
paradigms. The following is a brief discussion of each paradigm.
The formal-rational paradigm views organisations as ‘systems with coherent purposes 
and shared goals’ and perceives the strategy formulation process as a series of logical 
steps (Walsham, 1993, p. 143). This approach has its roots in the economic theories 
which adopt the notion of the “economic man’ who attempts to maximise the outcome 
of his decision (Currie, 1995. p. 58). Moreover, the paradigm assumes that effective 
utilisation of IT is critical to the organisation’s success. The literature within this 
school, such as that of Porter and Miller (1985), emphasises the importance of IT in 
driving competitive advantage. The inefficient utilisation of IT becomes a factor 
undermining the organisation’s competitiveness. The extent of damage caused by the 
inefficient utilisation of IT depends upon the intensity of competitiveness within the 
environment (Bryson et al, 1995). The critiques of Earl (1988, 1989) and Scott Morton 
(1991) are two examples within the literature that belong to the formal rational 
paradigm.

As discussed in the literature chapter, Earl (1988, 1989) prescribed techniques to aid the 
generation of strategic vision. However, sceptics of the formal rational approach argue 
that, although the formal rational approaches, such as that of Earl’s, may prove o f  some 
use in a particular context, but vision appears to derive largely from tacit knowledge and cannot be 
reduced to a series o f  logical Inferences and steps..” Walsham (1993, p. 161). Further criticism has 
been aired arguing that this approach fails to consider competing values, objectives and 
power bases..” (Currie, 1995, p. 61). Moreover, the amount of detail contained in the formal- 
rational frameworks is a further criticism, as it tends to confuse the decision makers 
rather than assist them (ibid., p. 61).
The other school studying the strategy formation is the interpretative or the behavioural 
(Currie, 1995, p. 69). Belonging to this school, Walsham (1993) adopted “broadly 
interpretative methods”. His approach aimed at understanding the context of the 
information system (IS), and the process by which IS influences and is influenced by 
this context. This approach incorporates issues such as the social context - historical 
context and multilevel context - and social processes - process of cultural change and 
process of political change - among other things, to understand the background from 
which the 'discourse’ about IS strategy takes place. Mintzberg (1994) provides another 
example of those who cast doubt on the formal rational approach to strategic planning. 
In an earlier work, Mintzberg and Waters (1989) discussed the emergent nature of the 
strategy process and described it as the second foot that complements the deliberate 
process. Quinn (1989, p. 20) criticised the ‘text-book’ framework approach and 
advocated a 'logical incrementalism’ in which he emphasised the importance of a 
flexible process:
•‘Executives managing strategic change in large organisations should not - and do not - follow  
highly formalised textbook approaches in long range planning, goal generation, and strategy 
formulation. Instead, they artfully blend formal analysis, behavioural techniques, and power 
politics to bring about cohesive, step-by-step movement toward ends which initially are broadly 
conceived, but which are then constantly refined and reshaped as new information appears. Their
I'
integrated methodology can best be described as ‘logical incrementalism”.
The above author and others have viewed strategy as a process of negotiation which 
stresses the political nature of organisations (Bryson and Currie, 1995). Johnson (1989) 
emphasised the role of the organisational paradigm - common beliefs and assumptions
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held through the organisation - in interpreting the environmental stimuli and configuring 
the organisational strategic responses (p. 45). He further argued that:
strategic decisions could be explained better in terms o f  political processes than analytical 
procedures; that cognitive maps o f  managers are better explanations o f  their perceptions o f  the 
environment and their strategic responses than are analysed position statements and evaluative 
techniques...” (p. 43).
Currie (1995, p. 74) revealed in her field work, which she conducted between 1990 and 
1992 in Japan, the USA, UK and West Germany, that strategy making for advanced 
manufacturing technology (AMT) was not based upon strict adherence to formal 
rational strategic planning. Instead, it was more incremental and ad hoc in nature. She 
argued that the AMT strategy was more influenced by the allocated financial budget 
rather than a thorough investigation of all relevant information that characterised the 
rational formal planning. Moreover, the process of strategy formation marked the
political struggle over scarce resources amongst the different departments. To quote her:
“In A nglo/Am erican companies, the annual budget varied only marginally. In times o f  recession, 
it was likely that the budget would be cut by, say, ten percent. This would obviously affect 
management choice about which systems to purchase and w ould inevitably lead to priority- 
setting decision-m aking designed to satisfy rather than m aximise out-com es..” (p. 75).
In this chapter, I embarked on using a spectrum similar to Bryson et al (1995) to help 
demonstrate the extent to which the banks were aligned to the formal rational or ad hoc 
paradigms to strategy formation. I would like to mention, however, that the Bryson et al 
spectrum was not sufficiently well described to enable exact representation of the banks. 
However, as I mentioned above, the spectrum may help in demonstrating the extent to 
which a given bank’s strategies were aligned to the paradigms. I have used the phrase 
‘aligned’ to indicate that the bank’s strategies may possess some characteristics of the 
opposite paradigm and need not purely subscribe to one paradigm. The following is a 
quotation from Bryson study demonstrating the limitation of their spectrum:
“We stress that this a conceptual model in the sense o f  being a heuristic device rather than an 
exact representation o f  the precise point in the continuum to which an organisation subscribes.."
(p. 679)
i
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Figure 1 represents the Biyson et al spectrum and the criteria they used to determine to 
which paradigm the strategy may be aligned.
forma! rational ad hoc
paradigms Rational formalism Logical incrementalism
Strategic value o f  IT critical
strategic
important little not
IT objectives for the 
future
formally stated 
unknown
Outlined unstated
V iew  o f  the future clear and predictable 
uncertain
less certain
Alignm ent o f  IT goals 
and overall 
organisational strategy
tight some none
Business orientation o f  
IT
very high medium low
Inputs to IT strategy
Role o f  top 
management
critical important little involvement none
Involvement o f  
mgt. consultants
high low none
Figure I: Bryson et al spectrum.
In addition to the Bryson et al. spectrum, I found Mintzberg and Waters (1989) typology 
of strategy approaches helpful in describing some of the banks’ strategies. Three of 
these are outlined below as they are related to the analysis of the cases.
Strategy Major features
Planned “Strategies originate in formal plans: precise intentions exist, formulated and 
articulated by central leadership, backed up by formal controls to ensure 
surprise-free implementation benign, controllable or predictable 
environment: strategies most deliberate” p. 16
Entrepreneurial “Strategies originate in central vision: intentions exist as personal, 
unarticulated vision o f  single leader, and so adaptable to new opportunities; 
organisation under personal control o f  leader and located in protected niche 
in environment; strategies relatively deliberate but can emerge” p. 16
Imposed strategies can be imposed from outside as well; that is, the environment 
can directly force the organisation into a pattern in its stream o f  actions, 
regardless o f  the presence o f  central controls. The clearest case o f  this 
occurs when an external individual or group with a great deal o f  influence 
over the organisation imposes a strategy on it..” p. 14.
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The following sections within this chapter discuss the following themes:
• the formulation of IT strategies and the role of the IT manager in this process;
• the formulation of business strategies;
• the relationship between business strategies and IT strategies; and
• the drivers of IT initiatives.
Formulation of IT strategies within the local 
banks:
j
Early stages of IT formulation:
Local banks:
More alignment to: 
Formal Rational Ad hoc
Table I: Phases o f  strategy form ulation exercise:
Early sta g e s  of IT strategy developm ent;
No reference to formalized strategic planning: L1, L2. 
L3
IT strategies: Improvised how ever driven 
by expansion goa ls, com petitor initiatives 
and vendor.
L4. L5
IT strategies: Operationally oriented L2. LI, 
13
. ' i f
t
The formulation of IT strategies within the local banks went into different maturity 
phases (see Table 1). During the early phases, there was no formal strategic planning 
taking place within the local banks, be it corporate strategies or IT strategies. The 
initiatives that the banks followed were of an ad hoc nature. According to Bryson et al 
(1995, p. 679):
if  the organisation does not view  IT as strategically important then it follow s that they will 
take an ad hoc approach by default. On the other hand, if  IT is seen as strategically important 
then there is an option between a formal rationalist, a logical incrementalist or a more ad hoc 
approach for the organisation.” .
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' I
I:
The IT strategies for the small local banks during this phase were more concerned with 
the automation of manual processes o f the banks’ backoffice operations than with the 
banks’ business. For the majority of the local banks, this stage was a chaotic one.
Failure was reported by LI- the bank had to scrap its systems at a later date - poorly : 
developed and integrated application systems were reported by L3, and a hardware 
system was acquired by L4 without any software system to support it. IT was a 
newcomer to the banks which had little knowledge about how to handle it. It was 
costly, as most of the banks perceived it, and demanded expertise, the lack of which 
resulted in the failure the banks reported.
The IT strategy goals for the big banks, L4 and L5, emerged incrementally during the 
early phases. The strategies were not documented nor did they follow a framework 
leading them step by step towards their pre-defmed goals. They were improvised, 
however, spurred by the desire of each of the big two banks to secure its leadership 
status in the local market. There were references to business goals driving these IT 
initiatives. For example, L4 and L5 both competed in expanding their branch network 
which demanded deploying IT for this target. Competition was one of the goals that led 
the big banks, according to L4. Other strategic issues were cost cutting and efficiency 
achieving, as mentioned by L4. These goals represented the ‘umbrella’ which defined 
the overall vision and goals and allowed the banks’ strategies to emerge. The big banks 
differed from the small banks in that their improvised IT strategies had links to their 
business goals and were perceived as competitive weapons, an issue which the small 
local banks did not comprehend then.
The top management relationship with the IT departments was strained in the small 
banks. The top management were unwilling to respond to the appeals of the IT 
managers due to the perceived high cost o f IT systems and the lack of appreciation of 
their business implications.
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I
The big banks’ top management were more supportive to their IT managers, though I 
strains in the relationship did exist, as reported
by L4. The IT managers, during this early Broad goals, e g.
com petitiveness,
phase, were the main visionaries and product Screes of 
champions. Moreover, the vendors, as reported " \  j
IT Top . J
. i l t h i  j  • , . 1 ' ' . 1  Vendors---------►  ► management — ► .Adoptionmainly by L4, played a major role in dnvmg the manager
improvised ad hoc IT strategies during this
Figure 2: Im provised  adop tio n  o f  IT- b a se d  on L4 phase. As will be discussed in more detail view s
elsewhere in the thesis, the vendors played a
proactive role in directing the adoption of IT strategies. If the vendors had a new 
technology that would meet the big two banks broad goals- being competitive and cost 
effective- then they would take the initiative to educate the banks about its implications 
and hence influence their emergent strategies. During this phase, the IT managers 
perceived the exhibitions and seminars run by the vendor, or any other parties, as one of 
the main sources of information which influenced their improvised strategies (see Figure
-I
3
During this phase, the practice amongst the banks was to develop their systems 
internally, e.g. LI and L2 backoffice systems, L3 PC application systems, and L4 f
application systems, to run on the Tandem mainfi-ame. However, when the IT systems |
were interrelated with the banks’ competitive ability, the big banks, as reported by L4, 
shifted from internally developing their systems to buying off-the-shelf systems as the 
cost and risk of failure of the off-the-shelf systems were perceived to be lower than of 
the internally developed systems, and as there was less need to employ 'armies of 
experts’, as L4 described, to develop the systems that were becoming more and more f
complex in nature. Moreover, the pace of adoption with the off-the-shelf systems
enabled the big two banks, L4 and L5, to counterattack each other’s initiatives- based on |' f
L4 views.
J
4
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Foreign banks:
It is not feasible to discern the phases that the foreign banks’ IT strategy formation went 
through, since these banks’ strategies were centralised away from Bahrain, as will be 
discussed later.
Later stage of IT formation:
Table 2 and the following tables describe the later phase of the IT formation process 
amongst the local banks.
More aligned to; 
Formal Rational Ad hoc
Table 2: L a ter p h a se  o f  IT form u la tion .
Form al d e v e lo p m e n t o f IT s tr a te g ies L3, L4. L5
N o re feren ce  to form al d e v e lo p m e n ts  o f IT 
s tr a te g ie s
L1,L2
input to IT s tr a te g ie s  (re feren ce  m a d e  to):
O n e  m an  sh o w  - links to  ven d ors and R ole  
m od el b an ks.
L1
R e fe r e n c e  to C o m m ittees, with major influence  
o f GM, referen ce  to board m em b ers  participation 
for m ajor IT approval.
L2
IT m a n a g er  - ad  h o c  s y s te m  d ev e lo p m en ts L2
R e fe re n c e  to c o n su lta n ts L3, L4. L5
S teer in g  co m m itte e s -  IT strategy  cen tra lised
with:
L3, L4, L5
S S C  s u b s e t  o f corporate planning 
co m m ittee , aid aligning IT strategy  to 
b u s in e s s  s tra teg ies .
L3, L4, L5
participation o f rep resen ta tives of 
b u s in e s s  units in th e  S S C
L4
Participation restricted to top  
m a n a g em en t - exclu sion  of b u s in ess  
units h e a d s
L5
T op m a n a g em en t - not precisely  
defin ed  w h o th ey are
L3
R e fe r e n c e  to  rep resen ta tiv es  from board  
m e m b e r s  to e v a lu a te  th e overali g o a ls  o f IT 
s tr a te g ie s  and liaison with th e board o f directors
L3
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Formulation of IT strategy:
Four of the local banks experienced changes in their culture. These banks were LI, L3, 
L4, and L5. More about this change is discussed in the banks’ culture chapter. With 
this change, three of the banks, L3, L4, and L5 experienced high isomorphism in their IT 
formation approach. The other two small banks exhibited some similarity in their IT 
strategy formation despite the difference in their adoption vitality.
The two big banks, L5 and L4, then followed by one of the small banks, L3, shifted their 
IT strategy formation to a formal rational approach. The three banks argued that they 
had had a formal IT strateg}'. The documents of the strategic plans, stated formally the 
objectives of the IT. I managed to verify this claim by examining one of these strategic 
documents in L5. According to Bryson et al., achieving this criterion would align these 
banks to the formal rational paradigm (see Figure 1). The three banks followed the first 
type of Mintzberg et al. typology which is the “planned strategy” since the strategies 
originated in formal plans, formulated by central leadership as will be discussed later, 
and backed up by formal controls for implementing them. However, the environment 
was not controllable and benign as was stipulated by Mintzberg et al. Accordingly, 
Local 4 had to postpone implementing its ‘planned strategy’ until around two years later 
than intended mainly because of the unexpected crisis of the Gulf war, and Local 5 had 
to reduce the time horizon of its second ‘planned strategy’ to cover only 3 years rather 
than 5 years to cope with the new market conditions.
.1
;
I
'
J
In contrast to the three banks, LI and L2, 
which were small in size, continued to 
approach their IT initiatives informally and B u s i n e s s  p i s o s  i n d  g o i l s
A  M u l t i p l e  m e t h o d o l o g y  
T
IT
O p p o r t u n i t i e s
in an ad hoc manner. T o p B o t t o m I n s i d e
d o w n u p
Earl (1989) defined a multiple
A p p li ca tion  St rategic  Planmethodology approach (Figure 3 ) in which 
he argued that a three pronged attack
approach” top-down, bottom up, and Figure 2: i s  s tra teg y  form u la tio n : a m u ltip le
m ethodology.
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inside-out" is needed for IS strategy formation.
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The three rational banks did not follow EarTs approach literally. However, there were 
references in the banks’ formation approaches, which I inferred from the banks' 
narrative description, that may give support to some of Earl’s methodologies over the 
others. The IT strategy formation within the three banks was more aligned to top-down, 
bottom-up approaches than the inside-out, which received no explicit reference from the 
informants.
IThe three banks argued that the impetus to their IT strategies was mainly their businessgoals, which they formulated guided by the consultants. L5, the first of the three banks
to implement its formal strategies, referred to this source of impetus as the macro-level
where the business was the vision directing the IT strategies. The other two banks
support this argument as well. There was another source for IT strategy, which was the
.users’ requests. L5 called this source the micro-level and the bank gave it less 
importance in directing the IT strategies than the macro-level. The impact of the micro­
level on IT strategies may differ from one bank to the other amongst the three. L4 was 
the most advanced bank amongst the three in serving its users through its PC - LAN 
environment. This advantage might be attributed to the fact that the bank gave more 
weight to the micro-level impetus to IT strategy.
Their were references to a bottom up IT strategy formation. The IT managers were the 
main product champions to this approach. Their main goal was to evaluate the current 
systems and advise the System Steering Committees (SSC) on their future prospects in 
serving the banks. Earl (1988, p, 163) wrote that organisations attempt to understand 
their current IS investment when they begin or renew their attempt to plan IS 
strategically. There are several reasons for this, among which is the top management's 
requirement of a clear understanding of the IS status before they can approve any major 
investments in it. This was the case with L3, for example. Prior to the invitation of the 
consultants who led an overall strategic planning exercise, the IT manager in 
collaboration with the vendor, IBM, prepared an analysis of the bank’s IT status. This 
analysis was used to inform the top management and the board of directors of the

deficiency in the bank’s systems and the need for an overall revitalisation of the bank’s 
IT scene. Another example is from L5 in which the IT manager, based on the outcome 
o f a bottom up approach, informed the bank of the disability of the bank’s systems 
hitherto in meeting the business goals and recommended renewing their infrastructure.
here one individual in personal control o f  an organisation is able to impose his or her vision 
o f  direction on it.... In this case, the force for pattern or consistency in action is individual vision.
a
There are two potential parties who can participate in the bottom up approach, the 
technologists and the users (Earl, 1989: p. 74). The technologists are mainly responsible 
for evaluating the technical conditions of the systems, whereas the users are responsible 
for evaluating the business value of the systems. Within the three ‘formal’ banks, L3, 
L4 and L5, there were references to the participation of the users in the evaluation of the 
new IT systems, as was the case with L4 and L3 for example. However, it was not 
possible to envisage from the informants’ narration whether the users participated in line 
with the IT managers in the technical bottom up evaluation of the systems.
Input to IT strategy:
The participants in the input to IT strategies varied amongst the banks. However, the IT 
strategy was considered at the strategic apex level for all of the banks with some 
exception made for L2.
As for the two small local banks, LI and L2, their ad hoc IT strategies were more 
influenced by one product champion. To LI, the operations manager was the main 
product champion and the visionary for the bank. He was a member of the top 
management team and his visions, past experience, links to the vendors and role model 
banks were the impetus of the informal IT strategies adopted by this bank. His role was 
then to convince his colleagues within the top management team of his ideas. Once 
approved, his next step would be to convince the board of directors. Based on the 
Mintzberg et al. typology, the LI approach may represent the ‘entrepreneurial strategy’. 
To quote Mintzberg et al (1989):
the central actor’s concept o f  his or her organisation’s place in its world. This is coupled with an t
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ability to im pose that vision on the organisation through his or her personal control o f  its 
actions..” (p. 8)
■The ad hoc IT strategies of L2 were also influenced by a product champion who was in 
this case the GM. His views and beliefs had the main influence on the bank’s adoption 
behaviour, e.g. delay in adopting the ATMs due to his negative perception about their 
effects on the bank’s deposit base. In contrast to the crucial role the IT manager played
in LI, the IT manager in L2 guided the minor developments such as automating the 
manual systems within the bank which needed no investments. He was consulted, 
however, on the major issues though he lacked the power to direct (or influence 
directing) the IT scene within the bank. It is worth mentioning that L2 enjoyed a 
relatively monopolistic advantage over the market niche that it served, since, for some 
time, it was the only bank that had had a license to offer a specialised banking services. 
This factor, I infer, relieved the bank from considering adopting a strategic discourse 
similar to the other ‘formal’ banks, since it enjoyed a relative stable environment.
. . .In both banks, the ad hoc IT initiatives were constrained and influenced by the cost that 
the top management and the board were strict about. The past experience of the LI 
board with their expensive old system which was scrapped and their lack of faith in 
expensive IT systems affected the operations manager’s approach to restructuring their 
IT infrastructure around the downsized, client server environment. L2 was not as active 
in its IT adoption behaviour as LI, since cost was a main obstacle that hindered 
adopting some systems which the IT manager proposed such as that of linking the 
bank’s systems with its insurance company systems. None of the two banks formally 
approached any consultants to formalise their IT strategies nor did they consider their IT
I
strategies as part of an ongoing formation of a strategy. As mentioned in page 366. 
Currie’s (1995) field work revealed that strategy making was more aligned to 
incremental and ad hoc approaches. Moreover, she argued in one of her cases that the 
AMT strategy was influenced by the allocated financial budget rather than thorough 
investigation of all relevant information that characterised rational formal planning. The 
findings of the LI and L2 are parallel to hers.
I
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For the other tliree banks which adopted the formal approach, L3, L4, and L5, input to 
the IT strategy was guided / informed by the consultants. Bryson et al. (1995, p. 678)
Iargued that management consultants are more likely to support the formal rational
1:’approach for a number of reasons, amongst which are:
•  “they wish to offer logical ‘so lu tions’ with a clear rationale to client organisations;
•  their perceived expertise is promoted and enhanced by being underpinned by rigorous theory;
•  their own training and experience as managers reinforced the orthodox view .” (P. 678). a
The consultants formed system steering committees (SSC) from the banks’ top 
management personnel, in addition to other top personnel from the support functions, 
e.g. financial controllers and IT managers. The formal rational literature, e.g. Andreu et I
al. (1992), prescribes the IT/IS committees as the organism in which the IT/IS affairs are 
handled:
I;“IT/IS Committee. This is the organism with final responsibility over the Information 
System that is eventually designed. It is made up by the company’s CEO, the head o f  the 
different functional areas, and the Information Systems Manager. This group’s specific 
responsibility include supervising the planning project, expressing the organisation’s 
commitment to the plan developm ent, providing strategic criteria and determining priorities and 
allocating resources, and finally, approving the IT/IS plan In its final form.” (Ibid., p 62).
The consultants’ participation was the source of isomorphism amongst the banks 
(L3, L4, and L5). They institutionalised the norms among these banks as to what was 
rational and progressive with regard to the banks’ strategy formation approach. The 
consultants, I argue, played a role similar to what Abrahamson named the ‘management- 'B.fashion-setters’. Abrahamson (1996) defined the management fashion setters as "..
organisations and individuals who dedicate them selves to producing and disseminating management
know ledge..” (p. 257). He argued that:
“.. if  norms o f  progress call for a flow  o f  apparently rational and progressive techniques to 
sustain the appearance o f  continuing rational progress, then how do organisational stakeholders 
come to perceive these techniques as rational and progressive rather than as irrational and s
retrogressive? d^
My answer is that there is a management-fashion-setting community populated b>
management fashion setters. It is this management -fashion-setting community that shapes
transitory collective beliefs among management fashion followers that certain management f
techniques are rational and at the forefront o f  management progress..” (p. 263)
:

L3 went further with these committees by involving nominated members of the 
board of directors in ad hoc committees to work as a liaison with the bank’s board of 
directors who were involved in the process of IT strategy approval. The above 
arrangement was perceived as a rational approach to IT strategy formation in that 
commitment of the top management was secured, which appraises the notion that IT is 
run by the business goals of the banks.
The members of the SSCs were either the same as those who participated in the 
formulation of corporate planning committees - of which the IT manager was a member 
also- as in the case of L4, or were a subset committee of the corporate planning 
committee to which members of the strategic apex belonged and to which the IT 
manager was invited, as in the case of L5. It is worth mentioning that senior personnel 
from support units other than the IT unit, e.g. the corporate services manager, as in the 
case of L5, for example, participated in the SSCs. These committees involved different 
experts who contributed in one way or another to the process of strategy formation.
Involvement o f  the board o f directors:
In all of the local banks, the board of directors were involved in the process of IT 
investment approval. For some banks which followed the formal approach, which was 
directed by the consultant, e.g. L3, the board involvement went further than the 
traditional approval exercise; for instance, they were involved in making decisions 
related to the type of bank IT infrastructure.
There were references also to the participation of the IT managers in presenting and 
defending their IT initiatives at the board meetings. This was reported by LI which 
followed the ad hoc approach to their IT strategy formation. The operations manager in 
this bank was the product champion who directed the IT strategy. Other references were 
given by L3 and L4 IT managers. The IT managers were invited to define / defend the 
business implications of the proposed systems to the bank as in the case of the Base 24 
which was adopted by L4 (during the informal strategic planning era), or create a 
tension about the bank’s deficient IT systems as was the case with L3 (during the
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turnaround phase). In all of these cases the board members, I infer, needed to depend on 
the expertise of the IT managers to make an informed decision about the proposed IT 
systems, as in the majority of these cases the banks were undertaking a major change in 
their IT infrastructure or systems.
In one of the local banks, L4, the board involvement in the process o f IT strateg) 
approval was characterised by a political struggle amongst the board members who were 
also heading other rival banks. Based on the IT manager’s account, reaching a decision 
was not free from the influence of the board members who considered their (other) 
banks’ interests as well. The board meetings witnessed a political struggle, which the IT 
managers were part of, to convince the opposing board members of the need to adopt 
certain IT systems within the bank. The IT managers were invited to inform the board 
about the drivers behind the proposed IT initiatives.
The symbolic nature of the formal rational strategies:
The formal rational approach of the three banks, I claim, played a symbolic role in
presenting these banks to the external stakeholders. Cited in Abrahamson (1996):
“M eyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that managers create the appearance o f  rationality by using 
or appearing to use management techniques that generally are believed by organisational 
stakeholders in a specific context to be rational ways o f  managing organisations and employees.."  
(261).
"... Strategy now is a type o f  representation; it becom es the outward face o f  the organisation, 
representing it to external powers (like the stock market and state bodies) with whom the 
organisation needs to maintain a reputation.” Flncham at al. (1995, p. 13)
Elsewhere in the thesis (refer to the financial services and culture chapters for a full 
discussion) I mentioned that some of the banks experienced profitability problems. 
Some of these problems were attributed to malpractice within some of these banks. The 
formal rational approaches / measures that were adopted by these banks played a 
symbolic role by signalling to the external powers a departure from the previous 
malpractice and the adoption of healthy practices. These signs were meant to restore 
confidence to the main stakeholders in these banks. This argument is stronger for L4 
and L3, as these banks were under the scrutiny of the central bank and their main
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shareholders after they had incurred heavy losses. DiMaggio et al. (1991, p. 69) 
attributed the mimetic process amongst the organisations, as was the case with L4 and
L3 in their approach to formulating their strategies, to the need to gain legitimacy:
these developm ents also have a ritual aspect; companies adopt these ‘innovations’ to enhance 
their legitimacy, to demonstrate they are at least trying to improve working conditions...” (p. 69)
The banks’ adoption of formal approaches to strategy formation is attributed also to the 
desire of these banks to learn management techniques that enhance their financial 
position and close the gap that results fi“om economic and technical changes in the 
environment. Moreover, there were psychological forces - emerging from these banks' 
frustration with their past performance and their desire to differentiate themselves from 
their past status - which played a role in spurring the banks to adopt the formal 
approaches propagated by the consultants. My argument is parallel with Abrahamson's 
(1996) argument, which contended that economic and technical forces, in addition to 
sociopsychological forces compete in shaping the demand for management fashions. 
Organisations adopt these fashions not merely due to sociopsychological forces but also 
to learn new techniques which would enable them to respond to the organisational gap 
left open by changes in the economic and technical environments.
Formation of IT strategies within the foreign 
banks:
The main features that characterise the formation of IT strategies within the foreign 
banks are discussed in Table 3 and the subsequent tables.
Table 3  : F orm ation  o f  IT  s tra te g ie s  in the fo re ig n  
bonks
G lobal IT stra teg ies FI, F2, F3, 
F4, F5, F6
C entralized within th e  h ea d  office  and regional office  
level: a top down flow  o f  s tr a te g ie s
FI, F2, F3, 
F4, F5, F6
C entralized d ev e lo p m en t o f  IT s y s te m s
C om pulsory ad op tion  o f th e  ‘bread and 
butter" s y s te m s .
FI, F2, F3, 
F4, F5, F6
FI, F2, F3, 
F4. F5, F6
379

The foreign banks share characteristics that distinguish them from the local banks, on 
one hand, and on the other, create a high isomorphism amongst these foreign banks, as 
indicated in the above table and as discussed within the coming sections. It is not easy 
to place the foreign bank branches on Bryson et al.’s spectrum as some of these banks’ 
informants shed little light on the details o f how their headquarters formulated their 
global strategies. I infer that these banks followed a formal-rational planning approach 
at their headquarters and at regional office level where their strategies get delineated. I 
argue also that Mintzberg et al.’s “imposed-strategy” approach may best describe these 
banks’ IT strategy formation at the domestic level in Bahrain. According to Mintzberg 
et al. (1989, p. 14) the clearest case o f  this occurs when an external individual or group with a great 
deal o f  influence over the organisation im poses a strategy on it..". The headquarters and the 
regional offices represent the external power that imposes these strategies on the 
branches in Bahrain despite their needs and the competitive pressure exerted within the 
local market. I would like to add also that there is a political struggle between these 
branches and their headquarters. This struggle influences, to some degree, the imposed 
strategies of these banks. The local branches keep struggling with the headquarters and 
regional offices for extra IT support to meet their local IT needs. The political struggle 
was a phenomenon which most of the foreign banks branches experienced. To give an 
example, the following quotation represents F2’s struggle with their headquarters:
for instance the upgrading into the A S 400 , when w e thought that the system was slow  and we 
had problems, w e wrote to our head office  and they said that they were already discussing and 
hopefully we will get it. EVERY TIM E W E HAVE PAINS AND PROBLEMS WE START  
CRYING- I need a system, this system  is not giving me what I want, this system is becoming  
very slow..
“.. Once I wanted to upgrade my A S 400 , and a team came from the headquarters and said why 
do you want to upgrade, only the other day you invested half a million on buying it. When they 
walked out they said you don’t need it. I did not need to invest at that time. But now after 
Equation 3. after the calculation they are convinced that definitely there should be a change 
before we go to Equation 3 ..’’
Global IT strategies:
Unlike the local banks, all of the foreign banks had global IT strategies that encompass 
all of the group’s branches world wide. None of the foreign banks had enough 
autonomy to develop their IT strategies to meet the specific needs of the Bahraini
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market in isolation from the grand strategies filtering down from the headquarters. 
More about the level of branch autonomy will be discussed later on. It is worth noting 
that one of the foreign banks held its headquarters in Bahrain and all of the IT strateg) 
formation was centralised in Bahrain. This bank, however, behaved as the other foreign 
banks. It gave none of its foreign branches autonomy to formulate IT strategies.
Top-down flow of IT strategies:
As Figure 4 shows, the IT strategies within 
the foreign banks were filtered from the 
headquarters via the regional offices to the 
branches world wide. These filtered 
strategies represented the mandates for the 
branches as to what to do and what to 
adopt in terms of their IT initiatives.
F lo *  o r  IT  s t n t o t i c *
H ead Quarter
Bonom'lp
feedback.
Formulation 
central teed 
at H. Q,
T o p  - Dowd  
f l t e  inng o f  
stra teg ic s
Figure 4: Flow o f  IT  stra teg ie s  f o r  the 
fo re ign  banks
Likewise, the developments of the IT
systems were made in centralised development centres, and it was compulsory for the 
groups’ branches then to adopt the ‘bread and butter’ systems developed within these 
centres.
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Centralisation of developments and economies of scale:
The foreign banks perceived the centralised development of their systems as a 
rationalised means for achieving
IT council: 2 board Members, 3 Senior EVP
* D eterm in e  S tra teg ics . P n o n tic s , and set b u d gets
IT steenng com m ittee
* Set deta iled  IT p o lic ie s  and  
strateg ies
IT International
fine usere
Application requirements InformationSystem s
Implementation
Insure
acceptance
management
feedbackegiona
BranchesBranches Branches in Countrvin CountTi in Countrv
economies of scale and controlling the 
cost of systems developments, as 
inferred from their informants’ 
arguments. Such arguments illustrate 
the institutionalised rational processes 
that the foreign banks conformed to.
Shaping the strategies - a 
bottom-up approach:
Global IT strategies might be influenced
by the group branches feedback, the Figure 5: i t  strategy form ation in FI 
effect of which, however, is minor
compared to the top doum approach discussed above. Shaping the global strategies, as 
illustrated by Figure 5, starts with the branches’ feedback on their unique needs that the 
global strategies had failed to address. These requests and concerns are filtered up to 
the regional offices, which in turn evaluate them and decide whether there is a regional 
or global need to pursue them. This approach is less structured than the top down 
approach mentioned earlier. For example, F2 depended on their IT manager to struggle 
for IT solutions from the headquarters through complaining via the memos sent to the 
headquarters. These memos form the pressure which shapes the bank’s global 
strategies.
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Trickle-down' effect of global IT strategies:
The effect of the foreign banks’ IT strategies directed at the Bahraini market could best 
be described as having a ‘trickle-down’ effect. This phenomenon is common across the 
foreign banks. These banks’ IT strategies were more geared towards meeting the IT 
requirements of the major international markets which were regarded as having higher 
business potential than the local Bahraini market. Once these IT needs were satisfied, 
the developed systems were then trickled down to the smaller markets which were 
placed at the bottom of the rank, such as the Bahraini market. As Table 4 indicates, the 
foreign banks, as a result of the trickle down effect, became less responsive to the local 
IT needs and consequently were less reactive to the local rivals’ IT initiatives.
Foreign Banks
1 2 3 4 6 6
Table 4: Trickle d o w n  e ffe c t
Reference to IT strategies geared  to markets with high potential then 
universalize th e se  system s
L ess responsive due commitment to global IT strategies * *
L ess responsive to small markets, e .g . Bahrain *
Competitive advantage nullified- (competitive disadvantage) by 
local rivals' sy stem s due to slow  resp on siven ess *
Standardize system s, not tailored to the local requirements, unable 
to match local’s  system s *
I
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Local IT 'strategies’ of the foreign banks’ branches in Bahrain:
All of the foreign banks’ branches in Bahrain were restricted in their autonomy to 
pursue their local IT needs. However, some of these foreign banks’ branches enjoyed 
limited autonomy, e.g. FI, F2 and F4, in meeting their local needs as long as their IT 
projects did not require significant investments and change in the group's main systems. 
Some application systems, for example, were developed on the PC environment to meet 
the unique personal finance needs of the Bahraini market that the global system did not 
offer as was the case in F4. In most cases, these localised initiatives required the 
approval of the regional office responsible for these branches. In the extreme case, the 
foreign banks’ branches did not have any autonomy at all for developing local IT
1
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systems. F6 was the example of this case. This bank did not have any programmers to 
develop or to alter any application system.
Foreign Banks
Table 5: L o ca lJ T  s tra teg ies o f the foreign banks: 1 2 3 4 5 6
R e fe re n c e  to  L ocal IT affairs raised in a  top m a n a g em en t co m m ittee * * * *
L ocal IT affa irs look ed  after mainly by th e  o p era tion s d ep artm en t *
H ead  o f  b u s in e s s  units w e re  not active in defin ing their IT n e e d s *
R e fe r e n c e  to  lack o f IT strategy *
R eporting lin e s  b e tw e e n  th e  local IT d ep artm en ts an d  th e  regional or H. Q. 
off ice s  to  air c o n c e r n s  ab ou t their local IT p rob lem s / n e e d s
There were references in four of the six foreign banks to local top management 
committees to which the IT managers were invited and in which the local IT affairs 
were raised. Representatives from the business units were usually present in these 
committees. The IT manager’s role was to communicate the banks’ local needs to the 
regional offices for support. In one of the foreign banks, F5, the local IT affairs were 
mainly the responsibility of the operations manager. In this bank, the business unit 
head(s) acted passively with regard to defining the unit’s IT requirements. This bank 
was the only bank amongst the foreign banks that argued that they did not have any IT 
strategies as the bank was in a standstill position for a long period of time.
Participation of different expert groups in the development of 
the application systems -  the F3 experience:
The F3 experience was unique among the banks. Due to the nature of its banking 
operations (Islamic banking) that differed from the other conventional banks, it had to 
develop all of its applications depending on its internal resources. The development 
process required the participation of the different expert groups in this process, for 
example, a key participant in the bank’s Islamic Banking System (IBS) was the financial 
controller, who contributed to the development of the IBS with other bankers and 
technologists. The bank considered its IBS as a strategic system which enabled support 
for the ‘Islamic’ banking operations in an integrated and on-line manner. Fincham
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"... with our expansion plan w e as technologists looked at that plan and saw how much we are
going to invest on IT in this expansion plan. We thought that this investment was huge... since 
the market was changing, the hardware and the software and based on our analysis and study o f  
the market, w e thought that this is the right time to review our overall hardware and software
Role of the IT managers in shaping the iocal 
banks IT strategies:
(1995) and Scarbrough (1997) have acknowledged the importance of the different forms 
of expertise in influencing IT strategic initiatives. Fincham (1995), for example, argued 
that in the technology arena the intentions o f  top management are heavily mediated by their 
dependence on the expertise o f  other groups...” (p. 7). The following quotation demonstrates the 
influence of the technologists’ input on the top management strategic decisions:
I
strategy...
“ .. the Wang went into chapter 11 and it was our responsibility to inform the management and 
give them different various solutions... similarly while changing the strategy, w e have to go to 
them and update them o f  what is the future perspective o f  future computing, the open system  
platform, the networking and so on. And based on our input to them, because they are not 
technical people, they relay on our input for that decision making so in order to make sure that 
we get the best decision from them w e have to update them very thoroughly o f  what is happening 
in the market., because w e don't want a decision that is taken and then regretted later on...” IT 
manager o f  F3.
Table 5 summarises the main features characterising the IT managers’ role in the process 
of shaping their IT strategies. The main role that the IT managers played within the 
formal rational banks, L3, L4 and L5, was a reactive role rather than a proactive role, as 
L5 described it, in serving the banks’ business strategies. The IT managers argued that 
their rote was an advisory one to the top management sitting in the System Steering 
Committees (SSC) as to how they may support the banks’ business goals. They were, 
however, powerless in influencing the banks’ business goals and setting priorities as to 
what to adopt. The power was mainly maintained with the top management who sat on 
the SSC as they controlled the amount of investments poured into the IT projects and 
what systems would be implemented.
385

Table 5: Role o f  the IT m anaaer in sh a o in a  the local tjanks IT s tra tea ie s L1 L2 L3 L4 L6
Understand, advise, and enable however not lead the business strategies * * * *
S ole product champion of IT strategy
Product champion of the infrastructure change
Early phases: Driver of IT strategies. D epended  on vendors, exhibitions and 
seminars.
?
Past experience and relationship with vendors influenced IT managers' vision / 
com petence
?
As for the small banks, LI and L2, in which the IT strategies were informal and of an ad 
hoc nature, the role of the IT managers varied. In LI, the operation manager was the 
main product champion of the bank’s informal IT strategies. The multiple role that he 
played as the head of different functional units enabled him to pursue his role as a 
product champion of the IT strategies. All the information he needed about the bank's 
IT requirements were comprehended by him, as he claimed. In contrast to LI, the L2 IT 
manager’s role was less active than the rest of the banks at the strategic apex, due to the 
bank’s sluggishness. However, when it came to proposing a new system, the IT 
manager played a similar advisory role to the top management as in the rest of the 
banks.
A distinction has to be made, however, from the early phases in which all of the banks 
followed ad hoc and incremental IT strategies. In this phase, the vision of what to do 
came mainly from the IT managers who were the main product champions directing the 
IT scenes within the banks. However, at the later phases o f IT strategy formation, the 
process shifted to the system steering committees, as in the cases of L3, L4 and L5.
IT managers, visionaries of their banks’ IT infrastructure:
■ II
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The role of the IT managers was greater when it came to designing the IT infrastructure 
the banks needed. In four of the five banks, the IT managers argued that they were the 
product champions for their IT infrastructure design. They were perceived as the most 
expert with regard to evaluating their current systems and deciding on their 
infrastructure. This role was consistent with the role of the Foreign 3 IT manager who 
played a crucial role in leading his bank’s infrastructure design. Fincham et al (1995)
-I
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has argued that strategic and operational issues are closely interrelated and the
development of IT is part of a process of strategic interchange. They further argued that
“the ‘technical’ input from computer-skilled staff reflected their own awareness o f  long-term trends in the
viability o f  system s” (and) computer professionals are able to shape strategy by controlling the options
other groups perceive as feasible” (ibid., p. 24). The IT managers, by virtue of their technical
expertise, had foresight with regard to long term IT infrastructural (and in some cases
.systems’) needs and possible threats. They therefore contributed considerably in this 
area which the top management perceived as the IT managers’ responsibility. How IT
■managers play a crucial role in educating and influencing the top management’s 
strategic decisions is illustrated by the quotation on page 385 concerning the F3 IT 
manager’s role..
Liaison with the vendors:
'I
• the previous employment of L2’s IT manager with the bank’s vendor enhanced 
the IT manager’s experience in developing Islamic banking application systems.
The IT managers, by virtue of their technical expertise, were at the front line in their 
contacts with the vendors and hence were the vehicle through which the vendors 
influenced the banks’ IT initiatives though for some of the banks, e.g. L4, the vendors 
targeted the top management as well to influence their vision. This relationship was 
important as the majority of the local banks depended mostly on off-the-shelf packages 
in serving their IT needs. The past experience and relationship of the IT managers with 
the vendors were a source of influence over the banks’ IT initiatives and competence. 
For example:
i
• L i ’s relationship with the vendor in Ireland influenced the bank’s system that 
ran mainly on a sole vendor software;
* the ex-relationship of the later IT manager with IBM influenced the L4 decision 
to adopt the AS 400; and
•J
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Role of the IT managers of the foreign banks in 
shaping their IT strategies:
The role of the IT managers of foreign banks in shaping their IT strategies is 
summarised in Table 6
Foreign Banks
Table 6: Role of the IT manager to the Foreign banksi 1 2 3 4 5 6
Implementing IT system s from the head office * * * * * •
Participant in IT strategy developm ent *
Liaison with the headquartere: * * * * *
Visit the bank on a part-time basis *
Participate periodically at headquarters level to get informed about global 
strategies and feedback H. Q.
?
Participant in system  1 top m anagem ent steering com m ittees * *
Advisory, supportive, consultative however not directive role * * *
IT m anager contribution cam e after b u sin ess n eed s w ere defined
Product champion of infrastructure initiatives * * * * *
Informer /  sensor of potential threat from IT environment:
Educate top m anagem ent a s  to technological ch an ges in the market
Main source of vision to the top m anagem ent a s  to main opportunities and threats 
in the IT environment
Hybrid background - internal consultant to the functional areas (so claimed) *
Implementing IT systems:
The main role that the IT managers played within the foreign banks was a technical role 
concerned with implementing the IT systems filtered to their branches from the head or 
regional offices. Their role in determining the IT strategies within these banks was 
minimal and restricted to providing the regional offices with feedback about their local 
IT needs. One exception, however, was F3 where the IT manager participated in a top 
management committee to set the group’s IT strategic vision. This difference in the role 
of the IT manager in F3 from the rest of the foreign banks could be attributed to the 
location of the headquarters of this bank in Bahrain, from which the bank’s global IT 
strategy was drawn.
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Liaison with the head and regional offices:
To enable implementation of the banks’ global IT strategies, all of the IT managers 
communicated with the regional or the head offices. Some of the IT managers reported 
that they had two reporting lines, one with the bank’s GM and the other with their 
groups’ regional or head offices.
Product champions of infrastructure changes:
389
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IThe IT managers emphasised their role as the main visionaries of initiatives of a !
technical nature, an issue that formed the source of a cultural gap with the top 
management, due to the lack of awareness of top management of the implications of 
these systems, on one hand, and, on the other, the lack of power of the technologists to 
impose these systems (more about this topic will be discussed within the culture 
chapter). Initiatives such as the 'Disaster Recovery Systems’ came from the IT 
managers rather than the business side. Such projects, due to their technical nature and 
intangible return, formed a source of tension between the management and the 
technologists. For example. Foreign 6 delayed the adoption of the disaster recoveiy
■system because of a dispute between the top management, who lacked the required 
technical sophistication and the technologists about how to acquire and implement the 
proposed system.
The IT managers also played the role of product champions in terms of the 
infrastructural transformation within the banks in Bahrain. They lobbied, as reported by
'
F2. at the headquarters office for new infrastructures to meet their local needs.
Educator / informer of any IT related threats within the environment:
:
As mentioned earlier, the IT managers played an educator and informer role to the top 
management, who were not able to take any informed decisions without the IT 
manager’s contribution. The top management was alerted of the possible threat and
,

Advisory role but not directive:
Formulation of Business strategies within the 
banks:
Strategy formation in the local banks:
■
deficiencies of their systems and, possibly, their relationship with their vendors by their 
IT managers.
As for the foreign banks’ business goals, the IT managers perceived their role as 
advisory to the banks’ local business goals rather than directive. Some of these banks 
mentioned that their participation in the banks’ top management committees was not
permanent but by invitation whenever there was an issue related to their specialities.
■I
I
There is a high degree of isomorphism among the local banks in their approach to 
formulating their corporate / business strategies.
On one hand, LI and L2 strategies were more of an ad hoc nature (see Table 7). Their 
business strategies, as L2 declared, were not innovative as they were committed to |
producing the same products almost since their inception. These banks had top 
management committees that were responsible for directing the banks. These 
committees, as L2 described, were mainly involved in adjusting their ‘interest rates’ and 
credit limits to the market’s parameters. These were the examples that the head of the 
bank provided when he talked about how his bank formulated their business strategies.
Î
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Formal Rational 
< ---------
Ad hoc 
 ►
Table 7: Formulation o f b u sin ess stra tegies 
(Local Banks):
N o referen ce  to form al corp orate  strateg ic  planning L1, L2
R e fe ren ce  to form al b u s in e s s  stra te g ies  and formai 
b u s in e s s  g o a ls
L3, L4, L5
R e fe ren ce  to c o n su lta n ts  guid ing th e  b u s in ess  
s tr a te g ies  form ulation
L3, L4, L5
R e feren ce  to ste er in g  co m m ittees: L3, L4, L5
R e fe re n c e  to  form al seg m en ta tio n  o f the  
m arket and form ulation o f  S B U s
L4, L5
On the other hand, isomorphism was high between the big local banks, L4 and L5, and 
one of the small banks, L3, in their approach to formulating their business / corporate 
strategies. The three banks depended on consultants to set the formal process. 
Moreover, the three banks depended on high level committees to set strategic goals. 
The big banks opted to structure their businesses in strategic business units. The small 
bank, L3, perceived itself as not big enough to introduce specialised business units as 
was the case with L4 and L5.
Strategy formation in the Foreign banks:
Table 8: F orm ation  o f B u sin ess S trategies F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
B u s in e ss  s tr a te g ie s  d irected  /  influenced by H. Q . or R egion al office * * * *
R e feren ce  to no form al loca lly  d e v e lo p ed  long term plans: *
R e fe ren ce  to sh o rt term  nature o f B u s in e ss  s tra teg ies  in Bahrain *
Formal corp orate  stra teg ic  pianning
B udgeting * * * * * *
B udgeting a s  stra te g ic  planning *
Table 8 summarises the main features of the foreign banks’ corporate strategies. The 
foreign banks also exhibited a high degree of isomorphism among themselves in the 
way that they approached their business strategy formation based on the informants’ 
accounts. A common feature amongst these banks is the high influence of the groups’ 
strategies on their branches’ local strategies. With some of the banks, e.g. FI, their local 
strategic goals followed their global goals which focused, among other things, on
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serving their international corporate clients. The other foreign banks branches’ overall
392
goals and guidelines came from their regional offices. However, some of these branches
had some autonomy to manoeuvre under the ‘umbrella’ of these global guidelines.
Foreign 3 followed a formal strategic planning approach. This bank differed from the 
rest of the foreign banks in the location of its headquarters which was in Bahrain, and 
thus its formal strategic plans were developed in Bahrain and were extended to other 
markets.
The other foreign banks’ branches in Bahrain followed formal capital budgeting 
procedures to fulfil the requirements of their headquarters. Some, like Foreign 5, for 
example, referred to capital budgeting as a strategic planning process. This capital 
budgeting was on a short term basis.
The local strategies for the foreign banks, which had some autonomy to manoeuvre 
under the ‘umbrella’ of the headquarters’ global guidelines, were of a short term nature, 
a year or less, as the F4 general manager declared. There was no formal documentation 
of the short term strategies in that bank.
Some of the foreign banks claimed that they had defined business areas within which to
. .. rexploit potential opportunities. Despite this claim, there was a consensus that all of the 
banks were more or less similar in broadly targeting the same market segments and 
offering similar products. This might be manifested in the following quotation of
Foreign 4 GM where he described the banks as the
‘lem ming’ that jum ps over cliffs and kills itself., one goes in one direction, normally we 
will rush after them .. one gets com petitive advantage., next year eveiybody else is caught up 
with you..” .
VÎ
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Relationship between IT and business strategies:
This section explores the relationship between the IT and business strategies based on 
the informants’ narration.
The relationship within the locai banks:
The relationship between IT and business strategies for the local banks is summarised in 
Table 9, Based on the case studies, I identified two main types of interaction between IT 
and strategies as indicated in Figure 6. The official account that all of the informants 
wanted to produce was that the relationship arrow flew from the business strategies to 
the IT strategies. This account argued that the IT 
initiatives were guided mainly by the banks’ 
business needs. The banks differed in the degree 
of normalisation to this alignment, as will be 
discussed below. The second category of Figure 6: i t  - business interaction.
relationship gave a greater role to the current IT
strategies in influencing the banks future business strategies. Interestingly, four of the 
banks denied this relationship. However, in one of the banks, L4, this relationship was 
present, as will be discussed later.
Business
IT straiemes
Capitalization
Future impact
strategies
Business
strategies
alignment to: 
Formal Rationality Ad hoc 
— ►
Table 9 .Relationship between IT  and business 
strategies in the local banks.
Explicit Relationship L3. L4. L5
LI, L2 
L2
L 3, L4. L5 
L3. L 4. L5
L1, L2 
LI, L2 
L1
L4
Implicit relationship
Rhetoric
Formal Alignment:
Multiple participants in SSC, contribution of 
different stakeholders, reference to top-down, 
bottom up planning Initiatives.
Informal Alignment:
C om petence of so le  product champions
Features of the 'off-the-shelf packages
Strategic sy stem s influencing business strategies
i
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Explicit relationship between IT and the business (see Figure 7);
Within the formal rational banks, L3, L4 and L5, the relationship between business 
strategies and IT was explicitly spelt out as was presented in L5 strategic planning
Explicitdocuments (refer to L5 case study). These banks 
argued that the mutual vision between the 
technologists and the business representatives 
were achieved formally. The centralised 
planning committees, represented by the SSC,
Business
strategics
Business
strategies
Business
strategies
R eference
Implicit
R eference
Rhetoric
IT
strategies
IT
strategies
IT
strategies
and the participation of the different stakeholders Figure 7 ■ R ela tion sh ip  betw een  business a n d  n
strategies.
from within the bank and outside it as well, e.g.
the consultants, were the formal means through which these rational banks claimed that 
they achieved this alignment.
The strategic relationship between IT and business strategies was not present, however, 
in all of the SBUs’ strategic plans. In terms of the retail business, the strategic 
relationship was both intimate and explicit. However, in the other businesses such as 
the commercial and corporate businesses, as in the case of L4 and L5, the strategic 
relationship between IT initiatives and business strategies was absent.
Implicit relationship between the IT and business:
To the ad hoc banks, LI and L2, the relationship between IT and business strategies was 
implicit rather than explicit. There were no formal IT strategies and there was no formal 
alignment between them and the business strategies in general.
To LI, the alignment between the business and IT was claimed to be achieved 
informally through selecting an appropriate ‘off-the-shelf package(s) capable of 
meeting the ‘bread-and-butter’ traditional banking services. There was no formal 
planning taking place, and the whole process depended on the features provided by the 
vendor’s application systems. The alignment, which is done informally, is dependent on 
the competence of the sole product champion directing the IT scene and his
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‘Rhetoric’ relationship between IT and business:
1
;
comprehension of the business needs. This bank provided no more than the ‘bread and 
butter’ services which were less likely to change over time and hence needed no more 
than the ‘bread and butter’ IT systems to meet the IT needs of the retail services.
In contrast to LI, the role of the off-the-shelf package in serving the bank’s business 
goals was marginal in L2 mainly due to the nature of the business operations (Islamic 
banking finance) that few if any of the off-the-shelf application software was able to 
fulfil.
The nature of the banking industry dictated that some of the IT initiatives needed to be 
aligned to the business goals of the ad hoc banks. The strongest example was the 
expansion of the branch networks that required IT infrastructural support, which all of 
the banks had to provide due to the nature of the banking sector.
Some of the replies that the informants provided about how they perceived the 
relationship between their IT and business strategies could best be classified as 
‘rhetoric’. A good example is provided by L2, whose strategies were ad hoc in nature. 
The head of the bank claimed that their IT strategies and business strategies were to a 
large extent overlapping and highly integrated. This description did not conform to the 
nature of the IT initiatives the bank took, on the one hand, and on the other, their IT 
manager’s claim that their focus was on automating manual processes, some of which 
did not have any link to the business goals. I assume that such a ‘rhetoric’ relationship 
was claimed mainly due to the desire of the head of that bank to conform to what he 
perceived as an institutionalised tight rational relationship between IT and strategy. By 
failing to conform to this institutionalised rational perception, the informant feared 
drawing a negative image to his bank. Such an argument may illustrate the symbolic 
role of IT that the players in the banking industry by one means or another wanted to 
conform to.
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The effect of infrastructure on the relationship between IT and business strategies:
The maturity of the IT infrastructure affected the relationship between the business 
strategies and IT strategies. The older the infrastructure was, the less capable it was of 
coping with the new trends brought by the competitors, and the less able it was to 
support more aggressive business initiatives. For example, L2 disregarded the attempt 
to link its IT systems with its insurance subsidiary systems due to the outmoded features 
of their IT structure. L3 was disabled from meeting its branch expansion goals without 
revamping its IT infrastructure.
To enhance the relationship between the two strategies, the rational banks embarked on 
migration projects. The migration projects aimed at transforming the banks from the old 
infrastructure to newer ones. The product champions of the migration projects were the 
IT managers. During the ‘bottle neck’ migration process, the IT strategies were mainly 
infrastructural-led.
One of the ad hoc banks, L 1, reported that it migrated to a new infrastructure due to the 
deficiency of its old infrastructure in meeting its transaction processing requirements. 
The operations manager was the main product champion of the migration initiative, 
which was based solely on his visions and past experience. The other ad hoc bank L2, 
also suffered from infrastructure deficiency; however, due to its conservative approach 
to IT, it decided to disregard pursuing some of its business goals.
IT systems influencing business strategies:
1
The impact of IT on future business strategies, which represented the other face of the 
relationship between IT and business strategies (refer to Figure 6), may best be 
demonstrated by L4’s adoption of Tandem and Base 24 application systems. The bank 
at the outset of the adoption initiative did not envisage providing shared ATM services 
to the banking community. However, the excess capacity that the IT department built 
from investing heavily in these systems affected the bank’s future business initiatives. 
The bank was more able to share its IT strength and earn revenue not subject to
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fluctuation in interest rate as a result of this excess IT strength. Moreover, Base 24 and 
Tandem were more able to provide retail banking products such as credit cards and 
EFTPoS at a marginal incremental cost, since the core module package was already 
adopted by the bank and the bank needed accordingly to invest less in buying the 
additional modules serving those additional products. In contrast to Local 4, their 
competitors would have to invest in both hardware and software if they wanted to adopt 
the strategic Base 24 module system, an option which was very expensive to the rivals.
The adoption of this strategic IT system in L4, which had widened the scope of their 
business, was achieved during the informal strategy formation phase rather than the 
formal rational phase. The relationship between the vendor and the IT manager, and the 
impact o f adopting a Teading-edge’ IT strategy were crucial in strategically influencing 
the business strategies.
The relationship between iT and business strategies within the 
foreign banks:
More explicit relationship between IT and strategy at the head office level:
I
I
The relationship between the IT and corporate strategies of the foreign banks were more 
delineated at the headquarters and regional offices level than the local level. The 
strongest example of the above argument was Foreign 1 corporate and IT strategies. F 1 
group’s strategy for its foreign branch network, including that operating in Bahrain, 
aimed at providing banking services to their international clients wherever they 
operated. The bank therefore assigned a higher strategic importance to the electronic 
banking and ‘Cash Management System’ it developed than the retail systems (although 
the bank provided both). All of these relationships were delineated by the bank’s central 
planning offices, rather than being determined locally.
Some of the foreign banks, such as Foreign 2, for example, argued that though they were 
under close supervision from their headquarters, they also maintained some autonomy 
over the local business they ran in Bahrain and in the close regional markets. The local
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steering committees that these banks had formulated played a major role in aligning 
local IT requirements with local business requirements. The ‘client-server’ and LAN 
systems introduced in Foreign 2, for example, aimed mainly at serving the business 
requirements of the branch in Bahrain - to provide prompt services to the regional 
clients.
The nature of local strategic planning performed by some of the foreign banks was short 
term, as Foreign 4 and Foreign 5 described. I infer that such a short term vision of 
strategic planning would be unable to direct the long term vision of IT strategies. Some 
of these banks, i.e. Foreign 5, referred to budgeting as strategic planning, an exercise 
which all of the foreign banks were doing for the regional offices. Currie (1995: p.61 ) 
argued that some organisations may be highly involved in budgeting however fail to
produce strategic thinking:
“Indeed, in som e organisations, strategic planning is inextricably linked to budgeting, where 
managers simply play the ‘numbers gam e’ without engaging in any real strategic thinking 
(Mintzberg, 1993)......
The numbers game may actually impede strategic thinking since performance measurement and 
control tends to be geared to existing organisation structures and not future ones..” .
The nature of planning that some of the foreign banks were involved in may indicate 
that achieving a formal integration between their IT and business plans was beyond the 
scope of their local plans, as in the case of Foreign 5, for example. This bank was higlily 
involved in the ‘numbers game’ to fulfil their head office requirements, nonetheless, it 
failed to identify its strategic IT requirements. In general. Foreign 5 did not have an IT 
strategy, as claimed by the operations manager, since it was the ‘neglected child’ of its 
group.
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Excess IT capacity and new scope of business:
All of the foreign banks argued that business was leading the IT rather than the other 
way around. There was, however,
one case in which the bank decision < >
to invest in its IT scene created a new \ /  \ /
!scope of business for the bank in I________________________I
later years. This was the case with
, ^  , 1 • Figure 8: EJfect o f  accumulating experience onthe Foreign 3 Islamic banking strategy
systems that they developed
depending entirely on their internal resources. With this system they developed
expertise in Islamic banking IT applications. The bank then formed an IT services 
company and hence entered into a new line of business, fulfilling the systems’ needs of 
the Islamic banks. This new scope of business had not been envisaged at the outset of 
the bank’s decision to depend on its internal resources to develop its application 
systems. However, the committed resources and support of top management, on the one 
hand, and on the other, the participation of the different stakeholders, bankers and 
technologists alike, in the process of developing the bank’s systems created the excess 
IT capacity and expertise which had a market niche to sell to. The Foreign 3 experience 
resembled the Local 4 experience that I discussed earlier. Both cases elucidate that 
“ experience with (“performing”) a strategy is expected to have feedback effects on the set o f  
organisational capabilities” which in turn affect the banks’ ability to exploit further strategic 
opportunities (see Figure 8 [Burgelman et al, 1997, p. 275]). The above argument is consistent 
with the Itami et al. (1992) argument in which it was contended that the relationship 
between strategy and technology is dynamic rather than static; the current strategy may 
foster and cultivate future technology and the cultivated technology (and expertise) in 
turn may drive cognition of future strategy (refer to the literature review for further 
discussion of Itami’s argument).
Î
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Effect of infrastructure on adopting competitive business 
strategies:
The foreign banks reported that they have had infrastructure problems that restricted 
their ability to adopt IT systems which were linked to their corporate and business 
strategies. For example. Foreign 3’s old infrastructure failed to support the bank's 
expansion strategies, while the Foreign 4 infrastructure failed to support their retail 
phone banking system. A more dramatic change amongst the foreign banks happened in 
Foreign 3, which it had gone into a grass roots evaluation of its IT infrastructure and 
redesigned it to meet its future business plans. During the infrastructure bottleneck, 
these banks focused on the infrastructure issues of their systems, and as Foreign 4 
argued, there was a time lag before their infrastructural-led IT initiatives became capable 
o f meeting their business IT requirements.
,
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Drivers of IT initiatives (see Table io):
Table 10 .R e a so n  for em barking on IT 
initiatives:
L1 12 L3 L4 L5 FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
C om petition  - leadersh ip  in th e m arket
M atch th e  com petitors • * * • * *
EverytxxJy m ore or le s s  w a s  do in g  th e  
s a m e
M atch th e norm s - V ogu e
N o e ffic ien cy  / com petitive ad v a n ta g e  but w e  
w ould  offer it
E sse n tia l for the b a n k s’ im age *
F ollow  th e  h ea d  / regional offices.
Supporting b u s in e s s  g o a ls  /  s tr a teg ies
Infrastructural problem s * *
O p eration s n e e d s
Accounting for IT adoption may be attributed to rational forces such as competitive 
pressure within the market, need to gain efficiency, and / or operational requirements. 
However, there are complementary institutional forces that explain the adoption 
behaviour of the banks. The banks seemed to strive to conform to the norms within the
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environment. These norms might be institutionalised by the powerful and successful
The lemming effect:
banks, or set by other key players within the industry, such as the consultants who 
prescribed how strategies, including the IT’s, ought to be formulated. Alliances with the 
vendors was a phenomenon which, I would argue, was behind the banks’, especially the 
local banks’, acquisition of knowledge which influenced their IT behaviour. These 
vendors played a role in diffusing IT initiatives within these banks. The relationship 
with the vendors was one of the institutionalised rationales for buffering the uncertaint) 
and perceived risk associated with the adoption behaviour. These banks’ IT initiatives 
were more influenced by the adoption pace within the banking community as a whole - 
or by the lemming behaviour as it was labelled by the GM of F4 - rather than the pace of 
development within the IT technology.
The following are some of the main driving forces that the informants mentioned as 
influencing their adoption behaviour.
Competition:
Competition was one of the main driving forces that the banks provided as a rationale 
for their adoption behaviour.
The two rational banks, Local 4 and Local 5, attributed their IT initiatives to the 
competitive pressure of maintaining their leadership in the market. On the other hand, 
the majority of the banks argued that their IT initiatives were defensive measures to 
match the competitors.
There was a high perception amongst the banks that they were all more or less doing the 
same with regard to their deployment of IT within the industry. How they differed, 
however, was in the maturity level of their IT systems, to paraphrase one informant. 
The drive for the banks in this case was to conform to the prevailing norms within the 
industry.
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The GM of Foreign 4 described the banking community as the ‘lemming’ community in 
which the isomorphism between them was very high due to their mimetic behaviour. 
The banks were inclined to conform to what had been institutionalised within the 
banking industry as normative services or systems, regardless of whether these services 
or systems contributed to that particular banks’ efficiency or profitability (in some of the 
case studies). Credit cards and telephone banking were two examples of services that 
were institutionalised within the banking industry and were perceived as taken for 
granted retail services. Some of the banks argued that they had to follow the norms, or 
the vogue, as Local 2 described it, and provided these services despite the lack of 
profitability or efficiency of these services to the banks'.
S':
Information technology played a role in enhancing the banks’ image, as some of the
banks described. This role was another incentive, I infer, in driving the banks towards
adopting IT systems similar to the most successful banks’ systems and hence increasing
the homogenisation amongst the industry. Such an attitude may provide the banks’
management the support needed from the key stakeholders within the industry or buffer
the blame for being incompetent had there been any major problems facing the banks.
An example of this argument could be derived from Local 3 initiatives to adopt the
same techniques and approaches towards adopting IT systems as that adopted by the two
big banks, which were perceived as successful ones. As mentioned within the case
studies, Local 3 experienced severe profitability problems which were followed by a
shake-out in the top management and board of directors’ positions, followed then by
new reforms in the bank, isomorphic to Local 4 and Local 5 initiatives. The message
that the top management wanted to communicate to the stakeholders in the industiv’ was
that by adopting new means for their goals they were efficient in their approach and
progressive, and were no longer the ‘village bank’ as they had been perceived
previously. There were psychological forces at work within the bank due to frustration
from their past performance^, striving for status differentiation to distance them from the 
-----------------------------------
' A s sp e lt out in the case  stud ies. L oca l 1 e x p r essed  its in ten tion  to adopt V isa  cred it cards m ain ly  b eca u se  it had  
b e c o m e  an in stitu tion a lised  serv ice  w ith in  th e industry d esp ite  the lack  o f  profit it gained  from  th is serv ice . 
L ik ew ise , L oca l 2 argued that th e ad o p tio n  o f  IT b ecam e ju st  lik e the v o g u e  that every b od y  had to ad op t d e sp ite  its 
real v a lu e  to  them . H e g a v e  p h o n e  b a n k in g  as an exam p le .
* T he sam e argum ent m ay be m ade for L 4, w h ic h  w en t through sim ilar profitab ility  problem s.
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Supporting the banks' business goais:
Infrastructural drivers:
403
former status as a ‘village bank’, and striving for novelty to put them in line with those
strong and financially sound banks.
“The more the managers o f  lower reputation organisations adopt fashionable techniques to make 
their organisation look like higher reputation organisations, however, the more both higher and 
lower reputation organisations look alike” (Abrahamson, 1996. p. 272). i
It is worth noting that psychological drivers and economic drivers were intertwined in 
creating the demand to adopt the mentioned course of action.
Regional and headquarters orders:
The foreign banks’ IT driver was more related to their head and regional offices' 
mandates than to the branches’ strategies in Bahrain. According to Foreign 6, for 
example, their IT systems were imposed on them and they had little say about them, to 
the extent that some of these systems, e.g. MIS, were considered as a bane to the 
management rather than a support.
There was almost a consensus between the banks that their business was a driver to their 
IT. Despite this argument, some banks such as Foreign 5 and Local 2, maintained a ;|
languid relationship between their IT initiatives and business initiatives.
The majority of the banks suffered from IT infrastructure problems which were drivers 
for migration initiatives, the most dramatic of which was the Foreign 3 case. Some 
banks like Local 2, for example, did have infrastructural problems; however, the 
conservative attitude of the bank’s management restricted any infrastructural migration 
within this bank.

Progressing with the vendors' systems:
The majority of the banks maintained a long-term relationship with their vendors and 
consequently progressed with their vendors’ platforms, as demonstrated by the case 
studies. This phenomenon was perceived by Local 1 as a driver influencing the banks’ 
decision to upgrade their IT infrastructure. This bank reported that they upgraded their 
ATM systems entirely because of their vendor’s influence. As the technology became 
older and new series of these platforms became available, the vendors played a more 
active role in motivating these banks to upgrade their systems. The motivation could 
take the form of providing more attractive prices for the new technology, as was the case 
with the coloured ATMs that replaced the old ones in Local 1. In this instance the 
upgrade, according to the account of Local I ’s informant, was not related to any 
business or efficiency needs.
Operational needs:
There were operational drivers amongst the banks’ accounts for their IT initiatives. The 
Islamic banks. Local 2 and Foreign 3, emphasised meeting their operational needs as a 
major driver of their IT initiatives due to the lack of ‘off-the-shelf application packages 
in meeting their backoffice operations, which were different from the traditional 
banking operations. These banks depended on their internal resources in meeting their 
operational needs. Amongst the conventional banks, the most dramatic example in 
which the operational needs were the main drivers of its IT initiative at certain phases 
was the Local 1 example. As discussed in that case study, the bank had to scrap its old 
systems due to their inaccuracy in processing the bank’s operations.
Central bank(s') requirements:
The central bank requirements imposed certain IT systems on the banks. Some of these 
systems were standard systems that each bank had to adopt. An example was the 
encoder systems used within the banks to encode the checks heading to the central bank.
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Meeting the central banks’ reporting requirement was among the drivers which some of
Ithe foreign banks mentioned. The foreign banks were requested to provide periodical 
reports to the central banks in their home countries, as well as to the central bank in 
Bahrain. IT was highly evaluated for enabling these banks to meet these reporting 
requirements. The same argument applied for the local banks as well. All of these 
banks had to acquire minimal systems to enable them to meet their reporting 
requirements.
j
As for the collective initiatives, the central bank regulations set the rules of the game 
within the market. For more detailed discussion about this issue, refer to the chapter on 
collaboration between the banks.

Chapter Ten
The banks' relationships and networks 
and their effects on adoption behaviour
Introduction:
Networking with other institutions plays a role in affecting IT adoption behaviour as my 
case studies exhibit within this part of the thesis.
The role of networks in shaping economic activities may is described in Granovetter’s 
articles (1985, 1992). Others, like Shearman and Burrell (1987)^ studied the evolution 
of networks amongst organisations and their clients, suppliers, and rivals. They 
emphasised how the behaviour, the perception and the attitude of the management 
involved in social networks were shaped and influenced by these networks which 
evolved with the sectoral life cycle. Swan (1996) stressed the importance of 
understanding the role of social networks in constructing, shaping and diffusing the 
required knowledge for innovation. Scarbrough (1997) emphasised the importance of 
social relations and expertise in empowering the adoption of new concepts. Clark and 
Staunton (1989: p. 158)" emphasised the importance of sharing knowledge through the 
networks of connected firms. In line with the previous arguments, Fincham (1994: pp. 
104-6) stressed the importance of the networks in sharing ideas and transforming 
knowledge. He referred to cases in which organisations exploited networks with the 
suppliers from which they gained professional expertise. In other cases, he referred to 
organisations that exploited a variety of networks with other participants in the field to 
cope with the knowledge requirements of strategic developments.
' c ited  in F in ch am  et at. (1 9 9 4 : 104 ) 
 ^ c ited  in F in ch am  et al (1 9 9 4 )
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In my case studies, I identified a number of relationships that had had an influence on 
the banks’ adoption behaviour. These relationships were with the suppliers, the 
consultants, and other role model banks and stakeholder banks.
In the following section I will discuss the main themes raised by the vendors, as these 
themes will clarify the role of the vendor-bank networks in shaping the banks IT 
strategies. Following that, 1 will discuss the role of networking with other banks and 
consultants.
Relationship with the vendors:
Main themes raised by the vendors:
1 interviewed four main vendors; IBM agents, AT&T, Tandem Agents (ITS) - a regional 
vendor - and Manteq (Mnt.) - a local vendor.
follows.
Downsizing the banking systems:
Ù
A summary of some of the main themes raised in the interviews with these vendors
Manteq promoted the concept o f downsizing the IT systems amongst its clients. This 
vendor claimed that the banking environment was mainly built around mainframe 
systems which were old in their infrastructural concepts and expensive to maintain. He 
referred to this phenomenon as the ‘Jurassic Park’ phenomenon.
::|
. 8-
Manteq’s promotion strategy was built on comparing its downsized systems’ cost and 
flexibility with IBM mainframe systems. According to his analysis, the downsized 
systems were more cost efficient than the mainframe systems and suited the banks’ 
environment in Bahrain, due to their relatively small size.
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The informant defined the following factors as the main drivers for downsizing:
• efficiency in terms of cost and performance;
• need to upgrade the old mainframe systems to cope with the new business realities 
which required flexibility, responsiveness and cost efficiency; and
• trends within the international IT environment which would reach the local market;
The informant also discussed the main factors that he perceived as inhibiting or slowing 
down the downsizing trends in Bahrain. These factors are summarised below:
• lack of banks’ awareness about the revolutionary changes within the IT 
environment;
' I
lack of leadership within the banks willing to risk change; 
previous relationship with the vendors; 
board member - vendor networks; and 
high cost of migration from the mainframe to the downsized environment.
■f
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IB usiness partners
Shift In the vendors' marketing strategies:
There has been a shift within the international vendors’ marketing approach to focus on 
industries rather than a line o f products and 
systems. This trend has been reported by IBM 
which dedicated ‘selected international 
accounts’ to serve their international banks.
AT&T behaved similarly; it formed a 
‘ Customer-Focused-Tearn ’ consisting of a
number of experts directed to each of its major pmWmg
clients in the different industries. solutions
Softw are
JiardviVff
Hard war Focus on the
industrySoftw are
N etw ork ing
;
i
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Total solution providers -  links with other IT providers:
Another trend amongst the IT vendors was their claim that they provided total solutions 
to their clients. Interestingly, these vendors acted alike in terms of their approach to the 
market. All of the four vendors claimed that they had business partners - software and 
hardware firms - who enabled them to provide total solution services. Figure I 
describes the stages IBM went through from hardware providers, to hardware and 
software providers, and to total solution providers through strategically aligning with 
other vendors within the industry.
1
ft
Perceived role of the vendor -  (vendor perspective)
Table 1 lists the main issues relating to how the vendors perceived their role towards 
their clients. IBM reported that they discussed with their key international clients their 
future developments, and the clients on their behalf discussed their future IT needs with 
IBM. Through this mutual understanding, IBM became capable of meeting the 
international banks’ IT needs, the informer of IBM claimed.
Îy■f
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Table I: P erceived  role  o f  the vendor (vendor perspective): Mnt IBM AT&T ITS
Mutual discussion o f  future plans between vendor and foreign bank 
at H.Q. level
*
Claimed that they influenced the infrastructure and business 
models:
*
e.g. opening (linking) midrange systems and mainframes to 
‘PC-ciient server’ te ch n o lo ^ . Adhered to market pressure.
*
Claimed that awareness among bankers needed attention * * *
Educate the user, increase his literacy, through seminars, expertise 
and exhibitions. Create demand for the technology
* * * *
Understand requirements and provide enabling technologies * * *
Work as ‘strategic partners’. Understand what services the banks 
are looking to provide, to enable providing o f  the best technology.
* * *
■■f
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IBM also claimed that they have had a profound influence on their client banks’ IT 
infrastructure and business models. I infer that the other vendors had a similar effect on 
their clients’ IT infrastructure as well.
Three of the vendors argued that awareness among the banks with regard to the 
developments and business implications of the IT systems required more attention from 
the vendors. All of the vendors claimed that they played an informer / educator role to 
their clients through their direct contacts or through arranging seminars, expert visits, 
site visits outside Bahrain, exhibitions, etc. The aim of these arrangements was to 
expose the banks to the vendors’ IT systems and thereafter influence their IT adoption 
decisions.
Figure 2 illustrates one of the 
bank"vendor relationships. ITS 
influenced Local 4 IT strategies 
through educating this client 
about the Base 24 system and its 
implications for the bank’s 
business. The vendor referred to 
his approach as ‘coaching’ the 
bank’s key personnel, through 
different means such as 
arranging for exhibitions and
L'ndeRland 
needs, business
Hardware
Stakeholders interest
C oaching
ough Seminars. Exhibitions ITS Client C 
in different countrvS în d in g  C lie n ts  A broad . D ir cc iContacts, etc
appro*cn A T M
Sw itch
roactive
e.g. Base 24
( g ) ITS Client B in different count
Figure 2: ITS ven dor re la tion sh ip  w ith  its clien ts
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Resources 
and Rules
seminars, sending the executive personnel abroad to gain insight into the business 
implications of the proposed IT systems for the bank’s business, and directly contacting 
and educating the bank’s management.
Figure 3 illustrates IBM’s approach 
to educating their clients, which 
resembles that narrated by ITS, 
AT&T and Manteq (Manteq 
educated Local 1 about a 
downsizing approach which became 
the bank’s infrastructure policy). 
Networking with these vendors 
played an informative / cognitive 
role in informing the clients of main 
developments in the field, and
f Reorganize 
based on 
. industry
er
undeRtanding 
ofbonking
Vendor  
■ InBBH.
N e  
erceptio
Bank 
Executives 
IT M grs
Create 
new 
requi remen
Influence 
IT strate
Educate the 
clients 
•Seminars 
•Expertise 
IrDirect contacts^
F igure 3: IB M  rela tionship  w ith  bank clien ts in B ahrain
trends within the vendors’ systems. It also signalled the competitors’ IT adoption 
intention, based on the L4 account. This finding is in line with the findings of Child and 
Smith (1987)^ who reported in one of their case studies how networking with the 
suppliers was used as a means of sensing strategic actions by the rivals.
There was a reference from IBM, AT&T and ITS vendors that it was important to 
perceive their relationship with their clients as a strategic partnership to enable them to 
meet the banks’ requirements. These vendors argued that their role was to understand 
their clients’ business needs and then provide them with the enabling technologies. 
Some vendors, e.g. ITS, claimed that they played a proactive role with their clients in 
which they took the initiatives and proposed systems to them which had future business 
implications.
c ited  in F incham  et al. (1 9 9 4 ; 105 )
i
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Vendors' network with the local banks:
This section discusses the vendors’ role from the perspective of the banks (see Table 2). 
The bank-vendor relationship was long-standing. All of the banks progressed with their 
vendors’ IT platform series, with the exception of Local 2, that was still with the first 
platform it bought since it automated its systems.
Table 2: Vendor- local bank relatlonshipi 1 2 3 4 5
Long relationship with the vendor * * *
Bank progressed with the vendors' sy s tem s * *
R eference to vendor guiding IT strategies at certain sta g es *
Vendor a s  an informer to the bank * * *
Bank d iscu sses  b u sin ess n eed s * * *
Vendor provider of solutions: * * * *
technical Advice * * * * *
information about new IT developm ents * * * *
information about the competition * *
Source of interrelatedness with others in the region *
Stakeholders’ interests in bank and vendor * * *
Aided other regional banks with similar banking requirements in developing their sy stem s *
Source of recruits to the bank *
Vendor-IT m anager collaboration to evaluate IT infrastructure, early attem pts for formal IT 
strategies. Bottom up approach.
*
Strategic relationship. Future strategies enabled by/ depend on vendor's system s * * * *
Strategic relationship with software vendor due to relationship with hardware vendor * * *
Desiring informative role as to b u sin ess implication of IT from vendor but not able to get *
Strategic relationship with software vendor independent from hardware *
Hardware vendor totally independent from software vendor: Hardware vendor directed 
infrastructure design
*
Hardware vendor directed infrastructure * * *
!
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To three of the local banks, L3, L4, and L5, the alliance with the hardware vendors had a 
strategic importance in the long run since their information systems applications (‘off- 
the-shelf applications) depended on the hardware systems these vendors provided.
To Local 1, the bank’s relationship with the software vendor was strategic since their IT I
strategies depended on what this vendor’s ‘off-the-shelf systems provided both in the 
short and long run. Their IT strategies were not dependent on any hardware vendors 
since they adopted an open system strategy which enabled them to run their software 
systems on any other platforms. Despite that, the bank’s relationship with their
413
hardware vendor was of a long term nature rather than a temporary, transactional nature.
■ ’ VThe bank’s operations manager attributed this to the trust and mutual understanding that 
had developed between the two since the bank started its automation in 1987.
As to Local 2, there was a listlessness in the relationship with their vendors mainly due 
the bank’s current languorous attitude to IT developments.
The bank-vendor relationships gained importance due to the informative role that the 
vendors played to their client banks. To enable them to pursue this role, three of the 
local banks discussed their business objectives with their vendors.
The bank-vendor relationship for one of the banks. Local 4, was a source of liaison with 
other networks of banks in the region for creating a shared ATM network. Some of 
these banks and the vendor had a stakeholder interest amongst them.
There were references in the cases to direct participation of the vendor in the 
formulation of IT strategies at certain stages of the banks’ IT development phases. For 
example, IBM was a source of the ‘grass-roots’ evaluation approach of the Local 3 IT 
strategy that started with the IBM initiative to help the IT manager within that bank to 
diagnose their IT systems. Another example was the ITS initiative to provide Local 2
!C

with expertise for developing the bank’s internal system. The IT manager of Local 2 
was an ex-ITS systems analyst.
As to the source of these networks, I observed that there was a common stakeholder 
interest that stimulated these banks to network with their partner vendors. For example, 
Local 3 and its vendors have a shareholder interest in both entities. Similarly, as Figure 2 
illustrates, Local 2, Local 4 and their vendor have common stakeholder interests, as the 
investors in these entities were from the same regional country. In other cases, the 
source of the relationship between the bank and the vendor was the IT strategy product - 
champion’s past experience and previous relationship with the vendor. For example. 
Local I ’s relationship with Kindle was because of the past relationship between the 
bank’s operations manager and Kindle. In Local 4, the adoption of IBM AS 400 was 
influenced by the bank’s IT manager, who was an ex-IBMer.
Vendors - Foreign banks relationship:
The relationship between the foreign 
banks and the vendors (T able 3 ) was 
defined at the headquarters level. Figure 
4 illustrates a typical relationship 
between IBM and its international
clients. As narrated by an IBM
informant, the relationship was defined 
at the headquarters level. The branches 
of these banks in Bahrain as well as the 
IBM vendor in Bahrain, have to follow 
the agreements made at the headquarters.
The informants from the foreign banks , „ , . , .Figure 4 : R elationship betw een  IBM  a n d  its
in Bahrain were less informed about this
Country A
Vamtor
Bahrain
Bnnch In 
c o u rm y  X
1
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remote relationship and therefore it was hard to investigate in greater depth the nature of 
this relationship. Nonetheless, Table 3 explores some of the characteristics of that 
relationship.
Table 3: Foreign banks - vendors relationship: F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
The relationship is maintained at the head quarter level * * * * * *
R eference to long relationship with the vendors * * *
Bank in a turnaround position - a s s e s s  his relationship with his vendor *
Relationship with vendor as threat to the bank's IT strategy *
IBMers * * *
IT strategy w as hardware dependent (run on just the allied vendor's 
hardware)
* * *
R eference to source of collaboration in acquisition ! mutual developm ents * * ? *
Relationship with vendor perceived a s  a threat *
IT strategy w as hardware independent *
The rationale that the branches of the foreign banks provided for this relationship with 
the vendors was to enable their banks to implement their global strategies through 
standardising the hardware environments. There were references by three of the foreign 
banks, Foreign 1, Foreign 2, and Foreign 4 to mutual system developments and support 
with their vendors. As was the case with the local banks, the foreign banks’ networks 
with their vendors were long-standing, with the exception of Foreign 3 and Foreign 5.
Foreign 5 was in the turnaround position and was assessing its relationship with its 
vendor which was NCR. There were no references as to why this relationship was 
assessed. Nonetheless, the bank was embarking on a global renovation of its IT 
hardware. It was not clear as to whether Foreign 5 was following the majority of the 
foreign banks who had had migrated from the NCR systems to IBM.
The most interesting case among the Foreign banks was Foreign 3’s relationship with its 
vendor. Unlike all other cases, this bank perceived its relationship with WANG as a 
threat to its strategic IT plans. Foreign 3 anticipated that WANG was having financial 
problems and would not be reliable in the future. Moreover, due to the bank’s total
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reliance on its internal resources and the inability of the vendors to provide any ‘off-the- 
shelf applications (due to the bank’s unique banking operations), the bank did not 
perceive any benefit (or expertise) that could be derived by committing itself to any IT 
vendor and it opted therefore for an open system.
In contrast to Foreign 3, Foreign 2, which was a regional bank, perceived its network 
with IBM as a substitute to the ‘huge’ IT expertise and resources that the foreign 
international banks have within their groups. The following points summarise the 
importance of the IBM-Foreign 2 relationship:
.• Source of signal of global changes in the IT environment;
• Provider of expertise to the bank, consultancy services and training programs;
-
' f
• A role model to the bank. IBM flattened its structure and Foreign 2 followed the 
model of its vendor in terms of organisational structure;
• Decrease the risk of project failure;
• Enabler of infrastructure developments;
• Source of systems;
• Source of collaboration with other banks using the same systems to increase the 
reliability of systems against any breakdown (members of these banks agreed to 
allow other banks using the same systems to use their hardware in case of any failure 
in their systems).
?ft
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Relationships with consultants and other role 
model banks:
Small Banks Big Banks
Table 4: O ther fo rm s o f  rela tion sh ips L1 L2 L3 L4 L5
Relationship with consultants; * * *
Consultants from abroad * *
Consultants from Bahrain - Stakeholder interests *
Relationship with a foreign bank outside Bahrain: Seconded a 
team - at early stages of the bank's inception
*
Banks with similar work experience outside Bahrain - informal 
networking with vendors' clients
*
Relationship with consultants:
The relationship with consultants was an important source of expertise which affected 
the approach to formulating their IT strategies within three of the local banks. Both 
Local 5 and Local 4 approached the consultants more or less at the same time, though 
Local 5 preceded Local 4 in formalising and implementing their business and IT 
strategies. Local 4 fell behind due to the Gulf crisis. Both banks approached 
international consultants rather than local ones. Both of these banks behaved almost 
similarly and both preceded Local 3.
There was a stakeholder interest in the relationship between Local 3 and the local 
consultant. This stakeholder interest is also found in the bank’s relationship with its 
vendor.
Local 3 linked with an international bank and seconded a team from that bank to support 
Local 3 during the early years of inception. The IT scene for the bank in those early 
days was created by the seconded team. Local 3 was not the first bank to second a team 
from an international bank. Local 4 preceded Local 3 and collaborated with an
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international bank, according to a consultant report. However, there was no reference to 
any influence from the international bank on the Local 4 IT scene during those days.
Relationship with role model banks:
There were references to informal networks with other role model banks who influenced 
Local I ’s and Local 2’s IT adoption. These role model banks acted as a source of vision 
in developing L i ’s informal approach to the IT scene. As to Local 2, the bank 
approached another Islamic bank to gain insight as to how it would develop its systems. 
Both of these local banks and their role model banks did have links with the vendors. 
Moreover, I noticed that there were a stakeholder interest amongst the local banks and 
the role model banks.
Discussion:
The narrative description of the informants defined a number of relationships that had 
an effect on the IT adoption process. These relationships were a source of tacit 
knowledge and expertise that influenced the banks’ strategic vision and adoption 
behaviour.
The relationship with the vendors influenced positively the adoption of IT within the 
banking industry in Bahrain. There is grounded support to the previous argument from 
the local banks and one of the foreign banks. As mentioned earlier, these networks were 
a source of knowledge to the banks, which navigated through the complex IT 
environment depending on the knowledge passed from the vendors to them. The 
knowledge that the banks acquired was related to the business implications of the 
systems as well as the technical solutions. For the more capable vendors such as IBM. 
the relationship took the following forms. It was a source of providing support to their 
clients’ IT strategy formulation exercise, e.g. Local 3 with IBM. It was a source of
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consultancy, e.g. Foreign 2 with IBM. It became an outsourcing option, e.g. Foreign 4 
with IBM.
To the foreign banks, the relationship with the vendors was perceived as an enabler for 
implementing the banks’ global IT systems and that was through standardising the 
infrastructure. It was not feasible to inquire deeper into this relationship due to its 
centralisation at the headquarters level away from Bahrain. However, two of the vendors 
(IBM and AT&T) shed some light on it and claimed that both the vendors and the banks 
achieved a mutual vision through discussing their future strategies and developments 
with each other, e.g. Foreign 1 and IBM.
Among the 11 cases there was only one case, Foreign 3, that broke the rules and 
perceived its relationship with its vendor as a threat. In this case, the bank did not 
anticipate any form of expertise that could be passed from any particular vendors to the 
bank due to the different nature of its operations. The bank was a newcomer and so was 
different from the majority of the banks which were not willing to ape its approach.
The phenomenon of vendor-bank
networking may be a by-product of the 
institutionalised banking environment.
With the exception o f Foreign 3, all of the 
banks were networked with certain IT 
vendors. The isomorphism in the banks’ 
behaviour could be seen also in their 
approach to networking with IBM. As 
Figure 5 illustrates, almost all of the banks
' Mnt
sy s .
L4 /  In-house
d e v e lo p m e n is
Figure 5: Vendor-B ank netw orks:
were networked to a vendor, with the majority of the foreign banks becoming IBM 
clients.
I infer that the banks perceived their networking with the vendors as a means to buffer 
the high risk of failure associated with the adoption of IT systems. Moreover, it was 
perceived as a means of providing the banks with newer and more complex systems.
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relationship is L3 with his vendor.
Such institutionalised perceptions about the role o f the vendors acted to create an
■fisomorphism amongst the banks.
I
Another feature that characterised the local bank-vendor relationships was the presence 
of stakeholder interests in both the banks and the vendors which, I deduce, was a source 
o f this relationship in some cases. This argument is made with reference to Local 3 and 
its vendor. The presence of board members interlocking between the bank and the 
vendor gave persistence to this long term relation. Other examples of this kind of 
relationship were between Local 4 and its vendor, and Local 2 and its vendor. As the
cases indicated, these vendors had led / enabled their clients’ adoption initiatives.
Some of the relationships between the local banks and the vendors emerged as a result 
of the past experience and networks of the IT managers. An example of this type of
Among those banks that talked about their relationship with their vendors, trust was a 
salient feature that promoted this long term relationship. A good example was Local 1 's 
relationship with its vendor. Unlike the majority of the cases, the bank's IT application 
systems were hardware independent. Nonetheless, the bank maintained its long 
relationship with its hardware vendor due to the trust that had developed between the 
two over the years.
The bank-vendor relationship facilitated a biased adoption of IT amongst these banks.
The majority of the banks depended on a main vendor and restricted themselves to 
progressing within the hardware and software provided by these vendors. The strong 
relationship with the vendors and the biased adoption of their systems were a source of
,inertia to these banks. In their conceptions, Powell and DiMaggio (1991) pointed out 
that;
organisations are not only involved in a set o f  exchange relations with other social actors; they 
are also located in a network or framework o f  relations which their own activities create but 
which also acts to shape and constrain their possibilities for action.” (Scott, 1991, p. 171).
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Depending upon the networks or relationships as a means to acquire knowledge and 
expertise from the vendors acted as a double-edged sword, with one edge facilitating the 
adoption of certain IT systems and the other constraining the banks’ options to adopt 
other forms of infrastructure and systems, e.g. downsized open systems as opposed to 
mainframe systems, which might be more cost efficient to them. In line with my 
argument, Hannan and Freeman (1989) identified the restriction imposed on the 
organisations to adopt only one specialised channel of information as one of the causes 
o f structural inertia:
“Acquiring information about relevant environments is costly, especially in turbulent situations 
where the information is most essential. In addition, personnel tend to specialise in using certain 
information channels even when other, perhaps newer, channels would provide superior 
information. This is another kind o f  sunk cost, an accumulation o f  specific human capital... Such 
specialisation limits the range o f  information about the environment that an organisation can 
obtain and process, thus reducing the possibilities o f  adaptive change..” (p. 69)
The stakeholder interests which characterised some of these relationships, the trust 
which was built over the long years of transacting, and the sense of security gained from 
the knowledge and expertise supplied by the vendor may sustain these networks and 
discourage adopting systems which need no permanent networks with any vendor.
:
.The relationship with the consultants was a phenomenon that was present in three of the
local banks, Local 3, 4, and 5. These consultants enabled the banks to formulate
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formally their business and IT strategies. I induce that the role of the consultants to 
Local 4 and Local 3 was more than guiding the banks in formalising their strategies. I B
argue that the relationship with the consultants was a means by which the two banks 
gained legitimacy before the stakeholders and that is through appearing to adopt a 
rational and a progressive means to approaching their business and IT scenes. Both 
banks experienced a revolutionary change in their board and top management members f
due to previous problems that affected the banks’ profitability. By formally approaching 
the consultants, these banks wanted to signal a diverting point in their practice before 
the main stakeholders. By doing so, they aimed at rationalising their behaviour and 
gaining legitimacy from the regulatory body and the shareholders in Bahrain.
*
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The informal relationship with ‘role-model’ banks guided two of the small banks in 
their adoption behaviour. This cost-less approach substituted the more expensive 
approach of networking with the consultants that the other three local banks followed. 
Through this relationship the banks gained expertise about how to approach their IT 
scene. Moreover it illustrated the mechanism through which these banks resembled 
each other.
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The Banks’ Culture
Introduction
The discussion in this chapter is based on the material presented within the “Banks’
Chapter Eleven
Culture” and “Problems Associated With the Adoption of IT” categories of the case 
studies. There were other categories that I have collapsed, such as the ‘Role of IT , and 
used in combination with the culture category. This chapter discusses cultural effects on 
the adoption of IT and the most important concerns aired by the informants.
I/'
The chapter starts by discussing the influence of the historical orientation of the banks 
on their adoption behaviour. Westall (1996, p. 24) argued that the link between culture 
and business history is very intimate as each contributes to the other. Based on this 
intimate relationship, I argue that the banks’ historical orientation has had an influence 
on the banks’ adoption behaviour.
The next section uses metaphors to classify the banks’ cultures. The informants’ 
narration was rich with a vocabulary that revealed attitudes, beliefs, and opinions, some 
of which were embodied within metaphors. I begin by using the metaphors that the 
informants provided to classify the banks’ cultures and thereafter link them to the 
adoption of IT behaviour within these cultures.
The chapter also discusses the changes that occurred within the banks’ cultures, and the 
context in which the discourse about IT took place. Moreover, this chapter discusses the 
cultural gap that existed within these banks, the role of the IT managers in this cultural 
gap, the attempts to bridge this gap, inertia within these cultures and IT concerns and 
problems.
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The banks’ historical orientation and IT adoption:
In this part of the thesis I argue that the banks’ historical orientation influenced their IT 
adoption attitudes. Westali (1996, p. 24-25) argued that:
“the culture o f  a business is a product o f  its history, because it is shaped by the interactions 
between individuals and circumstances in the firm’s past.... Yet, at the same time, the course o f  
business history is itse lf a product o f  business culture. This is because, once established, a 
culture forms a key elem ent in the matrix that determines the speed and direction o f  corporate 
development. Business culture is therefore a legacy from the past that helps to shape the future,”.
The banks’ strategies, some of which had been followed since the banks’ inception, 
played a major role in shaping their cultures. There are arguments in the literature that 
suggest that culture and strategy are indeed the same. For example, Bate (1994, p. 19) 
wTote that:
I am not suggesting that culture is like strategy (and vice versa), nor am I saying that culture 
and strategy are closely  related (as are W eick and others when they talk about the one being an 
‘outgrowth’, ‘offshoot’ or ‘dim ension’ o f  the other). What I am saying is that the one is the 
other: culture is a strategic phenomenon; strategy is a cultural phenomenon.”
As for my case studies, the long pursuit of some strategic focus had created a culture 
within these banks that affected thereafter the banks’ adoption decisions. My example 
comes firom Local 2. Since its inception, the bank focused on serving iim ited income 
employees’. This type of strategic orientation created a culture within the bank that 
avoided going beyond providing what the bank perceived as the basic services that 
'limited income employees’ needed. Terms such as “convenience banking services” 
were not among the vocabulary that the bank used to justify their adoption behaviour. 
Therefore, when the idea of introducing ATMs in the bank was first raised, the main 
decision makers looked at the ATMs as a source of threat to their deposit accounts 
rather than a potential advantage - a perception that was consistent with their culture 
that ascribed a ‘garish’ role to some IT systems and avoided providing them, due to their 
perception of the needs of their historical client base.
Local 3 provides another example of the influence of the bank’s cultural histoiy on its 
IT adoption. The bank was mainly created by merchant businessmen, who dominated 
its board of directors. The historical domination of the merchants on the board of
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directors created a salient corporate identity that influenced the way the bank reacted to 
events or carried out business. I infer that the bank’s cautious approach to investing in 
IT prior to the bank’s revolutionary changes was mainly due to the cautious behaviour 
of the businessmen who tended, as one informant said, to ‘pull the plugs o ff and spend 
less whenever they feared - as merchants - a slow down in their business activities. The 
old board members maintained a culture that was more sensitive to how much this 
technology would cost, rather than how much it would transform their business. 
However, with the change in the board of directors, the newcomers brought with them a 
culture that was more sensitive to IT issues than the old board’s culture. The new 
members participated positively in the bank’s IT strategies and were active members on 
the ad hoc committees that they formed to look after their IT scene. The new attitudes 
that the merchant board members brought with them were not, I believe, remote from 
their role as businessmen who had a stake in some of the IT vendors the bank was 
dealing with.
A third example is derived from the historical circumstances which influenced the 
creation of Local 4. This bank was created as a counterweight to Local 5, according to a 
consultant. Since then, rivalry between the two banks has become a part of their culture 
-just like the historical rivalry between Oxford and Cambridge Universities - which has 
driven their business as well as their IT initiatives. The branch network expansion, the 
adoption of ATMs, phone banking, EFTPoS, and credit cards were some IT related 
examples that took place in both banks almost simultaneously, as a reflex to each 
other’s initiatives.
I would like to continue my discussion by providing a summary of some of the key 
events of a number of the local banks that formed the historical context in which the 
discourse about IT strategies and initiatives took place. The importance of key historical 
events for the adoption of IT strategies and initiatives may best be summarised by 
Walsham (1993), who argued that:
“The discourse on IS strategy at any point in time takes place from a background provided by the 
historical context. This includes the history o f  the previous computer-based information systems 
in the focal organisation, the history o f  the focal organisation itself, and the broader contexts

within which the organisation is located. Human beings enact past events and actions in order to 
give meaning to the present and to speculate and make plans concerning the future.” (P. 161)
Local 1 experienced the following historical events, which formed the context in which 
the discourse about IT strategies took place:
• previous profitability problems;
• failure of previous systems;
• board of directors’ scepticism about IT,
• lack of willingness to spend on IT; and
• change in the top management team.
The above historical events influenced the bank’s approach towards building its new IT 
scene and thereafter its future strategies and initiatives, as this quotation may exhibit:
“ .. we were going into a phase where the bank had been into operations for three years, had not 
produced the kind o f  profits that the shareholders wanted. So it was very difficult for the new  
management team to com e in and say 'hi guys’ we are the new magicians, forget about what 
happened in the past, but because we tell you w e are the best, believe us and w e w ill spend ten 
million dollars and we w ill g ive you a lot whole o f  things. The shareholders would have said 
hold on, who the hell you are! How different are you from the other guys! Put your money 
where your mouth is, show us the results and we will start talking to you ..”
As discussed in the case studies, the bank adopted a downsized IT environment since 
this approach was consistent with its cost consciousness. Moreover, the main product 
champion of the IT scene started with the ‘basic systems’ and avoided adopting what 
they perceived as ‘complex’ systems that required complex IT expertise at their early 
stages. Their fear of failure spurred them to ‘play it safe’ as they lacked the competence 
to implement ‘complex’ IT systems at that time. Due to their historically negative 
experience with mainframe systems and in-house developments, the bank shifted their 
focus to the downsized environment and ‘off-the-shelf application systems. Past 
experience of the IT strategist with the software vendor played a major role in defining 
the current as well the future path of the bank’s IT initiatives.
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Another example is derived from Local 3. The bank experienced the following 
historical events, which are summarised in the following points:
• Profitability problems;
• deficiency of the old systems;
• change in the board members and top management;
• intimate relationship with the vendor (and consultant clients).
Local 3 followed a different scenario towards adopting its strategies than Local 1, 
though each were similar in size. Historical profitability problems and the malpractice 
that had accompanied them, provided positive and encouraging signals to the IT 
strategists to shift their focus to adopting more formal approaches towards developing 
their IT environment. This formal approach was similar to that of Local 4 and Local 5. 
the biggest, and perceived as most successful banks. It may be assumed, by tracing the 
steps of the big two banks after they (L3) had experienced profitability problems, that 
the bank’s management needed a sense of security and legitimacy. The historical 
relationship with the vendor and the consultant played a role in shaping the bank's 
adoption initiatives, as explained in the case study.
The last example is derived from Local 4. The historical profitability problems that the 
bank went through, in addition to Local 5 initiatives to change its approach to 
formulating its strategies, were key historical events that spurred Local 4 to change its 
approach to strategy formulation, including that of IT.
To conclude this section, I argue that the developments of IT strategies were not isolated 
from the historical events that these organisations experienced. These historical events 
played a role in either discouraging or encouraging the banks from pursuing a given 
course of action. The IT strategist(s) played a role in enacting these historical events in 
their IT strategies and initiatives.

Political power affecting IT strategy I  initiatives:
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In this section I argue that the exercise of power over the formation of IT strategies is 
intimately linked to the banks’ culture, and influences the discourse about the IT 
initiatives within these banks.
Within the local banks, the IT strategies and initiatives were perceived as being the 
prerogative o f the top management.
Within the three formal banks, Local 3, Local 4 and Local 5, the IT strategies were 
formulated within System Steering Committees (SSC). The number and position of the 
participants in these committees may differ from one bank to the other; however, in all 
three banks, IT affairs were perceived as being the prerogative of top management, who 
participated in these committees. In one of these banks, L5, the head of the SBUs aired 
concerns about their lack of representation on these committees. As will be discussed %
later in this chapter, the head of the SBUs were not part o f the SSC. Their ideas and 
needs were of little importance to the bank’s IT strategies at certain stages of the bank's 
strategic developments.
As to the other small local banks. Local 1 and Local 2, which adopted more informal 
approaches towards their IT strategies, the power of developing IT strategies and 
initiatives was concentrated within the hands of the sole product champions.
■ ,■■■
Differences, however, occurred within the two banks. In Local 1, the product champion 
of IT initiatives was the operations manager, and he was perceived and trusted by the 
bank as being the most expert in this area. His power emerged from his expertise. His 
role was to sell his ideas and vision to his colleagues in the top management and then to 
the board of directors to gain their support for approval of any IT investments. By being 
an operations manager from a support unit, he knew the limits and the boundaries that €
his proposals should not exceed. In contrast with Local 2, Local 1 IT initiatives were 
more determined by the head of the bank. His power came from his authority to which
the rest of the organisation had to comply. Any ideas coming from the different

Finally, the foreign banks’ IT strategies were perceived as the prerogative of the 
headquarters and regional offices. The local committees within the foreign banks 
played the role of lobbyists. Their political struggle with the head or regional offices 
was aimed at enhancing their local positions, which suffered due to the remoteness of 
the arena in which IT strategies were formulated.
stakeholders within the bank should be consistent with his vision and perception before 
they could flourish. If they were not consistent, they would fail.
. 1':
Metaphors, organisational culture and the 
adoption of IT:
There have been a number o f researchers who asserted the importance of metaphors in 
understanding the realities o f organisations. For example, Kendall et al (1994, p. 38)
:wrote that “.. there are four main functions for metaphors: supplying concreteness or actualisation o f  an
.abstract idea; clarifying the unknown; expressing the subjective; and assisting thought (W eaver, 196"% 
pp252-257)” . Others, like Morgan (1986, p. 12&13), argued that our theories of 
organisational life are based on metaphors that lead us to see and understand organisations in distinctive 
yet partial ways... By using different metaphors to understand the com plex and paradoxical character of 
organisational life, we are able to m anage and design organisations that we may have not thought possible 
before” (cited in Kendall et al, 1994, p. 38).
The informants within the banks used metaphors and analogies in their narrative 
description of their IT adoption experiences. These metaphors and analogies aided in 
demonstrating the informants’ world views within these banks. Moreover, they 
represented the influence of the banks’ cultures on IT adoption strategies and initiatives. 
Clark (1995, p. 2 )  claims that “.. it is now generally accepted that strategies are both rooted in, and 
partly explained by, organisation culture”.
Ï
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The following is a classification of the banks’ cultures based on these metaphors. It is 
necessary to mention that the characteristics forming these metaphors’ cultures were not 
mutually exclusive amongst these cultures. Some of the characteristics might be shared 
across the different metaphors. However, with some metaphors there were some 
characteristics that were more salient to that culture than the others.
The 'Catholic Marriage' culture:
This metaphor was originally used by the CEO of Foreign 3 when he wanted to describe 
the role of IT to his bank. Under the catholic marriage metaphor, the relationship 
between the bank’s business strategies, ability to compete and survive, quality of 
service, and IT was perceived as inseparable and of a permanent nature, just like a 
‘Catholic Marriage’.
There were other characteristics present in this culture. These were:
• the financial strength of the organisation;
• top management support and evaluation of the IT systems based on their strategic 
importance rather than their cost;
participation of the key bankers in the design of the IT systems; 
clarity of business objectives; 
dependence on IT for product delivery; and
I
■ s;
a competent IT department with the ability to define its future destination 
independently from the direct influence of vendors;
I
iI
• the percolation of MIS to influence the different functional areas, especially that 
which enabled the consultancy services business.
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In the ‘catholic marriage’ culture, the Foreign 3 IT department role was changed from a cost 
centre to a revenue centre, selling its services and products to siblings and rivals alike.
As mentioned earlier, other banks may share some of the catholic marriage culture 
characteristics, as the characteristics of different cultures are not mutually exclusive.
The "Daring" culture:
I have used this metaphor to describe the culture of the two big local banks, Local 4 and 
Local 5. This culture shares some o f the characteristics of the catholic marriage culture. 
In addition to that, it fosters attributes that encourage stepping forward and 
institutionalising systems and IT related services that were perceived by other banks as 
being highly risky or not feasible to introduce.
These two banks were focusing outward in their IT strategies, to go beyond the banks' 
boundaries. Their focus was on the retail market. The cost of their ‘beyond the 
boundaries’ systems was high. Moreover, they needed a long time to take off in the 
market and gain public acceptance. EFTPoS was the main example of IT systems that 
the other banks did not dare to introduce, due to its perceived high cost and uncertain 
returns. The two local banks faced limited success with their newly introduced EFTPoS 
services, especially with the absence o f a switch shared network in the market.
The other example of a high cost and radical IT system, aimed at transforming retail
,banking services to re-define the business network relationships based on sharing rather
than retaining IT, was the shared ATM network proposed bv Local 4. The proposal
'created tension in the market and direct competitive clashes between the two big local
banks. Despite the failure of Local 4 to implement its proposed system, its initiative
.was the catalyst that precipitated the introduction of the shared network and therefore 
overcame the inertia that prevented the other banks from introducing such shared 
network systems despite their awareness of its strategic benefit to them. The banking
‘ refer to V en k atram an ’s (1 9 9 1 , 1 9 9 4 ) ‘ f iv e  le v e ls  o f  IT -en ab led  b u sin ess  tran sform ation ’ in th e literature rev iew  
chapter.
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■ B oth  banks had had lo c a l sh areh o ld ers e v en  F oreign  5 as it w as a  jo in t  ven tu re  bank.
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industry in Bahrain was therefore transformed into a new phase, in which the isolated 
utilising of IT was broken by a collective IT utilisation initiative. This initiative 
maximised the potential benefits from embarking on IT within the retail business. The
two banks initiatives’ therefore institutionalised new retail services and systems that 
became the norm that the others conformed to.
The daring culture was embraced by banks with a strong capital base. The shareholders 
and board members had a strong bargaining power within the banking industry to 
introduce, constrain, or alter any IT related agreements affecting their strategic posture 
within the market. They were driven by their mission statements to maintain supremacy 
over the local market, which encouraged them to take the risk of introducing systems 
not introduced before in Bahrain. They were willing to spend liberally on their wide 
scale IT systems because of their strong financial base. Their top management support 
and commitment was perceived as being crucial for their success. Both banks perceived
%
following a rational approach towards formulating their business and IT strategies as a 
prerequisite to their success. Both banks aimed at grooming their IT managers’ skills, 
either by sending them on courses and training programs abroad or through recruiting 
from reputable foreign banks.
The "Demanding mistress” culture:
Reference to the “demanding mistress” was made by Foreign 5 and Local 2. In this 
culture, IT was perceived as a source of escalated cost to the bank, which conflicted 
with meeting the immediate interests of the shareholders". Any provincial upgrade in 
the infrastructure required snowballing upgrades to the other areas of the old IT 
infrastructure. Both banks were at a standstill for a relatively long period and both 
suffered from their old IT infrastructure deficiencies. IT in this culture was perceived as 
very demanding and small banks were unable to keep abreast of developments because 
of their smaller customer and capital bases. The cost-benefits of IT were perceived as 
unfavourable. The banks’ decision takers were more sensitive to the cost of the systems

 ^ T h e se  peripheral In itiatives w ere run by th e IT m an ager and n eed ed  no s ig n ifica n t in vestm en ts.
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and the payback period than the strategic implications of the systems. Moreover, there 
were no references made to formal business strategies, apart from the annual budgeting, 
nor to formal IT strategies. Commitment from the top management or the group to 
devoting resources was lacking in this type of culture. Moreover, this culture was more 
sensitive to negative experiences and failure stories than the successfril ones. The 
decision makers, as in Local 2, were described as being ‘cool tempered’, resisting the 
lure of technological changes taking place around them. Decision taking with regard to 
IT systems took a long time. It was driven by the views of the head of the bank, i.e. L2, 
or the headquarters, which lacked eommitment, i.e. F5. In both banks, top management 
demanded a cost justification of their systems. In addition to the above, in one of these 
banks, L2, the culture encouraged deference to authority despite the doubts that some 
may have had about the views of that authority.
:In this culture, inertia was high due to the lack of top management or group support and 
an unwillingness to depart from the status quo. Moreover, the IT departments were 
under-resourced, e.g. in Local 2 there were only two personnel running the IT scene, 
responsible for the internal development o f IT systems, as well as running day to day 
operations.
There were references in this culture to IT initiatives that were of an ad hoc nature and 
were not central to the banks’ business goals. For example, F5 embarked on an IT 
project to patch its old batch-oriented system with an on-line system that ran on a 
limited scale, to try overcome some of the operational deficiencies of the old system. It 
is worth mentioning that the other banks were fully operating on-line systems. Another 
example is from L2, when the bank focused on automating the islands of operations', 
such as printing 'loan certificates’ which were of minor importance to the banks' 
business.
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The "Play it safe” culture:
The main feature of this culture, which characterised Local 1, is its cautious approach to 
spending on IT systems. The previous failures of IT systems cast dark shadows on the 
decision makers’ belief in the capacity of IT systems to create business opportunities for 
the bank. The bank’s small customer and capital bases were behind the bank's 
sensitivity about substantial spending on IT.
The IT manager in this culture managed to differentiate his bank from the banks falling 
within the ‘demanding mistress’ culture, enabling his bank to overcome the bank’s old 
infrastructural deficiencies through adopting a downsized and open IT environment with 
an efficient ‘off-the-shelf applications system. Unlike the ‘demanding mistress’ banks, 
this bank was able to balance its high sensitivity to cost with its IT requirements through 
adopting an affordable but efficient downsized IT infrastructure. The expertise and past 
experience of the sole product champion, who was the operations manager, was crucial 
to the bank’s success in developing their new IT scene.
The 'others do the thinking and do the doing' cuiture:
This type of culture enabled a 'lemming’ approach to IT systems, in which traditional 
IT systems that depended on ‘off-the-shelf packages were deployed mainly within the 
boundaries of the bank. The ‘play it safe’ culture avoided radical and expensive 
initiatives, such as that of the ‘daring’ culture, e.g. EFTPoS and ATM sharing systems. 
The ‘play it safe’ adoption criteria instructed the bank to play the game safely by not 
deviating from the basics and the norms within the market.
This phrase was used by Foreign 6. In the ‘others do the thinking and do the doing' 
culture, the IT scene was more dependent on the headquarters or regional offices than 
the local branch resources. This culture embraced the branches of the foreign banks 
operating in Bahrain. The top management of these branches in Bahrain played a less 
vital role in the adoption process of IT than the local banks’ top management.
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The ‘trickle down’ nature of IT adoption*  ^ caused a slow pace in the adoption process, 
and resulted in minimal or incremental changes in the banks’ IT environments. Some of 
these banks reported deficiencies in their systems, the extreme case of which was 
Foreign 5^  batch systems, which had put the bank at a competitive disadvantage as 
compared to the other banks in Bahrain.
The 'others do the thinking and do the doing’ culture was less sensitive to stimuli 
coming from local competitors, and therefore the foreign banks in Bahrain were less 
responsive to the competitive pressure coming from the local rivals.
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The IT systems embraced by this culture were, to a great extent, of a global nature. The 
advanced banks embraced sophisticated global IT systems, such as Foreign 6’s 
electronic banking system and Foreign I ’s ‘Cash Management System’,
The IT managers only needed skills to implement the ready made systems, most of 
which were released though the banks’ global communication lines. The IT scene for 
most of the foreign banks was run by the operations departments and there were few 
developments, if any, taking place within these banks in Bahrain.
The main source of change within this type of culture came mainly fi-om the head or 
regional offices. This centralised approach to the IT developments was the source of 
inertia within this culture. Moreover, the centralised approach was a source of 
complaints and resentment, e.g. Foreign 2 and their complaint about their slow IBM 
system that preceded the AS 400; Foreign 5’s complaint about their IT systems that put 
them at a competitive disadvantage to the other banks, and Foreign 6‘s complaint about 
their MBS, which did not meet their local requirements.
P riority  w as g iv e n  to the m ajor in ternational m arkets. M ark ets su ch  as the B ahraini r ece iv ed  th e n e w  d ev e lo p m e n ts  
late as com p ared  to the m ajor international m arkets.
‘ T h o u g h  F5 b e lo n g s  m ore to the "dem anding m istress ' cu ltu re , it sh ares so m e o f  the ch aracter istics  o f  th e  'o th ers  do  
th e  th in k in g  and the d o in g ' cu lture su ch  as its d e p e n d en ce  on  the head o ff ic e  in acqu irin g  their IT sy stem s.
i

Radical changes in culture:
î
I
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A phenomenon that was unique within the local banks, as opposed to the majority of the 
foreign banks, was the radical changes that occurred in the culture of four out of the five
Ilocal banks in the case studies. These changes brought with them new ways of thinking 
and working.
As indicated in the case studies. Local 4, Local 3, and Local 1 experienced a change in 
their board of directors and / or top management team. Local 5 experienced 
revolutionary changes without, however, experiencing a change in its board of directors 
or local top management members. Foreign 3 was the only foreign bank that mentioned 
a radical change in their culture, which they had approached through adding new crew 
members to their top management.
Local 5 was the first of the local banks that started the revolutionary change in its 
culture due to its board of directors’ demand to maintain sound revenue in a declining 
economy. The bank’s approach to a consultant, Arthur D Little, began a new era in 
which the consultant led them into adopting management techniques that he was 
disseminating internationally.
The other three local banks as Table I indicates suffered from severe losses in the mid­
eighties. Local 4 soon followed Local 5 in approaching a consultant to facilitate their 
transformation process. Their approaching a consultant may have been meant to signal 
their efforts to distinguish them from the old management, through adopting rational, 
corrective techniques in prescribing new, efficient means to transform the bank, and 
hence restore confidence of the main stakeholders. Moreover, L4’s practices were a 
reflex to the practices o f their main competitor, Local 5. Local 3 went through the same 
problems that Local 4 went through. Thereafter, L3, adopted similar approaches to L4 
but at a later date.
if
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Small banks Big Banks
T ab le  1: R a d ica l ch a n g e s L1 L3 L4 L5 F3
Reported major losses * *
Change in top management and / or Board members *
Groom local top management skills * *
Empower top management with new skilled recruits * * *
Consultants managed the revolutionary change * *
First formal strategic plan implemented in 93/94 91/92 86 88/89
The three local banks. Local 3, Local 4 and Local 5, acted similarly in their response to 
the change in the economic environment. Their approach to achieving a revolutionary 
change within their environment was triggered by Local 5’s initiative, which stimulated 
Local 4 to go along the same path. Local 3 was the last to follow the herd. It perceived 
the big two banks as being more successful. This isomorphism between the main three 
local banks was triggered by economic factors^, as well as the desire from the banks’ top 
management to gain the confidence of the stakeholders by following what the banking 
environment then perceived as a rational norm, to change from the old misconduct 
practices.
All of the banks empowered their top management with new recruits to enable this 
cultural change. Two of the banks, Local 1 and Foreign 3, opted to change through 
depending on their internal resources instead of consultants. As to Foreign 3, the bank 
was in a sound financial position and was able to empower its top management with 
staff of the required expertise to direct their new strategic thrust. Local 1, on the other 
hand, was one of the small banks, and the one with the least financial capabilities. It 
depended on its operations manager to set its new goals and strategies informally. 
These were set carefully to follow the traditional banking business and required no 
sophisticated expertise. It is worth noting that Local 1 was the only bank among these 
banks that did not have a formal strategy approach.
T he c h a n g in g  e c o n o m ic  co n d it io n s  such a s  the drop in th e o il p r ices, the d ecrease  in gov ern m en t exp en d itu re, and  
th e  c o lla p s e  o f  th e r eg ion a l and lo ca l s to ck  m arkets, created  n e w  e co n o m ic  rea litie s  that th ese  banks had to  respon d  
to . R efer  to chapter 4  for further d isc u ss io n  abou t th e c h a n g es  w ith in  the b an k in g  en v iron m en t.
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Level of changes:
I referred to the changes in these cultures as being radical, because of how much the 
change encompassed, Mintzbeg et al. (1992) wrote that change could take place from 
the broadest and most conceptual levels, to the narrowest and most concrete levels (see 
Table 2). For change to be effective in transforming the organisation, Mintzberg et al. 
argued that it should encompass all of the organisational levels. A deductive change 
happens when change flows from the conceptual levels to the concrete levels. An 
inductive change, on the other hand, takes place when change flows from the concrete 
levels to the conceptual levels.
In five cases there were references to changes in the conceptual levels, as well as the 
concrete levels.
As to the conceptual levels, Local 5 argued that there was a need to shift the mindset 
away from the existing paradigms that created the bank’s culture. These paradigms 
were created by the economic conditions. The other banks had a similar vision about 
the need to change their strategic orientation. Table 3 summarises the new strategic 
orientation which represented the change in the banks’ conceptual level.
Table 2 : Content of organizational ch ange (Mintzberg, 1992)
Change in Change in strategy
organization (state) (direction)
Culture Vision
More
conceptual Structure Strategic Positions
(thought)
Systems Programs
More
concrete People Facilities
(action)
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Small
banks
Big
Banks
Foreign
Banks
Table 3: S tra teg ic  fo c u s L1 L3 L4 L5 F3
E xp an sion  in g eo g ra p h ica l m arket and in typ e  of b u sin ess; offering  
co n su lta n cy , w h o le s a le , and retail b u s in e s s
E xp an sion  in typ e  o f  b u s in e s s ;  com m ercia l banking, w iden fo c u s  to 
Include retail b u s in e s s  in addition to trade fin ance
Shift from  treasu ry and  interbank in vestm en t b u s in e s s  to  local 
com m ercia l banking b u s in e s s
19 8 6  stra teg ic  p lan s: d e v e lo p m e n t o f d o m e stic  operations: 1994: 
w iden b u s in e s s  fo c u s  on  international m arkets e sp ec ia lly  treasu ry  
b u s in e s s  in G 7
S e g m e n te d  th e m arket, prim e fo c u s  on retail. C orporate sec to r  
defin ed  a s  an  im portant b u s in e s s .  International opportunities potential 
b u s in e s s  for th e  bank.
With the change in the business focus, there was a new vision related to the role of IT. 
In all of these banks, their IT initiatives were directed to serve their business goals, e.g. 
the adoption o f retail systems by all of these banks as they focused on the retail 
business, the adoption of a sophisticated MIS system by Foreign 3 to enable consultancy 
business, and the adoption of the treasury IT systems to enable international and treasury 
banking unit business, as was the case in Local 5.
Small
banks
Big
Banks
Foreign
Bank
Table 4: R eferences to  ch an ges in a) structure L1 L3 L4 L5 F3
Introduction o f S B U s * *
C reation o f corp orate  p lanning units * *
Flatter structure to e n h a n c e  com m u nication *
b) C h a n g e  in th e  p osition  o f IT m a n a g er * *
IT m a n a g er  m e m b er  o f  top  m a n a g em en t com m ittee * *
C h a n g e  in th e nature o f IT dep artm en t * *
P rev iou s IT m a n a g er  h e a d s  the branch network *
The above changes were accompanied by changes in the structure of the banks (see Table 
4). Local 4 and 5 restructured their organisations and introduced SBUs, in addition to 
creating strategic planning units, as was the case with Local 5. Local 3, on the other 
hand, was not as big as the two big banks and therefore was not able to introduce 
business units as specialised as those of the big banks. L3 flattened its hierarchy to 
enable a faster response to the clients’ needs.
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The change in structure and positions reached the IT department as well. In Local 4, 
Local 5, and Foreign 3, the IT department became independent from the operations 
department and had more resources. In contrast to these big banks, the small banks’ IT 
departments continued to be part of the operations department.
As to changes in the positions, the IT managers became closer than before to the CEO in 
the big banks, Local 4, Local 5, and Foreign 3. One of the small banks. Local 1, shared 
this same characteristic in relation to the seniority of the IT manager. He became linked 
to the CEO and reported directly to him. Moreover, he was part of the top management 
committee where the strategic aspects of the bank were discussed. Local 3 was the 
exception, however, in which the IT manager continued to be headed by the operations 
manager. The IT manager argued that, to avoid filtering his requests, he had to bypass 
the operations manager to reach the CEO. This point was one of his concerns.
There were other examples of changes in the positions brought by the changes in vision 
and strategies. In Local 3, the previous IT manager, who preceded the one I 
interviewed, was transferred to head the branch network, his presence in this position 
and his past IT experience being perceived as crucial because at this stage Local 3 was 
expanding its branch network and IT was perceived as the backbone for this expansion.
Small
banks
Big
Banks
Foreign
Bank
Table 5: Levels o ffo rm a l structure o f  s tra teg ic  p lan n in g L1 L3 L4 L5 F3
Informal planning - O n e m an sh ow •
C o m m ittees * * * *
R e fe re n c e  to formal strategic  planning: * * *
Form al definition of the b u s in es s  g o a ls * * * *
Shift from th e o n e  m an sh o w  - m ultiple s ta k eh o ld ers  participating 
in th e d isc u ss io n  / d eve lop m en t / eva lu a tion  o f IT strateg ies: * * *
Shift o f pow er to the b an k ers  participating in th e  S S C *
Shift o f pow er to top m a n a g em e n t co m m itte e *
Table 5 illustrates the changes that were brought about by the revolutionary changes in 
the banks’ strategy formation. With the exception of LI which had an informal 
approach to its strategy formation, the other banks took a formal approach to e change in
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their strategy formation. The strategic goals were more formally stated and committees 
were formed to look after the IT strategies within these banks. The formation of these 
committees allowed the participation of different stakeholders in this process, which had 
become more of a joint venture project rather than a ‘one man show’.
At the concrete level, all of these banks experienced changes in their IT systems, 
examples of which were provided within the case studies. The above changes at the 
conceptual and the concrete levels were the basis of these banks’ revolutionary changes 
in strategy formation.
Approaches to change:
Mintzberg et al. (1992) described three approaches to change. The first is change by 
strategic planning. This type of change is deliberate, formal and deductive. The second 
approach to change is visionary leadership. This approach embraces an informal means 
of change led by a product champion who ‘tends to maintain close contact with the 
details of the operationaization o f his or her vision’ (Ibid., p. 43). The third approach to 
change is inductive learning, which is informal and emergent, in that it can take place 
anywhere in the organisation. These forms of change are complementary rather than 
substitutes. Mintzberg’s approach to change may provide an account of the radical 
changes that happened in the Bahraini banks.
I
N ew  Consultants Vendors Groom  
recruits . . the skills
o f  top 
mgt team
L 3 .L 4 .L 5  L1.L3.L4.
L1.L3.L4. /  LS
L5.F3
Figure 1 describes the 
process of change within 
the five banks. The process 
starts with learning and 
conceiving the change.
There were different 
sources for this process.
Learning could be imported.
This was the case with the F igure I : A pproach es to  change  
banks that depended on
Informa! 
L4. L5 '^Lange
process
Learning Vision
Formal
planning\
W ithin  
the bank 
L4.L5.F3
L3. L4. L5,m odel
banks
ProductCom m ittees
L3,L4,L5,F3
cham pion
«
5
1
3
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.consultants in their learning process, L3, L4, and L5, The relationship in this case was
more formal. The vendors, however, were an example of an informal source of the
learning process which the local banks depended on. Another informal source of
learning was the perceived ‘role model banks’, which Local I depended on. All of the
five banks empowered their top management with new recruits who acted as another
source of learning, a dramatic example being Local 1. In addition to the above, the two
big local banks embarked on grooming the skills of their top management. Learning
from within the banks was a main source of change. This was the case with Local 5,
which terminated its relationship with a consultant and depended on its internal
resources once it had mastered the required skills for formal strategic planning. Local 4
.and Foreign 3 provide further examples of learning from within to promote a wider ■ :
vision. Both banks learned from developing excess capacities from their IT initiatives 
to capitalise on their IT differently from the others, e.g. the proposal of the shared ATM 
network and the regional network by Local 4, and the creation of an IT subsidiary 
company selling IT services to rivals, as well as siblings, as was the case with Foreign 3, J
The outcome of the learning process was a vision. This vision crystallised within the 
committees, e.g. System Steering Conunittees, as was the case with Local 3, Local 4, 
Local 5 and Foreign 3. However, in Local 1, the vision was formulated within the 
mindset of the IT / operations manager, who was the sole product champion of the IT 
strategy direction.
The last step in the process of change is the formal planning process, which sets the 
programs for achieving required goals. Four of the banks, L3, L4, L5, and F3 depended 
on formal strategic planning for introducing change in their banks. In contrast to these 
four banks, Local 1 was the least formal in implementing its’ product champion’s 
visions, as it bypassed the formal planning phase.
442

iCulture - role of IT matrix:
This section attempts to graft context of change matrix of Boddy and Buchanan (1992) 
with the banks’ cultures discussed earlier in order to enrich understanding of the 
adoption behaviour amongst the Bahraini banks.
The Boddy et al. matrix (Boddy and Gunson, 1996, p. 191) has two dimensions. The 
vertical dimension represents the perceived scale o f change (from radical to 
incremental), while the horizontal dimension represents the centrality of change to the 
primary task of business (from core to. peripheral).
«Catholic M arriage 
•Daring B anks
Radical Operational and other 
drivers
Core, 
central to 
banks’ 
business 
strategies.
It safe
ATMs Demanding
istress
e.g. electronic 
Banking, Mis
O thers do  
th inking and  
doing
Pace and scale o f change 
Incremental
Peripheral 
to banks’ 
business 
strategies.
N o t im portant to 
asset side
• Patching o ld  sy stem s  
with new  sy stem s - 
effic ien cy  problem s.
• A utom ating m anual 
processes in a 
disintegrated m anner.
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Figure 2: change matrix based on Boddy and Gunson's <1996/ matrix.
Figure 2 maps the different cultures on a two dimension matrix similar to the Boddy et al. 
matrix. However, the horizontal dimension of my matrix represents the centrality of IT 
to the banks’ business as inferred from the main IT developments and the role of IT 
categories discussed within the case studies. The vertical dimension, on the other hand, 
represents the degree of cultural change within the banks.
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.Quadrant 1 of the matrix embraces the ‘Catholic Marriage’ culture and the ‘Daring
Banks’ culture. All of the banks in quadrant 1 experienced radical changes in their 
.cultures, as explained earlier. As to their IT systems, the ‘Catholic Marriage’ culture
'ii'and the ‘Daring Banks’ cultures promoted IT systems that were closely linked to their 
business goals. However, these banks also reported that they were embarking on IT 
systems that were not linked to the competitiveness of some business areas. To the 
retail business, IT was strategically valued. However, to the commercial and corporate 
banking business IT played a marginal role in serving the banks’ business and was 
mainly directed at enhancing effectiveness within these units. This example is indicated 
by the part of the ellipse that extends to quadrant 4.
As to the ‘Play it safe’ culture represented by Local 1, they also experienced a radical 
change in their culture, as indicated earlier, which places them on the upper half of the 
matrix. The initial drivers for their main IT initiatives were operational ones and 
institutional ones related to conforming to the institutionalised IT related services, such
as credit cards, despite their lack o f contribution to the bank’s business profitability. In
addition to these drivers, there were IT initiatives that the bank was initiating which
were perceived as closely linked to enhancing the quality of service. This enabled the
bank to compete with others based on the quality of service rather than the type of 
.business. These IT initiatives were related to the bank’s front desk operations, enabling 
tellers to perform different transaction types from one location and in the least possible
time. Based on the above accounts, the ‘Play it Safe’ culture may best fit between 
quadrant 1 and 4, hence embracing core and peripheral IT systems.
Quadrant 2, on the other hand, embraces the majority of the foreign banks, with the 
exception of Foreign 3. None of the informants within these banks narrated any change 
in their strategy formation processes nor in their top management. As mentioned in the 
case studies, these banks were affected by the changes within the head and regional 
offices and were more governed by the ‘trickle down’ effect of their IT strategy than the 
local changes within Bahrain. The inference is, therefore, that these banks experienced 
incremental changes, if any at all, in their culture over time and therefore should be
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located at the lower part of the matrix. These banks argued that their IT systems were 
more geared to serving their business goals. This was the case, for example, with the
■■‘Cash Management’ electronic banking system of Foreign 1, which was directed 
towards their main clients, the international corporate companies. Another example is 
Foreign 2’s adoption of the IBM AS 400 and the PC and LAN platforms to provide an 
on the spot response to their regional clients outside Bahrain, without needing to have a 
physical presence there. Based on this account, the foreign banks may best be located in 
quadrant 2, which represents cultures experiencing locally incremental change, or
possibly no change, yet adopting core IT systems. There were, however, some IT 
systems that these banks adopted due to their global IT strategies, that had a peripheral 
link to their business in Bahrain. An example of this may be Foreign 6’s sophisticated 
electronic banking that was perceived by the corporate banking manager as playing a 
marginal role in serving their corporate banking business or in creating a competitive 
advantage over the others. This was also true of their MIS system which was considered 
a bane by the management, rather than a support. Therefore, part of the ‘Others Do the 
Thinking and the Doing’ ellipse falls within quadrant 3 because of the ephemeral role 
some IT initiatives played in the local business requirements of these banks.
The ‘Demanding M istress’ culture falls mostly within quadrant 3. The banks in this 
quadrant experienced no radical change in their culture. For example, the GM and the 
other top management personnel in Local 2 had been almost the same since the 
inception of the bank, and there was no reference given by this bank to any changes to 
their approaches in formatting their strategies. The power to make strategic decisions 
was always seen as being the prerogative of the top management, especially the head of 
the bank, whose vision was the centre of the bank’s processes and strategies, including 
that of the IT, throughout the entire life of the bank. The IT initiatives that these banks 
discussed were peripheral to their business, for example, Foreign 5’s initiatives to patch 
its batch system with an on-line system, as mentioned earlier, and Local 2’s focus on 
automating the manual processes within the different functional areas and attempts to 
conform to the institutionalised retail IT systems, e.g. phone banking, despite their 
perceived low value to the bank’s business. Having said that, some of the IT initiatives
:
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were central to the banks’ business mainly due to the sectoral nature of the banking 
industry that required a minimal level of IT to support the banks’ ‘bread and butter' 
business requirements, for example, integrating the different branches electronically or 
adopting ATMs. Therefore, part of the ‘Demanding Mistress’ culture has to fall within 
quadrant 2.
Fiol (1996) used the ‘sponge’ metaphor for explaining organisations’ ability to absorb 
knowledge and thereafter innovate:
“To explore an alternative source o f  our inconsistency problem, I invite you to think o f  
organisations as sponges. They have more or less capacity to absorb new knowledge, not unlike 
sponges that have differing capacities to absorb a liquid. Depending on their absorptive capacity 
and on their ability to reconfigure what they have absorbed, organisations also have more or less 
potential to generate outcomes, not unlike sponges that are limited by the amount o f  the nature o f  
what they have absorbed. Though not labelling firms as sponges, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
introduced the analogy indirectly in their argument that innovative output is dependent on the 
prior accumulation o f knowledge that enables innovators to assimilate and exploit new 
know ledge.” (p. 1013)
Based on the above, I argue that the ‘catholic marriage’ and ‘daring banks’ cultures, 
which are located in quadrant one, seem to be more able to absorb knowledge. The 
banks' relationship with their vendors and with the consultants, the new recruits and the 
groomed skills of their employees enhanced these banks’ ability to absorb new 
knowledge and hence be more able to ‘innovate’.
The radical changes in culture that LI experience, increased the absorbency ability of 
this bank, and enabled it to produce IT solutions that were more efficient in meeting the 
banks’ IT needs than those banks which embraced the "demanding mistress’ culture, in 
spite of L i ’s ‘play it safe’ approach. However, the other characteristics within the ‘play 
it safe’ culture made this bank less innovative than the banks which belonged to 
Quadrant 1 of the matrix, the ‘catholic marriage’ and the ‘daring banks'.
:
The banks which were least able to absorb new knowledge were those located in 
Quadrant 3 of the matrix, which belonged to the ‘demanding mistress’ culture. These 
banks experienced little change in their culture, as explained earlier, and were less 
radical in their IT initiatives.
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As to the ‘others do the thinking and the doing’ banks, their absorbency ability was less 
influential on the banks’ adoption behaviour, as these banks depended on their 
headquarters and regional offices to obtain their strategies and systems.
Cultural Gap:
In the case studies, there were symptoms of a cultural gap that existed within the banks. 
The source of this cultural gap was the lack of congruence between the bankers who 
had the ultimate power to adopt the technologies, and the technologists who played an 
advisory role. In some of the banks, the technologists argued that, despite the general 
appreciation of the bankers o f the role of IT in the business, they were short-sighted and 
unable to comprehend the different aspects of the IT systems proposed by the 
technologists.
One of the symptoms of this gap was the delay in the adoption of some systems by these 
banks. This can be attributed to a lack of the GM support, e.g. Local 2, a clash of 
interests amongst the board members, e.g. Local 4, a lack of board support, e.g. Local 3, 
and a delay in group support, e.g. the foreign banks.
Tension was present between the bankers, on one hand, and the IT departments, on the 
other in some of the cases. The source of this tension, in Local 4 for example, was the
É1;
I
inability of the top management to assess the IT manager’s expensive proposals (this 
was prior to the formal strategic planning approach). The other source of tension was 
due to the prescribed role of the IT department falling short of the expectations of the 
users. This tension was created by poor communications with the IT department, lack 
of a top management mandate to support some of the functional areas, and the exclusion 
of the head of the SBUs from the System Steering Committees, as was the scenario in 
L5.
a:
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In some of the banks, the cultural gap was because of the lack of a clear vision about 
who should be responsible for marketing the IT related products, the technologists or the 
bankers. An example of this case came from Foreign 6. The bank offered its key 
corporate clients its sophisticated electronic banking system free of charge, to create a 
habit of banking through the electronic system among the corporate clients. There was a 
dispute within the bank over who should be managing this IT delivery system - the 
corporate banking manager or the IT manager. The IT manager was held responsible for 
the system, but he believed that the electronic banking system needed marketing efforts 
rather than technical efforts and hence should be managed by a business unit, rather than 
an IT unit.
4As to the foreign banks, the cultural gap existed between the branches in Bahrain and 
their headquarters and regional offices. Tension between the branches and the regional 
offices was reported as a result of the lack of sufficient support or responsiveness these :
banks received from the centralised offices. These branches found themselves in 
continuous strife for IT resources over which they had little control. Moreover, 
dissatisfaction with the banks’ systems was reported amongst some of these banks. The 
compulsory adoption of the systems from the headquarters or the regional offices 
created resentment in the users of the foreign banks. As Local 6 reported, some of their 
IT systems were perceived by their management as a burden rather than a benefit. They 
had to meet these demanding but unappreciated requirements mainly because the 
headquarters forced them to do so.
Another dilemma within the foreign banks was related to the development o f global 
systems. Because these global systems were so expensive to develop they threatened to 
overrun their budget, which forced the technologists cut comers. The outcome was 
systems that fell short of the users’ expectations - some of these systems were technical 
rather than user oriented - which the users worldwide had to put up with for a long time 
due to their long life expectancy. Tension between the technologists and the users, who 
accused the former of developing systems unable to meet the bankers’ needs, and the
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Role of the IT manager and the cultural gap:
The IT manager’s role was perceived as that of an ‘order taker’. In all of the banks the 
IT managers’ role was advisory to the bankers, and when they were less interested in 
hearing from them they just ‘shut him up’:
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technologists and the group top management, over the allocation o f resources were signs 
of the cultural gap.
The prescribed role of the IT manager was, in some instances, one of the ingredients of 
the cultural gap within the banks. Local 5 and Foreign 4 raised the issue of the need to 
change the role of the IT manager.
"... sometimes I have to be quiet in these meetings. I try to use them as a platform to tell them 
what is going on or what the technology has to offer. Sometimes they are interested enough, then 
they will ask me to pursue things, or som etim es they will tell me to shut up..” IT manager.
In some of these banks, the ‘order taker’, passive role of the IT manager did not enable 
him to question the bankers orders so that he could provide what they needed instead of 
what they just wanted.
There were appeals by some IT managers, e.g. Foreign 4’s IT manager, to enable them 
to play a more active role in the process of business products/strategy developments 
through enabling them to participate in this process at an earlier stage, rather than at the 
end of the process when the decisions had already been taken. Others, e.g. Local 5. 
appealed for enabling the IT manager to play a proactive role rather than the passive and 
reactive role that he usually played. They believed that the implications of IT for 
business were becoming more complex, and thus, hard for the banks to keep pace with.
The cultural gap between the bankers and the technologists continued to occur due to 
the persistence of a culture legacy in which the bankers perceived themselves as having 
the ultimate decision making power. This was a throwback to the old days when IT was 
perceived as having merely a data processing role. Despite the claim that the IT 
department has transferred into the strategic IT era, the bankers continued to perceive
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the technologists as subjects who had to assimilate the bankers’ views rather than 
participate in making them. The relationship could be described as one of bondage, in 
which the bankers still maintained a superior role, rather than a mutual marriage in 
whose affairs both partners had a say.
External cultural gap:
There were references to an external cultural gap that existed between the banks and the 
regulatory body. The gap arose due to the different postures the two parties took with 
regard to the IT initiatives some of these banks wanted to introduce into the market. 
The consequences of the cultural gap could be important to the banks because of the 
influential role the regulatory body played within the banking industry, as was discussed 
earlier in the thesis. One of the ‘daring’ banks gave me examples of its attempt to 
introduce an IT based retail product. The informant within that bank claimed that its 
initiatives were delayed due to the lack of awareness of the regulatory body about the 
business implications of these IT based products for the bank.
Inertia:
Inertia was one of the factors that affected the adoption of IT within the banking 
industry. The sources of inertia could be attributed to environmental ones that existed 
outside the boundaries of the banks and to internal sources that existed within the banks.
I
Regulation was one of the external sources of inertia within the banking environment.
The Bahraini banking industry is tightly regulated. These regulations play the role of 
safeguarding the banking industry from slipping into any malfunctioning practices. 
However, the regulatory aspects also played a role in slowing down, in some instances, 
the pace of IT adoption (refer to the shared ATM case study in chapter eight).

Other sources that decreased the banks’ manoeuvrability with regard to the type of IT 
platform was their dependence on their vendors in acquiring knowledge about the IT 
environment. By restricting themselves to one channel of biased information, e.g. 
information about IT systems promoted by the partner vendor(s), these banks became 
less adaptable to changes that occurred beyond what their vendors offered, despite the 
possible efficiency of other alternatives. For example, downsized technology might be 
more appropriate to the Bahraini small banks, which were more cost sensitive, than a 
costly mainframe technology of the vendors, who were the main source of information 
to the banks.
Table 6: Internal Sources o f  Inertia a s D isc u sse d  in the C ase  Studies
High sunk  c o s t  in in vestm en t in IT and  in learning
Lack o f top m a n a g em en t support /  group support
Lack of board support
P e r c e iv ed  high c o s t  o f th e  tech n o lo g y
S k ep tic ism  about th e  va lu e  o f th e  s y s te m s
L ack o f  internal m arketing
R e s is ta n c e  to shift from th e  e sta b lish e d  n orm s o f do in g  th in gs
Lack o f appreciation from th e  u se r s  to  th e  im plication of IT to their 
b u s in e s s
M entality o f  the old generation
L o ss  o f faith in IT du e to previous failure and c a s h  drain with IT s y s te m s  
L ack o f  en cou rag in g  banking culture 
Profitability problem s  
Lack o f financial strength
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Table 6 lists some of the internal factors that contributed to creating the inertia. The first 
of these factors is the high sunk cost of investment in IT and in learning to work with 
these technologies which created stagnation with the banks’ old systems for long period 
of time.
IThere were references to inertia that occurred because of the top management, the board 
of directors, or other personnel at the lower levels of the organisations. The most 
serious sources of inertia came from those who were at the top management or on the 
board of directors. As mentioned in the cases, some of the banks that were suffering 
high inertia because of lack of top management and board support managed to overcome 
this problem when revolutionary changes took place at these management levels.
■il■’I'1^'I
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There were also references to inertia that was caused by the users’ resistance to 
accepting the new technologies. Another factor causing inertia was a loss of faith in IT, 
as a result o f previous negative experiences with IT systems.
The level o f inertia varied depending on the banks’ culture. In the ‘demanding mistress’ 
and the ‘play it safe’ cultures, inertia was higher than in the ‘Catholic marriage’ and 
‘daring banks’ culture. As to the ‘others do the thinking and do the doing culture', 
inertia existed as a result of the slow responsiveness, or lack of responsiveness in some 
cases, to the banks’ local IT needs.
The last source of inertia was the profitability problems of these banks. Both the 
‘demanding mistress’ and the ‘play it safe’ cultures stipulated that no investments in IT 
could be made unless the banks were in sound financial positions prior to taking these 
decisions.
IT related concerns:
The following list represents the concerns of the banks as narrated by the informants.
• Regulations within the industry; Tightly regulating the IT scene within the 
industry may restrict the full exploitation of IT beyond the banks’ boundary. It may 
decrease the banks’ innovation in this area as well.
• Overcentralized IT decisions: The excess centralisation of IT decisions away from 
the foreign banks’ branches were a source of deficiency in some of these banks.
• Quantifying IT projects: The practice of justifying the returns of IT projects to the 
top management and headquarters was problematic to the IT strategists.
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• High cost of training; The high cost of training was one of the barriers that 
decreased the IT departments ability to overcome the inertia within the banks.
• Deficiency of IT systems; The previous system's legacy was a concern to the IT 
departments which disabled them from meeting their business goals.
• Underresourced IT departments: The allocation of sufficient resources was a 
concern of the IT managers who were overburdened with a long wish list.
Attempts to bridge the cultural gap:
Availability of Experts; Expertise within the IT area was an expensive resource 
that was in high demand among the banks. Some of the banks tended to groom the 
skills of their IT personnel. However, the turnover of experts was high because of 
the failure of some banks’ human resource policies to recognise the technologists' 
‘new’ strategic role.
The tenure of expatriate managers; The tenure of the expatriate managers and 
their influence on IT strategies was a concern as aired by Local 4. The concern was 
raised due to the perception that these managers may take decisions they won’t live 
with in the long run due to the nature of their short term contracts.
In addition to the concerns listed above, securing sufficient top management support 
and bridging the cultural gap were amongst the concerns of the informants. I
Some informants believed that the radical changes that took place in some of these 
cases, and the new measures that were introduced, played a role in reducing the wide 
cultural gap that had existed prior to these changes. The following, are some of the 
factors that played a role in this reduction.
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mainly due to the passive role the IT manager played within these committees.
Training:
Committees as a mean for gaining a mutual understanding:
It was claimed that the committees within the banks played a role in creating a mutual 
understanding among the participating parties. This was achieved through enabling the 
different parties to air their concerns and beliefs and subsequently reach a vision. 
Despite this argument from the banks, a cultural gap still existed in many of the banks.
There was a tendency from some of the banks, eg . Local 5, to change the profile of the 
characteristics o f the IT manager as a means to bridge the cultural gap. To rehabilitate 
his thinking in terms of business needs, the Local 5 IT manager was sent to acquire an 
MBA degree. However, the new qualification acted only as a veneer on the top and did 
little to bridge the cultural gap as long as the old paradigm perceiving the IT manager as 
an ‘order taker’ continued to rule.
*Training was one of the measures that were followed to rehabilitate the users. With the 
introduction of their new PC environment which aimed at enabling the bank to provide 
a prompt service to the overseas users, Foreign 2 perceived training as essential to 
enable the bank to exploit the system’s potential benefits. The bank’s top management 
commitments and financial support were essential to provide this measure to overcome 
the inertia problem.
Other banks perceived re-educating as being crucial to overcome the inertia problem. 
However, this claim was an empty gesture when it lacked the support of the resource
controllers. An example was Foreign 6’s IT manager’s vision which was not supported, 
due to the centralisation of the resources with a regional office that resented spending on 
such a project.
454

Shift in existing paradigm:
:# 
:
Need for changes in human resource policies:
Changes in human resource policies were perceived as part of the overall changes 
required to bridge the cultural gap. Some banks, e.g. Local 3, which complained of high 
IT personnel turnover, did not introduce changes in its human resource policies as a 
result of the new job requirements brought about by their IT enviroiunent. For example.
Local 3 did not alter its IT payments to compensate their IT personnel for staying 
beyond the normal working hours, as did the other banks. This failure to alter the 
human resource policies created problems for this bank.
Other banks perceived linking promotions and rewards to the ability of their employees 
to adapt to their jobs’ new IT requirements. These banks believed that this approach 
was essential to exploit the potential benefits of their recent IT developments. An 
example of this came from Foreign 2. They followed what they described as ‘carrot and 
stick’ policies. They claimed that they linked their promotion to the employees’ abilit> 
to adapt to the new work environment and learn the new skills dictated by it (the 
“carrot”). The stick was to show less interest in the habits of the older generation and 
replace non-adaptable employees, with younger, more adaptable employees. They 
claimed that their appraisal evaluated how well their employees could cope with their 
new work environment
Other banks, e.g. Foreign 3, claimed that they, as new banks, sought IT literacy skills in 
new recruits.
There were calls for shifting the existing paradigm about the role of IT manager to a 
proactive role. The new paradigm aimed at enabling the IT managers and the bankers to 
set their goals mutually and to work in a partnership. To achieve this. Local 5 suggested 
linking the IT managers’ promotions with the ability of their business partners to 
achieve their goals.
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Introduction:
456
Chapter Twelve
Conclusion
This thesis aims to produce an understanding of the context within which IT in the
commercial banking sector has evolved in a developing country, Bahrain.
’
The context within which IT is embedded may be concerned with the organisation, its 
history, its culture, and the micro-political power within which the actors directing IT 
manoeuvre. It may go beyond the organisation, to reach the economy or the industry 
within which the organisation operates. Or it may be concerned with the subtle set of 
contexts which are relevant to social construction in the mind set of those involved with 
directing the IT scene, and their perception and interpretation of reality. All these sets 
of contexts may interact to affect IT adoption behaviour.
I
The elements of the IT contexts were spelt out within the thesis chapters. In the 
"Bahrain Financial Services Sector” chapter, I described the scene in which the banks of 
my case studies were operating. This chapter discussed the main historical economic 
issues that affected the banks’ performance, which is one of the context elements that 
intertwined with other elements and affected the development and the adoption of IT. 
The “Collaboration” chapter discussed the institutional factors within the banking 
environment and their influence on collective IT projects. The “Strategy” chapter 
explored IT strategy processes within the commercial banks, and the drivers of these 
initiatives. The “Banks’ Relations and Networks” chapter discussed the nature of the 
banks’ relationships with other organisations and their effect on shaping IT strategies/

initiatives. Finally, the “Culture” chapter discussed the influence on the banks’ history, 
political power, and cultural change, among other elements, on IT.
Much of the literature about IT “ reflects a rational-economic interpretation o f  organisational 
processes, and a positivist methodology which is based on the view  that the world exhibits objective 
cause-effect relationships which can be discovered, at least partially, by structured observation." 
(W alsham, 1993, p. 4). My stance, however, is more aligned to that which perceives a 
pluralistic nature to reality. The rational-economic account represents only one aspect 
o f this reality, which requires attention to other complementary aspects as well. I 
therefore contend that IT adoption and IT strategy evolve within multifaceted contexts 
consisting of elements such as the economy, the sector, the organisations’ history, the
organisations’ cultures, and their political processes, to name some of the important 
elements of this context.
The industry context:
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In Bahrain, IT evolution was influenced by the industry context. Economic changes and 
their consequences on the banking industry, and the level of regulations were important
’elements o f this context and directly or indirectly influenced how the banking
community approached IT.
The economic element:
During the boom period, the late seventies and early eighties, the banks, especially the 
domestic ones, enjoyed a surplus in their liquidity. During that period, none o f the 
domestic banks had strategic plans, nor were they under pressure to present themselves 
as strategic planners, due to their relatively solid financial position and lack of anv 
external pressure.
4
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The recession that occurred in the mid eighties, and the debt problems that many of the 
key banks suffered during that period represented the context that influenced the 
incursion of strategic discourse within some of the domestic banks, as explained within 
the analysis chapters. Some banks, especially those that suffered profitability problems, 
mimicked the leader banks’ strategic formation behaviour as a means to appear more 
rational and progressive in dealing with the gap opened up by changes in the 
environment, and to gain thereafter approval and support of the central bank’s and other 
stakeholders’.
Some of the key banks shifted their focus to the retail business and gave personal 
lending more attention. The banking community soon aped the leaders’ behaviour. 
Though the personal lending and retail business were open to all banks, exploiting this 
business niche took place only after some banks had gone in that direction. As 
mentioned earlier, one of the leading banks in the retail business described the mimetic 
behaviour of the other banks as a ‘lemming behaviour’. This lemming behaviour was 
present in the banks’ approach to retail IT systems as well. Initially, there was an 
adoption gap between the big local banks, which spent more liberally during the 
depression period despite the profitability problems that some of them had, and the local 
small banks. However, once the IT systems, e.g. ATMs, phone banking and credit cards 
systems, were institutionalised in the Bahraini banking industry, the lemmings soon 
followed the leaders, despite the cost and efficiency implications of some of these 
systems to the adopters.
The regulatory context:
The regulations within the banking industry represent an important context that affected 
the banks’ adoption behaviour and their strategic actions.
As mentioned earlier, the banking industry was tightly regulated and protected by the 
regulatory body. This institutionalised aspect of the banking industry determined how 
the banks provided their IT related products and services, how they competed or
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collaborated amongst themselves based on using IT collectively, and how similar they 
were in adopting some IT systems in response to the regulation requirements.
As mentioned in the case studies, the regulations defined what was acceptable and what 
was not acceptable as to the way these banks deployed IT to their customers or designed 
their IT services. For example, before the introduction of the shared ATM network, all
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banks ruled out the possibility of providing a stand alone ATM service as the 
introduction of this type of service was not feasible due to the regulations.
The regulations also dictated that all of the banks had to acquire certain IT systems 
though these systems were not linked to these banks’ strategies nor were they related to 
their efficiency. Such regulations were the source of coercive isomorphism amongst the 
banks.
The most important effect of the regulations was in the way in which these banks 
approached IT collectively. In the regulated environment, redesigning the banks' 
business networks, and collaborating or competing based on using IT collectively were 
not feasible beyond the regulatory body “umbrella”. Stated differently, the success of 
any eollective IT projects depended on how well they conformed to the regulatory body 
culture and regulations.
Mi
The protection that the banking industry experienced, excluded non-banking institutions
4from competing with the commercial banks in providing bread and butter banking 
services, and identified market boundaries beyond which each type of financial 
institutions could not go. One of the Islamic banks at a given time enjoyed a i
monopolistic advantage in the market niche that it was targeting since no other 
institutions were able to provide similar banking services to that niche. This protection 
created a relatively stable environment in these banks which may explain their lack of 
innovation over a long period of time, and the lack of strategic discourse pressure they 
felt.
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strategy formation:
Strategy formation within the local banks:
Knights and Morgan (1995) described strategy formation as discontinuous, accidental, 
contested, and uncertain. There are resemblance between some of the characteristics of 
the strategy formation process as described by Knights and Morgan and that of the 
Bahraini local banks.
■ft
The strategy formation for the majority of local Bahraini banks went into different 
maturity phases. The pattern of development differed significantly between the early
'phases and the late phases of development. During the early phases, the strategv 
formation was informal for all of the banks. The small banks’ strategies were more ad 
hoc in nature, were disconnected to business goals, and perceived technology as a 
source of additional expense. There were periods of standstill between major IT 
developments, if these developments took place at all. As for the two big banks, they 
described their strategies then as informal. However, these strategies were emerging 
incrementally from the banks’ decision making processes, some of which were related 
to strategic goals. During the early phases of strategy formation, the failure rate and 
dissatisfaction in IT projects were high as these banks lacked the expertise to handle the 
IT scene. The IT managers were the main visionaries during this phase. However, they 
lacked the power to push their views forward, and tension characterised their 
relationship with the top management.
The later phases of the strategy formation process differed from practices in the early 
phases, particularly with reference to L3, L4, and L5. Their strategy formation process 
took the form of formal and planned strategies. These strategies were of a top-down 
nature stemming from the banks’ business goals, as these banks argued, and a bottom- 
up nature stemming from assessing the banks’ infrastructural needs. Fincham et al. 
(1994) argued that knowledge and strategy are influenced by the formation and 
deployment of expertise. For these banks, a main source of expertise came from the 
consultants that the three banks contracted with. These consultants propagated a
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formal-rational prescription to the strategy formation process. The Systems Steering 
Committees (SSCs) were the bodies that the consultants formed within these banks to 
handle the strategy formulation process. These committees were formulated from the 
top management and other key personnel from the support units. The power as to 
setting the budgets, defining business-related goals, and approving any suggested 
systems was concentrated within the top management. However, when it came to 
delineating infrastructure requirements, ability to meet business goals, future 
perspectives, and determining other technical issues, the IT managers’ input to the 
strategy was essential. The SSCs, then, were the crucible in which the interaction 
between the visions of the top management and support units shaped the strategic 
vision. The case studies also reported reliance on ad hoc committees to implement and 
follow up the IT strategies. Representatives fi-om the users and the board of directors 
were members in these committees.
Another form of strategy formation process was ad hoc and entrepreneurial in nature. 
This was exhibited by two of the small banks, LI and L2. The strategy process was 
informal, ad hoc in nature, constrained by the financial budgets, and driven by the vision 
of a sole product champion. The power of the product champion of one of these banks'. 
LI, emerged from his expertise. His political skills in convincing his peer managers at 
the top management and then the board of directors were essential for the approval of 
his visions. As mentioned earlier, these visions were restricted and shaped by the 
financial limits he was allowed to manoeuvTe within. As to the other small bank, L2.
the power to implement the main decision maker’s vision came from his authority and 
banking experience rather than his technical expertise, and his decisions were 
constrained by financial considerations. In both banks, these visions and decisions were 
subject to political challenge by other stakeholders, though to varying extents.
In all of the local banks, the board of directors participated in evaluating the IT 
strategies that marked a turnaround point for the banks and which needed substantial 
financial investment. The process of IT strategy approval within the board of directors 
was subject to a struggle between the directors, on one hand, and the banks'
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management, on the other. In one case study, a political struggle amongst the board 
members occurred between those who represented the bank’s interests and those who 
represented other entities’ interests as well.
Strategy formation within the foreign banks:
8
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The foreign banks’ strategy formation process may be contrasted to that of the local 
banks. These banks have high isomorphism in the way they handle their IT strategies. 
These strategies could be described as imposed strategies, centrally developed away 
from Bahrain, having a global nature rationalised by their desire to achieve an economy
of scale and control over the cost o f IT developments, with a trickle down effect, and are
less sensitive to local needs. The foreign banks’ branches operating in Bahrain are 
remote from the process of strategy formulation. Nonetheless, these branches were in a 
political struggle with their head offices or regional offices to achieve a better deal in 
terms of getting more IT resources in Bahrain. The local IT needs are negotiated within 
committees involving the top management and IT representatives and they are done 
through an informal negotiation process.
The strategy formation process in one of the foreign banks followed the pattern 
described above. However, it was formulated in Bahrain as this bank's headquarters 
office was located in Bahrain. The bank differed from the conventional banks in its 
operations. The development of its core banking system provided an example of 
systems that are developed as a result of the interaction of the different forms of 
expertise within the bank. The interaction between these forms enabled the 
amalgamation of the technical knowledge of the IT department with the knowledge 
about the specialised banking operations (Islamic banking operations), which was new
and different as compared to the other conventional banks’ operations. Such interaction
.was a source of the successful creation of the bank’s systems. This argument is parallel
.to the management of expertise approach of Fincham et al.’s (1994), which emphasises 
the importance of the involvement of different forms of expertise in the development of 
complex systems.
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Development of the strategic vision:
• relationship with the vendors - hardware and software;
• ‘commodified technological artefacts’;
• formal and informal relationships with the consultants;
• new recruits;
• grooming the skills of top management;
I*
The strategic vision for the banks was not restricted to the formal approaches that some 
of these banks adopted. It was influenced by tacit knowledge generated from how these 
banks formulated and deployed expertise. The following are the sources of expertise 
that generated the tacit knowledge required for the development o f a strategic vision:
• accumulation of expertise from the implementation of previous strategies and 
innovations; and
• formal and informal participation in events such as exhibitions, seminars, and 
conferences.
Scholars like Granovetter (1985, 1992) stressed the importance of social networks in '
influencing institutions’ behaviour through, for example, promoting trust and 
discouraging malfeasance. Others, like Fincham et al. (1994), Swan (1996), Scarbrough 
(1997), highlighted the importance of social networks as an important source of 
knowledge that affects strategy development behaviour.
In line with the above scholars’ arguments, my case studies revealed that the 
relationships, formal or informal, that the Bahraini banks maintained with other 
institutions were important sources of the banks’ expertise.
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ïThe first of these forms of relationships was with the vendors. This form of relationship was a source of knowledge about changes within the technological environment and a 
source of education to the IT strategists. This source of expertise was important for the 
conventional banks (as opposed to one of the Islamic banks) that depended on adopting 
“ comm odified technological artefacts - equipment and software packages” as a source of 
“condensed” expertise as Fincham et al. (1994) described. More about the banks’ 
relationship with their vendors will be discussed in a separate section.
Another relationship, was informal in nature with other role model banks outside 
Bahrain. One of the case studies modelled itself after these banks. These banks were 
perceived as successful banks that had pioneered in utilising IT.
The relationship with the consultants was a main source of expertise for the ‘ formal- 
rational’ banks. Some of the ‘formal rational’ banks ended their relationship with the 
consultants once they had acquired the skills for formalising their strategic plans. The 
banks also gained knowledge through informal contacts with the consultants, who 
approached these banks occasionally to provide seminars to market some of their 
services.
New recruits were another source of expertise that shaped the banks’ strategic vision. In 
those banks where IT strategies were ad hoc and entrepreneurial in nature, the new 
recruits’ background and past experience were the main sources that shaped their 
strategic vision.
,■1
Expertise was also generated through grooming the skills of old management. Within 
the 'formal-rational’ banks, it took the form of enabling the management to acquire 
degrees such as the MBAs. This approach to grooming was influenced by the 
consultants.
In two banks, L4 and F3, more expertise was generated from the implementation of 
previous strategies and innovations which influenced ‘cognition’ of future strategic 
vision thereafter.
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Relationship with the vendors:
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The strategic vision within the formal banks, L3, L4, and L5, evolved within the systems 
steering committees in which different expert groups participated. The power in these 
groups was uneven, with more power maintained by the top management. However, the 
IT managers’ ‘advisory role’ was essential for informing the top management of the 
possible strategic choices. As to the ad hoc banks, the strategic vision was embraced by 
the ‘entrepreneur’ or the sole product champion running the strategic scene. In contrast 
to the local banks, the foreign banks’ strategic vision was developed away from Bahrain. 
However, this vision was altered in some cases due to the political struggle of these
■■banks with their groups.
The evolution of the banks’ IT initiatives could not be separated from the context of 
their relationship with their vendors. All of the banks, with the exception of one, 
maintained a long relationship with key vendors.
The vendors perceived their role as follows:
to educate / increase the clients’ IT literacy, based on the technology the vendors 
offer; and
to understand their clients’ requirements.
In order to achieve the above objectives, the vendors targeted the key personnel within 
the banks. It was revealed that the vendor played a proactive role through targeting the
"Itop management, the technologists, and the users in order to shape their vision and 
hence influence their decisions towards their systems.
The intimate relationship with the vendors had the following effects on these banks:

to inform the banks’ IT initiatives / future strategies;
to direct the development of infrastructure; and in some cases
to participate in a grass roots (bottom up) evaluation of the systems.
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The relationship with the vendor could be viewed as an institutionalised practice 
through which these local banks acquired expertise to buffer the perceived risk of failure f  
associated with the adoption of IT, and cope with the uncertainty associated with 
changes within the technological environment.
The relationship between some of the key local banks and the vendors was established, I 
infer, due to the presence of stakeholder interest between the banks’ and their vendors, 
on one hand, and on the other, the relationship and experience of the IT strategists with 
some of these vendors.
The foreign banks were isomorphic in their relationship with their vendors. The 
relationship was maintained at headquarters level. IBM claimed that they mutually 
exchanged views about their future plans with their key clients at the headquarters level.
Some of the foreign banks rationalised their relationship with their vendors as a means 
to enable a global implementation o f their strategies. One of the smaller foreign banks gperceived its relationship with the vendor as strategic and serving the following 
purposes:
• informing the bank of any changes in the technological environment;
• enabling the bank to avoid the cost of major internal developments of systems;
• providing expertise / consultancy to the bank; and
• reducing the risk of failure associated with large scale IT projects.

example, the adoption of downsized and open infrastructure systems. Swan (1996, p. 
137) reported similar findings about the bias o f knowledge disseminated by these
Drivers to IT Initiatives:
Not all of the banks perceived their relationship with their vendors as strategic. The 
other face of the ‘bank - vendor’ relationship was that in which this relationship was 
perceived as a threat, as was observed in one case study. In this case, none of the 
vendors was able to offer any application systems to cater for the specialised needs of 
this bank. With the absence of this kind of support, or source of expertise, the bank 
perceived depending on a particular vendor’s hardware as a potential threat to its 
business strategies. The bank opted for an open system strategy instead. This bank 
broke the institutionalised norm. No other banks followed the pattern of this bank with 
the exception of LI. Both this bank and LI were not perceived as a benchmark banks in 
the industry, since they were comparative newcomers. One of them operated differently 
from the conventional banks, and the other was discredited due to its previous financial 
problems and its small size in the market. According to Morris (1996), banks tend to be 
disinclined to model themselves after organisations which are perceived as less 
successful in the industry.
Though the relationship with the vendors facilitated the acquisition of knowledge that
these banks needed in order to form their strategic vision, this knowledge was not 
neutral. Each of the vendors influenced his clients to acquire the solutions that the 
vendor offered. This type of behaviour prevented banks that had a strong tie with their 
vendors from considering other options that might have been more efficient, for
■I
networks.
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The analogy of the ‘lemmings’ was used by one of the banks’ general managers to 
describe the behaviour of the banking community. The banking community exhibited a 
high isomorphism in its behaviour. This isomorphism is one of the characteristics of 
highly institutionalised communities in which the members are under pressure to exhibit
467

The banks also provided rational accounts as a driver to their initiatives. For example. 
Local 5, one of the big banks, argued that their IT initiatives and strategies were mainly 
driven by the competition and this was rational strategic choice of theirs. In addition to 
the above, there was reference to operational needs and infrastructure needs as drivers to 
some of the banks’ initiatives.
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homogeneity through adopting the prevailing norms in order to secure stability and 
survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). When it came to the approaches to developing 
IT strategies within the local banks, the three major local banks were influenced by each 
others’ initiatives and moved to adopt ‘a formal rational approach’ to their IT strategy 
formation. The adoption of the formal-rational approaches to strategy formation was 
driven by psychological drivers emerging from the banks’ frustration and desire to 
change their previous image, legitimacy drivers seeking support and approval from the 
central bank and other stakeholders through adopting institutionalised rational norms.
and economic and efficiency drivers opened up by changes in the external environment. 
My argument is consistent with Abrahamson’s (1996) argument, which contended that 
economic and technical forces, sociopsychological forces, and institutional forces 
compete in shaping the demand for management fashions. Moreover, organisations 
adopt these fashions not merely due to sociopsychological forces but also to learn new 
techniques, which would enable them to respond to the organisational gap open by 
changes in economic and technical environments.
The foreign banks were also isomorphic in their approach to their strategy formation. 
All of them had an imposed strategies with a 'trickle-down' effect.
There was a consensus amongst most o f the banks that they were doing more or less the 
same thing with regard to their IT initiatives, though they were each operating
independently. Some of these banks argued that they had to follow the ‘vogue’ and
provide what the others were offering, despite their scepticism about its reward to their
. . .profitability. By doing so, I argue, they tended to buffer any criticism of abnormality 
and deficiency before the stakeholders.
ji
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Cultural context:
I argue in this section that decisions and strategies related to the adoption of IT are not 
independent of cultural, historical, organisational, and political contexts. These factors 
compete with rational calculations of economic benefits in shaping an organisation's 
strategic behaviour.
The ‘play it safe’ culture, which mainly represented LI, experienced a radical 
change within many aspects of this bank’s culture. The new recruits to this bank
Knights and Morgan (1995) provided a genealogical analysis o f strategic discourse. 
They argued that a genealogy w ould never claim to have exhausted what determines a particular 
discourse and practice. It sim ply seeks to uncover that without which such discourse might never have 
arisen” (p. 198). Though my thesis does not focus on a genealogical analysis in the manner 
that Knights and Morgan adopted, I have, however, uncovered some key historical 
factors which I claim were influential in the incursion of the strategic discourse. These 
historical events played a role in creating the culture of the banks and in encouraging or 
discouraging these banks from pursuing a given approach to their IT development.
I
In the culture chapter, I classified the banks into different cultures by using metaphors. 
Each of these metaphors embraced a different set of attitudes and beliefs that had 
affected the banks’ adoption behaviour. Moreover, the changes that these cultures 
experienced had an effect on the ability of these banks to adopt new approaches to their 
IT initiatives. The following metaphors describe the banks’ cultures.
• The ‘catholic marriage’ culture and the ‘daring banks’ culture experienced 
revolutionary/radical changes. The changes were at the conceptual level of thinking 
as well as the concrete level. To use a different vocabulary, the banks experienced a 
're-thinking’ and a ‘re-doing’ in association with these revolutionary changes. These 
changes enhanced these banks’ ability to absorb the new knowledge required to 
adopt new technologies. The IT strategic thrust within these banks was made within 
systems steering committees which embraced different forms of expertise.
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brought with them the knowledge required to ‘re-think’ and ‘re-do’ their approach to
• The ‘others do the thinking and the doing’ culture was subject to the changes 
coming from abroad, rather than the changes from within the foreign banks’ 
branches in Bahrain.
Political power and IT strategies /  initiatives:
proactive change enablers.
prerogative of headquarters or the regional offices. However, the local branches of 
these banks were in a political struggle to secure their local IT needs from headquarters.
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IT, and therefore, enabled the bank to absorb new knowledge that led the bank's 
later IT initiatives. However, the bank’s approach to IT strategies was not free from 
its past legacy and inherited culture that was conservative concerning spending on 
IT.
The ‘demanding mistress’ culture experienced less cultural change and higher inertia 
than the other cultures. This culture was slower to absorb the new technologies than 
the other cultures.
IThe development of IT initiatives / strategies was not isolated from political power and 
struggle within these banks. Within the local banks, IT was perceived as the prerogative 
o f the top management, who had supremacy in defining and approving the banks' 
strategic thrust, including that of IT, although the participation of the IT managers was 
perceived as essential for providing advice lacked by top management about the 
information technologies. The strategic role that IT acquired, enabled the IT experts to
enter the strategic decision arena that they had been long excluded from. Moreover, it 
enabled them to struggle for a change in their status from reactive ‘order takers' to
As for the foreign banks, the IT strategies / initiatives were perceived as being the
1

As for the foreign banks, the cultural gap existed in the form of tension and political 
struggle between the local branches and headquarters. Headquarters were less aware of 
and responsive to local needs. The imposed strategies created dissatisfaction in some 
cases. Some of the systems were perceived as a bane to the banks rather than a support. 
Moreover, because these systems were global in nature, the informants argued that they 
were designed in a less user friendly manner, and in some cases fell short of meeting the 
users’ needs due to the pressure from the headquarters to cut costs. The political
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Cultural Gap:
The ingredients of the cultural gap between the top management, and the technologists 
may be summarised in the following points:
lack of congruence between the two parties; 
lack of top management support; 
lack of top management technical sophistication; 
failure of the technologists to deliver their views;
lack of top management mandate to establish the required communication lines with 
the users;
lack of user representation within the system steering committees;
lack of clear vision about who is responsible for IT-based products within the bank, 
the technologists or the bankers; and
dispute about the role that the IT manager should play - a reactive ‘order taker’ who 
produces what the bankers want, or a proactive role able to influence strategies and 
participate in the needed change.
■8r

struggle in the foreign banks was among the users, the technologists and the groups’ 
management. The mismatch in the perception of each was a source of the cultural gap 
within these banks.
Another form of cultural gap exists between the banks on one hand and the regulatory 
body on the other due to the different views and perceptions that these two parties may 
have.
Inertia:
The banking industry was characterised by a number of factors which created inertia. 
These factors delayed the adoption pace within the industry. The factors contributing to 
the inertia could be classified as internal factors within the banks and external factors 
that existed within the external environment.
As to the latter, the regulations within the sector were identified as external factors 
which delayed the banks from redesigning their business networks, though the very 
same factor, the regulations, preserved the industry’s stability and safeguarded it from 
any disastrous events.
The internal factors were related to the banks’ culture. The ‘demanding mistress’ 
culture, the ‘others do the thinking and the doing’, and the ‘play it safe’ cultures 
exhibited relatively higher inertia than the ‘catholic marriage’ and the ‘daring banks' 
cultures. The high sunk cost in knowledge and investment that these banks experienced 
represented a source of this inertia, inhibiting these banks from coping with the pace of 
change in technology. The majority of the banks reported that they had an outdated 
infrastructure which restricted their business strategies. The inertia within these banks 
preserved these ‘Jurassic’ technologies for long periods o f time. It was the ‘lemming’ or 
the isomorphism driver that forced these banks to revitalise their systems at later dates 
rather than merely the efficiency driver.
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Other factors caused inertia, such as the lack of support from top management, board of 
directors, and groups; lack o f awareness about the banks’ local IT needs and business 
implications amongst these groups of decision makers, the banks’ small size and 
financial strength; the dependence of banks on certain channels for acquiring 
‘knowledge’ about their strategic vision; and a strong relationship with their vendors 
which prevented the banks from moving outside the boundaries that their vendors 
imposed.
Managerial implications:
This section lays out the managerial implications of the thesis.
IT strategies and initiatives are influenced by an amalgam of social, institutional, 
micro-political and economic factors. The strategists need to manage the issue of 
strategy within this amalgam of forces, recognising the competing values, powers, 
objectives, and institutional factors.
The case studies’ findings indicate that different forms of expertise played a role in 
influencing the strategic vision of these banks. An important source of expertise 
emerged from the strategists’ social networks with the vendors, the consultants, and 
the role model banks. Another source of expertise emerged from the new recruits 
and the grooming programs that the existing managers went through. The banks 
need to cultivate these sources of expertise. The strategists should possess the
■required social skills to cultivate their relations with the social networks and exploit 
the tacit knowledge derived from these networks. However, the strategists should 
also be alert to the possible bias derived from each of these forms of expertise.
The majority of the banks migrated to new IT platforms to exploit IT benefits that 
were not feasible with the old infrastructure. The vitality o f the banks’ infrastructure 
was critical for exploiting these benefits. Equally important, the management needs
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to consider changes in the organisation’s conceptual levels and foster the desired 
values which lead to a cultural change which is consistent with the strategic and 
systems change.
The ‘daring banks’ and the ‘catholic marriage’ cultures seemed more successful in 
their exploitation of IT. Other banks need to consider adopting the elements in these 
banks’ cultures that led to their success. The following are some recommendations:
• ensure top management support;
• encourage the participation of the different stakeholders in shaping the 
banks’ strategic vision. The capability of the strategists to exploit the intra- 
organisational social networks is crucial to their success in creating a 
strategic vision;
• ensure that any strategic changes reach the core beliefs of the organisations;
• exploit the different means of learning;
• enrich the banks’ top management with new recruits with varied experiences;
• train the existing top management and groom their skills to improve the 
banks’ strategic vision;
• establish competent IT departments which have sufficient resources;
• bolster the financial strength. This was amongst the factors that made the 
‘daring banks’ and the ‘catholic marriage’ cultures more able to exploit and 
experiment with new technologies and hence institutionalise new outputs 
within the industry. The smaller banks need to consider the possibility of 
merging to enhance their ability to adopt more radical solutions.
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The IT managers’ role needs to change from a reactive ‘order taker’ to a proactive 
role. The aim is to enable the IT managers to engage in a process that brings about 
business change rather than merely facilitates the activities of others.
Implication for theory:
The thesis argues that there is a need for a comprehensive view for understanding the
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yUp-take o f information systems and technology (IS/IT) as they expand beyond the mere
technical and functional domains to span other socio-political, cultural, and institutional 
domains.
Based on the above argument, I claim that the rational and functional frameworks 
developed to deal with the development of IS/IT strategies are limited in their scope and 
effect, as they fail to consider the wider perspectives of the IS/IT domain.
There is a need for developing a more sophisticated and comprehensive framework,
.which is capable of capturing the social and technical dimensions of IS/IT. This 
comprehensive framework should aid the managers in exploring the means of defining 
the content of their IS/IT strategies, and how that content is transformed to systems 
aligned to the organisation’s needs. There is a need to deploy more flexible 
interpretative measures, which are based on participative techniques, that are not static 
but dynamic and are performed on a continuous basis. These interpretative techniques 
are needed to capture the tacit knowledge and expertise from within the organisation or 
across the organisations to develop the needed strategic vision. Moreover, the 
comprehensive framework needs to enable managers to implement their IS/ÏT strategies 
successfully through exploring different means of solving social and organisational 
problems associated with the IS domain. Interpretative techniques may prove to be 
more appropriate for answering the ‘what’ question determining the content o f IS 
strategies. The information derived from these techniques may then be used with more

Suggestions for further research
In this study, the relationship with the vendors represented one o f the sources of 
expertise that many o f the banks depended on for coping with demands and changes 
within the technology arena. It was not possible, however, to conduct an in-depth 
inquiry within the foreign banks about the nature o f their relationship with the vendors 
and the influence o f this relationship on the development o f the technologies and 
strategies between the vendors and the banks. There were indications from the IBM 
informer that there was mutual influence on the development o f technology and
investigating the nature o f the relationship between the global foreign banks and their
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rational measures, for example, to determine how the systems need to be designed, and 
to solve the technical problems associated with the development o f the systems.
The bottom line is that there is a need for a complementary approach which considers 
social theories as well as rational theories, as both o f these fields pertain to the IS/IT 
domain. A step towards developing an integrated framework that incorporates the 
interpretivist as well as functionalist methods has been reported by Clarke and Lehaney 
(1997).
This thesis aims to provide an insight into the process o f IT adoption by going beyond 
the narrow rational stream of analysis. I claim that socio-cultural, institutional and 
economic forces represent an amalgam which influences the adoption process. Further 
research is needed to unveil the effects of these contexts on the processes o f adoption 
and strategy formation.
The process o f developing an IT strategic vision needs to be scrutinised to understand 
the different roles played by the different forms o f expertise in this process and to 
understand how it influenced and was influenced by innovations.
strategies, as a result o f this relationship. It would be worth conducting a research study
Iv
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vendors, and the influence of this relationship on their future development and
strategies.
Another suggestion for inquiring about the nature o f the banks’- vendors relationships is 
to conduct a longitudinal research study inquiring about the implication o f this 
relationship and the changes that may occur in these ‘intimate’ relationships as the 
adoption o f open systems becomes more institutionalised within the international 
banking industry.
It is also worth considering extending the analysis to representatives o f different forms 
o f financial institutions such as offshore banks and insurance companies to imderstand 
the nature o f IT strategy formation, the level o f its maturity, the factors that influence its 
incursion, and the institutional norms that affect it within these institutions.
477
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Examples of the question lists used to guide the interviews.
Examples of the meta-matrices used for data reduction.
Types of Islamic financing vehicles.
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Topics forming the basis for discussion with an SBU manager in L5
- Factors affecting the competitiveness of the Bahraini banks.
- Role of IT in this division/department.
Relationship between IT strategies and business strategies.
Main a - enablers
b - inhibitors of using IT strategically
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Informant background:
* Work experience * Education
* Position/main responsibilities * Nationality 
♦Age
¥
* Important IT systems.
What and Why.
* Mechanism through which IT requirements are 
defined/initiated
* Reasons for embarking on these systems.
.- Ways in which the bank is different in using IT, if it is so, from its main 
competitors.
‘:îi
- Extent to which the bank takes account of what other banks do.
- Impetus/drivers of IT strategies.
- Key players that formulate/direct (or aid in formulating/directing) the 
bank's
a: business strategies, 
b: IT strategies.
any external Key players, e.g. consultants, IT suppliers.
- Any change in the relationship between the bank and the following 
entities based on using IT collectively:
* Customers - Describe the nature of relationship
* Retailers - Nature of relationship
* Other banks - Nature of relationship
* Other key players in the market?
- Means through which business units and IT unit personnel achieve a 
mutual understanding of the role of IT.

ç'pc:'
Questions forming the bases of discussion with the IT
manager:
1- Background about the IT manger: 
Work experience 
Education 
Age
Nationality
2- Provide a historical background about the main developments of 
information technology (IT) within the bank.
Please mention any important dates, systems, and reasons for 
acquiring these 
systems.
3- What were the competitors doing during that period?
4- What role, if any, did the suppliers play in the process of adopting the 
mentioned IT systems?
5- What is your vision about where the bank should be heading with regard 
to the type of IT and why?
6- What are the major contributions of IT to the bank?
* What role does IT play in your bank?
7- How is this bank different from other banks in Bahrain in exploiting IT?
If it is different, How is it different?
.8- Is there any collaboration between the bank and any other banks based 
on joint IT initiatives?
* If yes, what are these joint projects?
* What are the expected benefits of these projects?
* If no, could you define any major joint initiative(s) that may have 
potential benefits to your bank?
* Why were these joint projects not implemented?
9- To what extent, in your opinion, do you think that the Bahraini banks are 
willing and able to collaborate among themselves based on IT projects?
* What are the barriers that may stop them from achieving this type 
of collaboration?
10- What are the market segment(s) that IT serve most?
What are these IT systems?
When and why these IT systems were introduced?
What are the market segment that IT serve least?
f
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1
11- Discuss the processes/procedures (formal or informal), if any, that the 
bank go through in formulating its IT strategies.
13- Through what mechanism does the IT department define the bank's 
business needs?
14- Through what means does the bank detect any changes in the external 
environment?
494
* Who Participate in the formulation of these strategies?
* Are there any committees either within the IT department or in 
which the IT department is involved?
* What are the purposes of these committees?
12- What are the main drivers of IT initiatives?
- ¥
15- For an IT project such as the ATMs:
* When the project was proposed?
* Compared to the other banks, what was the bank's rank at the 
time the of ATM adoption?
* Why it was proposed at that particular time?
* Who proposed this system?
* Discuss how the top management perceived the
a- advantage
b- disadvantage of the system
* Discuss how the board perceived the
a- advantage 
b- disadvantage
* In general what was their reaction to the system?
* Discuss the bases that you used for evaluating the feasibility of 
the ATMs?
16- In your opinion, has the bank reached a stage where there is a common 
vision about how IT should be used in the bank?
* If the answer is no, why
* If the answer is yes, what is this vision? and through what mean 
is this vision achieved?
17- How do you evaluate the bank's current IT systems?
* Does it allow you to compete on an equal footing with your 
main rivals?
* Does the current IT infrastructure enable you to introduce any IT 
systems that your competitors have adopted but you have not, e.g. 
EFTPoS, Phone Banking, etc..

* If you don't have Phone banking,
EFTPoS,
Credit cards
why did not the bank introduce these systems or products?
18- Is there any cultural gab either in the vision, perception of the role of
IT, and/or communication s
a- among the top management 
b- between the top management and the IT
manager(s)
19- What are the main IT problems?
■■t
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Topics forming the basis of discussion with the IT manager in L5
Informant Background:
* Work experience
* Education
* Position/Main responsibilities
* Nationality and age
- Historical background - Main IT developments within the bank.
- Main changes within the IT environment in the last two years.
* Any strategic IT systems? Why classified as strategic?
- Reasons for embarking on these changes within the IT environments.
- Role of IT.
- Extent to which the bank takes account of what other banks do.
- Ways in which the bank is different from other banks.
- Approach to the formulation of IT strategies.
Key players: Internal?
External? e.g. Consultants, IT suppliers!
- Impetus / drivers of IT strategies.
- Enablers / Inhibitors of strategically using IT.
" Shared network in Bahrain.
- Means through which a mutual understanding of the role of IT is 
achieved.
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Topics forming the basis for discussion with an SBU manager in L5
Informant background:
* Work experience * Education
* Position/main responsibilities * Nationality
* Age
- Factors affecting the competitiveness of the Bahraini banks.
- Role of IT in this division/department.
* Important IT systems.
What and Why.
* Mechanism through which IT requirements are 
defined/initiated
* Reasons for embarking on these systems.
- Ways in which the bank is different in using IT, if it is so, from its main 
competitors.
- Extent to which the bank takes account of what other banks do.
- Impetus/drivers of IT strategies.
- Key players that formulate/direct (or aid in formulating/directing) the 
bank's
- Any change in the relationship between the bank and the following 
entities based on using IT collectively;
* Customers - Describe the nature of relationship
* Retailers - Nature of relationship
* Other banks - Nature of relationship
* Other key players in the market?
- Means through which business units and IT unit personnel achieve a 
mutual understanding of the role of IT.
Ï
a: business strategies, 
b: IT strategies.
any external Key players, e.g. consultants, IT suppliers.
-
Relationship between IT strategies and business strategies.
V
- Main a - enablers
b - hindrances of using IT strategically
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Topics for discussion with the vendor:
• Background about the vendor.
• Nature of services offered to the banking sector in Bahrain.
• Nature of relationship with their main banking clients.
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S a m p l e  o f  m a t r i c e s  u s e d  f o r  d a t a  r e d u c t i o n .
R ole  o f vendor: Mnt IBM AT&T ITS
Mutual d isc u ss io n  o f future p lan s b e tw e e n  ven d or- his future d e v e lo p m e n ts  and  
foreign ban k's s tr a te g ie s  at H.Q. level
C la im ed  that th ey  in fluenced  infrastructure and  b u s in e s s  m o d e ls
e .g .  op en in g  m id ran ge s y s te m s  an d  m ain fram es to P C  links.
E d u ca te  th e  u ser, in c r e a se  h is  literacy, through sem in a rs, ex p ertise  and  
exh ib itions, crea te  d em a n d
C laim ed  that a w a r e n e s s  a m o n g  b an k ers  n e e d e d  attention * * *
U n derstand  req u irem en ts and provide en ab lin g  tech n o lo g ies:
work a s  'strateg ic  partners'- u n d erstan d  w h at th e b an k s are looking to provide by  
s e e k in g  a  g iven  IT to e n a b le  provide th e  b e s t  tech n o logy . *
U n derstand  partners' b u s in e s s  s tr a te g ie s  and  future p lan s to m ak e long term  
b u s in e s s  with th em '
C lo s e  relationship  with th e  c lien ts  is  required * *
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Examples of Islamic banks’ finance:
“Morabaha (Financing resale of goods)
Islam acknowledges the utility of trade and commerce. Utilising the Morabaha form, a 
commercial or industrial client may acquire capital goods, inventory or raw materials 
through the bank. Individuals may also utilise the Morabaha form to acquire capital and 
durable goods such as machinery or automobiles with financing provided by the bank.
Under the Morabaha form, the bank purchases goods from a third party at the request of 
its clients and sells the goods to such clients on deferred payment terms at a higher price 
receiving its clients unconditional obligation to pay such higher price on a future date or 
dates. The bank may obtain collateral from the client to ensure payment.
Musharaka (Mutual participation financing)
The Musharaka is identical to the Modaraba except that in addition to providing 
management and other services, the client shares with the bank in providing equity. The 
client, therefore, receives, for such equity participation, a defined percentage of the same 
distributable revenue to which the bank looks for the recovery of its investment plus 
profit. Project income and expenses are monitored through a controlled account at the 
bank and operated jointly by the partners. The bank may participate in the management 
o f a Musharaka where a new entity is to be established. Risks and rewards of capital 
investment are shared by both the client and the bank.
Ijara Wa Iktina (lease purchase financing)
Under such contract, the Islamic financial institution finances (purchases) equipment, 
buildings or an entire project for the purpose of renting the same to the client against an 
agreed rental, together with the client’s agreement to make payments into an Islamic 
investment account which will eventually lead, as promised in the agreement, to the 
client’s purchase of the equipment or project from the institution. Profits accumulating 
in the investment account are for the benefit of the client.
Ijara (leasing)
This permits the financing by the Islamic institution of equipment, buildings and other 
facilities as requested by a client against agreed rental.
Modaraba (Participation financing)
Under the terms of Modaraba contract, the bank supplies funds for use defined purposes 
in exchange for a percentage share in a defined revenue stream. The bank does not 
receive the unconditional obligation of its client to return the principal sum invested 
with a guaranteed profit but monitors the use of funds closely.
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Financing composite
Financing can be provided to a customer in more than one form simultaneously 
depending upon the nature o f the business.”
Source: One of the Islamic banks booklets.
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